Purse v Workers' Compensation Regulator

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Purse v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 299
PARTIES:	Purse, Adam (Appellant) v Workers' Compensation Regulator (Respondent)
CASE NO:	WC/2023/22
PROCEEDING:	Appeal against decision of Workers' Compensation Regulator
DELIVERED ON:	5 November 2025
HEARING DATES:	19 March 2024 20 March 2024 21 March 2024
SUBMISSIONS:	Appellant's closing submissions: 3 June 2024 Respondent's closing submissions: 13 June 2024 Appellant's closing submissions in reply: 1 July 2024
MEMBER:	Power IC
HEARD AT:	Toowoomba
ORDERS:	1. The appeal is upheld. 2. The decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator is set aside. 3. Failing agreement on costs, to be the subject of a further application to the Commission within 28 days.
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS' COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION – psychiatric or psychological injury – whether allegations substantiated – whether injury arises from management action – whether injury excluded under s 32(5) of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – appeal upheld.
LEGISLATION:	Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 32
CASES:	Davis v Blackwood [2014] ICQ 009 Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8, 101 CLR 298 MacDonald v Q-COMP (No. 2) [2008] ICQ 20 McGrory v Medina Property Services Pty Ltd [2017] QCA 234 Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 246 Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP [2006] QIRC 31 Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey [2016] ICQ 010 State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2020] QIRC 097 Taylor v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] QIRC 6 Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langerak [2020] ICQ 2
APPEARANCES:	Mr C. Watters of Counsel instructed by Work Rights Australia Ms L. Willson of Counsel directly instructed by the Respondent

Reasons for Decision

Mr Adam Purse ('the Appellant') appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator ('the Respondent') to reject his application for compensation in relation to an injury pursuant to s 32 of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ('the Act').
The Appellant claims that he suffered a psychological injury arising out of or in the course of his employment at the Toowoomba Regional Council ('TRC') to which his employment was a significant contributing factor.

Issue for determination

The issue to be determined is whether the Appellant suffered a personal injury within the meaning of s 32 of the Act. Section 32 of the Act provides:

32 Meaning of injury

(1)An injury is personal injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury.
(2)However, employment need not be a contributing factor to the injury if section 34(2) or 35(2)applies.
(3)Injury includes the following—
(a)a disease contracted in the course of employment, whether at or away from the place of employment, if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the disease;
(b)an aggravation of the following, if the aggravation arises out of, or in the course of, employment and the employment is a significant contributing factor to the aggravation—
(i)a personal injury;
(ii)a disease;
(iii)a medical condition, if the condition becomes a personal injury or disease because of the aggravation;

(c)loss of hearing resulting in industrial deafness if the employment is a significant contributing factor to causing the loss of hearing;
(d)death from injury arising out of, or in the course of, employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to causing the injury;
(e)death from a disease mentioned in paragraph (a), if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the disease;
(f)death from an aggravation mentioned in paragraph (b), if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the aggravation.

(4)For subsection (3)(b), to remove any doubt, it is declared that an aggravation mentioned in the provision is an injury only to the extent of the effects of the aggravation.
(5)Despite subsections (1) and (3), injury does not include a psychiatric or psychological disorder arising out of, or in the course of, any of the following circumstances—
(a)reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment;
(b)the worker's expectation or perception of reasonable management action being taken against the worker;
(c)action by the Regulator or an insurer in connection with the worker's application for compensation.

Examples of actions that may be reasonable management actions taken in a reasonable way—
•action taken to transfer, demote, discipline, redeploy, retrench or dismiss the worker
•a decision not to award or provide promotion, reclassification or transfer of, or leave of absence or benefit in connection with, the worker's employment

This appeal to the Commission is by way of a hearing de novo, upon which the onus of proof falls on the Appellant. The Commission must be satisfied that the worker has suffered an injury within the meaning of the Act.[1]
[1] MacDonald v Q-COMP (No. 2) [2008] ICQ 20; Qantas Airways Limited v Q-COMP [2006] QIRC 31.
The Appellant must demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that the claim is one for acceptance. That is, that the Appellant suffered an injury; the injury arose out of, or in the course of his employment with the employer; and the employment with the employer was a significant contributing factor to the injury.

The Appellant must also demonstrate that the injury is not excluded by the reasonable management action provision of s 32(5) of the Act.
The parties are in agreement that the Appellant was a worker, that he sustained a psychological or psychiatric injury, and that the injury arose out of his employment with the employer.
After carefully considering all of the evidence in this matter, on the balance of probabilities, I find that the Appellant has sustained an injury in accordance with s 32 and the injury is not excluded due to the operation of s 32(5) of the Act.
My reasons follow.

Evidence

The Appellant called the following witnesses to give evidence:
i)       Adam Purse, the Appellant;
ii)      Dr Shirley Butler, general practitioner;
iii)     Logan Harvey, psychologist;
iv)     Robert Charles Gibson, machinery operator (TRC);
v)      Gregory Rickert, unsealed supervisor (TRC);
vi)     Graham Thuns, plant operator (TRC);
vii)    Curt Batterham, fleet logistics controller (TRC);
viii)     Suraj Dewage, manager (TRC);
ix)     Nathan Whittaker, coordinator (TRC).
The Respondent called the following witness to give evidence:
i) Mark Williamson, plant operator (TRC).

Medical evidence
Logan Harvey, Psychologist

The report from Mr Logan Harvey provided the following summary of the Appellant's presenting issues:[2]
[The Appellant] initially presented reporting symptoms of anxiety and depression in the context of a protracted workplace dispute. He described a pattern of bullying and harassment by a colleague, followed by a period of what he described as inaction or inappropriate action by his employer…
[2] Exhibit 5.
Mr Harvey's report outlined that Dr Butler's letter of referral indicated an existing diagnosis of Adjustment Disorder and noted that Dr Butler had also indicated a diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ('PTSD') and noted that although the Appellant's brief, non-diagnostic measure of symptoms of PTSD were consistent with this diagnosis, he has not been formally assessed in this regard.

Mr Havey's report indicated that the Appellant had reported no history of mental health concerns and stated that the Appellant had reported:
… experiencing a period of primarily high anxiety and disturbed sleep across the course of his workplace issues. He identified symptoms of anxiety including cognitive symptoms (overthinking, worrying), and physical symptoms (sweating, agitation). [The Appellant] reported some experiences which may have been panic attacks. He reported his appetite had been decreased at this time.
Dr Shirley Butler, General Practitioner
Dr Butler was the Appellant's treating physician since 2020.
Dr Butler issued the Appellant a medical certificate after his visit on 26 November 2021. Dr Butler subsequently issued a WorkCover medical certificate on 29 November 2021, stating that the Appellant was suffering from 'work-related stress' and that the Appellant stated that the cause of injury was 'bullying at work'.
Further, Dr Butler provided a report to Local Government Workcare dated 28 February 2022 stating the following:
Clinical findings are consistent with Anxiety Disorder – severe sleep disturbance; nausea; abdominal pain; nightmares; sweats and feeling very stressed.
My opinion is that the conditions at his place of employment have caused [the Appellant] this injury.

The evidence of Dr Butler demonstrates that the Appellant's injury was caused by 'work-related stress' arising out of 'bullying' at work. This evidence does not suggest that management action played a role in the development of the injury.

