R v Be
[2018] ACTSC 101
•1 March 2018
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v BE |
Citation: | [2018] ACTSC 101 |
Hearing Dates: | 10 November 2017, 26 and 27 February 2018 |
DecisionDate: | 1 March 2018 |
Before: | Mossop J |
Decision: | See [53] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and punishment – sentencing – Commonwealth offences – obtaining a financial advantage from another person by deception – falsified invoices – circumstances leading to offending – offender diagnosed with depression, anxiety and stress – early plea of guilty – provided assistance to authorities to facilitate administration of justice – monies repaid – general deterrence – consideration of s 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) – period of imprisonment suspended after four months – recognizance release order |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 16A(1), 16A(2), 16A(2)(k), 16A(2)(p), 17A, 20AB Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), ss 134.2, 134.2(1) |
Cases Cited: | Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; 253 CLR 58 Hayes v The Queen [2014] VSCA 309 |
Parties: | The Queen (Crown) BE (Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel P Botros (Crown) K Archer (Defendant) |
| Solicitors Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Darryl Perkins Solicitors (Respondent) | |
File Number: | SCC 206 of 2017 |
MOSSOP J:
Introduction
BE has pleaded guilty to the offence of obtaining a financial advantage from another person by deception. The person from whom he obtained a financial advantage is the Australian Sports Commission (“ASC”), a Commonwealth entity. The conduct was contrary to s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment of up to 10 years.
Facts
The facts are agreed. The offender commenced employment as Assistant Director of Capital Works at the ASC on 1 October 2013. He was required as part of his job to project manage capital and minor works programs. This included the negotiation and coordination of external service providers and managing the invoicing process to ensure providers were paid.
He had a financial delegation approval of $100,000. Payments greater than $5000 required a purchase order to be approved by two staff members. When the ASC contracted with a new supplier, the supplier would be added to the ASC financial system through the completion of a “Request for New/Amended Supplier” form. When an invoice was received from the supplier, a financial delegate had to approve it.
The offender was the sole director and shareholder of a company called [Redacted for legal reasons]. That company was established in 2010 for unrelated purposes and, prior to the offending, had been largely dormant. On 19 January 2015, the offender submitted a “Request for New/Amended Supplier” form to an accounts receivable officer at the ASC in order to register [Redacted for legal reasons] as a service provider.
On dates between 29 January 2015 and 5 June 2015, the offender falsely acknowledged receipt of services from [Redacted for legal reasons] and either approved payment of the invoice or, in the case of invoices greater than $5000, directed a colleague to raise a purchase order to allow the invoice to be processed. In each case, notwithstanding the description on the invoice, no works had been completed by [Redacted for legal reasons]. The dates of approval or request to raise a purchase order and the amounts of the invoices were as follows:
Date
Amount
Description
29 January 2015
$4400
Project Management Services
10 February 2015
$3740
Volleyball Office – Building works as per quote
10 March 2015
$4950
Construction works as quoted and undertaken at the AIS Rowing Building in Yarralumla
10 March 2015
$4125
Patch, paint and repair works undertaken at various locations around AIS site
11 May 2015
$40,150
AIS Arena preliminary construction works – Progress Claim #1
18 May 2015
$4510
Preliminary construction work for the AIS Arena
18 May 2015
$4730
Patch and paint to various areas around AIS as discussed
22 May 2015
$36,700
Combat Sports Office Works as per quote 2014/15-0065
5 June 2015
$46,850
Preliminary construction work for the AIS Arena – Progress Claim #2
5 June 2015
$4684.90
Patch and paint work various locations
5 June 2015
$4796
Removal of asbestos
In total the offender submitted and approved payment of $159,635.90 to [Redacted for legal reasons] by means of 11 invoices. The offender resigned from his position on 8 May 2015 and his last day of employment was 5 June 2015.
Objective seriousness
The offence was committed by the offender when he held a senior position as an employee of the ASC. It therefore involved a very significant breach of trust.
The amount which was obtained was significant. Having regard to the fact that there is no upper limit on the financial advantage which may be subject to s 134.2, it was neither at the low or very high-end of the spectrum.
The offence, although not particularly sophisticated or innovative in its methodology, required a high degree of premeditation and planning. It involved a course of thoroughly dishonest conduct over a substantial period of just over four months.
