Presrod Pty Limited v Wollongong City Council (No 2)

[2013] NSWLEC 178

Land and Environment Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Presrod Pty Limited v Wollongong City Council (No 2) [2013] NSWLEC 178

Hearing dates:

5 June 2013

Decision date:

24 October 2013

Jurisdiction:

Class 1

Before:

Sheahan J

Decision:

(1) The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the substantive proceedings, except those relating to the merits issues.

(2) The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the hearing of the Notice of Motion for costs.

(3) All exhibits are returned to the parties.

Catchwords:

COSTS: Class 1 proceedings concluded by findings on issues of law at a hearing which also dealt with merits - principles to apply - costs of motion for costs

Legislation Cited:

Civil Procedure Act 2005
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
Land and Environment Court Rules 2007
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005

Cases Cited:

Allandale Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services [2013] NSWCA 103; (2013) 195 LGERA 182
BYT Nominees Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council (No 3) [2008] NSWLEC 294
Ekermawi v Bennett (No 2) [2010] NSWLEC 40
Grant v Kiama Municipal Council [2006] NSWLEC 70
Port Stephens Council v Sansom [2007] NSWCA 299; (2007) 156 LGERA 125
Presrod Pty Ltd v Wollongong City Council [2012] NSWLEC 240
Residents Against Improper Development Inc v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 323; (2006) 149 LGERA 360
Sky Design and Concepts Pty Ltd v Pittwater Council (No 5) [2009] NSWLEC 174

Category:

Costs

Parties:

Presrod Pty Limited (Applicant)
Wollongong City Council (Respondent)

File Number(s):

10101 of 2012

Judgment

Introduction

1. Council seeks an order that the applicant pay all or some of the Council's costs in this matter, which was a class 1 appeal, brought under s 97 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 ("EPA Act").

1. The court dismissed the appeal on 29 October 2012 - [2012] NSWLEC 240 - and reserved the question of costs.

1. In the hearing on costs, the ultimate contest turned on the failure of either or both of the parties to seek to separate the hearing on the merits of the development involved, from the hearing of competing submissions on the legal question of its permissibility.

1. The authorities exhibit a predisposition towards, if not apply a fully articulated presumption in favour of, making no costs orders in class 1 proceedings, except where there is a hearing and an outcome on a separate/preliminary question of law, or on an appeal on a question of law, under s 56A of the EPA Act.

Separation of Issues

1. The separation of questions in civil litigation is often controversial. The separate determination of a preliminary question is not always appropriate - it depends upon the circumstances of the case at hand.

1. Biscoe J's decision to separate a question, and my decision answering it, were both appealed to the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Allandale Blue Metal Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services [2013] NSWCA 103; (2013) 195 LGERA 182 ("Allandale"), which expressed a range of relevant views on the principles governing the exercise of the discretion to separate. (See, especially, Ward JA at [87]-[120]. The case against separation of questions was more comprehensively put to the Court of Appeal than to Biscoe J).

1. The court system prefers to see all issues between the parties dealt with at one time (Allandale at [10] and [87]), and that course is consistent with the "just quick and cheap" objectives of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 ("CP Act").

1. Part 28 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 guides the decision as to whether a question should be determined separately. Rule 28.4 reinforces the "just, quick and cheap" objectives of the Act.

1. Council submits that it may be cheaper for parties to deal with matters separately, to save the expense of having to litigate the merits, although the separate determination of matters may not always be quicker, and the consideration of justice in the determination of the substantive issues appears to be a neutral factor (Tp6, LL26-41).

The Hearing

1. Before the court, at the substantive hearing of this matter, there were four unseparated contentions by the Council - one concerning permissibility (which included several aspects), and three concerning questions of merit or impact (traffic, noise, and loss of privacy).

1. The relevant development application ("DA"), which Council had refused, sought the conversion and reconfiguration of some suites in an existing hotel.

1. Council consistently contended, even during its assessment of the DA (letter dated 9 November 2011, in Exhibit C1), that the development was prohibited, and that the site did not have the benefit of existing use rights. Council determined (notice dated 22 December 2011, in Exhibit C1) that the development ought to be refused on its merits, but was prohibited in any event as not satisfying a relevant zone objective.

1. The appeal was heard by Commissioner Brown and myself on 28-29 May 2012. The first day was taken up by a comprehensive site visit and the hearing of objections in Wollongong. On the second day, in the courtroom, exhibits were tendered and explained, and submissions were made, on the two legal issues involved in the question of permissibility, absolutely central to the appeal, as well as on particular merits issues. No cross-examination of the contributing experts was required. We reserved judgment for some considerable time because of the complexity of the legal issues in their factual context.

The Outcome

1. Our judgment of 29 October 2012 held that (1) the site did not benefit from existing use rights, pursuant to s 106 of the EPA Act ([59]-[67]); (2) that the project could not rely on earlier approvals, and modify them pursuant to s 109B ([83]-[86]); and (3) that, were it permissible, the amenity impacts of the proposal would not warrant its refusal ([87]-[91]).

1. A Notice of Intention to Appeal to the Court of Appeal was eventually allowed to expire, on 30 January 2013.

1. Following this court's primary judgment, Council wrote to Presrod's solicitors, on 5 November 2012 (Exhibit C2), arguing that it was entitled to its costs of the proceedings (estimated at $27,000), and offering to accept a lump sum of $20,000 in respect of them.

1. Presrod's solicitors replied on 13 November 2012 (Exhibit P1), noting that Council had succeeded on only one of its four contentions, and urging agreement on a Consent Order that there be "no order as to costs".

1. Council's general counsel responded, on 15 November 2012 (Exhibit C2), that the $20,000 figure it had offered to accept did not include the costs involved in Council's engagement of its consultant planner - "In other words, the costs of the ... merit issues are not sought ... and I will thus proceed to file a motion seeking Council's costs as they relate to the determinative issue", if Council's compromise was not accepted.

1. Presrod sought, on 19 November 2012 (Exhibit P2), an extension of time to 26 November to consider Council's offer, but sent no further response (Reilly par 8).

The Costs Question

1. Council's Notice of Motion was filed on 7 February 2013, and sought orders that:

1. The Applicant pay the Council's costs of the proceedings.

2. In the alternative to order 1, the Applicant pay the Council's costs of the proceedings, less the costs incurred by Council relating to the merit issues.

3. The Applicant pay Council's costs of this motion.

4. Such further or other orders as the Court sees fit.

1. The relevant provisions are the following pars of r 3.7 of the Land and Environment Court Rules 2007 (emphasis mine):

3.7 Costs in certain proceedings

(1) ...

(2) The Court is not to make an order for the payment of costs unless the Court considers that the making of an order as to the whole or any part of the costs is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

(3) Circumstances in which the Court might consider the making of a costs order to be fair and reasonable include (without limitation) the following:

(a) that the proceedings involve, as a central issue, a question of law, a question of fact or a question of mixed fact and law, and the determination of such question:

(i) in one way was, or was potentially, determinative of the proceedings, and

(ii was preliminary to, or otherwise has not involved, an evaluation of the merits of any application the subject of the proceedings,

(b) that a party has failed to provide, or has unreasonably delayed in providing, information or documents:

(i) that are required by law to be provided in relation to any application the subject of the proceedings, or

(ii) that are necessary to enable a consent authority to gain a proper understanding of, and give proper consideration to, the application,

...

(f) that a party has commenced or continued a claim in the proceedings, or maintained a defence to the proceedings, where:

(i) the claim or defence (as appropriate) did not have reasonable prospects of success, or

(ii) to commence or continue the claim, or to maintain the defence, was otherwise unreasonable.

1. That rule was made in 2007, and closely adopts/resembles the principles which had been formulated by Preston J in his class 1 judgment in Grant v Kiama Municipal Council [2006] NSWLEC 70, especially at [15].

1. Council contends that "the question of permissibility was a central issue" (my emphasis), and that its determination "turned entirely on construction of statutory instruments" (submissions par 9). As that was a question the finding on which was determinative of the proceedings, and did not involve the "evaluation of the merits" of the application, Council argues that Presrod's case on permissibility offends r 3.7(3)(f), and that, in terms of r 3.7(3)(a), and as an exception to the general presumption of "no costs in class 1", the court should consider it "fair and reasonable" to make an order, "in the circumstances" of the present case, at least in regard to the relevant component of the Council's costs.

1. Counsel for the Council referred the court to the dictionary definitions of the word "central", namely (Macquarie) "constituting that from which other related things proceed or upon which they depend", or "principal, chief, dominant", and (Oxford) "chief, essential, most important".

1. Council notes that only five of the 93 paragraphs of our judgment were devoted to merits, but it is too simplistic to focus only on the reasoning section of the judgment. At least half of the hearing time, much of the tendered material, and a fair proportion of the balance of the judgment, set out and dealt with the objections and concerns of Council and its citizens.

