Quinn & Lawson (No 3)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 112
•27 February 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Quinn & Lawson (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 112
File number(s): SYC 7896 of 2015 Judgment of: BEHRENS J Date of judgment: 27 February 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application – Dismissal – De facto relationship – Where Respondent sought dismissal of application for property adjustment orders and sought no property adjustment orders – Where the Applicant is self-represented – Where the Applicant is in default of orders for filing of trial material – Where Applicant has filed no trial material – Where Applicant was put on notice as to consequences of non-compliance with trial directions – Where there was an earlier threshold hearing on the question of the length of the de facto relationship – Where the Respondent has complied with trial directions – Where it was not appropriate in the circumstances to receive material filed by the Applicant on earlier occasions into evidence – Where the Applicant provided no evidence upon which a determination that it is just and equitable to adjust the parties’ interests in property could be made – Where proceedings have been before the Court for a substantial period and have been subject to significant delay – Where the Applicant contended that the delay was a product of the Respondent’s conduct and her claimed disability – Where it is found that the delay is largely attributable to the behaviour of the Applicant, which includes default – Where it is found that accommodations were made for the Applicant’s claimed disability – Where r 10.27 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Rules 2021 (Cth) considered and applied – Where the practice and procedure provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) considered and applied – Where it is in the interests of justice to dismiss the application for property adjustment orders – Where the Respondent does not seek the repayment by the Applicant of funds expended from those held in trust for the purpose of paying for legal fees – Where the Respondent has indicated that an undertaking would be given to that effect – Where the Applicant’s Application in a Proceeding seeking that such of the Rules in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Rules 2021 (Cth) as would prevent an application for costs associated with the threshold hearing are dispensed with – Where orders made for dismissal of Initiating Application and all extant applications Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 95, 96
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 69
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 10.27
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Central Practice Direction: Family Law Case Management, 1 May 2024, Core Principle 6
Cases cited: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172; [2000] HCA 40
Aon Risk Services Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479; [1990] HCA 30
In the marriage of Buljubasic (1999) FLC 92-865;(1999) 25 Fam LR 371; [1999] FamCA 474
Mertens & Mertens [2016] FamCAFC 136
Yenger & Wilbert [2023] FedCFamC1A 124
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 37 Date of last submission/s: 25 February 2025 Date of hearing: 24-25 February 2025 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Litigant in Person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Longworth Solicitor for the Respondent: Bartier Perry Lawyers ORDERS
SYC 7896 of 2015 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS QUINN
Applicant
AND: MR LAWSON
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BEHRENS J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Initiating Application filed 1 December 2015 and the Amended Initiating Application filed 26 May 2024 are dismissed.
2.All extant applications are dismissed.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.The Respondent has indicated that, in the event the Court dismisses the Amended Initiating Application filed 26 May 2024, the Respondent would undertake to the Court as follows:
(a)Not to seek to recover from the Applicant any funds drawn down from the Advanced Sum as described in Orders of 22 July 2024;
(b)To release the Applicant from the irrevocable authority as described in Order 4 of the Orders of 22 July 2024.
B.Upon the proceedings being dismissed, the Orders of 22 July 2024 will merge and the balance of monies held in trust will be repayable to the Respondent.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Quinn & Lawson has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BEHRENS J
These proceedings involve an application by Ms Quinn for property adjustment orders pursuant to Part VIIIAB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). She and the respondent, Mr Lawson, were in a de facto relationship for about seven years. They have no children together. Mr Lawson has maintained the position throughout these proceedings that the application should be dismissed on the basis that it is not just and equitable to adjust the parties’ interests in property. He does not seek any property adjustment order in the proceedings.
Ms Quinn commenced these proceedings on 1 December 2015. They have therefore been before the Court for more than nine years. Below, I set out further the circumstances which have led to this extraordinary delay.
The proceedings were listed for trial before me, commencing on Monday 24 February 2025. These reasons deal with my decision to dismiss Ms Quinn’s Initiating Application filed 1 December 2015, and her amended application filed 26 May 2024 pursuant to r 10.27(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”). That is in circumstances where she is again in default of orders made for the filing of trial material, and where she has filed no such material.
