Porter v Australian Prudential Regulations Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Porter v Australian Prudential Regulations Authority [2009] FCA 1148  

ROSS DAVID PORTER and FIONA CAMPBELL SHAND v AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY and WARREN SCOTT

NSD 810 of 2009

PERRAM J
9 OCTOBER 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 810 OF 2009

BETWEEN:

ROSS DAVID PORTER
First Applicant

FIONA CAMPBELL SHAND
Second Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY
First Respondent

WARREN SCOTT
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 OCTOBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The First Respondent is to pay the costs of these proceedings on an indemnity basis.

2.The First Respondent is to pay the costs of the Notice of Motion of 5 August 2009 in proceedings NSD 592/2009 on an indemnity basis.

3.Direct the Registrar to provide a copy of these reasons to the chairperson of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 810 OF 2009

BETWEEN:

ROSS DAVID PORTER
First Applicant

FIONA CAMPBELL SHAND
Second Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY
First Respondent

WARREN SCOTT
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE:

9 OCTOBER 2009

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. At 9.50am on Wednesday 5 August 2009 two officers of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”) served upon a solicitor, a Ms Shand, a notice which required her, on pain of the commission of a criminal offence, to produce to APRA a hard drive stored in a safe in her office.  The hard drive was a copy of another hard drive belonging to one of her clients, Mr Porter.  Production was required by 4.00pm that afternoon at APRA’s offices in Sydney. 

  2. Shortly before 4.00pm, Ms Shand applied to this Court for urgent relief which was, for reasons given below, declined.  On Friday 7 August 2009 she and her client Mr Porter commenced substantive proceedings relating to the notice and on that day I made orders restraining APRA from taking any steps in reliance on it.  Ten days later, on Monday 17 August 2009, a delegate of APRA purported to revoke the notice.  On Thursday 3 September 2009, APRA consented to orders setting the notice aside with effect from the day of its issue.  That left the question of costs unresolved.  Ms Shand now asks that the costs of this proceeding and of the urgent application on the afternoon of 5 August 2009 (which was made in a related proceeding) should be paid on an indemnity basis.

    Facts

  3. It is necessary first to say a little more of the facts.  The notice was issued by a delegate of APRA on Monday 3 August 2009.  On its issue, therefore, it required compliance within a period of two days.  There was no evidence before me of any of the circumstances…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1148
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Porter v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, the plaintiff, Mr Porter, sought relief against the Authority's decision to issue a notice requiring compliance within an unreasonably short timeframe. The substantive proceedings began on 7 August 2009, following the issuance of the notice by a delegate of APRA on 3 August 2009. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the Authority from taking any steps in reliance on the notice and was granted interim relief by the court. APRA later consented to set the notice aside, leaving the issue of costs unresolved.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Authority's decision to issue the notice, requiring compliance within two days, was unreasonable. The court found that the lack of evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the decision, including why a two-day period was deemed appropriate, permitted the inference that the decision was unreasonable. Additionally, the decision by APRA to serve the notice six hours and ten minutes before the compliance deadline was also deemed unreasonable due to the absence of any explanation for the delay. The court found that the failure to provide reasons for these decisions indicated that there were no good reasons for them.

The court held that the Authority's decision to issue the notice with a two-day compliance period was objectively unreasonable, and the decision to serve the notice six hours and ten minutes before the compliance deadline was also unreasonable. The court granted the plaintiff's application for indemnity costs for the substantive proceedings and the urgent application made on 5 August 2009.

The final orders of the court were that the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority is to pay the costs of the substantive proceedings and the urgent application on an indemnity basis. Additionally, the court directed the Registrar to provide a copy of the reasons for the decision to the chairperson of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The First Respondent is to pay the costs of these proceedings on an indemnity basis.

2. The First Respondent is to pay the costs of the Notice of Motion of 5 August 2009 in proceedings NSD 592/2009 on an indemnity basis.

3. Direct the Registrar to provide a copy of these reasons to the chairperson of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Shortly before 4.00pm, Ms Shand applied to this Court for urgent relief which was, for reasons given below, declined. On Friday 7 August 2009 she and her client Mr Porter commenced substantive proceedings relating to the notice and on that day I made orders restraining APRA from taking any steps in reliance on it. Ten days later, on Monday 17 August 2009, a delegate of APRA purported to revoke the notice. On Thursday 3 September 2009, APRA consented to orders setting the notice aside with effect from the day of its issue. That left the question of costs unresolved. Ms Shand now asks that the costs of this proceeding and of the urgent application on the afternoon of 5 August 2009 (which was made in a related proceeding) should be paid on an indemnity basis.Facts It is necessary first to say a little more of the facts. The notice was issued by a delegate of APRA on Monday 3 August 2009. On its issue, therefore, it required compliance within a period of two days. There was no evidence before me of any of the circumstances surrounding the delegate’s decision to issue the notice nor of why it was thought two days might be an appropriate time for compliance. There is, however, evidence from Ms Shand, which I accept, that at 9.50am on Wednesday, two officers from APRA served the notice upon her at her offices in Pitt Street in Sydney. One of these officers was Mr Matthew Whylie who is the manager of the enforcement division. There was no evidence from APRA explaining the decision to serve the notice at 9.50am on the same day that the notice called for production. It was common ground that compliance was required within six hours and 10 minutes of service. For reasons which follow, it is necessary to assess the reasonableness of this conduct. In the absence of any evidence surrounding the circumstances of the notice’s issue it would be open to me to infer that the two days contemplated by the notice was an unreasonably short period. The failure by APRA to lead any evidence from the delegate of those circumstances or of his reasons for issuing the notice with that time limit permits more readily that inference to be drawn: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308, 312 and 320-321. Indeed, this is one of those cases where the failure by the decision maker to give any reasons for the decision permits the inference to be drawn that he had no good reason for it: Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 at 663-664, 675, 676 and 678. I conclude, therefore, that the decision by the delegate to issue the notice so that it required production within two days issue was objectively unreasonable. The person who made the decision to serve the notice six hours and ten minutes before the time for compliance was not identified. APRA offered no explanation of why its officers delayed two working days before serving the notice. As with the delegate’s decision to issue the notice, so too I infer that whoever made that decision had no good reason for it. Accordingly, that decision is to be characterised as unreasonable.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRAM J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRAM J

Full text does not contain this section.