Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kooee Communications Pty Ltd v Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd
[2008] FCA 1316

KOOEE COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 011 341 331) v PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 071 191 396)

VID 583 OF 2008

GORDON J
25 AUGUST 2008
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 583 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

KOOEE COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 011 341 331)
Applicant

AND:

PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 071 191 396)
Respondent

JUDGE:

GORDON J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 AUGUST 2008

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The amended notice of motion be dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the notice of motion and the amended notice of motion.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 583 OF 2008

BETWEEN:

KOOEE COMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 011 341 331)
Applicant

AND:

PRIMUS TELECOMMUNICATIONS PTY LTD (ACN 071 191 396)
Respondent

JUDGE:

GORDON J

DATE:

25 AUGUST 2008

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The Applicant, Kooee Communications Pty Ltd (“Kooee”), seeks an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of Marshall J dismissing a motion for summary judgment on Anshun estoppel grounds:  Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Kooee Communications Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1027. For the reasons that follow, the interlocutory judgment is neither attended by sufficient doubt nor would it give rise to substantial injustice, if leave to appeal were denied, to warrant the grant of an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal. The amended notice of motion filed on 12 August 2008 will be dismissed with costs.

    Background Facts

  2. Kooee is a reseller of telecommunications services to retail customers.  The facts giving rise to the present application concern, in general terms, the provision of telecommunication services by Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (“Primus”) to Kooee.  During the relevant period, Kooee obtained those services from Primus pursuant to a contract described as the Virtual Service Provider Agreement (“VSPA”).  Under cl 6 of the VSPA, Kooee was not entitled to enter into any resale agreement with any third party for the supply and resale of telecommunications services competing directly with a Primus Product which Primus might have been able to supply unless Kooee first made an offer to Primus to acquire those services for resale being an offer which Primus could choose to accept or reject. 

  3. Kooee says that is in fact what transpired.  It found a better deal (referred to in the reasons for decision of Marshall J as the “Digiplus offer”), which it put to Primus and which Primus chose not to match.  As a result, the parties terminated their contractual obligations under the VSPA and recorded those termination arrangements in a document described as a “Separation Deed”.  A dispute arose as to the proper construction of the Separation Deed.  As a result, Primus commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1316
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kooee Communications Pty Ltd sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against an interlocutory judgment dismissing its motion for summary judgment on Anshun estoppel grounds. The interlocutory judgment was issued by Marshall J in Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Kooee Communications Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1027. The dispute arose from a contract between the parties, known as the Virtual Service Provider Agreement (VSPA), and the subsequent termination of that contract. A Separation Deed was executed to record the termination arrangements, but a dispute arose over its proper construction. Primus successfully sought a money judgment in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which was later reduced on appeal. Primus also commenced proceedings in the Federal Court, alleging that Kooee misled it into entering the Separation Deed by claiming a better deal existed, which did not. The central issue before the court was whether the interlocutory judgment should be appealed, considering the principles of Anshun estoppel and the risk of contradictory judgments.