The proceedings had previously been listed for trial commencing 11 December 2024 (and, as I set out below, on other previous occasions). That morning, Ms Quinn made an oral application for an adjournment in circumstances where she had not filed her trial material in accordance with trial directions of Harper J dated 4 September 2024, and was again self-represented. On 11 December 2024, I granted Ms Quinn an adjournment and made further trial directions and notations that “[t]he Court expects and will require strict compliance with the trial directions made today” and “[i]f the applicant does not comply with the trial directions made today it is likely that the matter will be dealt with pursuant to r 10.27(1)(h) of the Rules – namely it will proceed on the Respondent’s evidence and without hearing from the Applicant.”
On Monday 24 February 2025, Ms Quinn remained self-represented and was assisted by a McKenzie friend, Ms PP. As on the previous occasion, Ms Quinn had not complied with trial directions and had filed no trial material. She had not told the Court nor the respondent’s solicitors – whether by way of a Case Outline (which, in any event, she did not file, despite being previously directed to do so), nor in any other way – what she would be asking the Court to do this week. Mr Lawson had complied with the trial directions.
At the commencement of the trial, Ms Quinn sought leave to make an oral application for the appointment of a litigation guardian. I gave her that leave. She was not able to propose any person who might act as her litigation guardian. She sought that I request the Attorney-General to appoint a litigation guardian for her. Monday morning was therefore spent receiving evidence and hearing submissions in relation to that application. I dismissed the application and gave ex tempore reasons on Monday afternoon.
I then sought submissions, and any evidence in support of those submissions, as to how the trial should proceed.
Prior to the commencement of the submissions in relation to this question, I provided Ms Quinn with a copy of r 10.27. She confirmed that she had seen r 10.27 previously. Subsequently tendered on behalf of Mr Lawson was an email (“R4”) which had been sent by the solicitors for Mr Lawson to Ms Quinn on 6 November 2024, in which they put Ms Quinn on notice that, if she failed to file her affidavit evidence (which was due on that date pursuant Orders made by Harper J on 4 September 2024), they would seek that the final hearing scheduled on 11 December 2024 “proceed undefended in accordance with Rule 10.27”. By way of attachment to that email, she was provided with a copy of r 10.27.
The Case Outline filed on behalf of Mr Lawson on 10 December 2024 confirmed that Mr Lawson sought the dismissal of the application pursuant to r 10.27 as his primary position, and otherwise sought the dismissal of the application on the basis that it is not just and equitable to adjust the parties’ interests in property. The updated Case Outline filed on behalf of Mr Lawson on 13 February 2025 referred to Notations D and E to my Orders made on 11 December 2024, and sought that the matter be dealt with in the way referred to in Notation E, namely, “pursuant to r 10.27(1)(h) of the Rules”.
Ms Quinn was therefore well and truly on notice that the matter was likely to be dealt with on one of the bases in r 10.27 if she did not comply with the trial directions.
Counsel for Mr Lawson indicated in oral submissions that his primary position was that he sought the application be dismissed pursuant to r 10.27(1)(a) (or under s 69 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)). If that application was not successful, his alternate position was that the trial proceed in the manner set out in r 10.27(1)(h) – that is, on the respondent’s evidence only and without hearing from Ms Quinn. That Rule is designed for a situation where both parties are seeking property adjustment orders. That is not the case here. Were the application dealt with pursuant to r 10.27(1)(h), it is difficult to see how the result could be other than the dismissal of the application, because there would be no evidence before me from Ms Quinn and no submissions from Ms Quinn such that I could find it is just and equitable to adjust the parties’ property interests. Presumably, given he does not seek any property orders, no evidence would have been read in Mr Lawson’s case. Dismissal pursuant to r 10.27(1)(a) would, however, be on a different basis – that (broadly) it is in the interests of justice for the application to be dismissed in the circumstances of Ms Quinn’s default.