Dr David McGillivray, General Practitioner

The Appellant visited Dr McGillivray on 2 August 2021 and requested a 'couple of weeks' off work for stress leave.
In Dr McGillivray's notes he states that the Appellant 'has been having issues with work causing significant stress' but does not refer to any particular management actions.
Date of injury
The medical records confirm that the Appellant reported having issues at work causing significant stress at an appointment with Dr McGillivray on 2 August 2021. Dr McGillivray's note confirms that the Appellant intended to take a couple of weeks leave from work for 'stress leave'. Whilst these medical notes indicate symptoms of stress had appeared by this date, the Appellant returned to work following his leave and a period of long service leave and worked for approximately a further two months.
The Respondent submits that the date of injury is 2 August 2021 on the basis that it was on this date that the Appellant attended upon Dr McGillivray and told him that he was suffering stress regarding work. Dr McGillivray's medical notes do not record any reference to the Appellant being bullied at this time.
The Respondent refers to Dr Butler's evidence that the Appellant's symptoms as of 2 August 2021 could give rise to her providing a workers compensation certificate if it were severe enough that he could not go to work. The reality however is that despite the Appellant giving evidence at the hearing that he had suffered from sleep disturbance, abdominal pains, nightmares and anxiety at the time, there is no record of these symptoms in Dr McGillivray's clinical notes.

The medical evidence indicates that in the period following his return to work, the Appellant developed a psychological injury. I am satisfied that the Appellant's date of injury is 26 November 2021 on the basis that it was on this date that Dr Butler assessed the Appellant and subsequently provided the worker's compensation medical certificate stating that the Appellant was suffering from 'work-related stress' caused by 'bullying at work'.[3]
[3] Exhibit 4.

Statement of Facts and Contentions ('SOFC')

The Appellant's SOFC outlined 20 individual stressors that he contends contributed to his injury.
Many of the stressors related to incidents in which both the Appellant and Mr Williamson were involved. In considering the often-competing evidence between these two witnesses, I generally prefer the evidence of the Appellant.

Mr Williamson's testimony was often vague due to difficulties in recalling conversations and interactions. Some of Mr Williamson's evidence was self-serving in parts, for example his evidence that he 'asked to be moved' to a different depot where the evidence indicates that this was in fact a recommendation by Mapien following their investigation.
The Appellant gave clear, direct evidence and made appropriate concessions throughout his evidence.
I note that the letter from TRC providing the outcome of the Mapien investigation dated 25 November 2021 was in evidence, however the Mapien investigation upon which the outcomes were determined was not tendered. Where the investigation report was not in evidence, the outcomes arrived at as outlined in the TRC letter are of limited probative value. In circumstances where there is no evidence before the Commission regarding the manner in which the investigation was conducted, the names of witnesses interviewed or the terms of reference, I do not consider that significant weight can be given to the outcomes outlined in the TRC letter.
Before an assessment can be made of the extent to which any of the stressors outlined contributed to the injury, an assessment must be made as to whether the basis for the stressor occurred as a matter of fact.

In Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes (NSW) Pty Ltd, the NSW Court of Appeal stated:[4]
A number of cases of high authority insist that for a tribunal of fact to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities of the existence of a fact, it must feel an actual persuasion of existence of that fact.
[4] [2008] NSWCA 246, [44].
Each stressor is considered in turn below to determine whether it has been demonstrated on the balance of probabilities, such that I am persuaded that the incident occurred as contended.

Stressor 2(a) – Sometime around 2017, the Appellant witnessed Mr Williamson bully, harass, threaten, and intimidate a non-union member, in an attempt to get that employee to join the Union. The Appellant resigned his Union membership in disgust, over this incident.

The Appellant gave evidence that he was working with Mr Guy Miller setting up signs when Mr Williamson came over and started talking about why they should be in the union. The Appellant, who was a union member at this point, stated that Mr Williamson became very abusive and very loud to the point where Mr Miller started to walk off.[5] The Appellant stated that Mr Miller was upset and very emotional and looked like he was crying. The Appellant stated that Mr Williamson walked behind him yelling, "Keep going, keep going", after which Mr Miller sat in his car until another boss came and sat with him to calm him down and took him back into the workplace. The Appellant submits that he was so disturbed about Mr Williamson's behaviour that he resigned his union membership.
[5] T 1-10, l 34 to T 1-11, l 12

Mr Miller was not called to give evidence in this matter. A Jones v Dunkel inference will be drawn that Mr Miller's evidence would not have assisted the Appellant's claim.[6]
[6] [1959] HCA 8, 101 CLR 298.
There is insufficient evidence that the incident occurred in the manner described by the Appellant.
Even if the incident occurred as outlined by the Appellant, I am not satisfied that it could be considered causative of the Appellant's injury. The incident is alleged to have occurred in 2017, approximately 4 years prior to the development of the Appellant's injury. There is no medical evidence that the incident, which did not involve Mr Williamson directly bullying the Appellant, was causative of the Appellant's injury.
Stressor 2(a) is not substantiated.

Stressor 2(b) – Around the time that Albert Eames was dismissed from TRC in 2018, (and for which the Appellant was wrongfully blamed), Mr Williamson drove his truck straight at the Appellant forcing him off the road and while pulling up next to the Appellant yelled at him: "You're gonna have a big problem if you don't shut your mouth".

I accept the Respondent's submission that there are no submissions by the Appellant that this occurred and instead an alternative factual allegation is made which is outside the scope of the Commission to consider.
The evidence given by the Appellant is that he drove his truck to be at level with Mr Williamson's window as he thought they would discuss the route to be taken that day.
The Appellant gave evidence that Mr Williamson blamed him for 'getting Albert Eames the sack' and became abusive and 'called him everything from dogs to scum or whatever' in a heated and aggressive state.[7]
[7] T 1-15, ll 14-15 and T 1-15, ll 27-29.
It appears that Mr Williamson was of the view that the Appellant had been involved in the dismissal of Albert Eames.[8] However there is no evidence that Mr Williamson drove his truck straight at the Appellant forcing him off the road. In addition, there is no evidence that he yelled at the Appellant "you're gonna have a big problem if you don't shut your mouth." Neither the evidence of the Appellant nor Mr Williamson indicated that this event occurred.
[8] T 3-40, l 10.
Accordingly, stressor 2(b) is not substantiated.

Stressor 2(c) – Also, in 2018, while the Appellant was loading gravel and rock at Cooyar, as the loader operator was absent and the Appellant was the only operator with a loader ticket, Mr Williamson directed the Appellant to load all trucks with the same weight/load. As different sized trucks were licensed to carry specific loads – this would have been a workplace health & safety and a motor transport breach. The Appellant refused, but later had his truck stood down as a result of a false complaint made about this – by Mr Williamson.

The Appellant gave evidence that when he began loading the trucks Mr Williamson said to him to load all the trucks the same weight. The Appellant's evidence was that he responded that he could not overload a certain truck if it did not carry that weight, at which point Mr Williamson became very abusive.[9]
[9] T 1-15, l 46.
The Appellant gave further evidence that when he went to put his timesheet in after the exchange he saw Mr Williamson speaking to the person in charge of the job.[10] In cross-examination the Appellant confirmed that he did not know what was discussed.[11]
[10] T 1-16, l 2.
[11] T 1-50, l 35.
In cross-examination the Appellant denied that he was jumping to conclusions that a false complaint had been made about him by Mr Williamson resulting in his truck being stood down after this incident.[12]
[12] T 1-50, l 41.
Mr Williamson gave evidence that there was a practical purpose for the way in which the trucks were loaded that day, and that there were no safety issues with this task. Mr Curt Batterham confirmed that there was no safety breach.[13] Mr Williamson's evidence did not outline what he said to the Appellant, however, he stated that he was not aware that the Appellant's truck was stood down the next day.[14]
[13] T 3-40, l 33.
[14] T 3-44, l 31.