The court addressed three main issues. Firstly, whether there was sufficient doubt about the interlocutory judgment to warrant an extension of time to appeal. The court found that the ambiguity in the evidence suggested the need for further ventilation of the facts at trial, making an interlocutory appeal on the current state of the evidence pointless. Secondly, whether there was a risk of contradictory judgments. The court disagreed with Kooee’s submission that contradictory judgments were a risk, distinguishing this from the doctrine of election. Primus had made an election by suing for damages under the Separation Deed in the Supreme Court, and it was not contradictory to now claim additional damages in the Federal Court due to misleading conduct. Lastly, the court considered whether the facts in the two proceedings were substantially the same. It concluded that while the transactions were overlapping, the relevant facts in each case were different, particularly regarding the genuineness of the Digiplus offer. Therefore, the interlocutory judgment was not attended by sufficient doubt.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the amended notice of motion. It ordered that the amended notice of motion be dismissed and that the Applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the notice of motion and the amended notice of motion.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended notice of motion be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the notice of motion and the amended notice of motion.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Applicant, Kooee Communications Pty Ltd (“Kooee”), seeks an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of Marshall J dismissing a motion for summary judgment on Anshun estoppel grounds: Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Kooee Communications Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1027. For the reasons that follow, the interlocutory judgment is neither attended by sufficient doubt nor would it give rise to substantial injustice, if leave to appeal were denied, to warrant the grant of an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal. The amended notice of motion filed on 12 August 2008 will be dismissed with costs.Background Facts Kooee is a reseller of telecommunications services to retail customers. The facts giving rise to the present application concern, in general terms, the provision of telecommunication services by Primus Telecommunications Pty Ltd (“Primus”) to Kooee. During the relevant period, Kooee obtained those services from Primus pursuant to a contract described as the Virtual Service Provider Agreement (“VSPA”). Under cl 6 of the VSPA, Kooee was not entitled to enter into any resale agreement with any third party for the supply and resale of telecommunications services competing directly with a Primus Product which Primus might have been able to supply unless Kooee first made an offer to Primus to acquire those services for resale being an offer which Primus could choose to accept or reject. Kooee says that is in fact what transpired. It found a better deal (referred to in the reasons for decision of Marshall J as the “Digiplus offer”), which it put to Primus and which Primus chose not to match. As a result, the parties terminated their contractual obligations under the VSPA and recorded those termination arrangements in a document described as a “Separation Deed”. A dispute arose as to the proper construction of the Separation Deed. As a result, Primus commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking to resolve that dispute and, in particular, seeking to recover amounts it said were owing to it under the Separation Deed. Primus was successful in part and obtained a money judgment in its favour of $2,647,832. On appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the amount of the judgment in favour of Primus was reduced to $1,391,040. While the judgment on appeal was reserved, Primus commenced separate proceedings in this Court alleging, under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), that it was misled by Kooee into entering the Separation Deed because the so-called better deal said by Kooee to exist and which it put to Primus did not in fact exist (“the s 52 claim”). Therefore, so Primus contends, but for this misleading and deceptive conduct, the VSPA would have continued and Primus would have been entitled to receive more than it received under the Separation Deed. The other aspects of Primus’ claim in the Federal Court may be put to one side for present purposes.Court below and the Anshun principles

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GORDON J
In light of the state of the evidence and the fact that the judge went on to emphasise separate and independent grounds for dismissing the motion, I am inclined to the latter view. In any event, however, the ambiguity suggests the need for further ventilation of the facts at the trial level; an interlocutory appeal on this point on the present state of the evidence would be pointless.Contradictory Judgments Factor Primus submitted that no such risk existed. I agree. Kooee’s submission that there was a risk of contradictory judgments confused that issue with the doctrine of election. The former deals with the problem of one court saying, for example, that “P, having been hit by a negligently operated vehicle, is entitled to X,” while another court, looking at the same transaction might say “P is entitled to half X.” That was essentially the case in Anshun, where the issue was whether the Port of Melbourne Authority should recover 90%, as was held in the first action, or 100%, as was claimed in the subsequent action. The doctrine of election, on the other hand, deals with remedies. Relevantly, a party claiming fraudulent inducement (which is effectively what Primus now claims) has two choices: it may seek rescission of the contract, or it may seek to keep the benefit of the contract, such as it is, and sue for damages. For example, if one is deceived into buying a defective car, one may seek to have the contract voided and the purchase money returned in full, or one may keep the car and sue for damages (i.e. the difference between the value of the car as promised and the actual fair market value of the car received). Here, Primus sued in the New South Wales Supreme Court on the contract (i.e. the Separation Deed) and received a money judgment. Accordingly, it has made an election and cannot now seek to have the Separation Deed declared void. (Counsel for Primus quite properly conceded this point in oral submissions.) At the same time, however, there is nothing conflicting in the claim, now advanced by Primus in the Federal Court, that but for the misleading conduct of Kooee, it would have received additional moneys beyond those it received under the Separation Deed. Accordingly, Marshall J did not err in concluding that there is no risk of conflicting or contradictory judgments.Substantially Same Facts As to the final issue - the substantial similarity of the relevant facts, or lack thereof - in my view the judge was correct in concluding that while in a broad sense the transactions at issue in the New South Wales Supreme Court and in the Federal Court proceedings are overlapping, if not the same, the relevant facts in each case are quite different. In the present proceedings, the crucial question will be, as the judge noted, whether the Digiplus offer was a genuine offer and the services appurtenant thereto were actually available to Kooee. There is no suggestion that the facts relevant to the genuineness of the Digiplus offer were ventilated more than peripherally, if at all, in the New South Wales Supreme Court. In other words, although the same transactions may be at issue in both New South Wales Supreme Court and in the Federal Court proceedings, it cannot be said that substantially the same facts are at issue. For this reason as well, it cannot be said that the judge’s decision is attended with such doubt as to warrant granting an extension of time for leave to appeal an interlocutory judgment.Other matters

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GORDON J

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