QNI Resources Pty Ltd v Vannin Capital Operations Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

QNI Resources Pty Ltd & Anor v Vannin Capital Operations Limited & Ors [2023] QCA 216

PARTIES:

QNI RESOURCES PTY LTD
ACN 054 117 921
(first appellant)
QNI METALS PTY LTD
ACN 066 656 175
(second appellant)
v
VANNIN CAPITAL OPERATIONS LIMITED
(first respondent)
PALMER AVIATION PTY LTD
ACN 158 870 789
(second respondent)
QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD
ACN 009 842 068
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 1332 of 2023
SC No 13947 of 2018

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2023] QSC 1 (Burns J)

DELIVERED ON:

3 November 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

9 October 2023

JUDGES:

Mullins P and Boddice JA and Applegarth J

ORDERS:

1.   The appeal be dismissed.

2.   The parties have leave to file and serve written submissions as to costs, limited to three pages, within 14 days.

3.   The costs of the appeal be determined on the papers.

CATCHWORDS:

MORTGAGES – ESTATE, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE – OTHER MATTERS – where a predecessor in right to the first respondent funded the purchase of an aircraft by the second respondent pursuant to a loan facility and associated documents – where repayment of the loan was secured by a mortgage over the aircraft – where the repayment obligations of the second respondent under the loan was the subject of a guarantee and indemnity provided by the third respondent – where the third respondent was the general manager of a joint venture in which the first and second appellants were participants – where the second and third respondents were placed into voluntary administration, constituting an event of default under the loan facility – where the second and third respondents failed to comply with demands for payment of the loan amount – where the debt was subsequently assigned to the first respondent – where the first respondent issued a certificate of indebtedness (“the certificate”) – where the first respondent commenced proceedings against the appellants and second and third respondents, claiming recovery of the amount outstanding under the loan facility – where judgment was entered in favour of the first respondent – whether there was proof of the debt by the certificate or at all – whether the facility agreement required the certificate to be issued by an officer holding a particular qualification – whether the right to issue a certificate was capable of assignment

MORTGAGES – MORTGAGEE’S REMEDIES – SALE UNDER POWER – EXERCISE OF POWER – DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF MORTGAGEE – GENERALLY – where the aircraft was sold by the liquidators of the second respondent – where there was a significant shortfall between the sale proceeds and the outstanding balance of the loan facility – where the primary judge found the duty owed by a mortgagee exercising a power of sale did not require the mortgage “to sell for the best price obtainable or to act in such a way as to advance the interests of…

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Details
Case
[2023] QCA 216
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of QNI Resources Pty Ltd v Vannin Capital Operations Limited, the primary issues revolved around the validity of a certificate of indebtedness issued by the first respondent, and the duty of the mortgagee in exercising a power of sale. GE Commercial Australasia Pty Ltd had loaned money to the second respondent, who was to use the funds to purchase an aircraft. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the aircraft, with the third respondent providing a guarantee and indemnity. After the second and third respondents entered into voluntary administration, the debt was assigned to the first respondent, who issued a certificate of indebtedness. The first respondent then initiated proceedings against the appellants and the second and third respondents, seeking recovery of the outstanding loan amount. The primary judge found in favour of the first respondent, leading to the appeal.

The legal issues before the court were whether the certificate issued by the first respondent was valid, and if so, whether it constituted conclusive evidence of the debt. Additionally, the court had to determine the scope and content of the duty owed by a mortgagee when exercising a power of sale. The appellants argued that the certificate was not valid, as it did not meet the criteria specified in the facility agreement, and that the mortgagee had a duty to achieve the best price possible when selling the aircraft. The primary judge, however, held that the certificate was valid and provided at least prima facie evidence of the debt. Furthermore, the judge found that the duty of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale was limited to acting in good faith and not unconscionably.

The court found that the facility agreement allowed for the assignment of the right to issue a certificate of indebtedness, and that the certificate issued by the first respondent was valid as it was not affected by manifest error. The court also held that the duty of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale did not require the mortgagee to achieve the best price possible, but rather to act in good faith and not unconscionably. The court further found that the liquidators, not the mortgagee, sold the aircraft and that the mortgagee did not breach any duty by consenting to the sale and agreeing to release its security.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the parties were given leave to file written submissions on the matter of costs. The costs of the appeal were to be determined on the papers. This decision highlights the importance of strict construction of clauses providing for conclusive evidence certificates, and the limited duty of a mortgagee when exercising a power of sale.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The parties have leave to file and serve written submissions as to costs, limited to three pages, within 14 days.

