QX05/5 and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services

Case

[2005] AATA 646

22 June 2005

No judgment structure available for this case.

Administrative

Appeals

Tribunal

 

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 646

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No Q2005/99

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE  DIVISION )
Re QX05/5

Applicant

And

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Dr EK Christie, Member

Date22 June 2005

PlaceBrisbane

Decision The decision under review is affirmed. This means the application for review is unsuccessful. The decision to reject the application for a determination under section 7(E) of the Social Security Act 1991 was correctly made.
The decision raises the possibility of the application of "Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration Scheme" in the factual circumstances.

...................[Sgd]...........................

EK Christie
  Member

CATCHWORDS

SOCIAL SECURITY – Australian resident – protected special category visa holder – meaning of “residence” – meaning and application of the phrase “have regard to” – Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration Scheme

Social Security Act 1991 s 7

R v Toohey; Ex Parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327
Qld Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615
Department of Defence v Fox (1997) 24 AAR 171
Hafza v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 6 FCR 444  

“Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration Scheme”  

WRITTEN REASONS FOR ORAL DECISION

7 July 2005 Dr EK Christie, Member     

1. This is an application for a review of a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“the SSAT”) made on 12 October 2004 to refuse an application for a determination pursuant to section 7(2E) of the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”).  This decision resulted in a refusal to grant the applicant a Certificate of Australian residence.

2.      The applicant represented himself at the hearing.  The respondent was represented by Ms J Dwyer, a Departmental Advocate.

3.      At the hearing the Tribunal had in evidence before it documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (the “T” Documents – Exhibit 1) and various documents tendered as exhibits by the parties.

Issues To Be Decided

4. The only issue for the Tribunal to decide was whether the decision to reject the applicant’s application for a determination under section 7(2E) of the Act was correctly made. This issue required the following questions of law to be decided:

(a)      the date the applicant commenced residing in Australia; and

(b)in order to become a protected special category visa (“SCV”) holder, the time when the applicant had made an application for a determination of his resident status under the Act.

Facts

5.      The applicant and his family (father, mother and four children) emigrated from South Africa and arrived in New Zealand in January 1996. They eventually all became citizens of New Zealand.

6.      The applicant entered Medical School in New Zealand in March 1996.  The degree program was a six year undergraduate program equivalent to the medical program previously offered in Australian Universities – but since replaced by a graduate entry four year program.

7.      The applicant’s family left New Zealand in January 2001 and moved to Australia.  The applicant’s parents and siblings remained in Australia from this time and took up Australian citizenship.

8.      The applicant was midway through his six year medical undergraduate degree program in January 2001.  Because of the structural differences in the medical degree courses offered in Australia with his part-completed New Zealand degree, the applicant could not transfer his degree program from a New Zealand to an Australian University.

9.      Consequently, the applicant returned to New Zealand on 29 January 2001 in order to complete his medical degree studies by continuing his full-time tertiary studies in New Zealand.  He graduated with a MBBS on 7 December 2002.  The applicant then left New Zealand (on 9 December 2002) and moved to Australia in order to commence an internship at Ipswich General Hospital in January 2003.  From this time, he has continued to live with his family in the parental home and work in Australia.

10.     On the basis of the evidence before it, the SSAT made the following findings of fact:

“(i)       [The applicant] is a New Zealand citizen.

(ii)       He came to Australia from New Zealand with his family on 7 January 2001.

(iii)On 28 January 2001 he returned to New Zealand to complete his tertiary studies.

(iv)He visited Australia on various dates [outlined in paragraph 21 of the SSAT decision], and has been in Australia since 9 December 2002.

§  On 4 May 2001 for 2 weeks

§  On 3 November 2001 for just over 2 weeks

§  On 24 December 2001 for 2 weeks

§  On 16 March 2002 for 5 weeks

§  On 10 August 2002 for 2 weeks

(v)He applied to the Secretary of the Department of Family and Community Services for a certificate of Australian residency on 12 October 2004.”

11.     At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant agreed that the first three findings of fact were correct.   With respect to finding (iv), he agreed that he had visited Australia on the various dates referred to during University semester vacation but believed the rest of the finding did not properly represent his situation.  He disagreed with the final finding of fact.