I accept the Appellant's evidence that an exchange of words occurred between himself and Mr Williamson regarding the load weights. There is however no evidence that a false complaint was made by Mr Williamson against the Appellant resulting in his truck being stood down.
Stressor 2(c) is not substantiated.
Stressor 2(d) – During 2020, the Applicant was driving the number 3 truck in a convoy of trucks to Riley's Pit. The lead truck was being driven by Mr Williamson. The Appellant was flagged down by an irate motorist who claimed he had been run off the road by the first truck driver and he wanted to make a formal complaint. The Appellant placated the gentleman and gave him the TRC complaint contact details. The Appellant was later interviewed by management about this matter and told them he did not witness the incident but did provide Council details to the aggrieved driver. On the same day, Mr Williamson went to the Appellant's home, threatening him about the matter. The Appellant told him to leave his property and not return.
The Appellant gave evidence that he was flagged down by a motorist who complained that he had been run off the road by a truck driven by a TRC employee. The Appellant confirmed that he then gave the motorist the TRC complaint phone number.[15]
[15] T 1-20, l 35.

The Appellant gave further evidence that on another day soon after, Paul Spencer was tasked with investigating the incident and he then spoke to the Appellant about what had occurred.
The Appellant's evidence was that when he left the conversation with Mr Spencer, Mr Williamson walked straight up to Mr Spencer and began talking to him.[16]
[16] T 1-21, l 11.
The Appellant states that following the conversation with Mr Spencer, he returned home and was in his shed when he received a phone call from Mr Williamson. The Appellant stated the following:[17]
…
And no sooner, drove past on the public road, I received a call from Mark Williamson, "Adam, where are you?" I said, "I'm down here in my shed, Mark". "I want to see you". I said, "If you want to see me, don't come in past my guest houses, I have people coming and going". And he talked loudly over top of me, "Too late, I'm already in'. So, I said, "Well, drive down to my shed", which he drove past my house down between other two guest houses. At that time, there was no one in there. And down to my shed. And I stayed in my shed and I heard him pull up and he got out and I could, tell – sense that he was very aggressive towards me about something, and I assumed it was what I'd said to Paul Spencer, but I don't know. So as soon as he got out of the car, I said, "Mark Williamson, if you're worried about anything I said to Paul Spencer", I said "I spoke about my experience". With that, I was thinking he'll just leave, but he continued to walk into my shed. In an aggressive demeanour, but he settled down and we just talked a bit, and I told him to leave by the bottom gate where I asked him to wait and don't come under my place again. And I thought that would be the end of it.
[17] T 1-21, l 21.

When further questioned about how the Appellant knew that Mr Williamson was angry, the Appellant stated he knew because of the way Mr Williamson had spoken to him on the phone by not waiting until he finished and speaking over the top of him, along with his demeanour when getting out of his ute.[18]
[18] T 1-23, l 25.
The Appellant submits that the medical report of Dr Butler is corroborative of the Appellant's evidence on this issue. Dr Butler stated in her report of 28 February 2022 that 'the person who is threatening him at work turned up at Mr Purse's place of residence and threatened him there'. [19]
[19] Exhibit 1, Document 9.

Dr Butler's report is based upon information provided to her by the Appellant. Dr Butler has no independent source of information other than that provided by the Appellant and accordingly her report does not 'corroborate' the allegation, it merely records the information that has been provided by the Appellant.
Whilst it may be the case that the Appellant felt threatened by Mr Williamson's presence, the evidence does not demonstrate that Mr Williamson actually threatened the Appellant. On the Appellant's own evidence, Mr Williamson did not threaten him.
I do not however accept the Respondent's submission that the Appellant effectively invited Mr Williamson in by saying 'Okay, come to the bottom of the shed'.[20] The Appellant's evidence, which I accept, was that he told Mr Williamson not to drive onto his property before Mr Williamson responded that it was 'too late' and that he was already coming in.[21]
[20] T 1-51, l 13.
[21] T 1-51, l 11.

It appears that the Appellant felt threatened by the presence of Mr Williamson and he later conveyed this to Dr Butler. This is entirely plausible given the difficult history between the two men and the uninvited presence of Mr Williamson on the Appellant's land. The difficulty for the Appellant however is that there is no evidence that Mr Williamson actually threatened the Appellant.

I do not accept that the difference in the Appellant's evidence and the SOFC and subsequent report raises issues regarding the Appellant's credibility. Having heard the Appellant give evidence, I am satisfied that he gave truthful evidence of this and other incidents as he recalled them to have occurred. The Appellant made concessions that were against his interest, including conceding that no verbal threat had been made by Mr Williamson. The Appellant did not embellish his evidence to support his case and I am satisfied that he was a credible witness. On this basis, I prefer the Appellant's evidence over that of Mr Williamson, whom I found to be evasive in his testimony.
Whilst I accept that Mr Williamson attended the Appellant's property uninvited, the evidence that his demeanour was 'threatening' is not sufficiently cogent to form a conclusion that Mr Williamson did in fact threaten the Appellant.
Accordingly, stressor 2(d) is not substantiated.
Stressor 2(e) – In May 2021, Mr Williamson threatened: "I'll throw you under the bus" for alleged timesheet discrepancies, and again during a driver meeting in late May 2021, Mr Williamson started yelling at the Appellant, approaching him while holding a mobile phone in his clenched fist close to the Appellant's head, as if he was about to punch the Appellant.
When the proposition was put to Mr Williamson in cross-examination that he had said to Mr Purse, "I'll throw you under the bus over these timesheets" or words to that effect, Mr Williamson stated that he could not remember, however he "possibly said that".[22]

[22] T 3-86, l 10.

The Appellant's evidence was that Mr Williamson walked into the shed where the Appellant and Roger Mankins were seated and stated in an agitated manner that he was going to "throw some bastard under the bus" for issues regarding timesheets.[23] The Appellant's evidence was that Mr Mankins was unaware of the issue and asked him what the comment was about. The Appellant assumed that the comment was directed at him.[24]
[23] T 1-24, l 4.
[24] T 1-24, l 5.
On the basis that the Appellant had a clear memory of the interaction, and Mr Williamson conceded that it was possible that he had made the statement, I accept that the incident occurred in the manner outlined in the SOFC.

The second part of this stressor relates to an altercation at a Toolbox Talk in May 2021 ('the Toolbox Talk incident').
The Appellant gave the following evidence regarding the incident:[25]
Well, one fella sitting beside me, there's another fella next to him that got up and was talking about the job and saying you get more money on the dole and so forth and yeah, it was just totally, I felt, irrelevant to what we are trying to achieve. And all I said was, to the fellow sitting next to me, I said, "This is totally irrelevant". Quietly, just speaking to him. And with that, Mark Williamson was watching me. And he just yelled out, "If you got something to say, get up and say it", at the top of his voice. Very aggressive. So, I just stood up on my chair and said, "Mark, you're always complaining about all those bosses and all this stuff", I said, "You leave here, and you go out there and you talk about it. How about standing up? They're all here. Tell them your problem". And with that, he yelled back. And I yelled something out. And I said, "Well, you're always talking about it. You're taping it. You walk out behind the shed and you just look at it". I said, "Bring it up with them". And with that, Mark became very aggressive, walked through all those 40 people with the phone in his hand to where – to the extent where he was in centimetres from my face. And I stood my ground. And by then, other people got in between and pushed us apart. And I sat back down. And I just – I sort of felt devastated. All the bosses are there, but nothing was even – seemed to be done about, you know, or said, you know or – so, with that, I picked up my lunch box and 45 I said, "Well, I'll leave, if you just want me back, you can ring me". And as I walked out, Mark Williamson walked around the back of the people and followed me out of sight of them saying, "Bring it on, sunshine, bring it on". And I just ignored him and left and went and got my car and left.
[25] T 1-26, l 28.
Mr Williamson gave evidence that he confronted the Appellant after he saw him whispering to a colleague during the Toolbox Talk and said "If you've got something to say, just stand up and say it".[26] Mr Williamson further stated that the Appellant 'dogged him out' in front of everyone by stating that Mr Williamson did not say anything at Toolbox Talks but ran everyone down when they were at the trucks. Mr Williamson confirmed that he then walked over and 'fronted' the Appellant, but states that he did not have anything in his hand.[27]
[26] T 3-28, l 44.
[27] T 3-29, l 15.
Mr Greg Rickert, TRC supervisor, gave evidence that during the May 2021 Toolbox Talk he saw Mr Williamson angrily approach the Appellant from about 4 metres away and swung his arm at the Appellant.[28] Mr Rickert stated that the Appellant attempted to protect himself but either the Appellant's hand or Mr Williamson's hand hit the face of another colleague, Ms Mason. Mr Rickert further recalled that Mr Suraj Dewage intervened and 'put a halt to it'.[29]
[28] T 2-17, l 5.
[29] T 2-17, l 36.
The Appellant submits that TRC Manager Mr Dewage gave evidence that he was present at the Toolbox Talk incident where he witnessed Mr Williamson become very aggressive, threatening and abusive toward the Appellant. Mr Dewage stated that he saw Mr Williamson approach the Appellant and thought that he was going to physically hit the Appellant and so intervened before Mr Williamson swung his arm with a clenched fist at the Appellant.[30]
[30] T 3-9, l 24.
The evidence of the Appellant, Mr Dewage, and Mr Rickert supports a finding that that Mr Williamson behaved in a manner consistent with the allegation outlined in this stressor, with the exception of him holding a mobile phone. This evidence suggests that Mr Williamson's recollection of the incident is not reliable, and accordingly I find that Mr Williamson's conduct was consistent with the second part of this stressor.

