Police v Stanford

Case [2013] SASC 151

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

POLICE v STANFORD

[2013] SASC 151

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

11 October 2013

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL

POLICE - OFFENCES BY POLICE

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - ASSAULT

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - ERROR OF LAW - PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION - ADEQUACY OF REASONS

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - VERDICT UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE HAVING REGARD TO EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - INCONSISTENT VERDICTS

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of one count of assault whilst on duty.  The prosecution case was as follows.  The appellant and his partner, Constable Trnovsky, had responded to an incident in Hindmarsh Square involving the complainant and her then girlfriend, Ms Corban.  The complainant approached the two officers and made immediate admissions.  She was then arrested by the appellant and placed in a police vehicle and then dealt with by Constable Trnovsky.  The appellant then proceeded to place Ms Corban under arrest.  The complainant became distressed by the way Ms Corban was being handled by the appellant and complained to Constable Trnovsky about it.  Constable Trnovsky left the complainant and began to approach the appellant, whereupon the complainant ran up to the appellant and head butted him.  The appellant then allegedly took the complainant to the ground, straddled her, punched her to the face with his right fist, and spat in her face. 

At trial, the principal issue was whether the appellant did in fact strike (count 1) or deliberately spit upon the complainant (count 2). The appellant was convicted of count 1 but acquitted of count 2.  The appellant appealed on the basis that the Magistrate's reasons were inadequate, the conviction on count 1 was not proven beyond reasonable doubt having regard to the evidence, and the verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were inconsistent.

Held (Peek J dismissing the appeal):

(1) The reasons of the Magistrate were adequate. [8]-[9], [21]-[74] 

(2) The verdict was safely proven beyond reasonable doubt having regard to the evidence.  The Magistrate was entitled to take the view that the cumulative effect of the evidence of Ms Corban, the complainant, Constable Trnovsky  and the photographs in exhibit P5 was sufficiently strong to justify a finding that the appellant had overtly used excessive force on Ms Corban, despite the appellant's sworn denial of this.  The Magistrate was also entitled to consider that this finding affected the appellant's credibility.  The Magistrate had adequate regard to the deficiencies in the evidence of Ms Corban, the complainant and Constable Trnovsky as to the occurrence of the subject punch.  The Magistrate was entitled to accept the sworn evidence of Constable Trnovsky and reject that of the appellant. [21]-[69], [75]

(3) The verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were not…

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Police v Stanford [2013] SASC 151
Case
[2013] SASC 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Police v Stanford, the appellant, who was originally charged with one count of assault, was subsequently found guilty of one count of aggravated assault by the Magistrate. The appellant was acquitted on the second count, which involved a separate act of spitting. The appellant appealed against the conviction on count 1 on several grounds, including that the Magistrate’s reasons for decision were inadequate and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The appeal also argued that the verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were inconsistent.

The court considered whether the Magistrate's reasons for decision were adequate and whether the verdict was supported by the evidence. The court found that the reasons provided by the Magistrate were sufficient for the appeal court to understand the basis of the decision. The court concluded that the Magistrate had adequately considered the evidence, including the deficiencies in the complainant’s and other witnesses’ testimonies, and had given appropriate weight to the demeanour of the witnesses. The court found that the Magistrate's verdict on count 1 was supported by the evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. The court also determined that the verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were not inconsistent, as the conviction on count 1 was based on a distinct physical act, whereas count 2 involved a more equivocal act of spitting.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Magistrate’s reasons were adequate and that the verdict on count 1 was safely proven beyond reasonable doubt. The court further held that the verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were not inconsistent, allowing the conviction on count 1 to stand.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held (Peek J dismissing the appeal):

(1) The reasons of the Magistrate were adequate. [8]-[9], [21]-[74]