1. Although the permissibility question was not formally "separated" from those matters, the principles governing the costs of raising a preliminary point of law in class 1 proceedings are, Council submits, apposite to the claim for costs now before the court. I agree.

1. In another decision given before the making of r 3.7, namely the Court of Appeal's five-judge decision in Port Stephens Council v Sansom [2007] NSWCA 299; (2007) 156 LGERA 125 ("Sansom"), the Chief Justice stressed that, although the court's costs discretion is wide, judges should strive for a consistency of approach.

1. On that basis, the Council argues that the situation in this matter resembles extremely closely the situation in which a "preliminary question" was dealt with by the present Chief Judge in BYT Nominees Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council (No 3) [2008] NSWLEC 294 ("BYT"), especially at [26]-[31]. The Chief Judge ordered the applicant in BYT to pay Council's costs of the question and of the application for costs ([37]-[38]).

1. The proponents in both this case and in BYT were on notice of the Council's contention that the development was prohibited, and that Council did not accept the claim for existing use rights. In both cases, the question was properly arguable, whether on a preliminary basis as the only issue (as in BYT), or as part of a combined hearing (as here).

1. Counsel for Presrod argued that BYT lends support to the submission that if you deal with a legal issue as a preliminary point, a costs order may follow the event, subject to some exceptions (Tp17, LL26-28).

1. In terms of consistency of approach, Presrod relies upon the presumptive rule in 3.7(2), and the underlying "no discouragement" principle.

1. Counsel for the Council took the court to Preston J's judgment in a s 56A appeal in a class 2 (tree) case, Ekermawi v Bennett (No 2) [2010] NSWLEC 40, where His Honour referred (at [58]) to the "presumptive rule" in r 3.7(2), and considered the application of r 3.8(3)(a) and (f).

1. His Honour cited authorities in which "only a question of law" was involved, including Sky Design and Concepts Pty Ltd v Pittwater Council (No 5) [2009] NSWLEC 174 ("Sky Design'), and made an order for costs regarding the appeal, but declined to do so in respect of the original hearings.

1. In Sky Design, I had said (at [13]-[14]):

13 A s56A appeal is, by its nature, litigation separate from the merits appeal from which it is brought. The so-called "no discouragement" principle operates in favour of no order for costs being made in the substantive problem-solving, merits review proceedings. See the discussion by Biscoe J in Arden Anglican School v Hornsby Shire Council [2008] NSWLEC 103; (2008) 158 LGERA 224, especially at [9]-[10].

14 However, a s56A appeal is a serious adversarial proceeding involving argument of legal principles, in which the traditional "costs follow the event" is the more apposite principle, but an order must be found to be "fair and reasonable" in all the circumstances of the case.

1. Counsel for Presrod submitted, following the Court of Appeal's decision in Residents Against Improper Development Inc v Chase Property Investments Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 323; (2006) 149 LGERA 360 at [252] ("RAID"), that litigation needs to have the flavour of 'ordinary litigation', rather than merits review, for it to be "fair and reasonable" to depart from the presumptive rule, which was not the case in the present matter (Tp16, LL5-7).

1. In the present matter, Presrod was on notice that its development was prohibited, and that it could not rely upon existing use rights (see above at [12]). Either party could have sought the separate determination of the preliminary permissibility question, even though a choice on that question is not a bar to a costs order.

1. I am satisfied that the permissibility issues in this matter were both central and preliminary to any merit issues.

1. The decision on the permissibility issue effectively disposed of the proceedings, but the merits of the proposal were canvassed by Commissioner Brown and myself, in case our decision on permissibility did not stand, on appeal.

1. Counsel for Presrod submitted that no order should be made for an "issue by issue" approach to costs, as the form of the Council's costs application is not provided for in the rules (Tp18, LL3-5).

1. I disagree. Rule 3.7(2) provides for the making of an order for the "whole or any part" of costs where the circumstances are "fair and reasonable". The Council offered to moderate its costs claim, and not seek (Exhibit C2) its costs for the contest on the merits, and such an outcome was indicated by the authorities.

1. I am satisfied that it is fair and reasonable that the applicant be ordered to pay the costs of the substantive proceedings insofar as they relate to the permissibility issues, and also to pay the costs of the notice of motion.

ORDERS

1. The orders of the court will be:

(1)   The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the substantive proceedings, except those relating to the merits issues.

(2)   The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the hearing of the Notice of Motion for costs.

(3)   All exhibits are returned to the parties.

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Decision last updated: 24 October 2013