Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Kooee Communications Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Kooee Communications Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1027

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – motion to stay or dismiss application – Anshun estoppel – whether unreasonable not to have pursued present claim in previous proceeding in the New South Wales Supreme Court – whether present application arises out of substantially the same facts as previous proceeding – whether risk of inconsistent judgments – whether special circumstances justifying decision not to raise claim in previous proceeding

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52

Bazos v Doman [2001] NSWCA 347, followed
Custombuilt Homes Pty Ltd v Dowell [2005] WASCA 221, followed
Egglishaw v Australian Crime Commission (2007) 164 CLR 224, applied
Gibbs v Kinna (1999) 2 VR 19, followed
Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (No 1) (New York Deli case)(1988) 39 FCR 546, referred to
Ling v Commonwealth of Australia (1996) 68 FCR 180, applied
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589, applied
Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Kooee Communications Limited [2007] NSWSC 91, referred to
R & J Lyons Family Settlement Pty Ltd v 155 Macquarie Street Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 232, referred to
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, distinguished
Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 146 FCR 1, followed

PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 071 191 396) v KOOEE COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 001 341 331)

VID 1227 OF 2007

MARSHALL J
10 JULY 2008
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1227 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD
(ACN 071 191 396)
Applicant

AND:

KOOEE COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 001 341 331)
Respondent

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 JULY 2008

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent’s motion of 3 March 2008 is dismissed.

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and associated with the motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1227 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD
(ACN 071 191 396)
Applicant

AND:

KOOEE COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 001 341 331)
Respondent

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE:

10 JULY 2008

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant, Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd, has applied to the Court for damages from Kooee Communications Pty Ltd in respect of what Primus alleges was misleading or deceptive conduct engaged in by Kooee, in breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Primus also alleges that Kooee made a false representation to it and breached an implied duty to act in good faith in relation to the performance of a contract between Primus and Kooee.

  2. Primus filed its application in the Victoria District Registry of the Court on 21 December 2007. By motion filed on 3 March 2008 Kooee applied for an order…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1027
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd and Kooee Communications Pty Ltd were engaged in litigation concerning claims arising from a Separation Deed and subsequent conduct. The dispute was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria, which had to determine the appropriateness of the Anshun principle and whether the proceeding constituted an abuse of process. The Anshun principle refers to the situation where a party should not be allowed to litigate issues that have already been determined in a previous proceeding, to prevent inconsistent judgments. Kooee argued that Primus should have raised its current claims in the New South Wales Supreme Court proceeding.

The court considered whether it was unreasonable for Primus to defer raising its current claims and found that it was not unreasonable to do so. The critical facts in the current proceeding were different from those in the New South Wales litigation and there was no risk of inconsistent judgments. The court also found that the proceeding did not amount to an abuse of process, as the matters being litigated were distinct from those resolved in the earlier proceeding. The High Court's decision in Walton v Gardiner was not applicable, as the matters were different in character.

The Supreme Court of Victoria dismissed Kooee's motion and ordered Kooee to pay Primus' costs associated with the motion. The court held that the critical facts required to make out the current application did not require examination in the earlier litigation, and no judgment or order could be made in the current proceeding which would conflict with any judgment or order made in New South Wales.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s motion of 3 March 2008 is dismissed.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and associated with the motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MARSHALL J
The alleged unreasonableness is not manifest. No doubt it would have been more convenient for the issues raised in the current proceeding to have been advanced in New South Wales, but that is not the question. It is not appropriate when considering the Anshun principle to say what a party could reasonably have done. The proper question is, was it unreasonable to do as that party did? In any event there is much force in the view expressed by Wheeler JA in Custombuilt Homes that one should exercise considerable caution in summarily dismissing an application before the issues are crystalised after the filing of a defence. To this one might add “and/or contentions of fact and law”. A judgment dismissing the matter before the Court is interlocutory in nature. It would still be open to Kooee to advance its submissions based on the Anshun principle at the trial of the proceeding when the issues will be more clearly defined.CONCLUSION ON ANSHUN ESTOPPEL This is not a clear case for the invocation of the Anshun principle. The critical facts will differ substantially from the essential facts which were relevant in New South Wales, where the Separation Deed was the main focus of the Court’s analysis as distinct from the conduct of Kooee over a confined period. There is no risk of inconsistent judgments or orders. It was not unreasonable for Primus to refrain from advancing its current claims before the Supreme Court of New South Wales.ABUSE OF PROCESS Kooee also submitted that the current proceeding is an abuse of process. It based that submission on the judgment of the High Court in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 where at 392-393 Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ held that it would be an abuse of process to allow a party to litigate afresh a matter which has already been disposed of in earlier proceeding. That is because it would be manifestly unfair to do so. No such abuse of process arises here. The matter sought to be now litigated is entirely different in character to that disposed of in the earlier proceeding. The earlier litigation resolved a dispute about the meaning of the Separation Deed. This proceeding concerns a dispute about the circumstances which led to its making.ORDER The Court will order as follows:1.The respondent’s motion of 3 March 2008 is dismissed.2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and associated with the motion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARSHALL J

