Puri v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PURI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 1281
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – applicant for Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) subclass 885 visa (Skilled visa) provided IELTS test result form (Applicant’s TRF) of test he claimed to have undertaken (Test) - Tribunal not satisfied Applicant’s TRF was not a bogus document because of information received from International Development Program Education Pty Ltd (IDP) suggesting that a person other than the applicant sat for Test – whether the Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Department) was under a duty to provide to the Tribunal information the Department had received from IDP relating to the Test – whether Tribunal was required to make inquiries of the Department of information the Department had received from the IDP in relation to the Test – whether Tribunal relied on information from the IDP to the effect that the Test was cancelled because it had been undertaken by an imposter, and that IDP had provided access to a photograph of the person who had undertaken the test that did not match a photograph the Department maintained of the applicant (Relevant Information) – whether the Relevant Information had been communicated to the applicant by the delegate’s decision rejecting the Skilled visa – whether Tribunal was required by s.359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to give to the applicant clear particulars of the Relevant Information - jurisdictional error found because Tribunal did not comply with s.359A of the Act.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.97, 348, 352(4), 359AA, 359AA(1)(b), 359A,

359A(1), 359A(4)(b), 424A, 424A(1), 424A(3)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15C
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2, cl.885.224

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345
BZAHN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 281
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088
Khant v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1247

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
Melbourne Steamship Co Ltd v Moorehead [1912] HCA 69; (1912) 15 CLR 333
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; (2009) 259 ALR 429

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZRTF [2013] FCA 1377

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
Patel v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 22
Scott v Handley [1999] FCA 404
Shah v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 624
SZQQA v Minister for Immigration& Anor [2014] FCCA 1923

SZROQ v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 833
SZRSC v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 1281
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Manousaridis concerning an appeal by the applicant against a decision of the Minister for Immigration. The core of the dispute revolved around the applicant's alleged failure to personally undertake an IELTS test on 30 April 2011, with evidence suggesting an imposter had done so. The Tribunal had previously affirmed the delegate's decision, finding the information provided by IDP (the test administrator) to be reliable and probative.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal had erred in its findings regarding the applicant's personal attendance at the IELTS test. Specifically, the court was required to determine if the Tribunal had properly considered and relied upon the evidence presented, including information from IDP and photographic evidence held by the Department, in concluding that the applicant had not undertaken the test. The court also considered the broader principle of fair dealing by government litigants in legal proceedings.

The court reasoned that the Tribunal's satisfaction that the applicant did not undertake the IELTS test was based on information from IDP indicating an imposter had sat the exam, and access to a photograph of the actual test-taker. The court inferred that the Tribunal must have also had regard to the fact that the Department held photographs of the applicant that did not match the photograph of the person who undertook the test, even if the Tribunal did not directly access these photographs. This inference was drawn from the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant's evidence did not overcome the IDP information. The court noted that the principle of fair dealing, often applied to government litigants, requires conscientious compliance with procedures, assisting the court to reach a just result, and avoiding purely technical points or unfairly impairing the other party's capacity to defend itself.