3. The costs of the appeal be determined on the papers.

Background

Background to the litigation

Central to the appeal are two questions, enunciated by the appellants:“(a)First, whether a clause empowering a conclusive evidence certificate is assignable generally, or as matters of context might apply, and, if so, can it be given by an assignee representative with no personal knowledge of the assignor’s record keeping?(b)Second, what is the content and scope of the duty of a mortgagee when exercising a power of sale, or involved in it; including whether the duty only requires a mortgagee to act conscionably; and what does conscionability entail, in particular, does it extend to the obligation to achieve the best obtainable price consistent with the mortgagee’s right to realise the security?”Background In June 2012, GE Commercial Australasia Pty Ltd (GEC) loaned money to the second respondent, to finance the purchase of an aircraft. At the relevant time, the first and second appellants were participants in a joint venture agreement (JVA), conducting a nickel refinery in Townsville. The third respondent was the general manager of the JVA and was owned by the first and second appellants. Clive Palmer (Palmer) was a director of each appellant company and of the second and third respondents. One of the transaction documents was a written facility agreement between GEC, as lender, and the second respondent, as borrower. The facility agreement was entitled “US$ Aircraft Loan Facility Agreement”. Palmer executed the agreement on 28 June 2012, on behalf of the second and third respondents.[1][1]The second respondent had been incorporated on 7 June 2012 as a special purpose vehicle to borrow money to purchase the aircraft. The facility agreement was secured by a mortgage over the aircraft and guaranteed by the third respondent, on terms set out in a guarantee and indemnity contained in a schedule to the facility agreement. Clause 1.1 of the facility agreement defined various terms “unless a contrary intention appears”. Relevantly:(a)“Obligor” was defined to mean “individually or collectively, as the context may require, or permit [the second and third respondents] and any other person (if any) who gives, grants, enters into or otherwise provides any Security in connection with the Facility and/or any Transaction Document (each in any capacity)”; and (b)“Transaction Documents” was defined to include, in addition to the facility agreement, a document described as a “Joint Venturer Letter”. On the same day, a joint venturer letter, in the form of a deed, was given by the first and second appellants, in favour of GEC. It was signed by Palmer, along with the secretary of each company. Relevantly, the joint venturer letter contained the following acknowledgements:“1.AcknowledgementsEach of [first appellant] and [second appellant] (Joint Venturers) confirm, agree and acknowledge that:(a)the Joint Venturers have appointed [third respondent] as the ‘General Manager’ of the Joint Venture under the [JVA], and such appointment includes the appointment of [third respondent] as manager for all purposes of the Joint Venture, inter alia, including in connection with the Transaction Documents;(b)[Third respondent] is and remains the ‘General Manager’ of the Joint Venture and has not been removed as ‘General Manager’;(c)[Third respondent] enters into the Transaction Documents in its personal capacity, as nominee and agent of the Joint Venturers under the [JVA] and as General Manager;(d)the Secured Property does not constitute Joint Venture Property;(e)all approvals required under the terms of [the JVA] for each of [third respondent] and Joint Venturer’s entry into, delivery and performance of the Transaction Documents to which it is a party and for its carrying out the transactions contemplated by those Transaction Documents have been obtained and remain in full force and effect;(f)the entry by [third respondent] into, delivery and performance of the Transaction Documents to which it is a party and its carrying out of the transactions contemplated by those Transaction Documents are actions taken by it in the performance of its duties and responsibilities as General Manager;(g)the costs, liabilities and expenses under or in connection with the Transaction Documents incurred by [third respondent] under this Agreement are:(i) costs, liabilities and expenses properly incurred by it in performing its obligations under the [JVA], and(ii) under the terms of the [JVA], required to be met by, and are, liabilities of the Joint Venturers; and(h)the copy of the [JVA] provided by [third respondent] to [GEC] is a true and complete copy of the [JVA], and the [JVA] remains in full force and effect and has not been terminated; and(i)the Joint Venturers have received a copy of the Facility Agreement.” (emphasis in original)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was also submitted at trial, that the best price attainable was the offer made by Palmer and the third party and that Harrenvale breached its duty to achieve the best price attainable in selling the aircraft for US$5.6 million.Primary decision The primary judge found that although the term “Lender” was defined in cl 1.1 of the facility agreement as “the person described as such in the Details section”, and that in that section there was recorded:Lender: Name: GE Commercial Australasia Pty LtdABN: 98 096 876 292Address: Level 13, 255 George StreetSYDNEY NSW 2000Facsimile: (02) 8249 3784Attention: Corporate Aviation, Director-Underwritingthe certificate issued by the first respondent, pursuant to cl 18.13, on 27 April 2021, was a valid certificate on a proper construction of the facility agreement. In coming to that conclusion, the