Potier v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Potier v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 217

APPEALS – application for an extension of time within which to file and serve a notice of appeal – whether appeal has any prospect of success

IMMIGRATION – whether being a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention is a mandatory criterion for the grant of a protection visa

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15(2)

Jones v The Queen (Gallop, Neaves & Beaumont JJ, 17 August 1984, unreported) followed

MALCOLM HUNTLEY POTIER v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 1357 of 2000

STONE J
27 FEBRUARY 2001
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1357 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

MALCOLM HUNTLEY POTIER
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        the application be dismissed;

2.        the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1357 of 2000

BETWEEN:

MALCOLM HUNTLEY POTIER
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE:

27 FEBRUARY 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. I have before me an application for an extension of time within which to file and serve a notice of appeal from the judgment of Wilcox J pronounced on 3 November 2000 at Sydney.  The application was filed on 28 November 2000.  Under O 52 r 15(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules, a notice of appeal is generally to be filed and served within 21 days after the date on which the judgment appealed from is pronounced. Accordingly, the applicant's notice was out of time by some days.  However, O 52 r 15(2) provides that the Court has discretion to give leave to appeal out of time “for special reasons”.  The applicant seeks an exercise of this discretion in his favour. 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom.  He lived for some time in a de facto relationship with Myra Oswald and together they had a daughter, Sarah, who was born in April 1997. Mr Potier came to Australia about 15 or 16 months ago, bringing Sarah with him.  Subsequently, Ms Oswald came to Australia and made a successful application to the Family Court of Australia for a custody order pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Abduction of Children.  Mr Potier made an application (which included Sarah) for a protection visa and that application was refused.  The Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) confirmed this refusal and Mr Potier appealed to this Court.  The appeal was heard and dismissed by Wilcox J.  In that matter, Mr Potier was the only applicant and therefore, although the application before me today lists both Mr Potier and Sarah as applicants, Mr…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Potier v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Mr Potier, a UK citizen, sought an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal against the dismissal of his protection visa application. The Federal Court had previously dismissed his appeal, and the application for an extension of time was also dismissed. The central issue before the court was whether the applicant had special reasons justifying the late filing of the notice of appeal. Mr Potier argued that the use of the indefinite article "a" in s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) indicated that there were multiple criteria for a protection visa, and he claimed that he met an unspecified criterion. However, the court found no merit in this argument, reaffirming that the criterion in s 36(2) is an obligatory criterion that must be established by an applicant for a protection visa. The court found that the applicant had not provided any special reasons to justify the late filing of the notice of appeal. The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the application be dismissed;

2. the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have before me an application for an extension of time within which to file and serve a notice of appeal from the judgment of Wilcox J pronounced on 3 November 2000 at Sydney. The application was filed on 28 November 2000. Under O 52 r 15(1)(a) of the Federal Court Rules, a notice of appeal is generally to be filed and served within 21 days after the date on which the judgment appealed from is pronounced. Accordingly, the applicant's notice was out of time by some days. However, O 52 r 15(2) provides that the Court has discretion to give leave to appeal out of time “for special reasons”. The applicant seeks an exercise of this discretion in his favour. BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of the United Kingdom. He lived for some time in a de facto relationship with Myra Oswald and together they had a daughter, Sarah, who was born in April 1997. Mr Potier came to Australia about 15 or 16 months ago, bringing Sarah with him. Subsequently, Ms Oswald came to Australia and made a successful application to the Family Court of Australia for a custody order pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Abduction of Children. Mr Potier made an application (which included Sarah) for a protection visa and that application was refused. The Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) confirmed this refusal and Mr Potier appealed to this Court. The appeal was heard and dismissed by Wilcox J. In that matter, Mr Potier was the only applicant and therefore, although the application before me today lists both Mr Potier and Sarah as applicants, Mr Potier is the only applicant in this proceeding. The difficulty which Mr Potier faced in his application for a protection visa is that, by his own admission, he did not meet the criteria for the grant of such a visa set out in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Section 36(2) of the Act provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as “amended” by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (compendiously, “the Convention”). Article 1A of the Convention provides that a refugee is any person who:“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Under s 65 of the Act, if the Minister is satisfied that an application for a visa does not meet the criteria prescribed by the Act, he must refuse it. Mr Potier, both before the Tribunal and again before Wilcox J, specifically disclaimed having any well founded fear of persecution if returned to the United Kingdom. On that basis, the Tribunal had no choice but to decide that Mr Potier was not entitled to a protection visa. On appeal before Wilcox J, Mr Potier argued that the use of the indefinite article “a” at the commencement of s 36(2) indicated that it was only one of a number of criteria and that there would be other criteria applicable to him. Neither before Wilcox J nor at the hearing today has Mr Potier been able to point to the criterion that would be applicable to him. Wilcox J rejected Mr Potier's analysis. His Honour referred to the additional criteria in s 65 of the Act and concluded that “This, no doubt, explains why the indefinite article “a” is used in s 36(2). It was not the intention of the Parliament to say that there could be only one criterion for a protection visa. There are multiple criteria, but that does not derogate from the proposition that the criterion in s 36(2) is an obligatory criterion to be established by an applicant for a protection visa.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

STONE J
Issues
1. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time for special reasons?
2. What are the special reasons that justify an extension of time for filing and serving the notice of appeal?

Held
1. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time for special reasons?
The Court decided not to exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time for special reasons.
2. What are the special reasons that justify an extension of time for filing and serving the notice of appeal?
The Court found that there were no special reasons justifying an extension of time for filing and serving the notice of appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: STONE J

In considering whether to exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time for special reasons, the Court examined the circumstances under which Mr Potier sought the extension and whether they constituted "special reasons" as required by O 52 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules. The Court noted that the applicant had not filed his notice of appeal within the prescribed 21-day period and was therefore out of time. The Court identified that the applicant's argument regarding the interpretation of the term "a" in s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was not sufficient to constitute special reasons. The applicant's claim that he did not meet the criteria for a protection visa was not a new argument or a special circumstance warranting an extension of time. The Court relied on the principle that the use of the indefinite article "a" in s 36(2) indicated that it was not intended to be the sole criterion for a protection visa, but rather one of multiple criteria. However, this did not negate the necessity for an applicant to establish the criterion in s 36(2). The Court concluded that the applicant's failure to meet the criteria for a protection visa and his failure to provide any new or special reasons for the extension of time did not justify an exercise of the Court's discretion to grant leave to appeal out of time. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that a failure to meet the statutory criteria for a protection visa does not constitute special reasons for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal.