Police v TJ - [2025] SASC 73

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeal: Criminal)
POLICE v TJ
[2025] SASC 73
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stein
21 May 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - INTERPRETATION ACTS AND PROVISIONS - STATUTORY DEFINITION PROVISIONS GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DEFENCE MATTERS - DEFENCE OF PERSONS OR PROPERTY - REASONABLE BELIEF IN NECESSITY OF RESPONSE
CRIMINAL LAW - GENERAL MATTERS - CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CAPACITY - DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Appeal against acquittals entered by a Magistrate.
The respondent was charged with five counts of aggravated assault contrary to s 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The prosecution contended that whilst receiving medical treatment at hospital the respondent spat at, punched and kneed the three complainants as they attempted to further restrain him. It was alleged the offences were aggravated as they were committed against community youth justice officers (within the meaning of the Youth Justice Administration Act 2016 (SA) (“the Act”)) and that, at the time of committing the alleged assaults, the respondent was aware that the complainants were acting in course of their official duties.
The learned Magistrate found there to be no case to answer in respect of one count and delivered reasons acquitting the respondent of the remaining four counts. In doing so, his Honour found proved the acts alleged but nevertheless found there was insufficient evidence to establish the aggravating feature. It followed that the conduct of the complainants potentially occurred without authority, and accordingly, the alternative of basic assault also failed as the acts alleged against the respondent would have become justifiable as a reasonable and necessary response for a defensive purpose proportionate to the threat presented.
The Crown contended on appeal that the Magistrate erred in finding there was no evidence the complainants were acting lawfully and in finding the respondent’s conduct was a necessary and reasonable response for a defensive purpose and proportionate to the threat faced.
Held (dismissing the appeal):
1.The alleged circumstances of aggravation were that the offences were committed against a community youth justice officer (within the meaning of the Youth Justice Administration Act 2016 (SA) (the “Act”) knowing the victims were acting in the course of their official duty. On the basis of the definitions in the Act and the limited evidence given regarding these matters, the complainants appear to fall within the definition of “employees of a training centre”, as distinct from “community youth justice officers” as particularised. The evidence failed to establish the circumstances of aggravation.
2.There was insufficient evidence upon which the Magistrate could be satisfied the complainants were acting lawfully and within the scope of their duties.
3.What may or may not be reasonably necessary force in accordance with s 33 of the Act entails an objective assessment of a decision to apply force. A conclusion of this kind involves the Magistrate’s assessment of the complainants’ evidence in the atmosphere of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Police v TJ

Details

AGLC: Police v TJ [2025] SASC 73
Case: [2025] SASC 73
Decision Date: 21 May 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Police v TJ concerns the respondent's acquittal on multiple counts of assault against individuals who were escorting him for medical treatment. The case was heard and determined in the Magistrates Court of South Australia, where the respondent was acquitted of all charges. The prosecution appealed the decision, arguing that the trial magistrate erred in finding that the complainants were not acting lawfully when they restrained the respondent. The respondent, a youth who was in custody at Kurlana Tapa Youth Training Centre, was transported to a hospital for medical treatment accompanied by three complainants who were responsible for his supervision. The prosecution alleged that the respondent assaulted the complainants during the course of his treatment. The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of statutory definitions and the application of the defence of acting in the course of official duty.