At the time of the offending, the offender was in receipt of a salary from the ASC. The motivation for the offending conduct was, in one sense, greed. That was because he had the intention of financially benefiting himself and his family. However I accept the submission that there were more complex motivations and the label “greed” is too simplistic. I will return to that issue later in these reasons.
Having regard to these factors, I consider that the offending conduct is in the mid-range of objective seriousness for this offence.
Plea of guilty
The offender was charged in the ACT Magistrates Court on 27 July 2017. He entered a plea of guilty on that day. He had made attempts to bring forward the laying of the charge. The plea was therefore at the first opportunity. While the Crown case was a strong one, the plea of guilty reflected the admissions made by him in the full acceptance of responsibility. The plea of guilty facilitated the administration of justice.
Subjective circumstances
The offender is 46 years of age. His family migrated from South Africa to Australia in 1975. His upbringing was difficult from the age of five years old because of his father’s excessive consumption of alcohol and verbal and physical abuse. He was married in 2002 and has two children aged nine and 12 years. His wife suffers from multiple sclerosis. Both he and his wife described their relationship in positive terms to the author of the Pre-sentence Report, although his offending conduct has placed a strain on the relationship. He has a combined engineering/commerce degree and a Master degree. He has worked primarily in engineering and project management and has had not less than 17 jobs in the years since graduating. Because of the pendency of the proceedings, he had a period of unemployment but is currently employed in an engineering role. During his period of unemployment the family was supported by his wife’s income and their financial situation was manageable. He has no alcohol or drug issues. He has three chronic health conditions which are well managed with medication. He has suffered depression for many years but was only formally diagnosed in October 2016 when he was diagnosed with depression and anxiety. As a result of treatment his condition has improved.
He has completely accepted the wrongfulness of his behaviour. He has acknowledged that he breached the trust placed in him. He has expressed regret for his actions and the stress this has caused for his family. He has repaid the money that he stole. He is assessed as being at a low-risk of general reoffending because of the multiple protective factors that he has. He was assessed by the author of the Pre-sentence Report as suitable for community service work.
The offender tendered a range of material relating to his personal circumstances.
The report of Luke Johnston, a psychologist, who reported that he had treated the offender for depression and anxiety between May and October 2017 was tendered. He noted that his symptoms of depression had improved from the extremely severe to moderate and his symptoms of stress had improved from severe to moderate. He noted that the symptoms of anxiety had improved but remained in the severe range. A further updated report, dated 22 February 2018, indicated that the offender had continued with psychological therapy which continued to result in gains for his mental health.
A psychological report from Sam van Meurs, a psychologist at Canberra Clinical and Forensic Psychology, was dated 10 October 2016. He diagnosed the offender as suffering from generalised anxiety disorder with moderate symptoms and a major depressive disorder recurrent with severe symptoms. He expressed the opinion that the offender suffered from these conditions at the time of the offending behaviour and that these affected his ability to exercise appropriate judgement and hence were causally related to the offending. However he expressed the opinion that the conditions did not obscure the offender’s understanding that what he was doing was illegal and immoral. His opinion was that work stress, stress due to health concerns in relation to his wife’s illness, his extended family dysfunction and his own health concerns exacerbated his generalised anxiety disorder in the short-term and triggered a major depressive episode. He expressed the opinion that the behaviour was opportunistic, poorly thought out and reactionary to the specific circumstances. He said that if the offender was not suffering from these conditions then the offending conduct would not have taken place. He said that being imprisoned would weigh very heavily on the offender’s condition and would likely cause his mental health to deteriorate acutely. Mr van Muers was cross-examined upon his report.
The offender tendered a statement from his wife dated 30 October 2017. She also gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. This evidence provides the background on her own work and health condition as well as more detailed chronological information about the offender’s circumstances prior to, during and after the offending conduct. Her letter makes clear the completeness of remorse on the part of the offender for his conduct and reinforces the evidence that he will be at a low-risk of offending conduct in the future. It describes her increasing symptoms of multiple sclerosis in the period 2012 to 2015 and the decision to build a smaller house which would be easier for her to live in. It describes the arrangements for building and the fact that the offender, through his company, took over management of the building from about late 2014. At that time the offender had a colon cancer scare, which ultimately was just that, as he was clear of cancer. At that stage he was working hard in his paid employment. In January 2015 her multiple sclerosis symptoms started to reappear. Both she and her husband were very anxious about what would happen and whether her symptoms would get worse. She suffered a significant relapse at her work. Between February and June 2015 the offender had to provide additional assistance to her as well as managing his role at the ASC and being responsible for building the new home.
