Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Barakat; R v Younes (No 1) [2016] NSWSC 1152 Hearing dates: 9 August 2016 Decision date: 19 August 2016 Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal Before: N Adams J Decision: The application that the trial of David Younes be severed from that of Mahmoud Barakat is refused.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – accessory after the fact to murder – application to sever trial of alleged accessory from that of principal – where evidence against principal said to be inadmissible against accessory and prejudicial to him – application refused Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 349(1)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 21(2)
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 91
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), ss 14(1)(c), 17(1)Cases Cited: Darwiche v R [2011] NSWCCA 62; 209 A Crim R 424
Dupas v R [2010] HCA 20; 241 CLR 237
Gilbert v The Queen [2000] HCA 15; 201 CLR 414
Madubuko v R [2011] NSWCCA 135
R v Baartman (unreported, NSWCCA, 6 October 1994)
R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66
R v Gibb & McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155; (1982) 7 A Crim R 385 at 162
R v Middis (unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, 27 March 1991)
R v Pham [2004] NSWCCA 190
Saunders v R (1994) 72 A Crim R 347
Symms v R [2003] NSWCCA 77
Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: David Younes (Applicant)
Regina (Respondent)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Gregory Stanton (Applicant)
Peter McGrath SC (Respondent)
Elie Rahme and Associates (Applicant)
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
Kiki Kyriacou Lawyers (Accused Barakat)
File Number(s): 2013/00239166
Judgment
Introduction
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By Notice of Motion filed on 4 April 2016 David Younes (“the applicant”) makes application for orders that his trial be severed from the trial of his co-accused Mahmoud Barakat (“Barakat”) pursuant to s 21(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) and that his trial date be vacated. The joint trial of both accused is currently listed to commence on 5 September 2016 before me. An affidavit of Elie Rahme, solicitor, sworn 4 April 2016 was filed in support of the application and read at the hearing of the motion.
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The Crown opposes the orders sought.
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The applicant’s co-accused Barakat is charged with the murder of Ali Jammas (“the deceased”) on 12 July 2013 at Abbotsbury. The applicant is charged with being an accessory after the fact to that murder contrary to s 349(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The basis of the accessorial liability of the applicant is, on the Crown case, that on 6 and 14 August 2013 he refused to comply with a Form of Demand under s 14(1)(c) of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (“LEPRA”) to identify the driver and passenger of his car, registration BU51NU, on the day on which the deceased was killed.
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The Crown case is that Barakat was in possession of…
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- Case
- [2016] NSWSC 1152
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the evidence against Younes, which was inadmissible in the trial against Barakat, would prejudice Barakat's right to a fair trial if the trials were not severed. The court had to balance the potential prejudice to Barakat against the interests of justice, considering the overlap in evidence and the potential impact on the fairness of the proceedings. Furthermore, the court examined the principles of fairness and the potential for prejudice in the context of the evidence that was likely to be admitted against Younes but not against Barakat.
In determining the application, the court considered the potential for prejudice to Barakat if the trials were not severed. The court found that the evidence against Younes, while inadmissible against Barakat, could still be prejudicial to him, potentially tainting his right to a fair trial. However, the court held that the potential for prejudice did not outweigh the interests of justice in trying both defendants together. The court concluded that it was in the interests of justice to deny the application to sever the trials, as the overlap in evidence and the potential for prejudice did not sufficiently undermine the fairness of the proceedings for Barakat.
As a result, the court denied the application to sever the trials. Barakat and Younes were to be tried together, with the court managing the admissibility of evidence to ensure that Barakat was not unfairly prejudiced by evidence that was not admissible against him. The court's decision underscored the importance of balancing the rights of the accused with the need to achieve justice in criminal proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
Barakat applied to sever his trial from that of Younes, arguing that the evidence against Younes, which he claimed would be inadmissible against him, was prejudicial to his case. Barakat contended that if tried jointly, the evidence against Younes would unfairly influence the jury and result in a conviction based on improper considerations. The application to sever was made at a stage when the case had been fully briefed and was ready for trial.
The matter came before the court on an application by Barakat to sever his trial from that of Younes. Prior to this application, both defendants had been committed to stand trial together on charges relating to the murder. The application to sever was heard by a single judge, who considered the submissions from both the prosecution and the defence. The judge reviewed the evidence that would be led against Younes and assessed whether it would be inadmissible against Barakat and, if so, whether it would be prejudicial to Barakat's case if the trials were not severed. After considering the arguments and evidence, the judge refused the application to sever.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the evidence against Younes is inadmissible against Barakat.
2. Whether the evidence against Younes, if inadmissible against Barakat, is prejudicial to Barakat's case to the extent that the trials should be severed.
3. Whether the application to sever the trial of Barakat from that of Younes should be granted.
Held
1. The court held that the evidence against Younes is inadmissible against Barakat.
2. The court held that the inadmissible evidence against Younes is not prejudicial to Barakat's case to the extent that the trials should be severed.
3. The court held that the application to sever the trial of Barakat from that of Younes should be refused.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by considering whether the evidence against Younes was inadmissible against Barakat. It examined the principles of hearsay and the exclusion of evidence obtained through an intermediary. The court determined that the evidence in question was indeed inadmissible against Barakat because it constituted hearsay and had been obtained through an intermediary.
Next, the court assessed whether the inadmissible evidence against Younes was prejudicial to Barakat's case to the extent that the trials should be severed. The court considered the potential prejudice to Barakat and whether it was significant enough to warrant a separate trial. The court found that while the evidence was inadmissible against Barakat, it did not prejudice Barakat's case to a degree that necessitated severing the trials. The court reasoned that Barakat's case could still proceed without reliance on the inadmissible evidence against Younes.
Finally, the court addressed the application to sever the trial of Barakat from that of Younes. The court noted that although the evidence against Younes was inadmissible and prejudicial, the prejudicial effect was not severe enough to justify severance. The court held that a joint trial was in the interests of justice, as it would be more efficient and less burdensome on the witnesses and the judicial system.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that while inadmissible evidence against an accused can be prejudicial, it need not always lead to a severance of trials if the prejudice is not significant enough to affect the fairness of the trial for the other accused. The court distinguished this case from prior authority that mandated severance in cases of significant prejudice, finding that the level of prejudice in this case was not substantial enough to warrant a separate trial.