SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Purrer v Information Commissioner [2018] QSC 272
PARTIES:
Joseph PURRER
(appellant)
v
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
(respondent)FILE NO:
SC No 8444 of 2018
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
22 November 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 October 2018
JUDGE:
Boddice J
ORDERS:
1. I shall hear the parties as to the form of orders and costs.
CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – ERROR OF LAW – where applicant made a privacy complaint – where the complaint related to OneSchool records – where complaint concerned the applicant’s personal information, as well as the personal information of others – whether there was an error of law in the respondent’s refusal to accept the applicant’s complaint
Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), s 168
COUNSEL:
The appellant was self-represented
S A McLeod for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Office of the Information Commissioner for the respondent.
BODDICE J: By application, filed 7 August 2018, Joseph Purrer makes application for a statutory order of review of the decision of the Respondent Information Commissioner, made on 11 July 2018, declining to accept the applicant’s privacy complaint under section 168(1)(c) of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (“the Act”).
The grounds of review are that the respondent erred in law in interpreting the Act and in the application of the Act to the applicant’s complaint. However, at the hearing the applicant accepted his application was to be determined by a consideration of whether there was an error of law in the respondent’s refusal to accept the applicant’s complaint.
Background
The applicant is the parent of a child attending a secondary school under the control of the Department of Education and Training (“the department”).
In the latter half of 2017, the applicant, as parent of his child, had contact with a law enforcement officer attached to the school, on a confidential basis. Subsequent to that contact, the applicant discovered there was a record of that contact recorded in OneSchool, an Education Department Information Base.
After reviewing that record, the applicant sent email communications to the relevant school. In response, the school indicated the record simply recorded a contact, not the content of the discussion in that contact. That response was unacceptable to the applicant, who engaged in further email communications with the school and, subsequently, officers of the Department.
The applicant requested the matter be referred to the Department’s Ethical Standards Unit, with respect to a breach of privacy and an allegation that records had been deliberately modified by staff at the relevant school. The applicant also requested an audit be conducted of the information held on the particular information base.
After the Department advised the applicant that the complaint was not within the scope of matters to be considered by its Ethical Standards Unit, the applicant made a complaint to the respondent of a breach of privacy principles under the
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- AGLC
- Purrer v Information Commissioner [2018] QSC 272
- Case
- [2018] QSC 272
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the scope and nature of the applicant's complaint, which involved multiple facets and multiple entities, including the Department, the school, and the Queensland Police Service. The court found that the complaint was not solely about the applicant's personal information but also involved the personal information of the applicant’s wife and son. Moreover, the complaint encompassed dissatisfaction with various services and conduct, which were not strictly privacy issues but rather administrative or operational concerns. The court held that the Information Privacy Act 2009 was not the appropriate mechanism to address these broader administrative and operational complaints. The Information Commissioner’s decision to decline the complaint was within the broad discretion provided by section 168(1)(c) of the Act, which allows for the refusal of complaints deemed frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, or lacking in substance. The court concluded that the Information Commissioner reasonably believed the complaint to be lacking in substance and did not find an error of law in the Commissioner's decision.
The court ordered that the parties be heard regarding the form of orders and costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. I shall hear the parties as to the form of orders and costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the respondent submits that to the extent that the applicant’s outline of argument contains new allegations not part of the initial privacy complaint, they are not properly to be the subject of the application for statutory review, or are appropriately to be pursued through that the appropriate legislative scheme or against the appropriate agency.Consideration The Act provides a legislative scheme for the determination of privacy complaints by individuals about an act or practice of a relevant entity in relation to the individual’s personal information. That is a breach of the relevant entity’s obligations under the Act to comply with the privacy principles or an approval under section 157 of the Act.[1][1] Information Privacy Act 2009, s 164. The complaint, the subject of the application for an order for statutory review, was about an act or practise of a relevant entity. However, the complaint was not only in respect to the applicant’s personal information. It was a complaint in respect of the personal information of other individuals. To that extent, the complaint involved matters outside the definition of a privacy complaint under section 165 of the Act. Whilst the applicant submits that in those circumstances there was an obligation upon the respondent to give reasonable help to the complainant to put the complaint into written form,[2] a consideration of the material relied upon by the applicant, evidences compliance with that obligation. The respondent, on multiple occasions, sought to assist in a reasonable way, the applicant to ensure the complaint satisfied the requirements for a privacy complaint under section 166 of the Act. There is no substance to the applicant’s contention to the contrary.[2] Information Privacy Act 2009, s 166(2). Further, the respondent’s decision to decline to accept the complaint pursuant to section 168(1)(c) of the Act was made in accordance with a proper application of the Act, and of the Principles. No error of law has been established in the making of that determination. Section 168(1)(c) gives the respondent a broad discretion to decline to deal with the whole or part of a privacy complaint, if the respondent “reasonably believes the complaint or part, is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance”. Nothing in the applicant’s complaint raises a proper basis to call into question the respondent’s belief to that effect, or the reasonableness of that belief. A reasonable belief does not require proof of the existence of the subject matter. In George v Rockett,[3] the High Court stated:“The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof. Belief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.”[3] (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 116.