The quotation from the letter referred to in the preceding paragraph is more significant for what it does not say than for what it does say. It is entirely consistent with that statement to say that Primus became aware of the potential availability of the current claims during the currency of the New South Wales Supreme Court trial but took no action to seek to amend its application in that Court to encompass these issues. It also leaves unanswered the extent of the gap between seeking and receiving legal advice.CONSIDERATION The claims raised in the current proceeding were relevant to the subject of the earlier proceeding given that the same parties were agitating issues concerning the breakdown of their commercial relationship. However, the fact that the New South Wales litigation and this proceeding are closely related is insufficient to invoke the Anshun principle. The question remains whether it was unreasonable for Primus to defer reliance on its current claims. Based in large part on the inadequacy of the response of Primus’ solicitor when asked why he did not raise the current issues earlier, the subject matter of the current claims could have been raised in the New South Wales Supreme Court at first instance. This may have been done by way of an amendment to that proceeding; with the original New South Wales claims raised in addition or in the alternative. Although there are documents such as the VSPA, the Separation Deed, the Letter Agreement, the Purchase offer, the Digiplus offer and the B Digital/SP Telemedia Deed, which were referred to in evidence in New South Wales and are relevant to the current proceeding, the facts which are relevant to the instant proceeding are not substantially the same as those admitted in New South Wales. The critical facts in the current proceeding will concern the conduct of Kooee from about October 2004 until July 2005 with respect to the circumstances of the Purchase offer and the availability or otherwise of the services referred to in it. Those issues were not relevant to the monetary entitlement of the parties under the Separation Deed. It is not to the point that some of the evidence tendered in the New South Wales case will, in all likelihood, be sought to be relied on in this proceeding. The focus of this proceeding is different in nature to the focus of the litigation in the New South Wales Supreme Court. In Gibbs v Kenna at [23], Kenny JA observed that there would be “a good deal of overlap” in the evidence in the two cases her Honour examined, however that concept is not necessarily the same as the concept that the factual material will be substantially the same. Here the critical facts required to make out the current application did not require examination in the earlier litigation. On that basis alone it was not unreasonable for Primus to defer raising the current claims. There is a further consideration in support of the view that Primus did not act unreasonably in not raising the issues in the current application in the New South Wales Supreme Court proceeding. That reason would defeat the current motion even if the view that the facts are not substantially the same is in error. The reason is that no judgment or order can be made in the current proceeding which will conflict with any judgment or order made in New South Wales. The judgments in New South Wales give effect to the Separation Deed by interpreting the rights of the parties under it. Any judgment in this proceeding will focus on the conduct of Kooee in the six month or so period leading up to the termination of the VSPA to examine whether Kooee engaged in conduct of the kind which caused compensable damage to Primus. As Einstein J said at [10] in Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Kooee Communications Limited [2007] NSWSC 91:The VSPA received only minimal attention during the hearing. It is likely sufficient for present purposes to do no more than to set out the recitals and some detail from the schedules.