The evidence given by the Appellant regarding this stressor is indicative of the understated manner in which he gave his evidence at the hearing. The Appellant gave a basic factual account of what had occurred, which I accept as accurate. I note however the evidence of Mr Dewage that he had not seen anything like the altercation during his 24-year career, describing Mr Williamsons' conduct as very intimidating and aggressive.[31] This again demonstrates the Appellant's reliability as a witness in that he did not exaggerate or overstate his evidence.
[31] T 3-9, l 19.
On the basis of my finding that the conduct of Mr Williamson occurred as alleged, stressor 2(e) is substantiated.

Stressor 2(f) – The Appellant had reported these incidents of workplace bullying by Mr Williamson to his TRC leader/supervisor, Mr Curt Batterham. The Appellant became concerned that nothing had changed, and it appeared that nothing was being done by TRC in respect of his complaints. Accordingly on 31 May 2021, the Appellant sought a mediation with Mr Williamson. Mr Williamson attended the workplace mediation with the Appellant but did not participate in any meaningful way.

Mr Nathan Whittaker, TRC Co-ordinator, gave evidence that the Appellant phoned him on the Sunday night following the Toolbox Talk incident and requested that a meeting be organised to discuss the incident. Mr Whittaker stated the following:[32]
Yep, and just said he wanted to catch up with us to clear the air and make sure that he owned his part of what happened on the day.
…
Well, [the Appellant] just said he – he -he wanted to know if anything was wrong – if he was doing anything wrong, "Can you just let me know? I don't want any bad things to happen. I just want to get on and do my job"
[32] T 3-16, l 27 and l 30.

The Appellant gave evidence that at the meeting he apologised if he had offended anyone at the Toolbox Talk incident and that Mr Williamson did not sit down, speak, or look at him throughout the meeting.[33]
[33] T 1-29, l 29.
Mr Whittaker gave evidence that at the meeting the Appellant discussed his side of the incident and apologised if he had offended anyone. Mr Whittaker stated that he remembered that Mr Williamson did not say anything during the meeting.[34] Mr Whittaker confirmed in his evidence that he took notes of this meeting and submitted the notes to senior management.[35]
[34] T 3-18, l 11.
[35] T 3-17, l 46 and T 3-18, l 1.
In cross-examination Mr Whittaker gave evidence that the Appellant did not call the meeting on the basis that 'nothing had been done' about his complaints.[36]
[36] T 3-22, l 24.
I accept the evidence of the Appellant and Mr Whittaker that Mr Williamson did not participate in the mediation in a meaningful way as outlined in stressor 2(f).
The Respondent submits that in cross examination the Appellant conceded that he asked for a meeting and got 'exactly' what he requested.[37] The Appellant submits that the mere fact that he had to request and secure a mediation/meeting, demonstrates that nothing was being done by management. Whilst there is evidence that at some point management engaged Mapien to investigate the incident, it is unclear when this decision was made.
[37] T 1-44, l 16.
The Appellant gave evidence that he was called down to the office at a later date told by Tim Dodds and Mr Batterham and advised that there had been a full investigation into the Toolbox Talk incident.[38] The Appellant gave evidence that he had not been interviewed as part of this investigation.[39] The Appellant stated that he received a verbal warning from Mr Dodds who advised that Mr Williamson would also receive a verbal warning.[40] The Appellant was asked at the meeting if he wanted to be moved out of Charlton to another worksite to get away from Mr Williamson, which he declined.[41]
[38] T 1-28, l 27.
[39] T 1-28, l 31.
[40] T 1-28, ll 33-34.
[41] T 1-55, l 41.
This meeting occurred on 15 June 2021, some four weeks following the Toolbox Talk incident.[42] One could understand why the Appellant requested the mediation/meeting on the basis that there was no indication to him that anything was being done to address the conflict with Mr Williamson. This was a reasonable perception by the Appellant given that he had not been informed of any management action and had not been approached to be interviewed about the incident.
[42] Exhibit 1, Document 1.
The evidence indicates that whilst the Appellant was concerned that nothing was being done by TRC management, the main reason he sought a mediation/meeting was to address the incident and ongoing conflict with Mr Williamson. The evidence of Mr Whittaker indicates that the Appellant sought a mediation/meeting primarily to address the incident, not to pursue a grievance as to what management action was occurring.
The evidence supports a finding that stressor 2(f) is substantiated.
Stressor 2(g) – During June 2021, the Appellant became anxious and stressed at the extent of the repeated bullying he was suffering. The Appellant lodged a formal complaint with his employer, the TRC, and was advised to start keeping a diary of incidents. The Appellant was later interviewed by independent consultants (Mapien) about his complaint.
It is unclear if the Appellant intended to claim that this stressor led to his injury or simply referred to a step in the chronology. (Similar difficulties arise with stressors 2(h) and 2(k)).
This is indicative of the problematic way in which the stressors have been outlined in this matter. Rather than a description of discreet facts, the stressors have been outlined as a chronology of events with multiple components.
The description of 'repeated bullying' in this stressor cannot be considered given the high level of generality in which it is outlined. There is no evidence that the advice to keep a diary or being interviewed contributed to the Appellant's injury.
Stressor 2(h) – On 30 June 2021, Mr Williamson called the Appellant an 'arse-licker' and told other TRC employees he would get rid of the Appellant.
The Appellant gave evidence that when he was sitting in the toolbox shed with a colleague, Mr Williamson stated loudly to another person but directed it straight over to where he was sitting that "people should give notice to Sarage [Suraj] and walk out, not like these arse-licking c's here".[43]
[43] T 1-30, l 45.
In Mr Williamson's evidence he conceded that he may have used the word 'arse-licker' but not in reference to the Appellant:[44]
Did you tell – did you call Adam Purse directly an arselicker? ---No. It might have been – it might have come up in a conversation, but it wasn't directed at him.
[44] T 3-29, l 45.
On the basis of the Appellant's clear recollection of the incident, and Mr Williamson's testimony that he may have used the word, I accept that Mr Williamson called the Appellant an 'arse-licker' in a manner in which it was intended that the Appellant hear, even if it was not directly said to the Appellant. This part of stressor 2(h) is substantiated.
The Appellant did not give evidence that Mr Williamson told other employees that he would 'get rid' of the Appellant. This part of the stressor is not substantiated.
Stressor 2(i) – The next day Mr Williamson told the Appellant to: "move your fucking truck", in circumstances wherein the relevant truck was parked safely, awaiting maintenance. Later, at 2.15pm that day he called the Appellant an "arse-licking cunt".
The Appellant gave evidence that Mr Williamson yelled out to him "Adam, move your f-ing truck" following which the Appellant explained that the truck was parked there ready for the mechanics for maintenance.[45]
[45] T 1-31, l 49 and T 1-32, ll 2-3.
Mr Williamson was asked if he had used the term outlined in this stressor:[46]
Thank you. What about the phrase "arselicking cunt"? ---I don't think that's a word that I'd use.
Okay? ---The last word.
Yes. Thank you? ---In that phrase.
[46] T 3-30, l 6.
So, to be clear, are you denying that you said that word? ---Yeah.
The part of the stressor regarding the allegation that Mr Williamson called the Appellant an 'arse-licking cunt' was not put to the Appellant and no submissions are made by the Appellant in relation to this allegation. On this basis, along with Mr Williamson's denial, the allegation relating to the offensive term is not substantiated.
The allegation relating to Mr Williamson's statement to the Appellant to 'move your fucking truck' is substantiated.

