SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Powell & Anor v Queensland University of Technology & Anor [2017] QCA 200
PARTIES:
JACKSON DAVID POWELL
(first applicant)
CALUM MARTIN THWAITES
(second applicant)
v
QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
(first respondent)
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 13360 of 2016
QCAT No 295 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act
ORIGINATING COURT:
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Appeal Tribunal at Brisbane – [2016] QCATA 196 (Sheridan DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
8 September 2017
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
17 May 2017
JUDGES:
Sofronoff P and Gotterson and McMurdo JJA
ORDERS:
1. To the extent required, leave to appeal granted.
2. Appeal allowed by setting aside the orders in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal made on 19 December 2016.
3. Appeal otherwise dismissed.
4. The parties are to file any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, not to exceed four pages, within 14 days of the date of this judgment.
CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – REVIEW OF DECISIONS – OTHER STATES AND TERRITORIES – where the applicants applied for access to their personal information held by the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (the IPA) – where QUT refused the application as invalidly made on the ground that the applicants had not provided identification documents as required by the IPA – where QUT’s decision was upheld by the Information Commissioner – where the applicants appealed to QCAT but, before the determination of that appeal, QUT agreed to treat the applications as if they had been validly made – where QCAT made orders setting aside the decisions below and purporting to remit the matter to QUT to be dealt with according to law, and purporting to reset the time period for processing under the IPA – where the Information Commissioner, who had made the decision under appeal in QCAT, had no power to remit the matter to QUT – whether QCAT had power, under s 146 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) or otherwise, to remit the matter to QUT or to reset the time period for processing – whether the orders of QCAT, being beyond power and therefore nullities, should be set aside
Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), s 3, s 43, s 66, s 123, s 132
Information Privacy Regulation 2009 (Qld), reg 3
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 146, s 164CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley (2016) 90 ALJR 272; [2016] HCA 2, cited
Cooper & Sons v Dawson [1916] VLR 381; [1916] VicLawRp 51, cited
Hip Hing Timber Co Ltd v Tang Man Kit & Anor (2004) 7 HKCFAR 212; [2004] HKCFA 41, considered
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408; [1993] HCA 56, cited
Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10
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- Case
- [2017] QCA 200
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether QCAT had the power to remit the matter to QUT or to reset the time period for processing under the Information Privacy Act. The court considered the relevant statutory provisions, including section 146 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) and section 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). The court also examined the nature of the jurisdiction and powers of the court in hearing appeals from QCAT, particularly in relation to making substitutive orders.
The court found that QCAT did not have the power to remit the matter to QUT, as the Information Commissioner had no such power. Furthermore, the court held that QCAT could not reset the time period for processing under the Information Privacy Act, as this would amount to usurping the fact-finding function of QUT. The court held that the orders of QCAT were beyond power and therefore nullities, and set them aside accordingly. The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the parties were directed to file written submissions on the costs of the appeal within 14 days of the judgment.
In summary, the court held that QCAT did not have the power to remit the matter to QUT or to reset the time period for processing under the Information Privacy Act. The orders of QCAT were set aside as being beyond power, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed. The parties were directed to file written submissions on the costs of the appeal within 14 days of the judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. To the extent required, leave to appeal granted.
2. Appeal allowed by setting aside the orders in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal made on 19 December 2016.
3. Appeal otherwise dismissed.
4. The parties are to file any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, not to exceed four pages, within 14 days of the date of this judgment.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Information Commissioner submits that the processing period had not commenced, because “the provisions of the IP Act relating to the timeframes for giving a written notice of decision are not enlivened until the agency is satisfied that it has received an access application which meets all the relevant requirements.” Therefore, it is submitted, the processing period did not commence until 24 November 2016.[42] Consequently, the order which was challenged merely clarified the true effect of the IPA.[43][42]Second respondent’s outline of submissions at paragraphs 6 and 10.[43]Second respondent’s outline of submissions at paragraph 13.Considerations of the arguments In Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice, the appellant had applied under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) for certain documents. A delegate of the Secretary had refused the application. That decision was reversed upon her appeal to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The delegate’s decision was subsequently reinstated by the Victorian Court of Appeal.[44] Of present relevance is the discussion by French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ of the jurisdiction and powers of the Court of Appeal in hearing the appeal from the tribunal. Both the relevant jurisdiction and the powers of the court were set out in s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). So far as presently relevant, it provides, in s 148(1), that a party to a proceeding may appeal, on a question of law, from an order of the Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. Section 148(7) provides that the Court of Appeal may make any of the following orders:“(a)an order affirming, varying or setting aside the order of the Tribunal;(b)an order that the Tribunal could have made in the proceeding;(c)an order remitting the proceeding to be heard and decided again, either with or without the hearing of further evidence, by the Tribunal in accordance with the directions of the court;(d)any other order the court thinks appropriate.”[44]Which did so twice, the first of its judgments being set aside by the High Court in Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275, when it was ordered that the Court of Appeal reconsider the matter. French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ said of the court’s jurisdiction and powers:“[18] Section 148 confers “judicial power to examine for legal error what has been done in an administrative tribunal”. Despite the description of proceedings under the section as an “appeal”, it confers original not appellate jurisdiction; the proceedings are “in the nature of judicial review”.[19]The jurisdiction conferred by s 148(1) is confined to appeals on questions of law. Section 148(7) does not enlarge that jurisdiction. It confers powers on the court in aid of its exercise. That feature of s 148 resembles s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (the Commonwealth AAT Act), which defines the analogous jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear appeals on questions of law against decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Under s 44(4) of the Commonwealth AAT Act, the Federal Court, in determining an appeal, may “make such order as it thinks appropriate by reason of its decision”. But wide as that power may be, the Court “should not usurp the fact-finding function of the AAT”. Those observations turn upon the text of s 44. They do not depend upon the separation of judicial and executive powers, which limits the functions that can be conferred upon federal courts. They have application to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Appeal by s 148 of the VCAT Act, which is, in concept and in terms, modelled on, although not identical to, s 44.[20]The Court of Appeal, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under s 148 of the VCAT Act, may make substitutive orders where only one conclusion is open on the correct application of the law to the facts found by the Tribunal. Such a case arises when no other conclusion could reasonably be entertained. In that event, the Court can make the order that the Tribunal should have made. The language of s 148(7) is also wide enough to allow the Court of Appeal to make substitutive orders in other circumstances. But its powers must, as with the equivalent powers of the Federal Court in relation to the AAT, be exercised having regard to the limited nature of the appeal.”(Footnotes omitted.)