QBE Travel Insurance v Bassanelli

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QBE Travel Insurance v Bassanelli [2004] FCA 396

DISCRIMINATION LAW – ss 5 and 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act) contravened by insurance company by declining to issue any policy of travel insurance to an individual with metastatic breast cancer, on the basis of that cancer, for a short overseas holiday – insurance company sought to rely upon exemption in s 46 of DD Act which would make lawful any breach of ss 5 and 24 of DD Act – construction of s 46(1) of DD Act – consideration of inter-action of s 46(1)(f) and s 46(1)(g) of DD Act – where onus of proof lies in establishing the exemption in s 46 of DD Act – whether travel insurance policies offered by other insurance companies are relevant factors in deciding under s 46(1) of DD Act reasonableness of the insurance company’s discrimination – whether discrimination reasonable having regard to relevant factors

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 5, 24, 46
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PH(1)(a)
Explanatory Memorandum to the Disability Discrimination Bill 1992 (Cth)

Director of Public Prosecutions v United Telecasters Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 applied
Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 applied
Waters v Public Transport Commission (1991) 173 CLR 349 applied
Clarke v Catholic Education Office [2003] FCA 1085 applied
Nelson v John Lysaght (Australia) Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 201 applied
Hamilton v Nuroof (WA) Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 18 applied
Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs v Styles (1989) 88 ALR 621 applied
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) 150 ALR 1 applied
Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 63 FCR 74 cited
Pettit v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 applied
Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145 applied
Bourke v Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd (1993) 47 FCR 264 applied

QBE TRAVEL INSURANCE v DENICE BASSANELLI

S 806 of 2003

MANSFIELD J
7 APRIL 2004
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 806 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

QBE TRAVEL INSURANCE
APPELLANT

AND:

DENICE BASSANELLI
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 APRIL 2004

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal is dismissed.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 806 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

QBE TRAVEL INSURANCE
APPELLANT

AND:

DENICE BASSANELLI
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

7 APRIL 2004

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a Federal Magistrate given on 26 September 2003. The learned Magistrate declared that the appellant had unlawfully discriminated against the respondent, contrary to ss 5 and 24 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (the DD Act) by declining to issue…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 396
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of QBE Travel Insurance v Bassanelli involved the appellant, QBE Travel Insurance, and the respondent, a woman diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer, who sought travel insurance for a trip to Japan but was refused coverage. The case was heard in the Australian court system, with the appeal reaching the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue in the appeal was the interpretation and application of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), particularly whether QBE's refusal to provide travel insurance constituted unlawful discrimination against the respondent. The court had to consider the respondent's disclosed medical condition and whether this disclosure warranted the refusal of insurance under the terms of the policy and the Act.

The Federal Court of Australia examined the relevant provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act and the circumstances surrounding the respondent's application for travel insurance. The court focused on whether the refusal of insurance coverage constituted discrimination based on disability, as defined by the Act. The court also assessed the respondent's emotional distress caused by the refusal and the adequacy of the compensatory damages awarded. People with Disability Australia Incorporated, as an intervenor, provided submissions on the proper construction of the DD Act, which influenced the court's interpretation of the statutory provisions.

The court found that the refusal of insurance coverage did not constitute unlawful discrimination under the Act. The court reasoned that the respondent's medical condition and treatment were appropriately considered by QBE in making their decision, and that the respondent had not expected to obtain insurance coverage for events related to her condition. Furthermore, the court held that the damages awarded for the respondent's emotional distress were not manifestly excessive, considering her testimony and the impact of the refusal on her outlook and plans. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court was reversed.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

On the appeal, People with Disability Australia Incorporated (the intervenor) was given leave to appear, limited to making submissions as to the proper construction of the relevant provisions of the DD Act. The intervenor’s submissions were not on all fours with those of either party.THE FACTS There is now no issue about many of the relevant facts. The respondent was born on 3 August 1965. In May 1997, she was diagnosed with early breast cancer. In December 2000, she was diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer. For that condition, she was at the material time being treated with four-weekly biophosphonate infusions as a day care patient, and was taking a series of prescribed medications. In about July 2002, the respondent won a competition to travel to Japan. She arranged to travel to Japan between 26 and 31 July 2002. On 19 July 2002, through her travel agent, she applied to the appellant for travel insurance for the trip. She completed an application form for the travel insurance for submission to the appellant. She disclosed the information about her medical condition and treatment as set out in [4] above. She did not expect to obtain travel insurance in respect of any events related to or arising from her disclosed medical condition. Although the form she completed is headed ‘Preliminary Medical Appraisal Form’, and includes a section to be completed by a doctor, that section was not completed. The respondent was not asked to procure its completion. The form was then sent by the travel agent to the appellant. It was marked by the travel agent ‘Urgent reply pls’. It was considered by the officers of the appellant. On the same day, 19 July 2002, the respondent, through her travel agent, was notified of the appellant’s decision in the following terms:‘Unfortunately NO POLICY whatsoever may be issued on our behalf.Consideration has been given to many factors including the medical condition(s), length of the trip, destination and age.Should you have any questions please contact the Medical Appraisal Department on the above telephone number.’ The respondent did not then contact the appellant. Through her travel agent, she procured alternative travel insurance satisfactory to her. She completed her travel to Japan. Subsequently, on 2 September 2002, the respondent made a complaint to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) that the appellant had unlawfully discriminated against her, contrary to ss 5 and 24 of the DD Act by refusing to grant her any travel insurance in respect of her then proposed trip to Japan. On 26 March 2003, HREOC, after conducting an investigation into the complaint, terminated the complaint under s 46PH(1)(a) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (the HREOC Act). The delegate of the President of HREOC was satisfied that the alleged unlawful discrimination was not unlawful discrimination. Reasons for that decision were given. On 10 April 2003, the respondent applied to the Federal Magistrates Court under s 46PO of the HREOC Act to challenge that decision. The present appeal is from the decision of the learned magistrate in substance reversing the decision of the delegate of the President of HREOC.THE LEGISLATION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
I also reject the contention that the damages awarded were manifestly excessive. The evidence of the respondent demonstrates how deeply she was distressed by the appellant’s discriminatory conduct. She said she was ‘devastated’. She said:‘When living with cancer like I do, you need to keep a positive outlook on life, and winning this trip was a good omen as we were planning an overseas family holiday in 2003. Japan would be a great dress rehearsal. The refusal by QBE was like being given the cancer diagnosis again. I was angry that “someone” that doesn’t know me was telling me to stay home, be good and just die quietly. They, QBE, wanted to bury me before my time is up.’ For a time, she felt the appellant had taken away all that was positive about winning the holiday. She described the appellant as reaffirming the ‘negatives about cancer’. It was not suggested her reaction was not a reasonable one. Medical evidence was not necessary for the Magistrate to accept the respondent’s distress. In my view, the amount awarded was within the range of compensatory damages which the Magistrate might have awarded.CONCLUSION For the reasons given, I consider the appeal should be dismissed. I so order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J