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PPC v Stylianou

PPC v Stylianou

Case [2018] NSWCCA 300 20 December 2018

Appeal

Sexual Assault Communications Privilege

Standing

Criminal Law

No judgment structure available for this case.

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Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation: PPC v Stylianou [2018] NSWCCA 300
Hearing dates: 21 November 2018
Decision date: 20 December 2018
Before: Macfarlan JA at [1];
Rothman J at [40];
R A Hulme J at [71]
Decision:
(1)   Grant leave to the applicant to appeal against the order of Berman DCJ made on 31 October 2018.
(2)   Allow the appeal.
(3)   Set aside that order.
(4)   Remit the proceedings to the District Court to be dealt with according to law.

Catchwords:
CRIME – sexual assault communications privilege – interlocutory appeal – application for leave to appeal against a grant of leave to the accused to access documents counsellors had produced to Court under subpoena – whether primary judge was precluded by Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) from exercising independent discretion as to whether access to documents should be granted – discussion concerning operation of Criminal Procedure Act, Ch 6, Pt 5, Div 2

APPEAL – interlocutory appeal – sexual assault communications privilege – whether appellant in her capacity as a Principal Protected Confider, under the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), Ch 6, Pt 5, Div 2, had standing to seek leave to appeal – Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5F considered
WORDS AND PHRASES – “party” – Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5F
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 66A
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5F
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 222, 228, 295, 296, 298, 299A-299D, 306
District Court Rules 1973 (NSW), Pt 53
Courts and Crimes Legislation Further Amendment Act 2010 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 33.4
Cases Cited: Bogeta Pty Ltd v Wales [1977] 1 NSWLR 139
Brooks v The Upjohn Company (1998) 85 FCR 469
Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564
Ditford v Calcraft (1989) 98 FLR 158
Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund v Saunders (1994) 52 FCR 48
Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1 at 18; [1989] HCA 45
Haset Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 67 ALJR 841; [1993] HCA 47
KS v Veitch [2012] NSWCCA 186
KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; [2012] NSWCCA 266
Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645
NAR v PPC1 [2013] NSWCCA 25; (2013) 224 A Crim R 535
National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372
Onslow v Commissioners of Inland Revenue (No 2) (1890) 25 QBD 465
Pelechowski v Registrar, Court of Appeal (NSW)(1999) 198 CLR 435 at 452, [51]; [1999] HCA 19
PPC v Williams [2013] NSWCCA 286; (2013) 238 A Crim R 25
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28
Re Ludeke; Ex parte Customs Officers’ Association of Australia, Fourth Division (1985) 155 CLR 513 at 526; [1985] HCA 31
The Corporation of Peterborough v Overseers of the Parish of Wilsthorpe (1883) 12 QBD 1
Tran v R [2017]…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading PPC v Stylianou

Details

AGLC: PPC v Stylianou [2018] NSWCCA 300
Case: [2018] NSWCCA 300
Decision Date: 20 December 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of PPC v Stylianou, the court was called upon to address an interlocutory appeal concerning access to documents that were produced under subpoena to the court by counsellors. The dispute arose from the respondent's application to access these documents, which had been produced under the sexual assault communications privilege. The appellant, PPC, sought leave to appeal against the grant of this access, arguing that the primary judge was precluded by the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) from exercising independent discretion on the matter. The court was required to determine whether the primary judge had the authority to exercise such discretion, as well as the standing of the appellant in her capacity as a Principal Protected Confidant under the Criminal Procedure Act.

The legal issues central to this case involved the interpretation and application of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) and the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). Specifically, the court had to consider whether the primary judge was constrained by the Act from exercising independent discretion regarding the disclosure of documents, and whether the appellant, in her capacity as a Principal Protected Confidant, had standing to seek leave to appeal. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, particularly Chapter 6, Part 5, Division 2, and the definition of “party” under the Criminal Appeal Act.

The court held that the primary judge did have the authority to exercise independent discretion regarding the disclosure of documents, contrary to the appellant's contention. The court further found that the appellant, in her capacity as a Principal Protected Confidant, did not have standing to seek leave to appeal under section 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the grant of leave to the accused to access the documents was upheld. This decision clarifies the scope of discretion available to primary judges in such matters and the criteria for standing to appeal in the context of sexual assault communications privilege.

Orders