Putland v The Queen - [2003] HCATrans 418

[2003] HCATrans 418

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Darwin No D11 of 2003

B e t w e e n -
ROBERT JOHN PUTLAND
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 22 OCTOBER 2003, AT 11.00 AM

MR D GRACE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with, MR R.R. GOLDFLAM, for the appellant. (instructed by Northern Territory Legal Aid Commission)

MR D.J. BUGG, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with, MR G.C. FISHER, for the respondent. (instructed by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)

MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia:If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.R. BEECH, for the Attorney‑General, intervening in support of the respondent. It has been agreed between the Director and myself that we will divide up the arguments, so we will not duplicate it and that I will go first. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Grace.

KIRBY J: Mr Grace, I have a recollection that when special leave was granted in this case there was some condition imposed by the Court concerning the appearance of your client in Adelaide on this day. Is that correct or not?

MR GRACE: No, appearance ‑ ‑ ‑

KIRBY J: Is on the day of judgment, is it?

MR GRACE: On the day of judgment, yes.

KIRBY J: I see, thank you.

MR GRACE: Your Honours, the question in this case is whether there is a power under any Commonwealth legislation to impose an aggregate sentence, whether in terms provided by the Crimes Act (Cth) or whether it was capable of being picked up by section 68 of the Judiciary Act.

GLEESON CJ: It being the Northern Territory legislation?

MR GRACE: Yes.

GLEESON CJ: Empowered judges who were sentencing for multiple offences in their discretion to impose an aggregate sentence?

MR GRACE: Yes.

KIRBY J: Would you explain exactly what you understand by an aggregate sentence?

MR GRACE: It is one global sentence imposed for two or more offences.

GLEESON CJ: Where is the Northern Territory statute?

MR GRACE: It is contained in a green folder that your Honours have been provided by the Attorney‑General, plus in other material, but it is most convenient in this folder. It is behind tab 2.

KIRBY J: Is not the power to impose an aggregate sentence – leave aside for a moment whether you can do it – is not it a facility that tends to favour recognition of the principle of totality that we were discussing in the last case to avoid the risk that by taking bits and pieces that you will impose an excessive sentence, to impose an aggregate sentence facilitates looking at the total criminality?

MR GRACE: It may or may not. One just does not know in a given…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Putland v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Putland v The Queen [2003] HCATrans 418
Case: [2003] HCATrans 418
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Putland against his conviction for armed robbery. The dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained from Putland following his arrest, specifically a confession and items found in his possession. The High Court was tasked with determining whether this evidence should have been excluded by the trial judge.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence obtained from Putland after his arrest was unlawfully obtained, and if so, whether it should have been excluded in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion. This involved considering the provisions of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) regarding arrest and detention, and the common law principles governing the admissibility of evidence obtained in circumstances where police powers may have been exceeded.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the arrest of Putland was unlawful. However, they found that the subsequent confession and the discovery of the stolen property were not rendered inadmissible by this unlawfulness. The Court applied the principle that evidence obtained following an unlawful arrest may still be admissible if it was not obtained "by reason of" the unlawful act. The judges reasoned that the confession was voluntary and the items found were discovered through the accused's own volition, not as a direct consequence of the unlawful arrest itself. The Court affirmed that the discretion to exclude evidence obtained unlawfully is a broad one, but it is not mandatory to exclude such evidence in all circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders