SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
QNI Resources Pty Ltd & Anor v Vannin Capital Operations Limited & Ors [2023] QCA 216
PARTIES:
QNI RESOURCES PTY LTD
ACN 054 117 921
(first appellant)
QNI METALS PTY LTD
ACN 066 656 175
(second appellant)
v
VANNIN CAPITAL OPERATIONS LIMITED
(first respondent)
PALMER AVIATION PTY LTD
ACN 158 870 789
(second respondent)
QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD
ACN 009 842 068
(third respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 1332 of 2023
SC No 13947 of 2018DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2023] QSC 1 (Burns J)DELIVERED ON:
3 November 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
9 October 2023
JUDGES:
Mullins P and Boddice JA and Applegarth J
ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The parties have leave to file and serve written submissions as to costs, limited to three pages, within 14 days.
3. The costs of the appeal be determined on the papers.
CATCHWORDS:
MORTGAGES – ESTATE, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE – OTHER MATTERS – where a predecessor in right to the first respondent funded the purchase of an aircraft by the second respondent pursuant to a loan facility and associated documents – where repayment of the loan was secured by a mortgage over the aircraft – where the repayment obligations of the second respondent under the loan was the subject of a guarantee and indemnity provided by the third respondent – where the third respondent was the general manager of a joint venture in which the first and second appellants were participants – where the second and third respondents were placed into voluntary administration, constituting an event of default under the loan facility – where the second and third respondents failed to comply with demands for payment of the loan amount – where the debt was subsequently assigned to the first respondent – where the first respondent issued a certificate of indebtedness (“the certificate”) – where the first respondent commenced proceedings against the appellants and second and third respondents, claiming recovery of the amount outstanding under the loan facility – where judgment was entered in favour of the first respondent – whether there was proof of the debt by the certificate or at all – whether the facility agreement required the certificate to be issued by an officer holding a particular qualification – whether the right to issue a certificate was capable of assignment
MORTGAGES – MORTGAGEE’S REMEDIES – SALE UNDER POWER – EXERCISE OF POWER – DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF MORTGAGEE – GENERALLY – where the aircraft was sold by the liquidators of the second respondent – where there was a significant shortfall between the sale proceeds and the outstanding balance of the loan facility – where the primary judge found the duty owed by a mortgagee exercising a power of sale did not require the mortgage “to sell for the best price obtainable or to act in such a way as to advance the interests of…
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- Case
- [2023] QCA 216
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the certificate issued by the first respondent was valid, and if so, whether it constituted conclusive evidence of the debt. Additionally, the court had to determine the scope and content of the duty owed by a mortgagee when exercising a power of sale. The appellants argued that the certificate was not valid, as it did not meet the criteria specified in the facility agreement, and that the mortgagee had a duty to achieve the best price possible when selling the aircraft. The primary judge, however, held that the certificate was valid and provided at least prima facie evidence of the debt. Furthermore, the judge found that the duty of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale was limited to acting in good faith and not unconscionably.
The court found that the facility agreement allowed for the assignment of the right to issue a certificate of indebtedness, and that the certificate issued by the first respondent was valid as it was not affected by manifest error. The court also held that the duty of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale did not require the mortgagee to achieve the best price possible, but rather to act in good faith and not unconscionably. The court further found that the liquidators, not the mortgagee, sold the aircraft and that the mortgagee did not breach any duty by consenting to the sale and agreeing to release its security.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the parties were given leave to file written submissions on the matter of costs. The costs of the appeal were to be determined on the papers. This decision highlights the importance of strict construction of clauses providing for conclusive evidence certificates, and the limited duty of a mortgagee when exercising a power of sale.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The parties have leave to file and serve written submissions as to costs, limited to three pages, within 14 days.
3. The costs of the appeal be determined on the papers.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellants rely on three grounds that:(a)There was no proof of the debt by a contractual certificate or at all;(b)There was a duty owed by the mortgagee in selling the aircraft; and(c)There was error in the primary judge’s conclusion with respect to the requirement for, and refusal of, the appellants’ application for leave to amend their defence and counterclaim to encompass allegations sought to be pursued at trial.ConsiderationGround 1 The appellants submit that the primary judge erroneously concluded that the first respondent, as assignee, could issue a certificate under cl 18.13. Further, even if it could, the certificate issued was not one that met the necessary criteria, in that it was not signed by a person with personal knowledge of the alleged debt, or by a person who came within the class of persons authorised to sign such a certificate. In support of those submissions, the appellants rely on observations by Young J (as his Honour then was) in Shomat Pty Ltd v Rubinstein,[3] in relation to a clause in a contract which specified that a statement of certificate be “issued by a ‘Solicitor, Conveyancer, Manager or Accountant’”. Young J found that having regard to that specification, “the statement/certificate which was required was one to be prepared by a properly qualified official on due investigation …”.[4][3](1995) 124 FLR 284 (Shomat).[4]Shomat at 289. The appellants also rely on observations by Ward CJ in Equity (as her Honour then was) in Lucantonio v Benscrape Pty Ltd,[5] and Bathurst CJ (with whom Gleeson and Payne JJA agreed) in Beefeater Sales International Pty Ltd v MIS Funding No 1 Pty Ltd,[6] in support of the principle that clauses providing for conclusive evidence certificates are to be strictly construed.[5][2020] NSWSC 579 at [77] (Lucantonio).[6][2016] NSWCA 217 (Beefeater). Whilst each of those decisions support a strict construction of clauses of that nature, each makes it clear that the construction of such clauses is best approached by having regard to the parties’ actual intentions by that clause.[7][7]Lucantonio at [77], per Ward CJ in Equity; Beefeater at [98], per Bathurst CJ (with whom Gleeson and Payne JJA agreed). Accordingly, whether the right under cl 18.13 was capable of assignment and whether it required the issuing of a certificate by an officer holding a particular qualification, requires a consideration of the construction of the loan facility agreement. Whilst the appellants submit that the proper construction of the facility agreement was that the definition of “lender” operated to limit the “person” who could issue a certificate to a certain officer, namely, “Corporate Aviation, Director-Underwriting”, a consideration of the completed details for lender in the details section supports a conclusion that the reference to the designated officer is part of the address details, nominating the person within the lender organisation to whom any notice is to be directed. The reference to that position does not designate a particular officer level as a condition precedent to the issuance of an efficacious certificate.