Purrer v Office of the Information Commissioner

Link copied
Case Copied 30 min read

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Purrer v Office of the Information Commissioner & Anor [2021] QCATA 92

PARTIES: JOSEF PURRER

(applicant/appellant)

V

OFFICE OF THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

(first respondent)

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING
(second respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL098-19

ORIGINATING
 APPLICATION NO/S:

OCL018-19

MATTER TYPE: 

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

30 July 2021

HEARING DATE:

31 March 2020

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Daubney, President

ORDERS:

The application for leave to appeal or appeal is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – RIGHT OF APPEAL – WHEN APPEAL LIES – OTHER CASES – where applicant applied to second respondent for amendment of records containing personal information – where applicant argued the records were inaccurate, incomplete or misleading – where second respondent refused request – where applicant applied to first respondent for a review of that decision – where first respondent affirmed second respondent’s decision – where applicant filed in the Tribunal an application for leave to appeal or appeal against the first respondent’s decision – where appeal may only be on a question of law  – where grounds of appeal allege denial of natural justice and procedural fairness, a failure to consider evidence or give insufficient weight to evidence, insufficient reasons, a failure to apply correct test to the legal definition of “inaccurate”, and a failure to consider applicant’s grounds that information was “misleading” or ‘incomplete” – where first three grounds of appeal are not fully particularised – whether first respondent was in error by following certain legal authorities relating to the amendment of official records

Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), s 12, s 41, s 44, s 70, s 72, s 99, s 100, s 123, s 132

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 150(3)(a)

A4STL6K and Queensland Health (unreported, QIC, 6 September 2013)

Crewdson v Central Sydney AHS [2002] NSWCA 345
Director-General, Department of Community Services v S [2000] NSWADTAP 27
Doelle v Legal Aid Office (Qld) (1993) QAR 207
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409
G78QTW and Department of Education [2019] QICmr 5
Lee v Crime and Corruption Commission; Crime and Corruption Commission v Lee [2020] QCA 201

Pivovarova v Michelsen [2019] QCA 256

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

First Respondent:

K McGuire i/b Office of the Information Commissioner

Second Respondent:

A Psaltis i/b Clayton Utz

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. On 30 October 2017, the Applicant made an application under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (“IPA”) to the Second Respondent seeking amendment of certain “OneSchool” records containing personal information of the Applicant arising out of issues concerning the Applicant’s child. The Applicant asserted that the records were inaccurate, incomplete and misleading. The records in question were:

    (a)Record 1 – a record created by the relevant school’s Deputy Principal in relation to a meeting between the Applicant, the child’s other parent, the Principal and the Deputy Principal.

    (b)Record 2 – a record created by the Principal in relation to a phone call…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Purrer v Office of the Information Commissioner and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] QCATA 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Purrer sought to amend personal information held by the Office of the Information Commissioner (IC), arguing that the records were inaccurate, incomplete or misleading. The IC refused the request, and following a review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), the decision was affirmed. Purrer then applied for leave to appeal the AAT’s decision to the Federal Court, alleging several grounds of error including denial of natural justice, procedural unfairness, and incorrect application of the legal definition of "inaccurate". The court was required to determine whether these grounds of appeal demonstrated an error of law on the part of the AAT in its review of the IC’s decision.

The court found that the grounds of appeal were not fully particularised and did not demonstrate any error of law by the AAT in its review of the IC's decision. The court noted that the AAT's review was conducted de novo and that it was well-established that a reviewing authority could reach its own conclusions, differing from the original decision maker, in order to make a correct and preferable decision. The court held that the AAT had correctly recognised the shifting of the evidentiary onus and had not misapplied the legal definition of "inaccurate". The court also observed that Purrer had confirmed during the hearing that he was not pursuing any interim injunctions or appointments of independent parties, further supporting the dismissal of the appeal.

The court concluded that Purrer had not demonstrated an error of law in the AAT’s decision to affirm the IC’s refusal to amend the personal information records. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

ORDERS:
The application for leave to appeal or appeal is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for leave to appeal or appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 123 of the IPA provides: 123 Decision on external review(1)The information commissioner, after conducting an external review of a decision, must make a written decision—(a)affirming the decision; or(b)varying the decision; or(c)setting aside the decision and making a decision in substitution for the decision.(2)To remove any doubt, it is declared that subsection (1) does not apply if the external review is resolved informally.(3)The commissioner must include in the decision the reasons for the decision.(4)The commissioner must give a copy of the decision to each participant.(5)If—(a)a document is to be released because of the external review; and(b)the commissioner has notified a person under section 110(4) and the person did not become a participant in the review;the commissioner must take reasonable steps to notify the person of the release.(6)The commissioner must arrange to have decisions and reasons for decisions published.(7)However, subsection (6) does not require the commissioner to arrange to have a decision and reasons for a decision published to the extent they contain, or publication would disclose, exempt information or contrary to public interest information. It is trite to observe that the external review by the IC is conducted by way of a de novo consideration of the matter on the factual material before the IC. It is also well established that a reviewing authority, such as the IC, may reach its own reasons for decision that may differ from those of the original decision maker in order to make a correct and preferrable decision.[32][32]Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409. The so-called “strengthening” of the decision in this case is a reflection of the IC’s approach to, and conclusions in, the decision. No error of law has been demonstrated on this issue. Separately, the Applicant also contended that the IC had applied the wrong onus of proof. In fact, what the IC did was recognise the shifting of the evidentiary onus to which I referred above. The IC did not commit any error of law in recognising and applying that shifting onus. Finally, and for completeness, I note that the Applicant confirmed in the hearing that he was not persisting with his purported claims in this appeal for some sort of interim injunction and the appointment of some sort of independent party. For the reasons given above, the Applicant has not persuaded me that the decision of the IC was infected by an error of law. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal against the decision of the IC made on 20 February 2019 will be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established