Stressor 2(j) – At 5.45am on 15 July 2021 during a tool-box meeting, Mr Williamson looked straight at and nodded toward the Appellant and yelled out that: "Non-Union scum don't deserve the benefits the Union has fought for".

The Appellant gave evidence that after he walked into the toolbox shed Mr Williamson made the comment "non-union members are scum. They don't deserve the rights that the union fights for and they're stupid they don't know you can claim the money on your tax."[47]
[47] T 1-32, l 18.
Mr Williamson gave evidence that he would have said that the people in the union fight for rights and gave the following evidence regarding the alleged comment made to the Appellant:[48]

Right. Did you use the phrase non-union scum? --- Well, I probably – I could have done, but I don't remember saying that, but I'm not going to say that I'm – I didn't say it, because I – in the - like, it's going back years, like. I'm flat out remembering what I did a week ago lately.
[48] T 3-30, l 27.

When asked again about this issue Mr Williamson denied making the comment, stating that he would not have said it directly to the Appellant.[49] On the basis that the Appellant had a clear recollection of the comment being made, and Mr Williamson's recollection was that he 'could have done' but effectively could not remember, I accept that Mr Williamson made the comment as alleged.
[49] T 3-30, l 33.
Accordingly, stressor 2(j) is substantiated.

Stressor 2(k) – The Appellant had become so disturbed at the ongoing bullying behaviour of Mr Williamson, that he commenced taking some medical (stress) leave.

I accept the Respondent's submission that this is a factual assertion and is not a stressor.

Stressor 2(l) – At 5.45am on 19 July 2021, upon entering a tool-box meeting, the Appellant was greeted by Mr Williamson staring straight at him and yelling out: 'Stress – Ha – The only stress around here is when you can't choke some fucking asshole who needs it".

This allegation was not put to the Appellant or to Mr Williamson. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate stressor 2(l).

Stressor 2(m) – On 2 August 2021, the Appellant's anxiety increased to the point that he took 1 week of medical leave, followed by 4 weeks Long Service Leave (LSL) as a 'circuit breaker' to get away from Mr Williamson's bullying behaviours toward him.

This stressor appears to be essentially the same as that outlined as stressor 2(k). I accept the Respondent's submission that this is a factual assertion and not a stressor.
Stressor 2(n) – On 6 September 2021, upon returning to work, the Appellant was told Mr Williamson announced to a group of TRC plan operators that: "Dickhead is on stress leave", while the Appellant was absent on leave.
The Appellant's evidence was that he did not directly hear Mr Williamson make this statement,[50] and provided hearsay evidence that another colleague informed him that the comment was made by Mr Williamson.
[50] T 1-53, l 41.
Mr Williamson denied making this statement and gave evidence that this statement was made by Mr Roger Menkins.[51]
[51] T 3-31, l 1.

On the basis that there is no direct evidence that Mr Williamson made the statement, and Mr Williamson's evidence that another employee made the statement, stressor 2(n) is not substantiated.

Stressor 2(o) – On 15 October 2021, in a conversation about the Appellant's bullying complaint made about Mr Williamson, Mr Williamson stated: "I'll throw mud at any [sic] anyone who throws mud at me". Later, Mr Williamson was seen in the staff car park taking photographs of the Appellant's private motor vehicle.

The Appellant gave evidence that Mr Williamson stated directly to him that "those who throw mud at me I will throw mud back".[52]
[52] T 1-34, l 42.
In response to a question as to whether he remembers having a conversation about throwing mud, Mr Williamson stated "possibly" and that it would have been said as a tongue-in-cheek type thing.[53]
[53] T 3-31, l 4.
Mr Graham Thuns, a plant operator at the TRC, gave evidence that the Appellant and Mr Williamson had their cars parked next to each other at the worksite. Mr Thuns gave evidence that he saw Mr Williamson taking photos in the direction of the cars, however he stated that he could not say whether he was taking photos of the Appellant's ute or Mr Williamson's own car.[54]
[54] T 2-29, l 30.
Mr Williamson conceded that he took photographs of the Appellant's vehicle, stating that he sent the photo to a mate in Brisbane because he thought it was comical.[55]
[55] T 3-78, l 45 to T 3-79, l 6.
I am satisfied that on the basis of the evidence given by Mr Thuns and Mr Williamson that stressor 2(o) is substantiated.

Stressor 2(p) – At 3.30pm on 26 October 2021, while driving home from work the Appellant was stopped by Police who told him they had received a complaint that his car was unroadworthy. The Appellant enquired if the complaint had come from TRC employee, Mr Mark Williamson. Police stated they could neither confirm nor deny that information. Police inspected the Appellant's vehicle and took no enforcement action.

The Appellant gave evidence that the day after the 'mud' comment was made, the police stopped his car on the side of the road as he drove home from the worksite.[56] The Appellant stated that he told the policeman that this would have been organised by a disgruntled work colleague, Mr Williamson, and the policeman responded that he got his orders from the department in Oakey.[57] The policeman proceeded to inspect the vehicle after telling the Appellant that he had a report of an unroadworthy vehicle.[58]
[56] T 1-34, l 44.
[57] T 1-35, ll 1-6.
[58] T 1-35, ll 27-28.
The Respondent submits that although Mr Williamson may have made the 'mud' remark, there can be no finding that Mr Williamson was involved in the scenario whereby the Appellant's car was stopped by police. The Respondent submits that no police records of this alleged event were subpoenaed, and therefore the Jones v Dunkel rule applies.[59]
[59] [1959] HCA 8, 101 CLR 298.
Mr Williamson stated that he thought the Appellant's vehicle was unsafe and had been unroadworthy for years, however denied furnishing the photos to the police.[60]
[60] T 3-79, l 8.
It is clear that the Appellant believes that Mr Williamson was involved in reporting his car to the police following the 'mud' comment and the photos being taken of his car. This belief however is not based on cogent evidence. I accept that the failure to produce evidence in the form of police records of the incident warrants a Jones v Dunkel inference that such evidence would not have assisted the Appellant.

There is no evidence that Mr Williamson was involved with the reporting of the Appellant's car to the police, and accordingly this part of the stressor cannot be substantiated.

In circumstances where there is no evidence that the actions of the police in stopping the Appellant's car contributed to the injury, independently of the belief that it was the result of a report by Mr Williamson, stressor 2(p) is not substantiated.

