Powell v Queensland University of Technology

Link copied
Case Copied 81 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Powell & Anor v Queensland University of Technology & Anor [2017] QCA 200

PARTIES:

JACKSON DAVID POWELL
(first applicant)
CALUM MARTIN THWAITES
(second applicant)
v
QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
(first respondent)
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 13360 of 2016
QCAT No 295 of 2016

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Appeal Tribunal at Brisbane – [2016] QCATA 196 (Sheridan DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

8 September 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

17 May 2017

JUDGES:

Sofronoff P and Gotterson and McMurdo JJA

ORDERS:

1.   To the extent required, leave to appeal granted.

2.   Appeal allowed by setting aside the orders in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal made on 19 December 2016.

3.   Appeal otherwise dismissed.

4.   The parties are to file any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, not to exceed four pages, within 14 days of the date of this judgment.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – REVIEW OF DECISIONS – OTHER STATES AND TERRITORIES – where the applicants applied for access to their personal information held by the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (the IPA) – where QUT refused the application as invalidly made on the ground that the applicants had not provided identification documents as required by the IPA – where QUT’s decision was upheld by the Information Commissioner – where the applicants appealed to QCAT but, before the determination of that appeal, QUT agreed to treat the applications as if they had been validly made – where QCAT made orders setting aside the decisions below and purporting to remit the matter to QUT to be dealt with according to law, and purporting to reset the time period for processing under the IPA – where the Information Commissioner, who had made the decision under appeal in QCAT, had no power to remit the matter to QUT – whether QCAT had power, under s 146 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) or otherwise, to remit the matter to QUT or to reset the time period for processing – whether the orders of QCAT, being beyond power and therefore nullities, should be set aside

Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), s 3, s 43, s 66, s 123, s 132
Information Privacy Regulation 2009 (Qld), reg 3
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act
2009 (Qld), s 146, s 164

CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley (2016) 90 ALJR 272; [2016] HCA 2, cited
Cooper & Sons v Dawson [1916] VLR 381; [1916] VicLawRp 51, cited
Hip Hing Timber Co Ltd v Tang Man Kit & Anor (2004) 7 HKCFAR 212; [2004] HKCFA 41, considered
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408; [1993] HCA 56, cited
Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Powell v Queensland University of Technology and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] QCA 200
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Powell and Thwaites, sought access to their personal information held by the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) under the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). QUT refused their application, stating that the applicants had not provided the necessary identification documents. This decision was upheld by the Information Commissioner, but before the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) could determine the appeal, QUT agreed to treat the applications as if they had been validly made. QCAT set aside the decisions below and remitted the matter to QUT, as well as resetting the time period for processing. The Information Commissioner argued that they had no power to remit the matter to QUT, and the applicants sought to have the QCAT orders set aside as being beyond power.

The legal issues before the court were whether QCAT had the power to remit the matter to QUT or to reset the time period for processing under the Information Privacy Act. The court considered the relevant statutory provisions, including section 146 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) and section 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). The court also examined the nature of the jurisdiction and powers of the court in hearing appeals from QCAT, particularly in relation to making substitutive orders.

The court found that QCAT did not have the power to remit the matter to QUT, as the Information Commissioner had no such power. Furthermore, the court held that QCAT could not reset the time period for processing under the Information Privacy Act, as this would amount to usurping the fact-finding function of QUT. The court held that the orders of QCAT were beyond power and therefore nullities, and set them aside accordingly. The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the parties were directed to file written submissions on the costs of the appeal within 14 days of the judgment.

In summary, the court held that QCAT did not have the power to remit the matter to QUT or to reset the time period for processing under the Information Privacy Act. The orders of QCAT were set aside as being beyond power, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed. The parties were directed to file written submissions on the costs of the appeal within 14 days of the judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. To the extent required, leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal allowed by setting aside the orders in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal made on 19 December 2016.