The court's decision on the specific outcome of the appeal is not detailed in the provided text.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The passage is contained in the Tribunal’s reasons for decision. The Tribunal stated that it was “satisfied that the information provided from IDP, which indicates that the applicant did not undertake the IELTS test on 30 April 2011 and that it was undertaken by another person, is reliable and probative”.[83] In my opinion, the “information” to which the Tribunal intended to refer at the very least includes a substantial part of the Relevant Information, namely, the information contained in the report the Department received on 8 September 2011 that the IDP had cancelled the applicant’s IELTS test result of 30 April 2011 because an imposter undertook the exam, and the photograph of the person who undertook the IELTS test on 30 April 2011 which an officer from the Department accessed on the IELTS website by using the Applicant’s TRF. This, together with photographs of the applicant the Department held in ICSE, is the only information that could reasonably be supposed to have been considered by the Tribunal as indicating that the applicant did not undertake the IELTS test of 30 April 2011. This inference is reinforced by the Tribunal’s concluding that the matters on which the applicant relied did not “overcome the evidence provided from IDP which indicates that the applicant did not undertake the test”.[84] The only evidence IDP provided is that the IELTS test results of 30 April 2011 had been cancelled because an imposter had undertaken the test, and access to a photograph of the person who in fact undertook the test. This not only shows that the Tribunal considered that this part of the Relevant Information would be the reason or a part of the reason for affirming the delegate’s decision; it also shows that the Tribunal did in fact rely on that information as the reason or as a part of the reason for affirming the delegate’s decision.[83] CB154, [18][84] CB154, [18] Further, accepting as correct what I found in the previous paragraph, it must follow that, in concluding the Tribunal was satisfied “the information provided from IDP, which indicates that the applicant did not undertake the IELTS test on 30 April 2011 and that it was undertaken by another person, is reliable and probative”, the Tribunal must have had regard to the fact that there were photographs of the applicant in the possession of the Department that did not match the photograph of the person who, according to the IELTS website, had undertaken the IELTS test on 30 April 2011. I do not find the Tribunal necessarily accessed those photographs; it may have simply relied on the Departmental file note that such photographs did not match the photograph of the person who had undertaken the IELTS test on 30 April 2011. The inference is available to be drawn, and I do so infer, that the Tribunal acted in the belief that the Department held a photograph or photographs of the applicant which did not match the person depicted in the photograph that was accessible from the IELTS website.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Consistently with the context in which Griffith CJ stated the principle of fair dealing, the principle has been referred to or applied mostly to the Crown’s conduct as a litigant.[46] For example, in Scott v Handley the Full Federal Court said:[47][44] Insistence upon that standard is a recurrent theme in judicial decisions in this country in relation to the conduct of litigation by all three tiers of government: see eg Yong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 75 FCR 155 at 166; Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia [1997] FCA 558; (1997) 76 FCR 151 at 196-197; SCI Operations Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1996) 69 FCR 346 at 368; Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Saxon (1990) 28 NSWLR 263 at 267; Kenny v State of South Australia (1987) 46 SASR 268 at 273; Logue v Shoalhaven Shire Council [1979] 1 NSWLR 537 at 558-559; P & C Cantarella Pty Ltd v Egg Marketing Board (NSW) [1973] 2 NSWLR 366 at 383-384; see also R v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, Ex parte Chetnik Developments Ltd [1988] 1 AC 858 at 876-877.[45] As with most broad generalisations, the burden of this fair dealing standard is best appreciated in its particular exemplifications in individual cases. The courts have, for example, spoken positively of a public body’s obligation of “conscientious compliance with the procedures designed to minimise cost and delay”: Kenny's case, above, at 273; and of assisting “the court to arrive at the proper and just result”: P & C Cantarella Pty Ltd v Egg Marketing Board, above, at 383. And they have spoken negatively, of not taking purely technical points of practice and procedure: Yong’s case, above, at 166; of not unfairly impairing the other party's capacity to defend itself: Saxon's case, above, at 268; and of not taking advantage of its own default: SCI Operations Pty Ltd, above, at 368.[46] See G Appleby “The Government as Litigant”(2014) 37(1) UNSWLJ 94 at pages 100-102; S Le Mire “‘It’s not Fair!’: The Duty of Fairness and the Corporate Regulator” (2014) 36 SLR 445 [47] [1999] FCA 404 at [44] and [45] (Spender, Finn, and Weinberg JJ) The principle of fair dealing was also discussed, although not explored in detail, by the High Court in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar.[48] In that case the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the plaintiff (ASIC) was under a duty to act fairly in the proceedings, and ASIC breached that duty by failing to call particular evidence. In the High Court, the plurality accepted that courts and litigants rightly expect that ASIC will conduct any litigation in which it engaged fairly. The plurality noted, however, that the Court of Appeal did not sufficiently identify the source of the duty it held applied to ASIC which required it to call the evidence in question. The plurality, nevertheless, decided it was neither necessary nor desirable to explore the issue about the source or content of the duty the Court of Appeal held bound ASIC, other than to observe a number of matters. One of these was that ASIC had brought the proceedings in federal jurisdiction, and that, consequently, provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) were engaged. In that regard, the plurality said:[49]in considering how those sections would apply to pick up relevant State or Territory laws or the common law of Australia so as to provide for a duty of the kind hypothesised, it would be necessary to consider whether and to what extent laws of the Commonwealth such as the Corporations Act or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) otherwise provide. [48] (2012) 247 CLR 345[49] (2012) 247 CLR 345 at [149]