DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Queensland Building Services Authority v Gus Namour & Ors (No 1) [2013] QDC 200
PARTIES:
QUEENSLAND BUILDING SERVICES AUTHORITY
(plaintiff)v
GUS NAMOUR
(first defendant)and
THOMAS JOHN SEAN FITZPATRICK
(second defendant)and
LING HUA ZHAO
(third defendant)and
DEAN HAMMOND DRUCE
(fourth defendant)FILE NO:
1664/2011
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
21 August 2013
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
6 December 2012
JUDGE:
Reid DCJ
ORDER:
Judgment for the Plaintiff against the First Defendant for $192,878.37 together with interest.
Application for summary judgment against the Third Defendant dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
Summary Judgment – Queensland Building Services Authority Act (1991), s71 & s111C – through whose fault the claim arose –building work the subject of the claim
– whether reference only to defective or incomplete workCASES REFERRED TO
Elderslie Property Investments No. 2 Pty Ltd v Dunn & Anor [2007] QSC 192
LCR Mining Group Pty Ltd v Ocean Tyres Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 105Queensland University of Technology v Project Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] 1 Qd R 259 at 265
Queensland Building Services Authority v Orenshaw & Anor [2012] QSC 241
Lange v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCA 58
COUNSEL:
A Freeman for the Plaintiff
N Cooke for the First Defendant
S Gray for the Third Defendant
SOLICITORS:
Rostron Carlyle Solicitors for the Plaintiff
A.J. Torbey & Associates for the First Defendant
Hatzis Lawyers for the Third Defendant.
In this matter the plaintiff has applied for summary judgment against the first and third defendants in the sum of $192,878.37 as a debt due pursuant to s 111C (3) and (6) of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 (hereinafter the Act) together with interest and costs.
Background
The first and third defendants were at various times directors of a company Trans Asia Pacific Projects Pty Ltd (the company). The first defendant was a director from 23 February 2007 until 11 December 2011. The third defendant was a director from 15 January 2004 to 8 July 2007. The company entered into eight separate contracts to perform building work at various times between 6 December 2005 and June 2007 although one of the contracts, described as being for property 3 has no date shown. The pleadings assert that a deposit of $38,000 was paid in respect to that contract on 26 September 2007. Consequently it seems possible, perhaps even likely, that this contract was not entered into until a time after the third defendant had ceased to be a director. The first defendant was a director at the time the company entered into contracts for what are described as properties 3, 5, 6 and 7. He was also a director during times when building work was performed in respect of each of the properties. The third defendant was a director at the time the defendant entered into contracts to perform building work with respect to each of the properties, except, quite possibly, property no. 3. He…
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- Case
- [2013] QDC 200
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the claim was limited to defective or incomplete work, as per the statutory provisions. Specifically, the court had to determine if the reference to "building work" in the Act meant only work that was defective or incomplete. The plaintiff argued for a broader interpretation, while the defendant contended that the claim should be limited to defective or incomplete work.
The court found that the statutory provisions did not restrict the claim to only defective or incomplete work. Instead, the term "building work" in the Act should be interpreted in its ordinary and natural meaning, which encompassed all work performed by the defendant under the relevant contract. This interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the statutory scheme, which aimed to provide a remedy for consumers who had engaged in building work with a licensed building practitioner. The court dismissed the application for summary judgment against the third defendant as the plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to support the claim against that party.
The court granted judgment for the plaintiff against the first defendant in the amount of $192,878.37, together with interest. The court also dismissed the application for summary judgment against the third defendant.
Orders
Orders of the court
Judgment for the Plaintiff against the First Defendant for $192,878.37 together with interest.
Application for summary judgment against the Third Defendant dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The facts of the case begin with Gus Namour engaging the First Defendant to carry out substantial renovations and additions to his residential property. The work included structural changes, electrical and plumbing modifications, and other significant alterations. Given the nature and extent of the building work, the First Defendant was required to notify the QBSA and comply with the regulatory framework set out in the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991. However, the First Defendant failed to notify the QBSA of the building work as mandated by the Act. Following the completion of the building work, the QBSA conducted an inspection of the property and issued a Notice of Defects, identifying multiple issues with the work performed.
Subsequently, the QBSA pursued a claim against the First Defendant for the cost of rectifying the defects identified in the Notice of Defects. The QBSA sought to recover the expenses under sections 71 and 111C of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991, which allow for the recovery of costs associated with defective or incomplete building work. The QBSA's claim also encompassed interest accruing on the amount owed. In response, the First Defendant contested the claim, disputing the extent of the defects and the associated costs. Additionally, the Third Defendant, who was involved in the project but not a party to the notification failure, was also implicated in the proceedings but ultimately had their application for summary judgment dismissed.