3. Appeal otherwise dismissed.

4. The parties are to file any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, not to exceed four pages, within 14 days of the date of this judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Regulation 3 of the Information Privacy Regulation 2009 provides as follows:“3 Evidence of identity—Act, ss 43(4) and 44(6), definition evidence of identity(1)For sections 43(4) and 44(6) of the Act, the evidence of identity prescribed for a person is a document verifying the person’s identity, including, for example—(a)a passport; or(b)a copy of a certificate or extract from a register of births; or(c)a driver licence; or(d)a statutory declaration from an individual who has known the person for at least 1 year; or(e)if the person is a prisoner within the meaning of the Corrective Services Act 2006—a copy of the person’s identity card from the department administering that Act that is certified by a corrective services officer within the meaning of that Act.(2)If a document under this section, other than a document mentioned in subsection (1)(e), is a photocopy of an original document, the document must be certified by a qualified witness as being a correct copy of the original document.(3)In this section—qualified witness means—(a)a lawyer or notary public; or(b)a commissioner for declarations; or(c)a justice of the peace.” On 28 June 2016, Mr Morris replied to Mr Wright and proffered, in satisfaction of s 43, affidavits that his principals had sworn in the Federal Court in proceedings in which they had been engaged and to which QUT had also been a party. Mr Wright responded on the same day, pointing out that the affidavits did not satisfy the requirements of the Regulation and offered to extend time for compliance. Mr Morris, also on the same day, replied, relevantly:“As I read Regulation 3(1) under the Information Privacy Regulation 2009, it merely requires “a document verifying a person’s identity, including, for example …”. I have provided such a document. It is the kind of document which the Federal Circuit Court acts upon, and I am at a loss to think why QUT would not do so.However, if QUT wishes to pretend it is unaware of the “identity” of two of its students – one of whom is still enrolled – with whom it is a co-defendant in proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, let it do so, and we will see what the Information Commissioner thinks of that.” On 6 July 2016 Mr Wright wrote to Mr Morris to notify him, on behalf of the appellants, that he had decided that the applications that Mr Morris had filed on their behalf did not comply with s 43(3). On behalf of the appellants Mr Morris then made an application for external review to the Information Commissioner pursuant to s 99 of the IPA. Section 103 of the IPA obliges the Commissioner to “identify opportunities and processes for early resolution of the external review application” and to “promote settlement”. For that reason the Assistant Information Commissioner wrote to Mr Morris on 22 July 2016 saying, relevantly:“I understand Mr Powell is overseas and so unable to provide a certified copy of his driver’s licence or birth certificate. The IP Act accepts a statutory declaration from an individual who has known the person in question for at least 1 year as proof of identity. Any individual who has known Mr Powell for at least 1 year may complete it.You may also provide a statutory declaration for Mr Thwaites, or alternatively, as I understand Mr Thwaites is in the country, you may provide a passport, a copy of a birth certificate, or a driver’s licence.QUT has advised it will accept the above information and continue to process the applications from the date the proof of identity for each applicant is received.Please let OIC know by 29 July 2016 if you would like to informally resolve your clients’ external reviews by providing QUT with the information listed above so that it may continue your applications. Your clients’ rights of review are preserved in relation to any future reviewable decisions made by QUT.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Therefore, I would not make any order for costs in the tribunal.Conclusion The proceeding in this Court was commenced by an application for leave to appeal. In my view, leave is not required on the question of jurisdiction. By s 149(2) a party to a proceeding in QCAT may appeal to this Court against a decision of the tribunal if a judicial member constituted the tribunal. Such an appeal requires this Court’s leave if it is on question of fact, or a question of mixed law and fact. The appellants’ challenge to order number 5 was on a question of law only. The appeal against that order does not require leave. The challenge to the costs order involves a question of mixed law and fact, and thereby requires leave to appeal. I would grant leave but dismiss the appeal. I would order as follows:1.To the extent required, leave to appeal granted.2.Appeal allowed.3.Set aside the orders in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal made on 19 December 2016.4.Appeal otherwise dismissed.5.The parties are to file any written submissions as to the costs of the appeal, not to exceed four pages, within 14 days of the date of this judgment. As to the costs of this appeal, the parties should be allowed to consider the reasons for judgment, before making any submission. Relevant to that consideration would be what I have said about the lack of utility of this appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Information Commissioner submits that the processing period had not commenced, because “the provisions of the IP Act relating to the timeframes for giving a written notice of decision are not enlivened until the agency is satisfied that it has received an access application which meets all the relevant requirements.” Therefore, it is submitted, the processing period did not commence until 24 November 2016.[42] Consequently, the order which was challenged merely clarified the true effect of the IPA.[43][42]Second respondent’s outline of submissions at paragraphs 6 and 10.[43]Second respondent’s outline of submissions at paragraph 13.Considerations of the arguments In Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice, the appellant had applied under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) for certain documents. A delegate of the Secretary had refused the application. That decision was reversed upon her appeal to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The delegate’s decision was subsequently reinstated by the Victorian Court of Appeal.[44] Of present relevance is the discussion by French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ of the jurisdiction and powers of the Court of Appeal in hearing the appeal from the tribunal. Both the relevant jurisdiction and the powers of the court were set out in s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). So far as presently relevant, it provides, in s 148(1), that a party to a proceeding may appeal, on a question of law, from an order of the Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. Section 148(7) provides that the Court of Appeal may make any of the following orders:“(a)an order affirming, varying or setting aside the order of the Tribunal;(b)an order that the Tribunal could have made in the proceeding;(c)an order remitting the proceeding to be heard and decided again, either with or without the hearing of further evidence, by the Tribunal in accordance with the directions of the court;(d)any other order the court thinks appropriate.”[44]Which did so twice, the first of its judgments being set aside by the High Court in Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275, when it was ordered that the Court of Appeal reconsider the matter. French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ said of the court’s jurisdiction and powers:“[18] Section 148 confers “judicial power to examine for legal error what has been done in an administrative tribunal”. Despite the description of proceedings under the section as an “appeal”, it confers original not appellate jurisdiction; the proceedings are “in the nature of judicial review”.[19]The jurisdiction conferred by s 148(1) is confined to appeals on questions of law. Section 148(7) does not enlarge that jurisdiction. It confers powers on the court in aid of its exercise. That feature of s 148 resembles s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (Cth) (the Commonwealth AAT Act), which defines the analogous jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear appeals on questions of law against decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). Under s 44(4) of the Commonwealth AAT Act, the Federal Court, in determining an appeal, may “make such order as it thinks appropriate by reason of its decision”. But wide as that power may be, the Court “should not usurp the fact-finding function of the AAT”. Those observations turn upon the text of s 44. They do not depend upon the separation of judicial and executive powers, which limits the functions that can be conferred upon federal courts. They have application to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Appeal by s 148 of the VCAT Act, which is, in concept and in terms, modelled on, although not identical to, s 44.[20]The Court of Appeal, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under s 148 of the VCAT Act, may make substitutive orders where only one conclusion is open on the correct application of the law to the facts found by the Tribunal. Such a case arises when no other conclusion could reasonably be entertained. In that event, the Court can make the order that the Tribunal should have made. The language of s 148(7) is also wide enough to allow the Court of Appeal to make substitutive orders in other circumstances. But its powers must, as with the equivalent powers of the Federal Court in relation to the AAT, be exercised having regard to the limited nature of the appeal.”(Footnotes omitted.)