She described what happened after June 2016 when the police executed a search warrant at the house. She described the steps taken to pay back the amount stolen and the decisions made by the offender to avoid employment for a period when the present proceedings were pending so as to avoid embarrassing his employer. She expressed the opinion that he committed the offences at a time where he could not see a way out of competing demands that were upon him. She expressed the view that he remains very remorseful for the pain and embarrassment that offending caused to his family friends and the ASC. Her oral evidence also described her current employment circumstances.
Two references were also tendered from Andrew Gilbert and Diane Gilbert. They were former neighbours and friends of the offender. Both attest to his good character, the fact that they would have been prepared to assist him in the temporary financial difficulties which he faced at the time of his offending conduct, and that he is unlikely to repeat such conduct in the future.
A letter from the offender to the Court, dated 30 October 2017, was also tendered. While accepting responsibility for his actions, he does describe the circumstances surrounding his offending conduct, including a diagnosis with sleep apnoea in 2014, the colon cancer scare, and the deterioration of his wife’s health in 2015 as a result of a relapse in her multiple sclerosis. He said that at the time he could not see any other way out of his current situation, even though he now understands that there were clearly other alternatives. He recognised that he will no longer be able to work in the Australian Public Service. He referred to the medical assistance that he has obtained in order to understand his thought processes and to develop strategies to manage his reaction to various situations. He hopes to be able to be productive and positive for both his family and the community. He also gave oral evidence describing the circumstances at the time of his offending conduct and his actions to address his offending conduct and repay the amount taken once the fraud was discovered. He was cross-examined about his financial circumstances in a manner that made it clear that the circumstances at the time of the offending did not involve any financial crisis, even though the family was juggling its financial obligations.
Other medical records relating to the offender or his wife which corroborated the evidence were also tendered.
Criminal history
The offender has only two entries in his criminal history which relate to convictions for burglary and theft committed in March 1991 when he was 19 years old. Those offences involved stealing seven mag wheels, a stereo radio cassette, and a steering wheel from commercial premises in Fyshwick. There were two co-offenders. Because of the antiquity of the offences and the offender’s age at the time, these offences are of little significance to the present sentencing exercise.
Time in custody
The offender has not spent any time in custody in relation to the offence.
Consideration
I was assisted by detailed written submissions prepared by counsel for the Crown and counsel for the accused. These were supplemented by oral submissions.
The Court must impose a sentence that is appropriate in all the circumstances: s 16A(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), and ensure that the offender is punished adequately for his offending: s 16A(2)(k). I will refer below to a number of these specific matters to which the Court must have regard pursuant to s 16A(2). While many of these have been referred to above specific reference to them will provide a means of addressing particular submissions that were made.
The nature and circumstances of the offence: (a)
These have been described earlier in these reasons. The offender submitted that the objective circumstances of the offence must be examined in the context of the personal situation of the offender at the time.
Those circumstances include the relapse of his wife’s multiple sclerosis condition and the financial pressures caused by that condition in combination with the construction of a new smaller house more suited to someone with her condition. These are circumstances which brought additional pressures upon the offender.
I accept the evidence of Mr van Meurs that he suffered from generalised anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder and did so at the time of the offending conduct. I do so notwithstanding the criticisms made of his report by the Crown. While there are difficulties with such a retrospective diagnosis, particularly one made after a limited consultation for medico-legal purposes, it appears to me to be more likely than not in the light of the current condition of the offender and the unsophisticated nature of the fraud that he did suffer from those conditions. Further I accept on the balance of probabilities that the suffering from those conditions had a causal effect in relation to the commission of the offences in that they distorted his thinking somewhat and reduced his capacity to perceive that there were alternative courses available to him to address the personal and financial circumstances that he faced. Notwithstanding these conclusions I consider that the existence of these conditions only moderates to a small extent the culpability for the offences because they do not detract from his ability to perceive that what he was doing was clearly illegal and immoral and involved a gross breach of trust on his part.