Statutory Requirements And Legal Principles

12. A number of significant amendments central to this application for review [sections 7(2A) to 7(2E) of the Act] were introduced into the Act in 2001: Act No 18 of 2001, by Schedule 1, Part 1(3). These provisions relate to an application by a person to Centrelink for a certificate of Australian residency.

13. Section 7(2) of the Act defines an Australian resident as a person who:

“(a)     resides in Australia; and

(b)       is one of the following:

(i)        an Australian citizen;

(ii)       the holder of a permanent visa;

(iii)a special category visa holder who is a protected SCV holder.”     [Emphasis added]

14. In relation to section 7(2) of the Act, the central issue is whether the applicant is a “protected SCV holder”.The applicant is not an Australian citizen or the holder of a permanent visa.

15.     A number of provisions prescribe the various meanings for a “protected SCV holder”.

16. Section 7(2A) of the Act defines that a person is a “protected SCV holder” if:

“(a)the person was in Australia on 26 February 2001, and was a special category visa holder on that day; or

(b)the person had been in Australia for a period of, or for periods totalling, 12 months during the period of 2 years immediately before 26 February 2001, and returned to Australia after that day.”

17.     Immigration movement records reveal that the applicant has travelled between Australia and New Zealand on the following dates (Document T4, folios 17-19):

Arrived in Australia:      7 January 2001       Departed:      28 January 2001

Arrived in Australia:      4 May 2001              Departed:      20 May 2001

Arrived in Australia:      3 November 2001    Departed:      19 November 2001

Arrived in Australia:      24 December 2001  Departed:      6 January 2002

Arrived in Australia:      16 March 2002        Departed:      20 April 2002

Arrived in Australia       10 August 2002       Departed:      24 August 2002

Arrived in Australia:      9 December 2002    Departed:      14 September 2004

Arrived in Australia:      26 September 2004

18. With respect to section 7(2A) of the Act, the applicant cannot satisfy paragraph (a). In addition, given his movement records, the applicant does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph (b) and so cannot come within the meaning of a protected SCV holder.

19. Section 7(2B) of the Act defines that a person is a “protected SCV holder” if the person:

“(a)     was residing in Australia on 26 February 2001; and

(b)       was temporarily absent from Australia on 26 February 2001; and

(c)was a special category visa holder immediately before the beginning of the temporary absence; and

(d)       was receiving a social security payment on 26 February 2001; and

(e)       returned to Australia before the later of the following:

(i)        the end of the period of 26 weeks beginning on 26 February 2001;

(ii)       if the Secretary extended the person’s portability period for the  payment under section 1218C – the end of the extended period.”

20. All five criteria in section 7(2B) of the Act have to be satisfied. For example, the applicant does not satisfy criterion (d) and so cannot come within the meaning of a protected SCV holder.

21. Section 7(2C) of the Act defines a person who commenced, or recommenced, residing in Australia during the period of 3 months beginning on 26 February 2001 as a “protected SCV holder” at a particular time if:

“(a)     the time is during the period of 3 years beginning on 26 February 2001; or

(b)       the time is after the end of that period, and either:

(i)a determination under subsection (2E) is in force in respect of the person; or

(ii)the person claimed a payment under the social security law during that period, and the claim was granted on the basis that the person was a protected SCV holder.”

22.     The Tribunal agrees with the SSAT’s interpretation of this statutory provision:

“Paragraph (a) specifically provides that the person is a protected SCV holder for 3 years.  Paragraph (b) specifically provides for circumstances when a person can be a protected SCV holder beyond the 3 year period referred to in paragraph (a).  If a person was a protected SCV holder under paragraph (a), he or she will continue to be a protected SCV holder after 3 years under paragraph (b) if, before the 3 years has expired, the person has either sought a determination under subsection 7(2E) or has claimed and been granted a social security payment.”  (T2, Folio 9)

Accordingly, the application of this section turns on the meaning of “residing” in Australia and whether a determination under section 7(2E) of the Act is in force.

23. Section 7(2D) of the Act defines “a person who, on 26 February 2001:

“(a)     was residing in Australia; and

(b)       was temporarily absent from Australia; and

(c)       was not receiving a social security payment;

is a protected SCV holder at a particular time if:

(d)       the time is during the period of 12 months beginning on 26 February 2001; or

(e)       the time is after the end of that period, and either:

(i)at that time, a determination under subsection (2E) is in force in respect of the person; or

(ii)the person claimed a payment under the social security law during that period, and the claim was granted on the basis that the person was a protected SCV holder.”