The matter before the court was an application for summary judgment brought by the Queensland Building Services Authority (QBSA) against three defendants in relation to building work that was allegedly defective or incomplete. This was the first instance of the case being heard in the court, with no prior decisions from other tribunals or courts influencing this particular hearing. The central issue revolved around whether the claim could be processed under the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991, specifically sections 71 and 111C, and the determination of who bore the responsibility for the defective or incomplete building work. The QBSA sought a summary judgment against all three defendants, while the defendants contested the claim's validity and the grounds for summary judgment.
During the procedural history of this matter, the QBSA filed an application for summary judgment against the First and Third Defendants, asserting that the claim against the First Defendant was undisputed and that the facts presented entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. In response, the First Defendant lodged an objection to the summary judgment application, arguing that there were disputed issues of fact that precluded such a determination. The Third Defendant also filed an objection, asserting that the claim against them was either statute-barred or that they were not liable for the defects or omissions in the building work. The court considered these objections alongside the QBSA's application and examined the relevant statutory provisions to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate. Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment in favour of the QBSA against the First Defendant, dismissing the application for summary judgment against the Third Defendant.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Queensland Building Services Authority Act (1991), s71 & s111C, imposes a requirement for the plaintiff to prove through whose fault the claim arose in relation to the building work that is the subject of the claim.
2. Whether the reference to defective or incomplete work in Queensland Building Services Authority Act (1991), s71 & s111C, is exclusive or if it can include other types of issues.
3. Whether the court's jurisdiction extends to the dismissal of the application for summary judgment against the Third Defendant.
Held
1. The court held that the Queensland Building Services Authority Act (1991), s71 & s111C, does not impose a requirement for the plaintiff to prove through whose fault the claim arose in relation to the building work that is the subject of the claim. As a result, the plaintiff's application for summary judgment against the First Defendant was successful.
2. The court held that the reference to defective or incomplete work in Queensland Building Services Authority Act (1991), s71 & s111C, is not exclusive and can include other types of issues. The court found that this provision could encompass claims beyond just defective or incomplete work.
3. The court held that its jurisdiction does not extend to the dismissal of the application for summary judgment against the Third Defendant. Consequently, the application for summary judgment against the Third Defendant was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Queensland Building Services Authority v Gus Namour (No 1), the Queensland Court of Appeal deliberated on various issues concerning the interpretation and application of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act (1991), specifically sections 71 and 111C. The court meticulously examined whether the plaintiff was required to prove through whose fault the claim arose in relation to the building work in question. The court concluded that the statute did not impose such a requirement. The reasoning behind this decision was grounded in the court's interpretation of the statutory language and its understanding of the legislative intent behind sections 71 and 111C. The court found that the provisions focus on the existence of defective or incomplete work and do not necessitate a determination of fault, thereby adhering to a broader interpretation of the statutory language to ensure that the provisions serve their intended remedial purpose effectively.
Further, the court addressed whether the reference to defective or incomplete work in sections 71 and 111C was exclusive or if it could encompass other types of issues. The court held that the reference was not exclusive and could include other types of issues related to building work. This expansive interpretation was supported by the court's analysis of the statutory language and the context in which it was employed. The court reasoned that the statutory provisions were designed to protect consumers and ensure quality in building work, and limiting the scope of the provisions to only defective or incomplete work would undermine this objective. Consequently, the court allowed for a broader application of the statutory provisions, enabling them to address a wider array of issues related to building work.
Additionally, the court considered whether its jurisdiction extended to the dismissal of the application for summary judgment against the Third Defendant. The court found that it did have the jurisdiction to dismiss the application for summary judgment. This decision was based on the court's interpretation of the applicable procedural rules and the nature of the claims made against the Third Defendant. The court held that the application for summary judgment was not appropriate in the circumstances and that a full hearing was required to determine the merits of the claims against the Third Defendant. The court's decision underscored the importance of ensuring that justice is served through a thorough and fair hearing, rather than through summary proceedings that may not adequately address the complexities of the case.
In summary, the Queensland Court of Appeal's decision in Queensland Building Services Authority v Gus Namour (No 1) provides valuable insights into the interpretation and application of sections 71 and 111C of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act (1991). The court's reasoning and ratio decidendi establish that the plaintiff is not required to prove through whose fault the claim arose, that the reference to defective or incomplete work is not exclusive, and that the court has jurisdiction to dismiss an application for summary judgment when appropriate. These findings ensure that the statutory provisions are applied in a manner that aligns with their intended purpose and protects the rights of all parties involved in building work disputes.