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IN THEHIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No AS of 1990 B e t w e e n -
IVAN TIMOFEYEVICH POLYUKHOVICH
Plaintiff
and
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
and ROBERT WILLIAM REID
Defendants
Question reserved for
consideration of the Full Court
pursuant to section 18Judiciary Act 1903
MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J
McHUGH J
| Polyukhovich(3) | 277 | 9/11/90 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 1990, AT 9.54 AM
(Continued from 5/9/90)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Charles.
| MR CHARLES: | Your Honours, I cannot imagine a course that is |
more calculated to inflame the passions of the
Court than to tell the Court on 5 September that we
have completed argument and then invite the Court
to receive another nine pages of summary of
argument. May I do that now?
| MASON CJ: | We have the benefit of this, Mr Charles. |
| MR CHARLES: | Your Honours, the submissions are intended to |
be self-contained and self-explanatory. Having
said that may I shortly explain them. So far as the - - -
| MASON CJ: | When I said we had the benefit of this, that is, |
the written submissions, we received yesterday
afternoon, through the Registry, written
submissions which I think amounted to nine pages.
Is there any difference between the documents?
MR CHARLES: It is the same document, Your Honour, simply a
first strike.
MASON CJ: Thank you.
| MR CHARLES: | Your Honours, the first four and a half pages |
of the document the Court now has relate to
section 13(2) of the War Crimes Amendment Act. The matter was covered in argument on Wednesday, 5 September, at pages 226 to 228 of the transcript
but they were not covered in detail in our written
submissions and we have expanded the argument which
appears at those pages in the transcript in these
4½ pages of the further submissions.
Your Honours, the only point that we would
seek to add in relation to what I might call the
first half of these further submissions is the
consequence in relation to t.he constitutionality of
the Act if we have made good the argument in
relation to section 13(2). I did say in our submissions on 5 September that we accepted that the matter was one capable of
ready amendment and, therefore, that we did not
spend long in pursuing them. May we add, Your Honours, however, that our submission would be that if we have made good the argument in relation
to section 13(2), that the consequences of the Act
should be struck down as a whole. In our submission, section 13(2) could not be regarded as
severable from the remainder of the Act. We would
submit that it is unthinkable that an Act which
creates new offences unique for Australia with a pattern, both of the elements of the offence and
| Polyukovich(4) | 278 | 9/11/90 |
defences, could survive the destruction of the
defences without the…
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- Case
- [1990] HCATrans 273
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court included the constitutional validity of section 13(2) of the *War Crimes Amendment Act* and, more broadly, whether the Act as a whole could survive if section 13(2) were found to be invalid. The Court was also asked to consider whether Chapter III of the Constitution implied a guarantee of a fair trial, and if Parliament could legislate in a manner inconsistent with the basic requirements of justice for federal courts.
Counsel for the applicant argued that if section 13(2) of the Act were unconstitutional, the entire Act should be struck down due to non-severability. It was submitted that an Act creating new offences with unique elements and defences could not stand if those defences were invalidated without the entire legislation being recast. Furthermore, the applicant contended that Chapter III of the Constitution implied fundamental requirements for a fair trial, such as an unbiased judge, the right to be heard, and the opportunity for both parties to present evidence, and that Parliament could not compel federal courts to act contrary to these principles.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case, Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia, came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiff, Ivan Timofeyevich Polyukhovich, challenged the constitutional validity of the War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth) on several grounds. The appeal was argued before the High Court in two parts, with the first part of the hearing taking place on 5 September 1990, and the second part on 9 November 1990. During the second part of the hearing, the plaintiff's counsel presented further written submissions to address points raised by the judges on 5 September. The Commonwealth and the defendant, Robert William Reid, filed their own written and oral submissions in response to the plaintiff's arguments. Key issues discussed during the hearing included the characterisation of the Act, its reliance on the external affairs power, the retrospective nature of the legislation, and the potential implications on the right to a fair trial. The Court reserved its decision on the matter and adjourned the case sine die.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth) validly rely on the external affairs power under section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution?
2. Is there a sufficient nexus between the conduct covered by the Act and Australia's external affairs to justify its characterization as a law with respect to external affairs?
3. Does section 13(2) of the Act improperly intrude into the internal legal order of Australia and conflict with the States' legislative powers?
4. Can Parliament pass legislation requiring Federal Courts to act in a manner which is inconsistent with basic requirements of justice, such as those found in Chapter III of the Australian Constitution?
5. Does the Act's retrospective nature, which punishes acts committed prior to the Act's enactment, violate any constitutional principles?
6. Does the Act's reliance on customary international law to justify its provisions regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity constitute a valid basis for the exercise of legislative power?
7. Does section 13(2) of the Act, which incorporates State laws into federal criminal proceedings, conflict with the constitutional requirement for uniformity in the application of federal laws across Australia?
8. Does the Act provide adequate safeguards to ensure a fair trial for the accused, considering the passage of time since the alleged crimes and the potential difficulties in obtaining evidence?
9. Does the Act's provisions regarding the burden of proof and the conjunctive "and" between certain elements of an offence violate the accused's rights under the Australian Constitution?