primary judge held that the facility agreement specifically provided that a reference to “a party to any document” includes “that party’s successors and permitted assigns” and that the right on the part of the lender to assign the whole of its rights under the agreement was expressly preserved, including the right to issue a certificate of indebtedness. The primary judge further found there was no suggestion the relevant certificate was affected by “manifest error”, or even that it was incorrect in some respect. Accordingly, it afforded at least prima facie evidence of the fact of the indebtedness and of its quantum at the date of issue. Further, that amount was supported by spreadsheets containing detailed calculations of the overall debt. Those spreadsheets formed the basis for the certificate. Accordingly, the first respondent had proved the debt in the amount certified on 27 April 2021. The primary judge found that the duty owed by a mortgagee exercising a power of sale did not require the mortgagee “to sell for the best price obtainable or to act in such a way as to advance the interests of the mortgagor”. The exercise of that power was subject only to the qualification that the mortgagee must act in good faith and not unconscionably, or in a way which sacrificed the interests of the first and second appellants and/or the third respondent by acting in a wilful or reckless way. The primary judge found that the counterclaim was misconceived in alleging a breach of duty by Harrenvale. Harrenvale did not sell the aircraft; it was sold by the liquidators in accordance with their power under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Giving its consent to the sale and agreeing to release its security did not mean Harrenvale was exercising its power of sale under the aircraft mortgage. In reaching this conclusion, the primary judge found that nothing in the evidence supported the contention that the liquidators acted as agents for Harrenvale in the marketing and sale of the aircraft. The primary judge further found that the offer made on 19 May 2016 was an offer to buy the aircraft and the debt. In rejecting that offer, Harrenvale expressly described it as “both unconstructive and unilaterally favourable to Mr Palmer” and said it was unable to accept such a position. It was in that context that the counteroffer was made for a substantially larger sum, restricted to the sale of the aircraft and not conditional upon the result of proceedings in Western Australia. However, no agreement was ever reached as to price and there was no evidence of negotiations thereafter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants rely on three grounds that:(a)There was no proof of the debt by a contractual certificate or at all;(b)There was a duty owed by the mortgagee in selling the aircraft; and(c)There was error in the primary judge’s conclusion with respect to the requirement for, and refusal of, the appellants’ application for leave to amend their defence and counterclaim to encompass allegations sought to be pursued at trial.ConsiderationGround 1 The appellants submit that the primary judge erroneously concluded that the first respondent, as assignee, could issue a certificate under cl 18.13. Further, even if it could, the certificate issued was not one that met the necessary criteria, in that it was not signed by a person with personal knowledge of the alleged debt, or by a person who came within the class of persons authorised to sign such a certificate. In support of those submissions, the appellants rely on observations by Young J (as his Honour then was) in Shomat Pty Ltd v Rubinstein,[3] in relation to a clause in a contract which specified that a statement of certificate be “issued by a ‘Solicitor, Conveyancer, Manager or Accountant’”. Young J found that having regard to that specification, “the statement/certificate which was required was one to be prepared by a properly qualified official on due investigation …”.[4][3](1995) 124 FLR 284 (Shomat).[4]Shomat at 289. The appellants also rely on observations by Ward CJ in Equity (as her Honour then was) in Lucantonio v Benscrape Pty Ltd,[5] and Bathurst CJ (with whom Gleeson and Payne JJA agreed) in Beefeater Sales International Pty Ltd v MIS Funding No 1 Pty Ltd,[6] in support of the principle that clauses providing for conclusive evidence certificates are to be strictly construed.[5][2020] NSWSC 579 at [77] (Lucantonio).[6][2016] NSWCA 217 (Beefeater). Whilst each of those decisions support a strict construction of clauses of that nature, each makes it clear that the construction of such clauses is best approached by having regard to the parties’ actual intentions by that clause.[7][7]Lucantonio at [77], per Ward CJ in Equity; Beefeater at [98], per Bathurst CJ (with whom Gleeson and Payne JJA agreed). Accordingly, whether the right under cl 18.13 was capable of assignment and whether it required the issuing of a certificate by an officer holding a particular qualification, requires a consideration of the construction of the loan facility agreement. Whilst the appellants submit that the proper construction of the facility agreement was that the definition of “lender” operated to limit the “person” who could issue a certificate to a certain officer, namely, “Corporate Aviation, Director-Underwriting”, a consideration of the completed details for lender in the details section supports a conclusion that the reference to the designated officer is part of the address details, nominating the person within the lender organisation to whom any notice is to be directed. The reference to that position does not designate a particular officer level as a condition precedent to the issuance of an efficacious certificate.