Stressor 2(q) – At 5.35am on 25 November 2022 [2021],[61] Mr Williamson again threatened the Appellant, telling him: "Hey Adam – when all this shit is over – you better look out". At the same time while advancing on the Appellant in a menacing gait, such that the Appellant put his lunchbox on the ground to be ready to defend himself, as he thought Mr Williamson was about to assault him.
[61] It is assumed that the reference to 25 November 2022 was a typographical error in the Appellants SOFC.
The Appellant gave the following evidence of this incident:[62]
…
[62] T 1-36, l 20.
And [Mr Williamson] walked like he was just minding his own business, going down the lunch room from a distance away going a direction diagonally across my path which I thought, you know, he's going down to do something. And he got past me and when I got in earshot Mark Williamson called out "Oy, Adam", and he was very confronting so I just put my lunchbox down as I was quite certain I was going to be assaulted. Mark Williamson walked up to me and towered over me, and pointed his finger within – very close to my face and said to me, "When this shit's over you better look out". And I said, "For what?" And he said, again, "When this shit's over youse had better look out". And I would not walk away, I stood my ground. And Mark Williamson walked around, then go tin the view of the camera between him and I and yelled at me, "Just walk away. Just walk away", as – as if I was attacking him or ---
Mr Williamson's evidence was as follows:[63]
…
[63] T 3-31, l 40.
Anyway, I sort of walked over towards [the Appellant], and he dropped his lunchbox and stuff on the ground, and I just put me hands in the air and walked away, and I said to Greg Rickert and that, "Did you see what happened then?", and they said, "No. We didn't see any – we didn't hear anything". I said "Yeah. Righto." So I reported it to my supervisor, Curt, and that's it.
On 21 April 2022, the Executive Manager of People, Culture and Engagement at TRC, Ms Jacobs, provided correspondence to the Appellant following a workplace investigation into the incident.[64] Ms Jacobs notes that the Appellant lodged a complaint against the conduct of Mr Williamson, however, Mr Williamson denied the alleged conduct and states that he simply approached the Appellant to say 'G'day Adam'. On the basis that it was the Appellant's word against that of Mr Williamson, Ms Jacobs determined that the complaint was not substantiated. The correspondence further determined that a complaint of workplace bullying could not be sustained as the behaviour of Mr Williamson on 25 November 2021 could not be viewed as 'unreasonable'.

[64] Exhibit 3.

Ms Jacobs notes that two witnesses who were some distance from the incident were not able to corroborate the Appellant's version of events but shared their observations that an altercation occurred between the Appellant and Mr Williamson. Ms Jacob concluded that an altercation did occur however could not determine who escalated the matter or what was exchanged between the parties. It is not clear to me the basis upon which Ms Jacob made this determination nor the details of the investigation report including witness statements.
Mr Batterham gave evidence that he reviewed the CCTV footage of the incident and referred to his notation in an email to Ms Claire Ryan and Mr Dodds on 2 December 2021 of the following:[65]
In the footage, Mark goes out of his way to head straight at Adam. But unfortunately there is no audio, so we have no idea of the words exchanged
[65] T 2-36, l 10; Exhibit 1, Document 3.

While the lack of available audio makes assessment of the interaction difficult, the fact that the CCTV indicates that Mr Williamson went out of his way to head straight at the Appellant allows for a reasonable inference that Mr Williamson had a clear intention to interact with the Appellant.
Mr Williamson denied stating 'Hey Adam – when all this shit is over – you better look out' and provided the following evidence when asked if he said something to the Appellant:[66]
I would've asked him what he was – what he said when I was walking over to him because I said, like – like, he just – I don't know. He just – his eyes were like dinner plates. I don't know. Just – just too long for me to just go on about it. I'm just over the whole show.
[66] T 3-32, l 4.
This evidence is not consistent with the summary in Ms Jacobs' letter that Mr Williamson simply approached the Appellant to say 'G'day Adam'.
In Mr Williamson's evidence he states that the Appellant dropped his lunchbox on the ground when he walked towards the Appellant, and Mr Williamson then walked away with his hands in the air.[67] There is no plausible reason why this would have occurred if words had not been exchanged. It is also implausible, given the history of animosity between the two men, that Mr Williamson decided to go out of his way to head straight toward the Appellant for the purposes of saying 'G'day'. I am not persuaded that Mr Williamson's testimony regarding this incident is reliable.
[67] T 3-31, l 40.

On the basis of the Appellant's plausible evidence and Mr Batterham's assessment of the CCTV footage, stressor 2(q) is substantiated.
Stressor 2(r) and 2(s) will be considered together as they arise from the same meeting.

Stressor 2(r) – The Appellant reported this further incident, at which time, he was served with a written notice advising him that his previous complaint concerning Mr Williamson's misconduct was not substantiated, and that no further action would ensue. The Applicant protested that nominated eyewitnesses had not even been interviewed, but the Employer stated its decision was final.
Stressor 2 (s) – TRC Manager, Ms Brenda Kelly further told the appellant that she would not discuss or listen to his further complaint about the incident that occurred earlier that day (25 November 2021), stating that she would wait for a report from the appellant's supervisor, Mr Curt Batterham.

As with many of the stressors outlined in this matter, these stressors contain a number of separate claims. I have placed considerable weight on the evidence given by the Appellant to determine the genuine nature of the stressor.
The Appellant gave evidence that he made a number of phone calls to report the incident of 25 November 2021 immediately after it had occurred and was ultimately directed to attend a meeting with Ms Brenda Kelly at 10am.[68]
[68] T 1-37, ll 12-23.
The Appellant gave evidence that when he attempted to tell Ms Kelly about the incident with Mr Williamson that morning he was advised that she did not want to hear about his complaint.
Instead, the Appellant's evidence was that Ms Kelly went through the Mapien findings following the investigation into the previous allegations against Mr Williamson and handed him a copy of the findings in a written notice from TRC.[69] The Appellant stated that Ms Kelly advised that there had been no adverse findings against Mr Williamson and after the Appellant asked her about the incident that had just occurred, Ms Kelly stated again that she did not want to hear about it as she would talk to Mr Batterham.[70]
[69] T 1-38, ll 41-47.
[70] T 1-38, l 29.

No evidence was put before the Commission as to whether nominated witnesses had been interviewed as part of the investigation. Accordingly, this part of stressor 2(r) is not substantiated.

The Respondent submits that the investigation processes and report relate to management action and in circumstances where the author of the investigation report was not called as a witness the rule in Jones v Dunkel applies.
The Appellant submits that the Respondent did everything possible to ensure the Mapien report did not make it into evidence. The Appellant submits that despite its best efforts to have the report adopted through several witnesses, the relevant document could not be tendered by the Appellant as it was not his, but the TRC's document. The Appellant submits that no one from management at TRC was called or gave evidence in these proceedings to establish reasonable management action.
I accept the Respondent's submissions on this point. It was open to the Appellant to call the authors of the Mapien report to give evidence and have the report tendered into evidence through these witnesses. There is no information before me indicating that the Appellant attempted to take these steps. It was entirely foreseeable that the Respondent would object to the tendering of the report through other witnesses, and there was nothing improper about the Respondent's Counsel inevitably making such objections at the hearing.
This stressor relates directly to the actions taken by management to investigate the incident and determine the outcome. In circumstances where the decision makers relating to the Mapien investigation were not called to give evidence, a Jones v Dunkel inference will be drawn that such evidence would not have assisted the Appellant.
I accept the Appellant's evidence that at the time he reported the incident outlined in stressor 2(r) he was served with a written notice advising him that his previous complaint concerning Mr Williamson's misconduct was not substantiated, and that no further action would ensue.
Stressor 2(r) is substantiated with the exception of the reference to nominated eyewitnesses having not been interviewed.

Stressor 2(r) arose out of the decision by the TRC to determine that the allegation of bullying against Mr Williamson could not be substantiated. Accordingly, I find that this stressor arose out of or in the course of management action. On the basis that no evidence was called from the author of the Mapien report to address the claim that nominated eyewitnesses were not interviewed, or to provide evidence about the reliability of the investigation, there is no evidence that the management action to rely upon the report was unreasonable.