I did raise with the parties the possibility that Ms Quinn could be allowed to rely on material previously filed in the matter, and that I could deal with the matter pursuant to r 10.27(1)(g). That course was opposed by Mr Lawson. It faces the difficulty that Ms Quinn had filed several affidavits in relation to a number of applications over the years, but no affidavit which had been prepared for the purposes of dealing with the question of whether it was just and equitable to make a property adjustment order and, if that is the case, what order would be just and equitable. Her most substantial affidavit was filed on 13 February 2020, and I was told that it was prepared for the purposes of a “threshold hearing” as to the date of the parties’ separation. Further, by an email sent to Ms Quinn on 29 November 2024 which was contained in “R4”, Mr Lawson’s solicitors indicated that “[i]f you do not file a trial affidavit and you make an application to rely on one of your earlier affidavits filed in this matter, please identify by Friday 6 December 2024 which particular affidavit you will rely on at the final hearing”. I was told that there was no response. There would be evident unfairness in allowing Ms Quinn to rely on previous material in those circumstances. In any case, there was no such application by Ms Quinn and, when I asked her whether she wished to rely on previous material, she indicated a reluctance to do so on the basis that it would not be adequate for her case. She reiterated that she wanted more time. I indicated that I would not be granting a further adjournment. For the reasons set out in this paragraph, it is not appropriate for me to receive into evidence material already filed by Ms Quinn.
While I was not asked to, I could have proceeded with the matter by way of r 10.27(1)(g) but without any evidence from Ms Quinn. Again, given he does not seek any property orders, I assume no evidence would have been read in Mr Lawson’s case. In the absence of any evidence on the point from Ms Quinn, I could not have been satisfied that it is just and equitable to make an order adjusting property interests. I would not even have had in evidence an updated Financial Statement from Ms Quinn (her last Financial Statement having been filed on 1 September 2023).
Notwithstanding these difficulties with proceeding in any other way, dismissing Ms Quinn’s application pursuant to r 10.27(1)(a) is an extreme step which is not to be taken lightly. I need to be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so.
Submissions on behalf of Mr Lawson emphasised that the application with which the proceedings are concerned is Ms Quinn’s (no order being sought by Mr Lawson), and that her defaults need to be seen in that light. The submissions also focused on the inordinate delay in reaching the matter, which it was said was a result of Ms Quinn’s exceptional level of default. I deal with the history of the matter, and my findings in relation to that history, below.
I was referred to ss 95 and 96 of the Act. I am required by s 95(3) to interpret and apply the family law practice and procedure provisions (including those dealing with default) “in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose”. Section 95 contains the “Overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions” and relevantly provides that the overarching purpose of those provisions is to facilitate the “just resolution of disputes” “according to law” and “as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”. The overarching purpose includes the following objectives:
95 Overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions
…
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes the following objectives in relation to proceedings under this Act:
(a) the just determination of all such proceedings;
(b) the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;
(c) the efficient disposal of the overall caseload of courts exercising jurisdiction in such proceedings;
(d) the disposal of all such proceedings in a timely manner;
(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.
It is a duty of parties to proceedings under the Act to “conduct the proceedings…in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose of the family law practice and procedure provisions” (s 96). It was said that Ms Quinn has not done that.
Core Principle 6 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, Central Practice Direction: Family Law Case Management, 1 May 2024, makes clear that:
Non-compliance with orders, Practice Directions, the Family Law Rules or the obligations imposed on parties and their lawyers to conduct proceedings in a manner consistent with the overarching purpose will be taken seriously by the Courts. Non-compliance may lead to serious consequences for parties and for their lawyers including, if relevant, liberty being granted to the compliant party to proceed on an undefended basis….
I was referred to the authorities of Mertens & Mertens [2016] FamCAFC 136; Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 (“Gallo v Dawson”); In the marriage of Buljubasic (1999) 25 Fam LR 371; Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40 (“Allesch v Maunz”); Aon Risk Services Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; and Yenger & Wilbert [2023] FedCFamC1A 124 for the relevant principles that underlie the interests of justice, and refer to aspects of those authorities below.
Ms Quinn made submissions. I asked her to address both the issue of whether I should dismiss her application and also what other way she said I should deal with the matter. As indicated above, she did not have an answer to the question of how I should deal with the matter, other than to indicate that she needed more time. I indicated I would not give her leave to make an oral application for another adjournment.
Her submissions as to the application to dismiss focused on two broad timeframes. First, in relation to the period prior to the making of the trial directions last year, she sought to establish, by reference to various documents that she tendered, that the delay was not attributable to her, but rather to Mr Lawson. In particular, she emphasised that he had unsuccessfully contended for a separation date of August 2011, such that her application was out of time. She also made various complaints about lack of disclosure and other matters. Second, in relation to the more recent period, she said that the explanation for her lack of compliance lies in what she referred to as her “disability” and the fact that she has not had sufficient accommodations to enable her to comply.
In relation to the delay, by reference to the Court record (and, later, to documents tendered), I find that:
(a)On 12 April 2019, the matter was first listed for hearing in September 2019, in relation to whether the application was out of time and “the jurisdictional threshold issue”. From the correspondence which became “R5” I can see that, a few days after the matter was listed, Mr Lawson had sought Ms Quinn’s consent to vacate those dates on the basis that he was not able to change travel plans without penalty. In the absence of a response on behalf of Ms Quinn indicating whether this request would be acceded to, Mr Lawson cancelled the travel and notified Ms Quinn on 7 May 2019 that he was content for the matter to proceed. On 9 August 2019, the hearing dates were vacated at the request of Ms Quinn (a letter from Ms Quinn’s then lawyers to Mr Lawson’s lawyers dated 24 July 2019 seeking consent to such adjournment was “R3”). Ms Quinn made that request on the basis of difficulties with her National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) funding, and lack of support workers (“R3”). Ms Quinn only provided me with one piece of this correspondence (“A10”), and it presented a misleading picture of what had occurred.
(b)The subsequent intervention of COVID-19 caused the Court to vacate a hearing date in 2020.
(c)On 22 December 2021, Schonell J listed the proceedings for trial on all issues, to commence on 19 August 2022. Mr Lawson filed (slightly late) his trial material going to all issues. Ms Quinn did not file her trial material and sought that the final hearing dates be vacated. The trial ultimately proceeded on the “threshold issue” only, and presumably on the basis of material previously filed by Ms Quinn. Justice Schonell found that the parties’ de facto relationship broke down on the date contended for by Ms Quinn.
(d)In October 2023, further Court dates, commencing 29 November 2023, were offered. Those dates were accepted by the respondent but not by the applicant. Ms Quinn told the Court that the matter was not ready for final hearing.
(e)On 22 January 2024, Ms Quinn filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking litigation funding. Ms Quinn did not comply with various directions in relation to that Application, and Harper J dismissed all outstanding Applications in a Proceeding on 2 February 2024.
(f)On 7 February 2024, Ms Quinn filed a separate Application in a Proceeding seeking litigation funding. That was resolved by consent on 22 July 2024.
(g)On 4 September 2024, the matter was listed for final hearing commencing 11 December 2024, and trial directions were made. I have set out above the history from this point to the present date.
(h)Numerous listings have taken place in order to deal with issues pertaining to single experts. Where the “blame” lies for these occurrences is not clear to me from the extensive correspondence which was tendered as “A17”, but the difficulties are one reason, among many, why I find that any further delay is likely to result in further difficulties and is therefore not in the interests of justice.
The history of the proceedings is a relevant matter for me (Gallo v Dawson). In this matter, that history is nothing short of tortuous. I find that the bulk, but not all, of the delay and difficulty can be attributed to Ms Quinn’s conduct, including default. Mr Lawson clearly contributed by pursuing an ultimately unsuccessful application regarding what he contended was a date of breakdown of the relationship some two years before Schonell J found. On the other hand, he was ready to proceed on all issues at that time. Irrespective of conduct, the fact that the proceedings have been on foot for so long is, in and of itself, a factor which goes to the interests of justice – in part because of the consumption of public resources which inevitably goes with that delay.
It is the failure, however, by Ms Quinn to comply with trial directions since the matter was set down for trial in September 2024 which constitutes the serious default to which I have regard in making my decision and, in particular, the failure to comply with the trial directions made on 11 December 2024, despite being given the indulgence of the Court.
