PRABHAKAR v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PRABHAKAR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 1243
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Visitor (class FA) (subclass 600) visa – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Kaur & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Anor [2014] FCA 915; 236 CR 393; 141 ALD 619
Le v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 20; 157 FCR 321
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 92 ALJR 713; 357 ALR 408
Minister for Immigration v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332; 87 ALJR 618; 297 ALR 225; 139 ALD 181
MZALO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1339; 70 AAR 495
Ogawa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 62; 159 ALD 138

Applicant: NARESH PRABHAKAR
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: MLG 644 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Mercuri
Hearing date: 16 October 2018
Date of Last Submission: 16 October 2018
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 15 May 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the applicant: Ms Grinberg
Solicitors for the applicant: Aila Rose Melasecca Barristers & Solicitors
Counsel for the respondents: Mr A Roe
Solicitors for the respondents: Australian Government Solicitors

ORDERS

  1. The applicant’s application for judicial review filed on 30 March 2017 and amended 18 September 2018 be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in a sum to be fixed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 644 of 2017

NARESH PRABHAKAR

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the tribunal”) dated


    27 February 2017. The tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the delegate”) to refuse the applicant’s application for a Visitor (class FA) (subclass 600) visa (“the visa”). 

The applicant’s claims

  1. The applicant was the holder of a Visitor (class FA) visa which expired on 3 November 2016, having arrived in Australia on 16 July 2016.[1]

    [1] Court book page 36.

  2. Additionally, on 3 November 2016, the applicant applied for an extension of her Visitor visa.[2]

    [2] Court book pages 9 to 19.

  3. In the applicant’s application for a visitor short stay visa, the applicant was required to “give details of request for further stay” by providing, among other things a “reason for extension” of her visa. In response to this part of the application form, the applicant said that the reason for extension was “Applicant is currently being held at Dandenong Hospital under Medical Care.”[3]

    [3] Court book page 9.

  4. In response to a question on the application for a visa form completed by the applicant on 3 November 2016 as to whether “during their proposed visit…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 1243
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Prabhakar v Minister for Immigration*, the applicant, Mr Prabhakar, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration to refuse his application for a Protection Visa (Class 866). The Minister's decision was based on the applicant's alleged failure to satisfy the criteria for a Protection Visa, specifically concerning the assessment of his claims for protection.

The primary legal issue before the Federal Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had erred in law in their assessment of Mr Prabhakar's claims for protection. This involved determining whether the delegate had properly considered all relevant evidence, applied the correct legal tests for assessing claims of persecution, and whether the delegate's findings of fact were reasonably open on the evidence before them. The court was required to consider the interpretation and application of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and the *Migration Regulations 1994* (Cth) in relation to protection visa applications.

Judge Mercuri found that the delegate had made an error of law by failing to adequately consider certain aspects of the evidence presented by Mr Prabhakar, particularly concerning the credibility of his account and the potential for him to suffer harm if returned to his country of origin. The court applied the principles of administrative law, including the requirement for administrative decision-makers to undertake a proper, rational, and evidence-based assessment of claims. The delegate's failure to engage with significant portions of the evidence meant that the decision was not open to be made as it was.

The Federal Court set aside the delegate's decision and remitted the application for a Protection Visa to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, Naresh Prabhakar, sought a Visitor (class FA) (subclass 600) visa to extend her stay in Australia beyond the expiry of her existing visa on 3 November 2016. The applicant had arrived in Australia on 16 July 2016 under a Visitor visa and had been admitted to Dandenong Hospital on 26 October 2016 suffering from pneumonia. She was subsequently transferred to the Intensive Care Unit on 30 October 2016 and remained hospitalised due to her medical condition. In her visa application, the applicant stated that the reason for extending her stay was due to her medical treatment and that she intended to visit her son and stay with him. Attached to her application was a letter from her doctor confirming her medical condition and that she was too unwell to travel.

On 7 November 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the applicant's visa application, finding that she did not meet the mandatory requirements of clause 600.221 of the Migration Regulations 1994, as her sole purpose for seeking a further stay was related to medical treatment. The applicant applied for a review of this decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the tribunal). The tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 17 February 2017, stating that if she did not attend, the tribunal would decide the review without further action. The applicant did not attend the hearing, and the tribunal dismissed her application for review on the same day. The applicant subsequently requested that her application be reinstated and a further hearing be scheduled. After some correspondence between the parties, the tribunal scheduled a further hearing on 23 February 2017 but the applicant did not attend and the tribunal again dismissed her application for review. This decision was affirmed on 27 February 2017.

The applicant sought judicial review of the tribunal's decision, arguing that the tribunal failed to comply with the statutory requirements for providing notice of the hearing, that the tribunal acted unreasonably in not granting a further adjournment, and that the tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the relevant provisions of the Migration Regulations. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia found that none of the grounds of review were made out, and dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review with costs.

