FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
PrimeSpace Property Investment Ltd v Vienne Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 326
Citation: PrimeSpace Property Investment Ltd v Vienne Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 326 Parties: PRIMESPACE PROPERTY INVESTMENT LIMITED ACN 107 345 317 v VIENNE PTY LIMITED ACN 151 789 972
PRIMESPACE PROPERTY INVESTMENT LIMITED ACN 107 345 317 v DOMA INVESTMENTS (ACT) PTY LIMITED ACN 083 161 451
PRIMESPACE PROPERTY INVESTMENT LIMITED ACN 107 345 317 v JUDITH ANNE JENSEN AS TRUSTEE FOR THE PERIDOT INVESTMENT TRUST ABN 92 780 407 682
File number(s): NSD 1303 of 2014
NSD 1366 of 2014
NSD 9 of 2015Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 9 April 2015 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – statutory demand – application to set aside – defects in demand – whether genuine dispute – s 459J Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9, 459E, 459G(2), 459H, 459J(1)(a), 459J(1)(b), 459J(2)
Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) Sch 2
Cases cited: Astram Financial Services Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland [2010] FCA 1010
Castlepines (IBM) v Residential Housing Corporation [2003] NSWSC 398
Chadwick Industries (South Coast) Pty Ltd v Condensing Vaporisers Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 37
Elders Trustee & Executor Co Ltd v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 193
Everkind Pty Ltd v Hazenforn Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1031
Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785
Mibor Investments Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] 2 VR 290
Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896
Re Glenevan Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 201
Re International Materials & Technologies Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 787
Re Morris Catering (Australia) Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 601
Re Stacks Managed Investments Ltd [2005] NSWSC 753; (2005) 54 ACSR 466
Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452
Temperzone Australia Pty Ltd v Armcor Heating & Cooling Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 137
Topfelt Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales (1993) 47 FCR 226Date of hearing: 7 April 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Plaintiff: M Cashion SC & P Newton Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Colin Biggers & Paisley Counsel for the Defendants: C R Newlinds SC & D Barnett Solicitor for the Defendants: Bradley Allen Love Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1303 of 2014
BETWEEN: PRIMESPACE PROPERTY INVESTMENT LIMITED ACN 107 345 317
PlaintiffAND: VIENNE PTY LIMITED ACN 151 789 972
Defendant
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 APRIL 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The originating application be dismissed.
2.The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1366 of 2014
BETWEEN: PRIMESPACE PROPERTY INVESTMENT LIMITED ACN 107 345…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 326
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the statutory demands were valid, considering a defect in the address provided, and whether the demands could be set aside due to the existence of a genuine dispute. The court had to determine if the defect in the demand was sufficient to invalidate it and whether the contention of a genuine dispute was legally tenable. The court also had to interpret the contractual relationship between the parties, specifically focusing on the terms of the Subscription Agreements and the Constitution.
The court found that the defect in the demand regarding the address was not sufficient to invalidate it, as strict compliance with the statutory provisions was not a precondition for validity. The court referenced the Full Court's decision in Spencer Constructions, which held that a demand could remain valid even if it contained defects, provided no injustice resulted. The court further determined that the plaintiff's contention of a genuine dispute was weak and untenable as a matter of law, as the interpretation of the Subscription Agreements and the Constitution did not support the plaintiff's position. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s arguments were insufficient to establish a genuine dispute.
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s application to set aside the statutory demands. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs. This decision was based on the court's finding that the defect in the statutory demand was not fundamental enough to invalidate it and that the genuine dispute raised by the plaintiff lacked legal merit.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The originating application be dismissed.
2. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In support of its primary contention that cl 19 of the Constitution does not form part of the bargain between PPI and the defendants, the defendants contended that the term “supplemental to” in cl 4 simply means that the Subscription Agreements added to (or supplemented or modified) the Constitution and did not mean that the Constitution is added to the Subscription Agreements. Emphasis was placed upon the fact that the second sentence in cl 4 was fatal to PPI’s position because it provided that, in the event of inconsistency between the obligations under a Subscription Agreement and the terms of the Constitution, the Subscription Agreement prevails. Such an inconsistency arises if PPI is obliged under the terms of the Subscription Agreement to repay the face value of the convertible notes within the specified time and there is a provision of the Constitution which limits or excludes that obligation. For these reasons, the defendants submitted that the “genuine dispute” raised by PPI “is manifestly untenable as a matter of law” and is “patently feeble”. Consideration It is convenient to deal first with the plaintiff’s challenge based upon the deficiency in the demands caused by the provision of the wrong address before considering whether the demands should be set aside on the basis of the existence of a genuine dispute. (a) Setting aside the demands under s 459J(1)(b) of the Act For the following reasons, the plaintiff’s reliance on s 459J(1)(b) of the Act as a basis for setting aside the demands must be rejected. In Spencer Constructions, the Full Court held that, in the case of a defect in, or in relation to, a demand, strict compliance with the relevant statutory provisions is not a precondition to the validity of the demand, which means that such a defect does not result in invalidity. The Full Court found that the provision of an address for service of any application and affidavits in a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction in which the demand was served was clearly a defect in the demand but that because no injustice was caused by the defect in the particular case, the demand could not be set aside merely because of that deficiency (referring to both s 459J(1)(a) and (2) of the Act). Furthermore, the Full Court held that the Court’s power to set aside a demand for “some other reason” under s 459J(1)(b) had no application because that provision was only available in relation to a reason other than a defect in the demand. The Full Court stated that this view was supported by the definition of “statutory demand” in s 9 of the Act, which defines a statutory demand as a document that is, or purports to be, a demand served under s 459E. Accordingly, as long as a document is or purports to be a statutory demand served under that provision, even significant defects in the document fall to be determined under s 459J(1)(a) and not s 459J(1)(b). The Full Court did not reject the possibility that there may be cases where deficiencies in the form of a demand are so fundamental that the demand is incapable of meeting the definition in s 9 of the Act (see Lockhart J’s comments in Topfelt Pty Ltd v State Bank of New South Wales (1993) 47 FCR 226 at 238). It is plain, however, that the Full Court in Spencer Constructions did not regard the incorrect provision of an interstate address for service of any application or affidavit as constituting such a fundamental deficiency, at least in the circumstances of that case.