In relation to stressor 2(s) the Appellant gave evidence that he was shaken by the incident outlined at 2(q) and tried to ring Mr Batterham immediately afterward to report what had occurred. The Appellant stated that the person he was working for, Mr Brett Barnes, phoned him to enquire where he was, to which the Appellant advised that there had been an incident and he was waiting for Mr Batterham to arrive.[71]
[71] T 1-37, l 11.
The Appellant stated that he went out to finish the job with Mr Barnes and eventually Mr Batterham called him and directed him to come back to the yard at 10 o'clock to speak with Ms Kelly.[72]
[72] T 1-37, l 22.
The Appellant's testimony was that Ms Kelly would not let him speak about the incident that had occurred that morning, stating that she did not want to hear about the incident and that she would talk to Mr Batterham.[73] The Appellant stated that he told Ms Kelly that the matter was 'pretty serious' to which Ms Kelly responded that she did not care and that she did not want to hear about it and instead would speak to Mr Batterham.[74]
[73] T 1-38, l 31.
[74] T 1-38, l 23.
I accept the Appellant's evidence as a reliable account of this interaction with Ms Kelly.
Ms Kelly's interaction with the Appellant was management action in that it involved a manager responding to a complaint by an employee and providing the outcome of a workplace investigation. I am not satisfied that it was reasonable management action. On the evidence given, the Appellant had attempted to raise a complaint about an interaction with Mr Williamson that had left him shaken. Rather than allow the Appellant to make his complaint contemporaneously to the incident, the Appellant was directed to attend a meeting some hours later where he received the outcome of an entirely different process. He was then precluded from discussing the incident altogether and ushered out of the meeting by Ms Kelly once the discussion about the Mapien investigation had concluded.
It is in my view unreasonable that the Appellant was not permitted to raise his grievance soon after the incident with Mr Williamson. Whilst it was open to management to inform the Appellant of the outcome of the Mapien investigation, the time to do that was not when he had requested a meeting about an altercation with a colleague that had just occurred.
I have determined that it was not reasonable management action to prevent the Appellant from raising his grievance at the meeting with Ms Kelly and instead provide him with the outcome of the Mapien investigation. If Ms Kelly was of the view that Mr Batterham was best placed to consider the most recent grievance at another time, this should have been arranged and the Appellant advised of the process. Instead, this meeting was used to discuss the outcome of an entirely separate process, despite the Appellant's vulnerable state following the altercation with Mr Williamson.
I am satisfied that this stressor is substantiated, that it arises out of management action, and that the management action was not reasonable.
Stressor 2(t) – The following day, 26 November 2021, the Appellant commenced medical (stress) leave, on 1 December 2021, the Appellant's General Practitioner (GP) certified and signed a mental health (psychological injury) claim form for submission to Local Government Workcare.
I accept the Respondent's submission that this is a factual assertion and not a stressor.
Consideration

The decision before the Commission is whether the Appellant has suffered an injury in accordance with s 32 of the Act.
The Respondent concedes that the Appellant is a worker and has sustained a personal injury in the form of a psychological condition. Further, the Respondent accepts that it is open to the Commission to find that the Appellant's injury arose out of employment in circumstances where employment was a significant contributing factor.[75]
[75] The written submissions of the Respondent filed on 13 June 2024, para. 53.
The medical evidence of Dr Butler and Mr Harvey support a finding that the Appellant suffered a psychological injury arising out of his employment and that his employment was a significant contributing factor to his injury.
The date of injury is 26 November 2021 as outlined in [24] and accordingly I do not consider that the evidence regarding the Appellant's Application for a Stop Bullying Order against Mr Williamson filed in November 2022 to be relevant on the basis that it post-dates the onset of the injury.
The Respondent contends that s 32(5) operates to exclude the injury on the basis that it arose from reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. The Appellant bears the onus of demonstrating that the injury is not excluded by reasonable management action provisions in s 32(5) of the WCR Act.
Did the injury arise out of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way?

As outlined above, I am satisfied based on the evidence before the Commission that the following stressors are substantiated:
·2(e)
·2(f)
·2(h) partially substantiated
·2(i) partially substantiated
·2(j)
·2(o)
·2(q)
·2(r) partially substantiated
·2(s)
Of the above, the following stressors did not arise out of management action – 2(e), 2(f), 2(h), 2(i), 2(j), 2(o) and 2(q). These stressors are broadly consistent with the medical evidence that the Appellant's injury was caused by 'workplace bullying'. I note that the letter from TRC advised the Appellant that the Mapien investigation had not substantiated his grievance regarding bullying by Mr Williamson. In circumstances where the Mapien investigation report was not in evidence I cannot make any findings regarding that investigation. The stressors have been substantiated on the basis of evidence given at hearing.

The substantiated stressors relate to adverse interactions between the Appellant and Mr Williamson. I am satisfied that these stressors occurred and that the Appellant reasonably perceived these interactions as bullying by Mr Williamson.

In State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Workers' Compensation Regulator Deputy President Merrell determined that when an employer performs a specific action or actions concerning a specific issue with an employee, it is likely to have the characteristics of management action.[76]
[76] [2020] QIRC 097.
I am satisfied that out of the above stressors, only stressors 2(r) and 2(s) relate to management action.
The medical evidence indicates that the Appellant's injury arose out of both workplace bullying and management action, however, after considering all of the evidence it is clear that the stressors that played a far more significant role to the development of the Appellant's injury were those related to the alleged bullying by the Appellant's colleague Mr Williamson.
The report provided by Dr Butler to LGW Workcare dated 28 February 2022 outlined the history of the Appellant's injury, noting that it related to “a co-worker who repeatedly intimidated [the Appellant] and threatened him with violence”. Further, Dr Butler responded to the prompt regarding factors outside of the Appellant's employment that there were 'no other factors' other than the “person who is threatening him at work turned up at [the Appellant's place of residence and threatened him there”.
Whilst Dr Butler's identification of factors contributing to the Appellant's injury is based upon the information provided to her, it is clear from her report that the actions or omissions by management were not significant enough to be mentioned by the Appellant at the time.
The medical report by Mr Harvey summarises the Appellant's presenting issues as based on a pattern of bullying and harassment followed by a period of what the Appellant described as inaction or inappropriate action by his employer. Mr Harvey notes that his initial assessment of the Appellant occurred on 14 February 2023. This assessment occurred over a year after the onset of the Appellant's injury and at a time when the Appellant was in the process of 'following up with a tribunal process to challenge the rejection of a workers compensation claim'. I am not satisfied that this is cogent evidence that the Appellant's injury arose out of management actions taken or not taken prior to 25 November 2021.
I note the observations of the Court of Appeal in McGrory v Medina Property Services Pty Ltd, that the primary judge was not limited by the same constraints as the medical experts, having the benefit of comprehensive evidence of symptomology given by the Appellant in that matter.[77] Noting the Court's observation that “a trial judge who is performing the function of finding facts is obliged to consider that evidence comprehensively”,[78] I consider that it would be an error to rely on a single reference in a report to inappropriate employer action/inaction rather than considering that opinion in the context of the broader evidence before the Commission.

[77] [2017] QCA 234, [65].

[78] Ibid, [70].

I further note the observations of his Honour O'Connor VP in Taylor v Workers' Compensation Regulator:[79]

The Commission, as a tribunal of fact, can be assisted by expert medical opinion evidence, but must weigh and determine the probabilities as to the cause of an injury having regard to the totality of the evidence. The Commission's duty is to find ultimate facts and, so far as it is reasonably possible to do so, to look not merely at the expertise of the expert witness, but to examine the substance of the opinion expressed and (where experts differ) to apply logic and common sense to the best of its ability in deciding which view is to be preferred or which parts of the evidence are to be accepted.
[citations omitted]

[79] [2017] QIRC 6, [43].