24. Similarly to section 7(2C) of the Act, the application of this section turns on the meaning of “residing” in Australia and whether a determination under section 7(2E) is in force.

25. Section 7(3) of the Act prescribes the following six criteria for deciding, for the purposes of the Act, whether or not a person is residing in Australia:

“(a)     the nature of the accommodation used by the person in Australia; and

(b)the nature and extent of the family relationships the person has in Australia; and

(c)the nature and extent of the person’s employment, business or financial ties with Australia; and

(d)       the nature and extent of the person’s assets located in Australia; and

(e)       the frequency and duration of the person’s travel outside Australia; and

(f)any other matter relevant to determining whether the person intends to remain permanently in Australia.”

26. Under section 7(3) of the Act, in deciding the question of law, whether or not a person is residing in Australia, “regard must be had to” a number of factors.  The phrase “have regard to” has been considered judicially on many occasions:

(a)It requires [the decision maker] to take those matters into account and give weight to them as a fundamental element in making his recommendation: per Gibb CJ in R v Toohey; Ex Parte Meneling Station Pty Ltd (1982) 158 CLR 327 at 333;

(b)The mere assertion that [the decision maker] had acted would not be conclusive if it were demonstrated that regard had not been had to those matters in any real sense: per Gummow J in Qld Medical Laboratory v Blewett (1988) 84 ALR 615; and

(c)There would be a failure [by the decision maker] to have regard to matters nominated in the statute if the regard was not adequate or not sufficient: per O’Loughlin J in Department of Defence v Fox (1997) 24 AAR 171.

27.     In addition to the legal meaning of this phrase and central to applying this meaning to the consideration of the six statutory factors, is an understanding of the legal meaning of “residence”.  The concept of what amounts to residence was discussed by Wilcox J in Hafza v Director-General of Social Security (1985) 6 FCR 444. Although decided with reference to the Social Security Act 1947, the general concepts discussed by His Honour have not been altered by the 1991 Act.  His Honour said (at 449-450):      

“There is a plethora of decisions, arising in various contexts but predominantly matrimonial causes and revenue cases, relating to the legal concept of residence.  As a general concept residence includes two elements: physical presence in a particular place and the intention to treat that place as home; at least for the time being, not necessarily forever. The concept was explained in a taxation case, Koitaki Para Rubber Estates Ltd v FC of T (1941) 64 CLR 241 at 249, by Williams J:

The place of residence of an individual is determined, not by the situation of some business or property which he is carrying on or owns, but by reference to where he eats and sleeps and has his settled or usual abode.  If he maintains a home or homes he resides in the locality or localities where it or they are situate, but he may also reside where he habitually lives even if this is in hotels or on a yacht or some other abode.'

Physical presence and intention will coincide for most of the time.  But few people are always at homeOnce a person has established a home in a particular place – even involuntarily (see Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght [1928] AC 234 at 248 and Keil v Keil [1947] VR 383) a person does not necessarily cease to be resident there because he or she is physically absentThe test is whether the person has retained a continuity of association with the place – Levene v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1928] AC 217 at 225 and Judd v Judd (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 147 at 149 together with an intention to return to that place and an attitude that that place remains ‘home’ (see Norman v Norman (1969) 16 FLR 231 at 236). It is important to observe firstly, that a person may simultaneously be a resident in more than one place – see the facts of Lysaght (supra) and the reference by Williams J to ‘a home or homes’ – and, secondly that the application for the general concept of residence to any particular case must depend upon the wording, and underlying purposes, of the particular statute in relation to which the question arises. But, where the general concept is applicable, it is obvious that, as residence of a place in which a person is not physically present depends upon an intention to return and to continue to treat that place as ‘home’, a change of intention may be decisive of the question whether residence in a particular place has been maintained.” (Tribunal emphasis)

28. Section 7(2E) of the Act provides for applications to be made in relation to a determination on residency. That is:

“a person who is residing in Australia and is in Australia may apply to the Secretary for a determination under this subsection stating that:

(a)the person was residing in Australia on 26 February 2001, but was temporarily absent from Australia on that day; or

(b)the person commenced, or recommenced, residing in Australia during the period of 3 months beginning on 26 February 2001.”

29. The timelines that must be adhered to for such an application are set out in section 7(2F) of the Act.

“If a person makes an application under subsection (2E), the Secretary must make the determination if:

(a)the Secretary is satisfied that paragraph (2E)(a) or (2E)(b) applies to the person; and

(b)the application was made within whichever of the following periods is applicable:

(i)if paragraph (2E)(a) applies to the person – the period of 12 months beginning on 26 February 2001;

(ii)if paragraph (2E)(b) applies to the person – the period of 3 years beginning on 26 February 2001.

The Secretary must give a copy of the determination to the person.”

Examination Of The Evidence

30. In response to meeting the requirements for residency under section 7(3) of the Act, the applicant stated:

(a)That he had moved to Australia with his parents on 7 January 2001 and continued to live in the parental home, and had continued to live there, apart from the periods he had to return to New Zealand to complete his medical degree;

(b)That the only immediate family he has are in Australia i.e. his parents and siblings;

(c)That during the time he was a full-time medical student in New Zealand [March 1996 – December 2002] he was supported by his family, having no income or assets of his own;

(d)That he only had limited assets in Australia when he was a student and lived in rented accommodation in New Zealand.  That he had a Westpac Bank Account in Australia (see Exhibit 4) for the period June/July 2003;

(e)That he had undertaken numerous trips, of short duration, from New Zealand to Australia, during University holidays, to be with his family; and

(f)That his attachment to his family was a relevant matter with respect to his intention to remain in Australia permanently.

31.     The applicant challenged the basis for his failing to apply for a determination within the statutory time period [26 February 2004].

32.     In relation to this issue, the applicant stated:

(a)that his father had rung Centrelink on 31 July 2003 to inquire about Australian citizenship for himself and the applicant (Exhibit 2).  In addition, he thought it unusual, at the time, that Centrelink had not provided any printed materials or documents, in response to his father’s query;

(b)that although an inquiry was made, no information was given by Centrelink as to the statutory time period to apply for a determination;

(c)that, if he had been aware of the prescribed statutory period when an application would be out of time, he would have applied as at the date the query was raised; and

(d)that he had been granted general registration as a Medical Practitioner in Queensland from 14 January 2003 (T12, Folio 39).

33.     The applicant concluded by stating that the result of the failure of Centrelink to provide any information on prescribed time limits for an application for determining residency in Australia had caused the predicament in which he now found himself.  Furthermore, he believed that when he applied in October 2004, the time he had spent in Australia arising from all of the trips from New Zealand, together with commencing a full-time internship in 2003, would have led to his complying with the two year residency requirement.

34.     The applicant gave the following responses during cross-examination:

(a)That he had an awareness, by “word of mouth” in New Zealand, that the 26 February 2001 date existed – but was unaware that he had to be in Australia on that date;

(b)That he agreed with the following summary in the SSAT decision:

“9.In response to Tribunal questions he gave a brief history of his studies in New Zealand and his living arrangements.  In first year he studied at Hamilton University and lived with his parents.  For second and third years, he had to study at Dunedin University.  During that time he lived at a hostel or shared a flat with fellow students.  Then he took a year off and worked.  He resumed 4th year studies at the Wellington campus where he rented a place with fellow students.  This took him to the end of 2000.”  (T2, Folio 5)

(c)He acknowledged that he had a bank account in New Zealand – but that it only contained small amounts;

(d)That in addition to financial support from his father in 2001 and 2002, he had taken out a student loan with the Medical Assurance Society for $10,000 to help defray his living expenses.

Consideration Of The Issues

35.     The Tribunal firstly considers the question of whether the applicant was “residing in Australia” from 2001.  The Tribunal has considered “residency in Australia”, in terms of the statutory requirements imposed by section 7(3) of the Act as well as the legal principles in Hafza’s case, in relation to two time periods: (i) January 2001 to December 2002 and (ii) December 2002 to the present time.

vJanuary 2001 to December 2002

36. The Tribunal concludes that some of the criteria [section 7(3)(a) to (f) of the Act] may suggest that the applicant is a resident – and some may suggest otherwise.

37.      For example, the applicant had no family in New Zealand. His entire family lived in Australia.  The frequency of travel to Australia during University vacations indicates the continuing nature and extent of the family relationship he has in Australia. The nature of the accommodation in Australia is that he had his own separate room and furnishings in the family home where he stayed during visits from New Zealand.

38.     Pulling in the other direction is the fact that the extent of his employment or business in 2001-2002 [his medical degree studies] reflects more of an association with New Zealand rather than Australia. He decided to complete his medical studies in New Zealand when his family moved to Australia in January 2001, as he was mid-way through his degree studies in New Zealand and could not transfer his medical degree studies to an Australian University.  A consequence of completing his medical degree is that he spent more time in New Zealand than Australia. Over the two year period, January 2001 to December 2002, the applicant spent 16 weeks in Australia – with the remainder of time spent in New Zealand. The applicant had rented accommodation in New Zealand.

39.     The applicant had limited assets in both Australia and New Zealand at this time. He received financial support from his parents whilst studying in New Zealand. However, he had also taken out a student loan in New Zealand of $10,000  to help defray some of his living and financial costs whilst a medical student in New Zealand.

40.     Furthermore, the Tribunal places special weight on the test in Hafza’s case.  In particular, whether both elements of the test for the concept of residence – “physical presence in a particular place” and the “intention to treat that place as home” both coincide.  The Tribunal considers, based on all of the evidence and information before it over this time period, that only one element is satisfied: the intention to treat Australia as home.    The applicant’s physical presence was in New Zealand as, during this period, New Zealand was the place where he slept, ate and had his usual abode as he studied full-time for his medical degree.

41. On careful consideration of all of the evidence and information before the Tribunal over this time period and in relation to all criteria prescribed in section 7(3) of the Act, – as well as the common law requirements (Hafza’s case) for meeting both elements for the concept of “residence”, the Tribunal concludes that the applicant does not satisfy the statutory requirements for “residency in Australia.  In making this finding, the Tribunal has considered all of the statutory criteria and applied the legal principles as to the meaning of the phrase “have regard to” by giving weight to criteria (c), (d) and (e) in the factual circumstances of this application for review.

vDecember 2002 to the present time

42.     However, the applicant’s residency situation changed following graduation on 7 December 2002.  The applicant then left New Zealand (on 9 December 2002) and moved to Australia in order to commence an internship at Ipswich General Hospital in January 2003.  From this time, he has continued to live with his family, in the parental home, and to work in Australia; he has been continuously employed in the Australian public hospital system.

43.     Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes from 9 December 2002, the applicant satisfies the statutory requirements and the “Hafza test” for “residency in Australia”.

44. Given this finding section 7(2D) of the Act comes into effect and a determination under section 7(2E) is required in order to come within the meaning of a “protected SCV” holder.

45. In the applicant’s factual circumstances, section 7(2E)(b) applies in relation to an application for a determination of residency.

46. The timelines for such an application are prescribed by section 7(2F)(b)(ii): the application must be made between the 3 year period, 26 February 2001 – 26 February 2004. However, the application for a determination on residency was made on 12 October 2004 – outside the prescribed starting time limit. The Tribunal concludes that the query made by the applicant’s father on 31 July 2003 does not represent an application for a determination of residency.

47. Given the above reasons, the Tribunal can make no other finding than to conclude that the decision to reject the application for a determination under section 7(2E) of the Act was correctly made.

48.     Whilst this decision may seem harsh, it would probably be more appropriate to describe the outcome as unfortunate.  There is no discretion provided in the legislation to deal with the factual circumstances of the applicant – which the Tribunal considers to be “unusual”, “uncommon” and “exceptional”, given that the primary obstacle was the omission of Centrelink to provide any written/published materials in response to the query made by the applicant’s father in July 2003. This information would have facilitated the applicant in pursuing a determination under section 7(2F) within the prescribed statutory time limits.

49.     The Tribunal makes the observation that in this regard, the following Departmental Policy Guideline (10.2.3.80 Protected SCV/Non-Protected SCV) contains the following information on this topic:

Protected SCV holder

SCV holders who are protected SCV holders (section 7(2)) are resident for the purposes of the Social Security Act and the Agreement.

