Primary Health Care Ltd v Australian General Practice Network Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Primary Health Care Limited v Australian General Practice Network Limited [2012] FCA 174

Citation: Primary Health Care Limited v Australian General Practice Network Limited [2012] FCA 174
Parties: PRIMARY HEALTH CARE LIMITED ACN 064 530 516, IDAMENEO (NO 123) PTY LTD ACN 002 968 185 and SIDAMENEO (NO 456) PTY LTD ACN 089 995 817 v AUSTRALIAN GENERAL PRACTICE NETWORK LIMITED ACN 082 812 146, HUNTER RURAL DIVISION OF GENERAL PRACTICE LIMITED ACN 061 782 965, THE SOUTH EAST PRIMARY HEALTH CARE NETWORK LIMITED ACN 061 075 607, GENERAL PRACTICE QUEENSLAND LIMITED ACN 123 426 111, GOLD COAST PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PTY LTD ACN 140 903 028, MACKAY DIVISION OF GENERAL PRACTICE LIMITED ACN 062 930 385, EASTERN SYDNEY DIVISION OF GENERAL PRACTICE LIMITED ACN 063 189 042, CENTRAL QUEENSLAND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PTY LTD ACN 141 687 774 and BARWON DIVISION OF GENERAL PRACTICE LIMITED ACN 094 964 575
File number: NSD 239 of 2010
Judge: STONE J
Date of judgment: 2 March 2012
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to discontinue proceedings – whether proceedings reasonably commenced and reasonably maintained – whether order as to costs appropriate in the circumstances – whether order preventing applicants from commencing further proceedings appropriate

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 26.12

Cases cited:

Clark v ING Life Limited [2007] FCA 1960
Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261

Equity Access Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) 16 IPR 431

Harvey Norman Holdings Limited v Fels (2002) ATPR ¶41-852
Hornsby Building Information Centre Proprietary Limited v Sydney Building Information Centre Limited (1978) 140 CLR 216
Mantra Group Pty Ltd v Tailly Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 183 FCR 450
Mineralogy Pty Ltd v National Native Title Tribunal [1998] FCA 1700
Nature’s Blend Pty Ltd v Nestle Australia Ltd (2010) 272 ALR 487
O’Neill v Mann (2000) 175 ALR 742
Re the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622
Smith v Airservices Australia (2005) 146 FCR 37
Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1992) 33 FCR 382

Date of hearing: 4 and 5 October 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Applicants: DB Studdy SC with JH Hennessy
Solicitor for the Applicants: Gilbert + Tobin
Counsel for the Second Respondent: RJ Webb SC with C Champion
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Respondents: R Perry SC
Solicitor for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Respondents: Carter Newell Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 239 of 2010

BETWEEN:

PRIMARY HEALTH CARE LIMITED ACN 064 530 516
First Applicant

IDAMENEO (NO 123) PTY LTD ACN 002 968 185
Second Applicant

SIDAMENEO (NO 456) PTY LTD ACN 089 995 817
Third…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 174
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerns an application by Primary Health Care Ltd for leave to discontinue their proceedings against Australian General Practice Network Ltd and others. The application was heard by the Federal Court and involved issues around the reasonableness of the proceedings and the appropriateness of costs orders. The central dispute was about the use of the term "Primary Health Care" by the respondents, with the applicants originally seeking to limit this use in a trademark sense. However, disagreements arose between the parties about the scope of the claims, which influenced the decision on whether the proceedings were reasonably maintained. The court had to decide if the proceedings were reasonably commenced and maintained, and if so, whether an order for costs and a restriction on further proceedings was appropriate.

The court found that the proceedings were reasonably commenced, but had reservations about whether they were reasonably maintained due to the applicants' failure to clarify their position earlier. Despite this, the court determined that the proceedings were maintained reasonably from a certain point onwards. Regarding costs, the court found that each party should bear their own costs, except for the costs incurred by the respondents after a certain date, which the applicants were ordered to pay. The court also considered it appropriate to restrict the applicants from commencing further proceedings about the term "Primary Health Care" without leave of the court, but only in its use as a trademark or badge of origin.

The court granted the applicants leave to discontinue the proceedings on specified terms. The applicants were required to file a notice of discontinuance within fourteen days, bear their own costs, and pay the respondents' costs incurred after a particular date. Additionally, the applicants were restricted from initiating further proceedings regarding the use of "Primary Health Care" without court leave, except for its use as a trademark or badge of origin. The court also ordered the applicants to pay the respondents' costs for the application to discontinue the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants have leave to discontinue the proceedings on the following terms:

(a) the applicants file a notice of discontinuance no later than 14 days from the date of this order;

(b) subject to order 1(c) and any previous order made for the payment of costs by any party, each party to this proceeding is to bear its own costs;

(c) the applicants pay the second to ninth respondents’ costs of the proceeding incurred after 15 June 2011.

2. The applicants, or any of them, not commence further proceedings against the respondents, or any of them, in respect of the use by the respondents, or any of them of the expression, ‘Primary Health Care’ other than its use as a trade mark or badge of origin without the leave of the Court.

3. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of the application to discontinue the proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In oral submissions, Mr Studdy again reiterated that the applicants’ offers of compromise and the Calderbank letters that accompanied them, made it clear that their concerns “were limited to the use by the respondents of the trade names in a trademark sense” and that they were not concerned by use of ‘Primary Health Care’ in any descriptive sense. The offers of compromise followed the Government’s Portfolio Budget Statement referred to at [18] above. Conclusion As indicated above the applicants and respondents disagree as to the ambit of the claims made by the applicants. This has a material bearing on the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct of the proceedings and, in particular, whether the proceedings, while properly commenced, were reasonably continued and, in particular, whether the applicants should have sought to discontinue them at an earlier point. Leave to discontinue It would not be in the interests of any of the parties for leave to discontinue to be refused and the respondents have not argued for this to be the case. The applicants should be given leave to discontinue the proceedings on the conditions outlined below. Given the length of time since the proceedings were first commenced and the fact that the long-standing schedule for hearing their application was vacated at comparatively short notice, it is in the interests of all parties that their notice of discontinuance be filed without delay that is within fourteen days of leave being given. Restriction on commencement of further proceedings The applicants submit that leave to discontinue should be granted with each party to bear its own costs. Apart from the issue of costs to which I will come shortly, the respondents have submitted that leave should only be given on terms that the applicants not commence further proceedings in respect of the use by the respondents of the expression ‘Primary Health Care’ without the leave of the Court. I do not regard a restriction on further proceedings in such wide terms as appropriate however, as the applicants seek leave to discontinue on the basis that their concern has always been only to limit the use of the term in a branding or trade mark sense such a limitation would be appropriate. Whether it is possible to use the term purely as a badge of origin is not for me to say. The difficulties were sufficiently summarised by Stephen J in Hornsby Building Information Centre discussed above at [31]. Nevertheless, that is the position on which the applicants rest their claim for leave and it is fair that they be required to stand by it. Costs As I have already indicated I consider that the proceedings were reasonably commenced. While I have some reservations on the issue, on balance I also consider that it was reasonable for the applicants to maintain the proceedings to a certain point. The reservations relate to the failure of the applicants to clarify the precise nature of their position. I suspect that this could have been achieved somewhat earlier than it was however I also suspect that there was a degree of intransigence on both sides. I am, however, satisfied that at least from 15 June the position of the respondents was tolerably clear and that the applicants could have applied for leave to discontinue the proceedings from that point without materially prejudicing the position that they now hold.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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