In submissions, Ms Quinn raised issues with Mr Lawson’s disclosure, although there was limited evidence upon which to base those submissions. Ms Quinn tendered a letter dated 7 June 2022 from her lawyers to Mr Lawson’s lawyers in which issues of disclosure were raised (“A15”). She also raised issues of disclosure in her “Objection to proposed trial date”, dated 9 October 2023 (“A14”). This evidence does not enable me to be satisfied that disclosure was not in fact provided. Ms Quinn conceded that, pursuant to Orders made by Harper J on 2 February 2024, she had been provided with a 97-page schedule setting out the disclosure provided. Whilst Ms Quinn tendered various pieces of correspondence, she did not tender any letter from the two sets of lawyers which were respectively on the record for her since March 2024 to the effect that there have been any subsequent issues with disclosure. I infer that there have not been. Issues were raised with Ms Quinn’s disclosure, and on 13 July 2022, Judicial Registrar Mordaunt made orders after a Conciliation Conference requiring Ms Quinn to provide that disclosure. Ms Quinn has not fulfilled one of the most basic requirements of disclosure – namely, the filing of an updated Financial Statement. There is nothing in any of this evidence or Ms Quinn’s submissions in relation to disclosure which has an impact on the decision I need to make. Ms Quinn’s failure to comply with directions of this Court cannot be explained by disclosure issues.
The narrative which Ms Quinn would have me adopt is that she is a person with a disability, who is unable to progress the matter solely because of that disability, who is self-represented through no fault of her own, and who has been unfairly treated in the process. I can find no aspect of unfairness in the way Ms Quinn has been treated. I proceed to deal with the other matters she raises.
In my Reasons for Judgment dated 24 February 2025 dismissing the application to appoint a litigation guardian, I have dealt with the issue of Ms Quinn’s claimed disability. I incorporate those Reasons here. Throughout these proceedings, Ms Quinn has maintained that she has a cognitive impairment, and that this has various effects on her functioning, including a lack of awareness of time, difficulty multitasking, and other organisational difficulties and the like. It is an agreed fact that she is in receipt of a package pursuant to the NDIS. Until the morning of the trial, she had maintained she did not need a litigation guardian, and a notation to that effect was made in the Orders of Harper J on 23 October 2023. I infer that her application was prompted by the knowledge that she had not complied with my trial directions, and that I would not entertain an application for a further adjournment.
Before me in Ms Quinn’s application for the appointment of a litigation guardian were various documents to which I refer in my Reasons, which describe Ms Quinn’s various needs and difficulties. I must give that evidence some weight – but not as much weight as the report of clinical neuropsychologist, Dr QQ, who was appointed as the single expert for the purposes of these proceedings and assessed Ms Quinn in December 2024. While that report is untested, and Ms Quinn indicated that she had a number of matters to raise in relation to the report, it is the most reliable evidence that I have as to Ms Quinn’s cognitive function. Dr QQ opines that:
… my opinion based on the current test results is that [Ms Quinn’s] cognitive abilities are at least at the same level as anybody else her age. The majority of her cognitive skills are in the High Average range or above. In fact, some of her memory and executive (problem solving, logical thinking, multitasking) skills are very strong and in the Superior or Very Superior range.
Relative to formal premorbid expectations predicting that [Ms Quinn] should be performing in the High Average range intellectually, she has produced marginally below expectation performances (Average range) only in immediate attention span, working memory and on one visual memory test. Processing speed was in the Average range but not significantly lower than formal predictions, so not considered reduced.
…
[Ms Quinn] reports she was diagnosed with ADHD in 2016, based on her reported distractibility and propensity to lose her focus stretching back to her school years … My opinion is ADHD seems a plausible diagnosis. However, it is difficult for me to provide this diagnosis because [Ms Quinn] undertook the current examination using stimulant medication, making I difficult to detect any problems with sustained attention. In any case, my view is it is unlikely the impact of her apparently untreated ADHD prior to receiving this diagnosis in 2016 was substantial because of her reported success at school and university and in her career. Furthermore, her largely intact current cognitive results with only mild reductions in some areas suggests that even if ADHD is an issue, it is likely only a minor issue.