The court examined whether the complainants were "community youth justice officers" as defined in the relevant legislation. The prosecution argued that the complainants were acting in the course of their official duty as community youth justice officers when they restrained the respondent. However, the court found that the complainants were actually "OPS3 youth workers" employed at the training centre, not community youth justice officers. The statutory definition of community youth justice officer did not encompass the duties of supervising a youth in custody at a training centre, which was the role of the complainants. The court held that the complainants were not acting in the course of their official duty as defined by the statute, leading to the acquittal of the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed by the court, affirming the decision of the trial magistrate. The court concluded that there was no error in the magistrate's finding that the complainants were not acting lawfully in restraining the respondent. The distinction between the roles of community youth justice officers and employees of a training centre was critical in this determination. The court upheld the respondent's acquittal, finding no basis to overturn the original decision.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the appeal, thereby upholding the acquittal of the respondent on all counts. The court's reasoning emphasized the importance of accurately interpreting statutory definitions and the specific roles and duties of the complainants in this context.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below, I have determined to dismiss the appeal.Background The prosecution case was that on 15 November 2023, the respondent (a youth) was in custody at Kurlana Tapa Youth Training Centre, having been there for approximately 24 hours. He was transported to hospital for medical treatment by the three complainants who were responsible for remaining with him while he received treatment. The respondent was initially handcuffed to one of the complainants, Mr Mangar. After arriving at the hospital Emergency Department, the respondent was handcuffed by his leg to the hospital bed. On the prosecution case, there was a delay before the respondent was treated by hospital staff and the respondent was very unsettled. During this time, the respondent was taken to the toilet and handcuffed to a rail in the bathroom. Mr Mangar gave evidence in which he described hearing banging sounds and said he thought the respondent was “testing the rails in the toilet”. Another of the complainants, Mr Hughes, also gave evidence of hearing noises. When the respondent left the toilet, he was secured by handcuffs to Mr Mangar and then walked back to the cubicle. Mr Mangar gave evidence that the respondent said he wanted to see if he could run with Mr Mangar with the handcuffs on because Mr Mangar was skinny and he could “take him on”. When they returned to the cubicle, the respondent was secured to the bed by his left leg. There was a significant delay in treatment and the respondent became unsettled and agitated. The bed was moved towards the public area by Mr Hughes as the respondent was trying to open drawers near the bed. On the respondent’s case, this caused him to become more agitated and he wanted the bed moved back. Immediately before the alleged assaults, the respondent was on the bed with one leg cuffed to the bed and his hands handcuffed together. The three complainants were in close proximity. The prosecution case alleged the respondent said he was going to pull out the intravenous drip pole and hit the complainants. The third complainant, Ms Smith, gave evidence that the respondent was quite upset and threatened to “wrap a pole around Shayne’s head”. On the prosecution case, the three complainants decided to further secure the respondent to the bed for their own safety and the safety of staff and this was communicated to the respondent. All three complainants were involved in the process which was to cuff the respondent’s already handcuffed hands to the bed. During the process of carrying out that restraint, the respondent was alleged to have kneed Mr Mangar in his ribs twice. This conduct gave rise to count 1 on the information. The respondent was also alleged to have punched Mr Mangar to the right side of his jaw, which gave rise to count 2. It was further alleged he spat on Mr Mangar, which gave rise to count 3. Ms Smith described stepping away from the respondent after he was restrained. The respondent continued to spit, some of which landed on her. This gave rise to count 4. Mr Hughes gave evidence that the respondent spat numerous times and the spit landed on him. This conduct was alleged as count 5.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 34 of the Act allows the Chief Executive in writing to grant a youth leave of absence from the training centre for medical treatment. If in an emergency it is necessary for a youth to be removed for treatment, the Chief Executive is to be informed as soon as practicable. Leave of absence may be subject to conditions including that the youth will be in the custody of, and supervised by, one or more officers or employees of the Department authorised by the Chief Executive for that purpose. ConsiderationAsserted error in finding no evidence the complainants were acting lawfully The Magistrate found that the youth kneed, punched and spat at the complainants as set out in the relevant counts on appeal. There was no challenge to those findings. The Information and provisions of the Act In this case the circumstances of aggravation specified on the Information were that the offences were committed against “community youth justice officers” knowing the officers were acting in the course of their official duty. The circumstances of aggravation could only be proved if the evidence established that the offences were committed against community youth justice officers and that the youth knew the victims were acting in the course of their official duty. The first aspect required proof that the offences were in fact committed against community youth justice officers. As part of establishing the second aspect, that is, to prove the youth knew the complainants were acting in the course of their official duty, it was necessary to prove that the complainants were in fact acting in the course of their official duty. Were the complainants community youth justice officers? The prosecution opened the trial on the basis that the complainants worked at the Kurlana Tapa Youth Training Centre as “youth workers” and were on shift at the time of the offences. Despite the reference in the Information to “community youth justice officers”, the prosecution stated that the aggravating feature was that the youth allegedly assaulted each complainant in the course of their employment as employees in a training centre within the meaning of the Act. During the trial the three complainants were asked where they were working and what were their daily duties in the position. Mr Mangar gave evidence that he was working at the Adelaide Youth Training Centre as an “OPS 3 youth worker” and his role included running programs and other activities, school and medical escorts. Ms Smith stated she was working at Kurlana Tapa Youth Justice Centre as an “OPS3 youth worker”. Mr Hughes stated he was working at Kurlana Tapa Youth Justice as an “OPS3 youth worker”. The three complainants were referred to during the course of the trial as “youth workers”. Community youth justice officer is defined in the Act by reference to assignment to a position which includes supervision of youths “required to carry out community service” or who are “subject to supervision in the community”. The definition does not include supervision of a youth in custody in a training centre. That definition can be contrasted with the definition of employee of a training centre which is defined to include an employee having duties which include the “supervision of youths detained in a training centre”. Given the way the roles are defined in the Act, it appears the two roles are distinct and different.