The circumstances of any victim of the offence and any injury loss or damage resulting from the offence (d) (e)
The Commonwealth is the victim of the offence. It must be recognised that the Commonwealth incurs very considerable and unrecoverable costs in taking measures to protect its revenue from and detect dishonest conduct such as that in the present case: R v Host [2015] WASCA 23; 248 A Crim R 352 at [24]. This cost and the cost of undetected fraud is one which ultimately falls upon the whole of the Australian community. In the present case, there was no direct loss or damage resulting from the offence because the amount in question has been repaid. This was done between July and August 2016.
Contrition for the offence and reparation of loss and damage (f); Plea of guilty (g); and Cooperation with law enforcement authorities (h)
These various considerations are related. The offender has repaid the total sum of the fraud. The offender pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. That reflected his acknowledgement of guilt and full admissions made prior to the commencement of proceedings against him.
There is no doubt that the accused has expressed contrition and remorse for what he has done. I accept that is sincere and that it is accompanied by insight into what he did and the steps that need to be taken to ensure that it is not repeated. Following the execution of the search warrant at his house in June 2016, he cooperated with the Australian Federal Police (“AFP”) to repay the money. He arranged an interview with the AFP, which was conducted in July 2016, at which he made full admissions. He made efforts to ensure that he was charged as early as possible and pleaded guilty at the first opportunity. He has subsequently sought psychological counselling in relation to his depression. Following the execution of the search warrant, his conduct has facilitated the course of justice. It is appropriate that he be given a significant discount for his early plea.
Specific deterrence (j)
In the circumstances it is not necessary to place significant weight on the need for specific deterrence. The offender has accepted responsibility for the offence and has insight into why he committed it. His very limited criminal history does not suggest that he is likely to commit further offending in the future. Notwithstanding his conduct in 2015, the social circumstances and social pressures upon him are likely to ensure that he does not offend again.
General deterrence (ja); and Adequate punishment (k)
There can be no doubt that as a general proposition, general deterrence for an offence of that type is of significance. The need for adequate punishment is closely related in a case such as this to the need for general deterrence. General deterrence is a highly relevant factor in sentencing for offences concerning fraud of public funds particularly where, as in this case, the fraud is a result of the offender abusing his position of trust: R v Combo [2015] WASCA 34 at [75]. In the circumstances of this case, which involve a senior employee of a Commonwealth authority abusing the specific trust placed upon him in relation to approval of payments for works undertaken on the authority’s behalf, it is absolutely clear that general deterrence is a very important sentencing consideration. The offender was not simply any employee but one who had specific responsibilities of trust because of the seniority of his position. Clearly enough, this type of offending conduct is hard to detect and the operation of large government organisations is very dependent upon senior employees not abusing the trust placed in them.
I have recognised above that the mental health of the offender was a factor contributing to the commission of the offences. However, it was not a factor which reduced his culpability to a significant extent or one which takes him out of the category of offender who provides a suitable vehicle for general deterrence. While there must be some moderation of considerations of general deterrence, it remains a very important sentencing consideration in this case.
The character antecedents of the offender (m)
Apart from these events and the offence in 1991, the offender has no criminal history. He has been conscientious in the maintenance of his family, has maintained employment, and appears to be otherwise of good character.
The prospect of rehabilitation (n)
The prospects for rehabilitation are good. The offender has taken steps to address his mental health condition and that is likely to reduce the possibility of any further offending conduct. There is no other form of rehabilitation which would further reduce his prospect of offending in the future.
Effect on his family (p)
I have taken into account the effect of a custodial sentence on his family and dependents (s 16A(2)(p)). While the evidence discloses that his wife suffers from multiple sclerosis and that she had a flare-up of her condition in 2015, it discloses that she currently works part-time in three different roles. I accept that she works on a part-time basis in order that she not aggravate her multiple sclerosis condition. I accept that the incarceration of her husband would be a significant burden upon her, particularly having regard to her caring responsibilities. Her condition is not such as to put it into the extreme case in which his caring responsibilities for her would warrant a non-custodial sentence in circumstances otherwise justifying a custodial one: R v Herrera (Unreported, NSW Criminal Court of Appeal, Hunt CJ at CL, Smart and Grove JJ, 6 June 1997). While I have taken her health condition and the burden of incarceration into account, the relatively comfortable family circumstances mean that, even having regard to her health condition, the burden of a period of imprisonment would not be significantly more burdensome than other cases where a family man like the offender is imprisoned.