…
… it is also worth considering [Ms Quinn’s] reported previous traumatic brain injuries. Again, it is difficult to comment on these in the absence of relevant medical records, such as hospital discharge summaries, rehabilitation reports or brain imaging results. However, the first incident in 1978 … likely represents a mild traumatic brain injury, from which [Ms Quinn] would have been expected to have recovered within weeks or possibly months. The second incident in 1998 … is more challenging to evaluate based on [Ms Quinn’s] reports and without relevant medical records. It may potentially have been a more serious traumatic brain injury if it was associated with 18 months of cognitive rehabilitation. However, [Ms Quinn] went on to work in challenging high-level consulting roles without any further involvement with a rehabilitation provider or neurologist for many years, suggesting she made a good recovery. The third incident 20 years ago … is unlikely to be significant given [Ms Quinn’s] own report of recovering quickly. Overall, although [Ms Quinn] has probably experienced two or possibly three traumatic brain injuries in her life, her self-reported history since these events, current presentation and current test results suggest traumatic brain injury is a past diagnosis from which she has recovered and therefore not clinically relevant to her current status.
…
… I highlight the fact [Ms Quinn’s] current test results reveal only mild personal weaknesses only in immediate attention span and working memory, with otherwise intact cognitive abilities.
…
… considering [Ms Quinn’s] cognitive functioning as indicated by her current neuropsychological test results, my opinion is there would likely be very minimal impact on her capacity to work from a neuropsychological perspective. Indeed, she presents with multiple significant cognitive strengths, including learning, memory, problem solving, flexible thinking, logical thinking, multi-tasking and abstract reasoning.
…
The basis for [Ms Quinn’s] reported functional limitations is unclear from a neuropsychological perspective.
Put simply, Dr QQ’s report does not support that Ms Quinn has a disability, save for possibly a mild issue with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), the symptoms of which her psychiatrist reported had been assisted by ADHD medication (“A2”).
In any case, Ms Quinn was given accommodations in November and December of last year, which involved:
(a)On 14 November 2024, an extension of a date for filing trial material to 28 November 2024;
(b)On 28 November 2024, the making of a notation “[d]espite Order 8 of the orders dated 14 November 2024, the Court indicated it was prepared to consider an Application for the Applicant to be able to rely upon late-filed material, and that such Application will be considered at the time it arises”;
(c)On 11 December 2024, the granting of leave to make an application for, and the making of, an order vacating the final hearing listed for 11-17 December 2024; and
(d)On 11 December 2024, the making of amended trial directions such that she then had until 10 February 2025 to file her trial material.
Tendered in Mr Lawson’s case (“R1”) was an email exchange on 10 February 2025 between Ms PP and Mr Lawson’s lawyers in which Ms PP sought, on Ms Quinn’s behalf, consent to late filing, indicated that Ms Quinn was able to email an unsigned copy that day and that an appointment with a Justice of the Peace had been made for the next day. It beggars belief that, given a document was at that stage on 10 February 2025, it has still not been filed. This state of affairs cannot be explained by any disability. It also beggars belief that Ms Quinn has not even filed for trial a Financial Statement – a relatively simple document, especially where, as here, a party’s financial circumstances are not complicated.
Mr Lawson is wealthy. Ms Quinn is not. Ms Quinn is self-represented, but that is in circumstances where, by consent, an interim costs order was made in July 2024 that Mr Lawson make available to her the sum of $300,000 for her legal costs, to be held in the Trust Account of Mr Lawson’s lawyers, and used to pay invoices. A Trust Account Statement dated 25 February 2025 was tendered and marked “R7”. It shows that there is a balance of $153,897.75 remaining. There is no evidence about why Ms Quinn has not been able to engage legal representation using those funds – although she told me several things from the bar table. She has had seven firms of lawyers on the record for her during these proceedings. She told me that is because she has at times not had satisfactory representation. I cannot make any finding about that, but it cannot be said that there is a source of injustice in Ms Quinn’s inability to engage legal representatives. Along with the history of the matter, the fact that she has not done so is another factor which leads me to the conclusion that further delay will not assist and is therefore not in the interests of justice.
The authorities make clear that it is not only Ms Quinn’s interests which go to whether an outcome is just. As the High Court has pointed out, the rights of other parties are involved and “the rights of the public in the efficient discharge by courts of their functions must be weighed against unreasonable delay in concluding litigation” (per Kirby J in Allesch & Maunz, at [40]).
