PRASAD v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PRASAD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 1552
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application to extend time in which application for judicial review may be made – whether explanation for delay adequate – whether substantive case arguable – explanation for delay not adequate – substantive case not arguable – not in interests of administration of justice to grant extension of time – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.360, 360A, 379A, 379C, 477

Migration Regulations 1994, cl.572.235 of sch.2, Condition 8202(2) of sch.8

Cases cited:

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd & Ors v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391
Prodduturi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 5
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146

Applicant: MANASA PRASAD
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 985 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Jones
Hearing date: 16 May 2016
Date of Last Submission: 16 May 2016
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 24 June 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Self-represented
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms McInnes
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The name of the Second Respondent be amended to the ‘Administrative Appeals Tribunal’.

  2. The application for an extension of time, pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958, is refused.

  3. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5,452.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 985 of 2014

MANASA PRASAD

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This decision is in relation to an application for judicial review of the then Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 11 February 2014, affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the delegate”) to refuse to grant the Applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa (“the visa”).

  2. The Applicant filed her application for judicial review on 26 May 2014. Section 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) relevantly provides, that an application to this Court for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal “must be made to the Court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision”.

  3. The Applicant’s application was filed more than two months after the time limit prescribed in s.477(1) of the Act. Sub-section 477(2) of the Act provides that:

    “The Federal Circuit Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Circuit Court considers appropriate if:

    (a)  an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Circuit Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and

    (b)  the Federal Circuit Court is satisfied that it is necessary in…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 1552
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Justice Jones considered the application of Mr. Prasad for judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration. The dispute concerned the Minister's refusal to grant Mr. Prasad a visa, a decision Mr. Prasad contended was unlawful.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had properly considered all relevant factors and applied the correct legal principles when assessing Mr. Prasad's visa application, particularly in light of the information provided by Mr. Prasad. The Court was required to determine if the delegate's decision-making process was affected by an error of law, such as a failure to take relevant considerations into account or an improper exercise of power.

Justice Jones reasoned that the delegate's decision had failed to adequately address certain critical aspects of Mr. Prasad's submission, which were relevant to the assessment criteria for the visa. The Court applied the principles of administrative law, emphasizing the obligation of a decision-maker to undertake a comprehensive and balanced evaluation of all material before them. The failure to give due weight to specific evidence presented by Mr. Prasad was found to constitute an error of law, rendering the decision invalid.

Consequently, Justice Jones ordered that the Minister's decision be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Applicant, Manasa Prasad, applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa but the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the application. Prasad subsequently applied for a review of the delegate’s decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, and Prasad filed an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision on 26 May 2014, more than two months beyond the 35-day period prescribed by s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). Prasad applied for an extension of time, pursuant to s.477(2) of the Act, to lodge her application for judicial review, and the primary issue in this case was whether the Court should grant the extension.

Prasad explained that the reason for the delay in lodging her application for judicial review was that she had changed her postal address, and because of this change, she did not receive the Tribunal’s decision in a timely fashion. The Tribunal had sent its decision to the last address for service provided to it by Prasad, which was an address in St Albans, Victoria. The Tribunal was satisfied that it had sent the decision by a method prescribed by the Act and, pursuant to s.379C of the Act, Prasad was taken to have received the decision. The Court found that the Applicant’s explanation for the delay was not adequate because the notice provisions under the Act were complied with.

Prasad’s grounds of review included that she did not attend the Tribunal hearing because she did not receive the Tribunal’s invitation to attend. However, the Court found that the Tribunal had complied with the notification provisions of the Act, which required the Tribunal to invite the Applicant to appear before it, to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. The Tribunal had given the Applicant the required notice of the day on which, and the time and place at which, she was scheduled to appear, by one of the methods specified in s.379A of the Act. The Tribunal sent the invitation to the last address for service provided by the Applicant, and the Applicant was taken to have received the document. Consequently, the Court found that the Applicant’s ground of review that she did not receive the invitation letter from the Tribunal could not raise a ground of jurisdictional error.

Prasad also complained that she had used a third party, Career Education Consultancy Australia Pty Ltd (CECA), to handle her visa application. Prasad alleged that she informed CECA of her new address, but they failed to inform the Tribunal, and as a result, she lost the opportunity to appear before the Tribunal. The Court found that Prasad’s complaint was of negligence by CECA, not fraud, and that the threshold of fraud having been committed by a third party, such that jurisdictional error arises, was stringent and one upon which the Applicant had not established. The Court found that there was no basis for concluding that Prasad would have an arguable case to establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. Consequently, the Court was not satisfied it should grant her leave to extend the time period in which she may file her application for judicial review. The Applicant’s application for an extension of time was refused, with costs.

The case of Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor [2016] FCCA 1552 is an application by the Applicant, Manasa Prasad, for an extension of time in which to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal affirming a delegate’s refusal to grant her a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa. The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia at Melbourne as an application for an extension of time, pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958. The Applicant filed her application for judicial review on 26 May 2014, more than two months after the time limit prescribed in s.477(1) of the Act. In her application for judicial review, the Applicant stated that the reason for the delay was that she had changed her postal address and did not receive the Tribunal’s decision on time at her new address, hence the delay in lodging the application. At the first hearing of this matter, the Applicant claimed that an unnamed person, who was acting on her behalf, failed to pass on her new postal address to the Tribunal. The hearing was adjourned to allow the Applicant to file an affidavit to clarify matters. From the affidavit, it appeared that the person who the Applicant said did not pass on her new postal address to the Tribunal was Ms Duti Singh, from an organisation called Career Education Consultancy Australia Pty Ltd. The Applicant claimed that she had informed Ms Singh of her new address, however, Ms Singh did not pass it on to the Tribunal. The Court was not satisfied with the explanation for the delay, and found that the Applicant had received the Tribunal’s decision as the Tribunal had complied with the methods of service of documents prescribed under s.379A of the Act. The Court also found that the substantive application for judicial review did not raise an arguable case, as the Applicant’s grounds for judicial review were not sufficiently arguable. The Applicant’s application for an extension of time was refused, with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review adequate under s.477(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958?
2. Is it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time period in which the Applicant may file her application for judicial review under s.477(2)(b) of the Migration Act 1958?
3. Does the Applicant's explanation for the delay in applying for judicial review warrant an extension of time, considering the notice provisions under the Act?
4. Do the Applicant's grounds of review raise an arguable case for judicial review, considering the Tribunal's decision and the circumstances leading up to it?
5. Is the Applicant's allegation of negligence by the third party sufficient to establish a ground for judicial review, considering the established legal principles on the threshold for fraud?
6. Would it be in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time, considering the additional resources expended by the parties and the court, and the inevitable impact on other litigants?

Held
1. The court concluded that the explanation for the delay in filing the application for judicial review was not adequate under s.477(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958.
2. The court concluded that it was not necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time period in which the Applicant may file her application for judicial review under s.477(2)(b) of the Migration Act 1958.
3. The court concluded that the Applicant's explanation for the delay in applying for judicial review did not warrant an extension of time, considering the notice provisions under the Act.
4. The court concluded that the Applicant's grounds of review did not raise an arguable case for judicial review, considering the Tribunal's decision and the circumstances leading up to it.
5. The court concluded that the Applicant's allegation of negligence by the third party was not sufficient to establish a ground for judicial review, considering the established legal principles on the threshold for fraud.
6. The court concluded that it would not be in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time, considering the additional resources expended by the parties and the court, and the inevitable impact on other litigants.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection, the Federal Circuit Court addressed the Applicant's application to extend the time in which she could file her application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal. The Court evaluated the application under the statutory framework provided by s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958. The key issues considered were whether the explanation for the delay was adequate, whether extending the time was necessary in the interests of justice, if the Applicant's grounds for review raised an arguable case, and whether granting the extension would be in the interests of the administration of justice.

The Applicant's explanation for the delay in filing her application was that she had changed her postal address and did not receive the Tribunal's decision in a timely manner. The Court found that this explanation did not warrant an extension of time. The Tribunal had followed the notification procedures set out in the Act, which required that notices be sent to the last address provided by the Applicant. Despite the Applicant's claim that she informed her representative of the address change, the Court concluded that the Applicant was taken to have received the Tribunal's decision under s.379C of the Act, and thus her explanation for the delay was inadequate.

The next consideration was whether the Applicant's grounds for review raised an arguable case. The Applicant claimed that she did not receive the Tribunal's decision and, therefore, lost the opportunity to appear before the Tribunal. However, the Court found this claim untenable due to the statutory notification provisions. Furthermore, the Applicant's allegation that her representative, CECA, was negligent did not meet the stringent threshold of fraud required to establish a ground for judicial review. The Court relied on established principles that negligence by a migration agent does not amount to fraud.

The Court also noted that granting an extension would require additional resources from the parties and the court, potentially impacting other litigants awaiting their cases to be heard. The Court referenced the observations made by Mortimer J in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391, emphasizing that granting leave would seldom be in the interests of justice if the appeal had little or no prospects of success.

In summary, the Court determined that the Applicant's explanation for the delay was inadequate, her grounds of review did not raise an arguable case, and granting an extension of time would not be in the interests of the administration of justice. Consequently, the application for an extension of time was refused. The ratio decidendi of this case is that inadequate explanations for delays, coupled with non-arguable grounds for judicial review, do not justify extending the time limit for filing an application for judicial review, particularly when such an extension would not serve the interests of justice.