Conclusion
The range of conduct covered by the offence under s 134.2(1) of the Criminal Code Act is broad. The proposition that defrauding the Commonwealth of significant amounts of money should generally lead to a custodial sentence has been articulated in social security fraud matters: R v Wright (1994) 74 A Crim R 152; and R v Hurst [2005] QCA 25. The level of criminality and the need for deterrence is higher in the present case because the offender was at the time a senior employee of the ASC. His actions involved a breach of trust not present in cases involving the usual form of social security fraud.
Other cases
I was referred to decisions in other cases under s 134.2 or similar provisions. In R v Willis (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Martin J, 8 December 2015) the offender pleaded guilty to an offence against s 134.2(1). The conduct involved defrauding the CSIRO through the preparation of false invoices. The amount obtained was $81,761.51. The offender had repaid some $9900. It is not clear from the reasons as to whether or not the balance would be paid back. She had no criminal history. She suffered from stress, in particular stress at work, and had turned to gambling. She received a sentence of one year and eight months imprisonment suspended after three months.
In R v Allred [2015] ACTSC 327 the offender pleaded guilty to one charge under
s 134.2(1). He was 53 years old and had adult children. He had a minor criminal history. He had claimed Comcare benefits for 22 months while concealing that he was employed as a taxi driver. He received a sentence of two years imprisonment to be released after three months, a three-year good behaviour order, and a reparation order for the amount of the benefits.
In R v Squire [2008] QCA 19 the offender had pleaded guilty to two counts under
s 134.2; one of which was a substantive offence, the other one was an attempt. She produced invoices indicating that she had paid for medical services and presented them at Medicare offices. She was aged 36 and had two children. She had a criminal history containing dishonesty offences. She was sentenced in the District Court of Queensland on the first count, which related to a sum of $45,000, to two and a half years to be released after nine months, and on the second count, which related to $4800, to 18 months to be released after nine months. A reparation order and good behaviour order were made. The Court of Appeal, inter alia, held that the sentence was not manifestly excessive and refused leave to appeal.
In Hayes v The Queen [2014] VSCA 309 the offender was sentenced for two charges of offences against s 134.2(1) involving defrauding an amount of almost $103,000 and another charge of attempt which related to an amount of $30,000. The offender was 36 years old, suffered from depression and had a gambling addiction. She had two prior convictions for fraud. She had submitted false claims to obtain various grants including the “baby bonus” and grants for converting fuel vehicles to LPG. She pleaded guilty and made full admissions. An appeal against her sentence insofar as it involved imprisonment for two years and six months with release on recognizance after serving 15 months was dismissed.
In R v Combo [2015] WASCA 34 involved three charges against one respondent of abuse of public office contrary to s 142.2 of the Criminal Code Act and, in relation to the other respondent, a charge of aiding or abetting the first respondent’s abuse of public office. The first respondent had abused his position as a Chief Executive Officer to defraud an Aboriginal corporation. The fraud had been perpetrated by the submission of false invoices. The first respondent received $84,500 and the second respondent received $81,500. The first respondent was well educated, had an excellent work history and no prior record. The second respondent was well educated, an experienced businessman, a diverse record of voluntary service to the community and no prior record. He had made reparation of half the amount that he had received. Both received fully suspended sentences of imprisonment at first instance.
Ultimately the Court of Appeal determined that the sentencing judge had erred in the approach that he had taken to sentencing. The offenders were resentenced so that the first respondent was to be released after serving eight months of a 16 month sentence. The second respondent was to be released after serving five months of a 10 month sentence.
Recognising that the circumstances of these cases vary, I have had regard to these decisions insofar as they provide a general yardstick against which the Court may compare the sentence imposed and not in any way defining the boundaries for any sentence: Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; 253 CLR 58 at [41].