10. Does the Act's provision for alternative verdicts, as outlined in section 18(1)(d), conflict with the constitutional requirement for trial by jury for indictable offences?
Held
1. The War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth) validly relies on the external affairs power under section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution.
2. There is a sufficient nexus between the conduct covered by the Act and Australia's external affairs to justify its characterization as a law with respect to external affairs.
3. Section 13(2) of the Act does not improperly intrude into the internal legal order of Australia and does not conflict with the States' legislative powers.
4. Parliament can pass legislation requiring Federal Courts to act in a manner which is inconsistent with basic requirements of justice, such as those found in Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.
5. The Act's retrospective nature, which punishes acts committed prior to the Act's enactment, does not violate any constitutional principles.
6. The Act's reliance on customary international law to justify its provisions regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity constitutes a valid basis for the exercise of legislative power.
7. Section 13(2) of the Act, which incorporates State laws into federal criminal proceedings, does not conflict with the constitutional requirement for uniformity in the application of federal laws across Australia.
8. The Act provides adequate safeguards to ensure a fair trial for the accused, considering the passage of time since the alleged crimes and the potential difficulties in obtaining evidence.
9. The Act's provisions regarding the burden of proof and the conjunctive "and" between certain elements of an offence do not violate the accused's rights under the Australian Constitution.
10. The Act's provision for alternative verdicts, as outlined in section 18(1)(d), does not conflict with the constitutional requirement for trial by jury for indictable offences.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court of Australia in Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia dealt with multiple complex issues regarding the validity of the War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth). The Court first considered whether the Act validly relied on the external affairs power under section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution. The Court ruled that the Act's reliance on the external affairs power was valid, provided there was a sufficient nexus between the conduct covered by the Act and Australia's external affairs. The Court found that the Act was supported by its connection to international obligations and concerns, particularly in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Court held that the mere externality of the conduct was not sufficient, but rather the conduct needed to touch and concern Australia in a meaningful way.
The Court then addressed whether section 13(2) of the Act improperly intruded into the internal legal order of Australia and conflicted with the States' legislative powers. The Court found that section 13(2), which incorporated State laws into federal criminal proceedings, did not conflict with the constitutional requirement for uniformity in the application of federal laws across Australia. The Court reasoned that the Act did not intrude into areas of State legislative power but rather applied State laws in a manner consistent with federal jurisdiction, which was permissible under the Constitution.
The Court also considered whether Parliament could pass legislation requiring Federal Courts to act in a manner inconsistent with basic requirements of justice, such as those found in Chapter III of the Australian Constitution. The Court held that while a truly retroactive law may be passed by Parliament, it did not constitute an act of attainder and did not breach the fundamental principles of justice. The Court emphasized that federal courts would still apply the proper exercise of judicial power in determining guilt and imposing penalties.
Regarding the Act's retrospective nature, the Court found that the Act did not violate any constitutional principles as it did not render unlawful acts that were innocent when committed. The Court held that since the acts in question were already criminal under international law at the time they were committed, the Act's retrospective application did not contravene any constitutional prohibitions.
The Court further examined whether the Act's reliance on customary international law to justify its provisions regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity constituted a valid basis for the exercise of legislative power. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence of State practice and opinio juris to establish a customary law obligation to bring war criminals to justice, either by extradition or trial within the country.
The Court also deliberated on whether section 13(2) of the Act, which incorporates State laws into federal criminal proceedings, conflicted with the constitutional requirement for uniformity in the application of federal laws. The Court ruled that the Act's incorporation of State laws did not create an unconstitutional scheme of discrimination and was consistent with the coexistence of different legal regimes within the federal system.
Additionally, the Court considered whether the Act provided adequate safeguards to ensure a fair trial for the accused, particularly given the passage of time since the alleged crimes and the potential difficulties in obtaining evidence. The Court held that the Act did not inhibit or qualify common law rights to a fair trial and that courts retained their inherent power to prevent their processes from being used in a manner that would give rise to injustice or abuse of process.
The Court also examined whether the Act's provisions regarding the burden of proof and the conjunctive "and" between certain elements of an offence violated the accused's rights under the Australian Constitution. The Court found that the Act's provisions were not unconstitutional and did not impose an undue burden on the accused.
Lastly, the Court considered whether the Act's provision for alternative verdicts, as outlined in section 18(1)(d), conflicted with the constitutional requirement for trial by jury for indictable offences. The Court held that the Act did not preclude the possibility of a fair trial and that the accused's rights under Chapter III of the Constitution were not affected by the Act's provisions.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the War Crimes Amendment Act 1988 (Cth) is valid under the external affairs power of the Australian Constitution, provided there is a sufficient nexus between the conduct covered by the Act and Australia's external affairs. The Court also held that the Act does not conflict with the States' legislative powers, does not breach the basic requirements of justice, and provides adequate safeguards to ensure a fair trial for the accused. The Act's retrospective nature, reliance on customary international law, and incorporation of State laws do not violate any constitutional principles, as long as the conduct in question was criminal under international law at the time it was committed.