This case involves an application for judicial review by Naresh Prabhakar of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the tribunal) to affirm the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) to refuse her application for a Visitor (class FA) (subclass 600) visa. The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for judicial review. Prabhakar originally applied for a visa extension on 3 November 2016 and, on 7 November 2016, the delegate of the Minister refused the application. Prabhakar applied for a review of this decision by the tribunal on 14 November 2016. The tribunal invited Prabhakar to attend a hearing on 17 February 2017. Prabhakar did not attend and the tribunal dismissed her application for review. Prabhakar subsequently applied for the tribunal to reinstate the hearing and the tribunal scheduled a new hearing for 23 February 2017. Prabhakar again did not attend and the tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant her the visa. Prabhakar applied for judicial review of the tribunal’s decision on 30 March 2017. Prabhakar’s application was amended on 18 September 2018 and the matter was heard on 16 October 2018.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the tribunal fail to comply with statutory requirements and act without power by affirming the delegate’s decision under the wrong statutory provision?
2. Did the tribunal act unreasonably by providing less than three days’ notice of the reinstated hearing and proceeding to determine the matter in the applicant’s absence?
3. Did the tribunal misconstrue and misapply clause 600.221 of the Migration Regulations 1994 in its decision-making process?

Held
1. Did the tribunal fail to comply with statutory requirements and act without power by affirming the delegate’s decision under the wrong statutory provision?
The court found that the tribunal did not fail to comply with statutory requirements and did not act without power by affirming the decision under the wrong statutory provision. The tribunal's reference to section 425A of the Act should be read as a reference to section 360A, and the applicant's reference to regulation 4.35D of the Regulations should be read as a reference to regulation 4.21. The court concluded that the tribunal's decision was within its power.

2. Did the tribunal act unreasonably by providing less than three days’ notice of the reinstated hearing and proceeding to determine the matter in the applicant’s absence?
The court found that the tribunal did not act unreasonably by providing less than three days’ notice of the reinstated hearing and proceeding to determine the matter in the applicant's absence. The tribunal provided the applicant with an opportunity to attend the hearing and offered to take evidence by telephone if the applicant was still overseas. The court concluded that the tribunal's exercise of discretion was not patently unreasonable.

3. Did the tribunal misconstrue and misapply clause 600.221 of the Migration Regulations 1994 in its decision-making process?
The court found that the tribunal did not misconstrue and misapply clause 600.221 of the Migration Regulations 1994 in its decision-making process. The court held that the tribunal correctly interpreted the exclusion for medical treatment and applied it to the applicant's case, as the sole purpose for the extension of the visa was due to medical concerns. The court concluded that the tribunal's interpretation and application of the provision was accurate.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court’s reasoning in this case revolves around three major issues: whether the tribunal failed to comply with statutory requirements and acted without power, whether the tribunal acted unreasonably, and whether the tribunal misconstrued and misapplied a statutory provision.

First, concerning the tribunal's compliance with statutory requirements and its exercise of power, the court assessed whether the tribunal acted without power by affirming the delegate’s decision under the wrong statutory provision. The applicant argued that the tribunal failed to comply with section 425A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and acted without power by affirming the delegate's decision under section 426A instead of section 362B. The court noted that while there was an error in the tribunal's reference to the statutory provisions, this did not amount to acting without power. The tribunal’s ultimate conclusion to affirm the delegate’s decision was still valid under the correct statutory provision. Therefore, the court found this ground of review to be unmade out.

Second, the court considered whether the tribunal acted unreasonably by providing less than three days’ notice of the reinstated hearing and proceeding to determine the matter in the applicant’s absence. The applicant argued that the tribunal should have granted a further adjournment due to the short notice and the applicant’s unavailability. The court examined whether the tribunal exercised its discretion reasonably, considering the factors identified in relevant case law. The tribunal had provided the applicant with ample notice of the initial hearing and had offered to take evidence by telephone. The court held that the tribunal did not act unreasonably by proceeding with the hearing in the applicant's absence, as the tribunal had made a reasonable effort to accommodate the applicant's circumstances.

Third, the court examined whether the tribunal misconstrued and misapplied clause 600.221 of the Migration Regulations 1994. The applicant argued that the tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s intention to visit her son, an Australian citizen, as a purpose for her visa application. The court found that the applicant’s sole stated purpose for the visa extension was medical treatment, as clearly indicated in her application form and supported by the letter from her doctor. The tribunal correctly concluded that this purpose fell under the exclusion in clause 600.221(b), and therefore, the visa could not be granted. The court found that the tribunal did not misconstrue or misapply the statutory provision.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a tribunal’s decision to proceed with a hearing in the absence of an applicant, provided that the tribunal has given reasonable notice and has considered the applicant’s circumstances, does not necessarily amount to acting unreasonably. Additionally, when a tribunal is called upon to interpret statutory provisions, it must do so in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the text and the legislative intent, and any misapplication of the statutory provision can be grounds for review. However, in this case, the tribunal's interpretation and application of the statutory provision were found to be correct.