Ms Quinn brought her application to the Court more than nine years ago. Enormous court resources have been expended dealing with it over more than nine years. She has been granted indulgences by the Court. She is in serious default. The fact that Mr Lawson is a wealthy individual does not detract from the fact that he is entitled to have these proceedings determined in a timely manner, and to have Ms Quinn do the things she is ordered to do so that there may be a timely resolution.
I am conscious of the consequences for Ms Quinn of the decision to dismiss her application. It is not something to be done lightly. As a result of my decision, she will not be able to have her claims tested and a judicial decision made on the substance of the matter. That is in circumstances where she has repeatedly not done what she has been required to do to progress to a judicial decision and where, having regard to the history, I can have no confidence that she will do so. As Kirby J made clear in Allesch v Maunz at [39], a decision-maker cannot force a litigant “to act rationally in their own best interests”. The Court is not obliged “to delay proceedings indefinitely” (at [40]). The consequences of my decision for Ms Quinn have been mitigated somewhat by Mr Lawson’s agreement not to require the repayment of funds spent on legal fees (see below).
For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice – including through consistency with the overarching purpose of the practice and procedure provisions of the Act – that Ms Quinn’s applications to this Court be dismissed pursuant to r 10.27(1)(a). These proceedings, and the associated financial and other costs for both parties and for the Court, must now come to an end.
I also dismiss the balance of Ms Quinn’s Application in a Proceeding filed 13 November 2024 (“the Application in a Proceeding”) in which she sought that such of the Rules as would prevent her applying for costs in relation to the threshold hearing be dispensed with. On 14 November 2024, I stood that matter over to trial. The relevant test is whether I am satisfied that strict compliance with the rules would produce an injustice (Gallo v Dawson). The only evidence in support of the Application was paragraphs 41-45 of Ms Quinn’s affidavit filed 13 November 2024:
41. On 1 December 2015, I initiated proceedings to seek a property settlement with [Mr Lawson], which required a threshold issue to first be determined. I sought a declaration that I was in a de facto relationship with [Mr Lawson] between August 2006 and 23 December 2013. [Mr Lawson] sought a declaration that we were in a de facto relationship between August 2006 and August 2011.
42. The matter was listed for various hearings throughout the course of the proceedings and ultimately listed for a two-day Threshold Hearing on 23 August 2022. There were significant delays in the listing of the two-day Threshold Hearing, including due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
43. The Final Orders dated 17 April 2023 provided a declaration that [Mr Lawson] and I were in a de facto relationship that commenced in August 2006 and ended no earlier than 23 December 2013.
44. I did not make an application for costs within 28 days of the Final Orders being made on 17 April 2023 as I was unaware at that time that I needed to make a formal application to do so.
45. This application has previously been foreshadowed in earlier Hearings in 2024.
Given this is the only evidence I have, and having regard to the matters of conduct and default to which I refer above, and the numerous occasions on which Mr Lawson’s costs have been reserved during these proceedings (on seven occasions between July 2023 and December 2024), I am not satisfied that it is in the interests of justice that the Rules be dispensed with to allow the Application in a Proceeding to proceed. I therefore dismiss the Application in a Proceeding.
I raised with counsel for Mr Lawson my concerns about the detail of the interim consent costs order made in July 2024. That order would have had the consequence that, if I dismissed the application, Ms Quinn would have had to pay back, from what is apparently one of her only sources of funds, namely, an inheritance from her mother, and in circumstances where Mr Lawson is a very wealthy individual, the funds (approximately $150,000) which she has already received by virtue of that order. Ms Quinn has apparently given an irrevocable authority to that effect. It was therefore sought, by way of an interim order, to determine that matter on a final basis. Counsel took instructions and I was told that Mr Lawson would make various undertakings in the event the application was dismissed, to the effect that he would not require the repayment of those funds already expended. The money remaining in the Trust Account should be returned to him. I have made those notations.
I certify that the preceding thirty-seven (37) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Behrens. Associate:
Dated: 27 February 2025
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