The Appellant's Claim Information Summary attached to his Application for Compensation to LGW was completed by the Appellant and outlined the following in note form:[80]
Tired, sleepless, angry, anxious about going to work, anxious about further threats. Council can provide information on this matter which has been ongoing for months. I am only allowed to report this latest incident. Intermittently since May 2021. I took 6 days sick leave and 18 days long service in August/September to get a break.
[80] Exhibit 1, Document 7.
In response to the query regarding stressors on the claim summary, the Appellant outlined the following:[81]

Please refer to my statement of 26/11/21. This is indicative of incidents with Mark Williamson I have been subject to for months. May, June, July incidents have been investigated but there has been no change in his behaviour.

[81] Ibid.

It is clear from the Appellant's Claim Information Summary that the Appellant relates his symptoms of stress to his interactions with Mr Williamson. Whilst the Appellant notes that the incidents have been investigated, he remained concerned that there has been no change in the behaviour of Mr Williamson. The Appellant outlines no specific concerns about management action in this application form.
In Simon Blackwood (Workers' Compensation Regulator) v Mahaffey, in which President Martin said:[82]
[82] [2016] ICQ 010, [32], [37] – [38] and [40].
What does s 32 require?
This section has been the subject of consideration on many occasions. In this case, there was conduct (the harassment) which was a cause of the disorder and which did not come within s 32(5) and there was conduct (the telephone answering issue) which was a cause of the disorder and which did come within s 32(5). Thus the following question arises:
If a particular stressor is held:
(a)to have been a cause of a psychiatric or psychological disorder, and
(b)to have arisen out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action reasonably taken, then
is the psychiatric or psychological disorder excluded from the definition of "injury" in s 32(1) no matter what else may have caused the disorder?
…
Section 32 (1) is concerned with consideration of an injury which arises out of, or in the course of, employment. In other words, it covers the whole gamut of the employment relationship. It does not confine its operation to particular aspects of the employment, rather, it emphasises that all of the employment is to be considered because an "injury" will only come within the definition "if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury".
A distinction can then be drawn with the provisions of s 32(5). Putting to one side s 32(5)(c), that section is concerned with "reasonable management action" which is actually taken or a worker's expectation of perception of such action. In other words, it is concerned only with a "slice" of the employment.
…
The question which arises in this case, and which has been set out above, could, if answered in the way proposed by the appellant, lead to circumstances where a worker who nominated two stressors would be denied compensation if one of those stressors was reasonable management action etc., even if the unchallenged expert evidence was that its contribution to the disorder was minimal. Similarly, the appellant's answer would also deny a worker compensation if a disorder was the result of ten stressors, each of equal importance, but where one fell within s 32(5).
In Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langerak, President Martin stated:[83]
The ultimate question under s 32(5) is whether the injury, not any one stressor, arose out of, or in the course of, reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way by the employer in connection with the worker's employment. The determination made in respect of s 32(5)(a) is one made by weighing reasonable management action against other employment factors in light of the whole of the evidence.
[83] [2020] ICQ 2, [86].
Whilst medical evidence may be a more reliable indicator of the cause of a psychological injury than the views of the person suffering the injury, that does not render the history of the Appellant's complaints irrelevant. When the information provided by the Appellant in his application for compensation and at hearing is considered along with the medical evidence, I am satisfied that the injury arose out of stressors related to Mr Williamson and, to a much lesser extent, management action.
Determining the stressors that are causative of the injury is not a mathematical exercise, with some stressors likely to have a greater impact than others. However, I note that of the 20 stressors outlined by the Appellant, only 2 stressors related to management action – 2(s) and 2(r).
The Respondent submits that the employer engaged in reasonable management actions in the form of a meeting and warnings following the Toolbox Talk incident and the provision of the findings of the Mapien Report on 25 November 2021. The Appellant nominated the interaction with Mr Williamson at the Toolbox Talk incident as a stressor but did not nominate his receiving a warning from management as a stressor. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that management action in providing the warning did not contribute to the Appellants injury.

Although the management action in providing the Appellant with the outcome of the Mapien investigation occurred prior to the Appellant decompensating, the Appellant also experienced an altercation with Mr Williamson just hours before this outcome was delivered. It is reasonable to infer that the combination of both incidents resulted in the Appellant's decompensation. It would be artificial to determine that it was one or the other of these events that had a greater impact on the Appellant, causing him to leave the workplace on stress leave.
I do not accept that the Appellant's response that he 'fell back down' following the outcome of the Mapien investigation is evidence that this stressor caused his injury. Simply because the Appellant felt as though 'nothing was being done' by management,[84] does not mean that the injury arose out of or in the course of management action, particularly in circumstances where the medical evidence indicates that it was related to other stressors described as 'bullying' in the workplace. I accept the Appellant's evidence that he made verbal complaints to Mr Batterham and was told that something would be done about Mr Williamson prior to his leave. I am not persuaded that this is evidence of management action, nor that it is evidence of a significant contributor to the injury.
[84] T 1-24, l 43.

In Davis v Blackwood, ('Davis') Martin P stated the following:[85]
… The task of the Commission when applying s 32(5) does not involve setting out what it regards as the type of actions that would have been reasonable in the circumstances. There may be any number of actions or combinations of actions which would satisfy s 32(5). The proper task is to assess the management action which was taken and determine whether it was reasonable and whether it was taken in a reasonable way. Sometimes, that may involve considerations of what else might have been done but that will only be relevant to whether what was done was, in fact, reasonable.
…
I agree with the reasoning of Hall P in Q-Comp v Hohn where he said that the mere occurrence of reasonable management action will not insulate a disorder from characterisation as an "injury". In cases such as this the Commission will be aided by expert evidence which can assist in the assignment of weight to the various factors which go to the creation of maintenance of a psychiatric disorder. If the evidence supports a finding that the psychiatric disorder results from the employment being a significant contributing factor then, when one turns to consider s 32(5), it is important to determine to what extent, if any, there is an overlap of reasonable management action and other employment factors.
[citations omitted]
[85] [2014] ICQ 009 ('Davis') [47] and [51].

In applying Davis, the evidence demonstrates that there is an overlap of management action and other employment factors, although the contribution of management action to the injury in this matter is minor. The stressors that gave rise to the Appellant's injury were overwhelmingly caused by the stressors relating to Mr Williamson.
To the extent that management action contributed to the injury, at least one of these actions was not reasonable nor was it taken in a reasonable way. As outlined above however, I have found that whilst the management decision to provide the outcome of the Mapien report as outlined in 2(r) to be reasonable, the management decision to do so at the meeting arranged at the Appellant's request to discuss a different grievance as outlined in 2(s) was not reasonable for the reasons outlined above.
The fact that one stressor related to management action that was taken reasonably does not mean that the Appellant is not entitled to succeed in light of the significant contribution to his injury made by the stressors unrelated to management action.

I have determined that the management action involved in providing the outcome of the Mapien investigation to the Appellant as outlined in 2(r) was reasonable management action, however this stressor is intertwined with 2(s) which involved the unreasonable manner in which the outcome was provided to the Appellant.

Conclusion

It is common ground that the Appellant was a worker who suffered a personal injury and that the injury arose out of his employment.
The Appellant's evidence and the medical evidence demonstrates that the Appellant's employment was a significant contributing factor to the injury.

To the extent that management action was involved in the nominated stressors, I am not satisfied that this action was reasonable. As a consequence, s 32(5) of the Act is not enlivened to exclude the Appellant's claim. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Appellant suffered an injury within the meaning of the term pursuant to s 32 of the Act.

Orders

I make the following orders:
1. The appeal is upheld.

2. The decision of the Workers' Compensation Regulator is set aside.

3. Failing agreement on costs, to be the subject of a further application to the Commission within 28 days.

[2025] QIRC 299

5 November 2025