Protected SCV holders are those who

(a)       were present in Australia on 26 February 2001,

(b)had been in Australia for an aggregate of at least 12 months in the 2 years immediately before that day,

(c)were residing in Australia but temporarily absent on that day, or

(d)commenced (or recommenced) residing in Australia within 3 months of that day.

People in groups (c) and (d) will only become protected if they obtained a determination of their residence status within a set period.

For those in group (d) that is those SCV holders who commenced residing in Australia by 26 May 2001, they must apply for a determination by 26 February 2004.

A ‘determination’ is either a letter from Centrelink or by claiming and being residentially qualified for a social security payment.  Either determination will protect a person’s future entitlement to social security payments.  Also this ‘determination’ can be used to apply for Australian citizenship with DIMIA. [Emphasis added]

Date this topic last updated:  2 September 2002

50.     Clearly, the information on this topic was available at the time the telephone query was made in July 2003 – but somehow there was an omission by the Centrelink officer to convey the information to the applicant’s father.

51.     The applicant has described the situation with respect to his knowledge as to residency and visa categories as follows:

“We were made aware that we were holders of special category visas but we were not made aware by any of the officials we dealt with that we were ‘protected’ special category visa holders nor were we made aware of its significance.  My father only contacted Centrelink on 31-07-2003 purely because his 2 year residency period was almost complete and DIMIA required a Permanent Residency Certificate from Centrelink in order to process his application for citizenship.  At no state during his discussions with various officials of Centrelink or DIMIA was he made aware of the deadline set for 26/02/04.  Had he been told about this deadline he would obviously have informed me so that I could have taken the appropriate action to apply for the relevant certificate within the prescribed time limit.”  (T18, Folio 51)

52.     The Tribunal considers that this statement complements the Tribunal’s observations on the omission by Centrelink to provide existing information contained in Departmental Policy Guidelines at that time which may have averted the legal problem that has arisen.

53.     At the end of the hearing, the respondent raised the possibility of whether the Commonwealth Policy:  “Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration Scheme” had any application.  Clearly, this is an issue for the applicant to consider whether such a claim may be warranted and might be pursued.

54.     Under the “Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration Scheme”, each Minister, or any official authorised by the Minister for the purpose, has the administrative discretion to determine whether gratuitous compensatory payments should be made to claimants for the effects of defective administration by Commonwealth agencies.  Payments under this scheme fall outside the scope of statutory entitlements, Government approved programs and payments by the Commonwealth under legal liabilities.

55.     This scheme is therefore a method of Commonwealth agencies providing compensation to persons who have been adversely affected by the maladministration of such agencies, but who have no legal means to seek redress, such as a legal claim against the Commonwealth.

56.     Criteria under which claims under the Scheme are considered, and which may be applicable to the applicant’s circumstances, include:

. giving advice to (or for) a claimant that was, in all the circumstances, incorrect or ambiguous; or

.an unreasonable failure to give to (or for) a claimant, the proper advice that was within the official’s power and knowledge to give (or was reasonably capable of being obtained by the official to give).”

57.     Under the Scheme, detriment is the amount of quantifiable financial loss that a claimant can demonstrate that he/she has suffered despite having taken reasonable steps to minimise or contain the loss or, if this is impracticable, can reasonably be assumed to have suffered;  and non-financial damage, such as pain and suffering, inconvenience or other “qualitative” elements of that nature.

58.     The Tribunal makes the further observation that it has no power, whatsoever, to give effect to this Scheme.  Rather, the Tribunal emphasises that it cannot order that the Compensation for Detriment caused by Defective Administration Scheme be made applicable to the applicant’s factual circumstances.  The procedure is for the applicant to make a claim to the respondent and to request that his claim be assessed under the specified eligibility criteria.  The final authority to give effect to the Scheme does not rest with the Tribunal, but the Minister or their appointee.

59.     For all of the above reasons, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

I certify that the 59 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr EK Christie, Member

Signed:         Jenny Tran
  Associate

Date/s of Hearing  22 June 2005
Date of Decision  22 June 2005
Date of Written Reasons          7 July 2005        
The Applicant appeared in person
For the Respondent                  Ms J Dwyer, Departmental Advocate