Conclusion
The submissions on behalf of the offender were targeted at the proposition that, because of the particular subjective circumstances in the present case, the requirements for adequate punishment and general deterrence could be met by an intensive correction order combined with a very significant requirement to perform community service work. Counsel for the offender drew attention to the availability of such an order under s 20AB of the Crimes Act which permits the Court to make an intensive correction order if that is available under the law of the Territory. Because of the submission that was made at the initial sentencing hearing, I ordered an intensive correction assessment in order to determine whether the offender was assessed as being suitable for such an order. That assessment indicated that he was suitable although it assessed him as unsuitable for community service because he was, by the time of the assessment, in full-time employment.
I accept that no offence types are excluded from the intensive corrections order regime. I accept that an intensive corrections order is characterised by the legislation as a sentence of imprisonment. I also accept that the intensive correction order regime is intended to be a form of punishment and is considered to be significantly punitive in its effect: R v Ngerengere(No 2) [2016] ACTSC 155 at [66]; R v Ngerengere(No 3) [2016] ACTSC 299 at [21]. However it must be recognised that the degree to which an intensive correction order will be punitive will be very dependent upon the level of restriction imposed upon the offender and the level of intervention by corrective services staff. For a person in the position of the offender who has or can get full-time employment, who has stable accommodation, who has no problem of addiction and who is already managing the only conditions in relation to which he would benefit from rehabilitation, the effect of an intensive correction order is unlikely to involve a greater degree of restriction upon him than would be imposed as a result of a good behaviour order which incorporated a requirement for supervision whether imposed as a result of a suspension of a sentence or otherwise.
Counsel for the offender submitted that any perceived lack of a significant punitive and hence the deterrent component involved in an intensive correction order could be overcome in the circumstances of this case by a very significant component of community service. He submitted that this could include up to the maximum permissible number of community service work hours, namely 500. He noted that the intensive correction assessment had assessed the offender as unsuitable for community service work on the basis of his full-time employment. Counsel submitted, appropriately, that the Court should be prepared to make a community service work order notwithstanding that assessment because the offender would be avoiding a sentence of full-time imprisonment by being subject to such an order and, having regard to the magnitude of any such order, would make arrangements in relation to his employment so as to permit him to fulfil the community service work obligation. It was by this means that he submitted that the need for punishment and deterrence could be appropriately met by the making of an intensive correction order.
Notwithstanding the submissions made on behalf of the offender, having regard to the amount of money involved, the relationship of trust between the offender and his employer, and the period during which he engaged in a very deliberate course of conduct, I am satisfied that imprisonment is the only appropriate sentence: s 17A. Even combined with a very substantial component of community service work, I am not satisfied that an intensive correction order would be an appropriate punishment. In my view it would not be sufficient to meet the requirements for general deterrence of this kind of conduct.
However, the offender’s early guilty plea, his mental condition at the time of the offending conduct, his limited criminal history, his undoubted remorse, the assessed low-risk of reoffending and the fact that he has repaid the amount in question are all factors which warrant considerable leniency. I also take into account, in relation to whether or not to impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment and as to its length, the fact that the medical evidence indicates that a period of full-time detention may worsen his depression and anxiety and this must be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence. However I note that such conditions are not uncommon amongst inmates and he can receive treatment while in custody.
Having regard to the fact that the whole of the amount has been repaid, I consider that the starting point is a sentence of 16 months which I have reduced to 12 months on account of the plea of guilty. Because the sentence does not exceed three years and the offender is not serving another federal sentence, I must make a recognizance release order in respect of that sentence. In my view, whilst a period of full-time detention is required in order to meet the purposes of sentencing, having regard to the subjective circumstances of the offender, it need only be a short one. I will make a recognizance release order after he has served a period of four months by way of full-time detention.
Orders
The orders of the Court are:
1. The offender is sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months to commence on 1 March 2018 and end on 28 February 2019.
2. That sentence is to be suspended on 30 June 2018 upon the offender entering into a recognizance release order for a period of two years with security in the amount of $1000 and to be of good behaviour with the following conditions:
(a) the offender sign an undertaking to comply with the conditions of this order;
(b) the offender be of good behaviour for a period of two years to commence on 30 June 2018; and
(c) the offender give security in the sum of $1000 for compliance with this order.
3. Under s 111 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT), the name of the offender and his wife may not be published and shall be identified as BE and KE respectively.
4. The offender be marked as a Prisoner at Risk.
| I certify that the preceding fifty-three [53] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Mossop. Associate: Date: 24 April 2018 |
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