(2) The verdict was safely proven beyond reasonable doubt having regard to the evidence. The Magistrate was entitled to take the view that the cumulative effect of the evidence of Ms Corban, the complainant, Constable Trnovsky and the photographs in exhibit P5 was sufficiently strong to justify a finding that the appellant had overtly used excessive force on Ms Corban, despite the appellant's sworn denial of this. The Magistrate was also entitled to consider that this finding affected the appellant's credibility. The Magistrate had adequate regard to the deficiencies in the evidence of Ms Corban, the complainant and Constable Trnovsky as to the occurrence of the subject punch. The Magistrate was entitled to accept the sworn evidence of Constable Trnovsky and reject that of the appellant. [21]-[69], [75]

(3) The verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were not inconsistent. The conviction on count 1 is founded upon an observation of a precise and distinctive physical act by the appellant, a forceful punch to the face. There could be no mistake or misapprehension of some other physical occurrence; the punch either occurred or it did not. By contrast, a conviction on count two depended on the observation of a much more equivocal act of spitting; there were difficulties associated with drawing inferences beyond reasonable doubt as to both whether any expectoration was voluntary or involuntary and as to whether an impact of spittle on the complainant was intended. [76]-[81]

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is necessary that the reasoning upon which the decision is based can be seen so that justice can be seen to be done.[6] However, the extent of reasons required may vary from case to case. In cases of direct evidence, a minute explanation of each step in the reasoning process and detailed findings on every issue of fact may not be required and reference to every argument of whatever cogency may not be necessary. [7]In R v Mayger, the Full Court recently summed up the matter thus:[8]In Keyte, Doyle CJ, with whom Wicks J agreed, … dealt with a number of authorities in which the courts have concluded that a failure to give reasons was in itself an error of law. He considered the extent of reasons required. He observed that, insofar as decisions upon facts require reasons, it is not incumbent upon a judge to provide a detailed explanation for the judge’s decision to prefer the evidence of one witness to another. Nor is the judge required to give detailed explanations for his conclusion of satisfaction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence of a particular witness, at least when the relevant decision rests substantially upon the impression made by the witness on the judge when giving evidence. In Sweeny, the Court of Criminal Appeal observed that there is no fixed formula when considering the adequacy of a judge’s reasons. Judges will adopt their own style and method. What is required is that the reasons explain the verdict, identify the legal principles and are sufficient to enable an appellate court to understand and review the verdict. More recently, in Douglass, the High Court confirmed that a judge is required to give reasons sufficient to enable an appellate court to understand the basis upon which the judge found the case proved beyond reasonable doubt. The question of whether in a particular case a judge has given adequate reasons will depend upon the circumstances of that case. So long as a judge has clearly set out the basis upon which the judge’s decision rests, it is not necessary for a judge to give extensive and elaborate reasons.…Although the Judge did not give a detailed summary of the inconsistencies in the evidence, we are satisfied that he was aware of them and had regard to them when deciding whether he relied upon C’s evidence, and was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. The reasons, although short, were adequate.[Footnotes omitted][6] Harwood v Police (1998) 71 SASR 300, 305 (Duggan J); Papps v Police (2000) 77 SASR 210, 215-217 [24]-[26], 218-219 [34]-[35] (Gray J).[7] R v Keyte (2000) 78 SASR 68, 78 [48], 79 [54] (Doyle CJ).[8] [2013] SASCFC 65 [18]-[21], [25] (Gray, Sulan and Blue JJ).The correct approach to a complaint that a verdict is not supported by the evidence Although the phraseology “against the weight of the evidence” has a certain pedigree, particularly in appeals against judgments in civil cases, it is not a good choice for an appeal against a verdict in a criminal trial heard by a Magistrate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
The appellant was originally charged with one count of assault. Prior to the plea being taken at trial, counsel for the appellant objected that the charge was latently duplicitous in that the evidence sought to be led would, if believed, establish two different assaults, one a punch to the face and the other a deliberate spitting on the complainant’s face.[2] The appellant further submitted that the result was that the prosecution was required to elect as between the two possibilities. The prosecution on the other hand submitted that if the objection were to be upheld, the prosecution would seek to amend the Information by laying a new second count to separately refer to the spitting. The Magistrate allowed the objection but permitted the prosecution to lay the new count 2 referable only to the spitting.[3] Count 1 continued to refer to the alleged punch by the appellant while astride the complainant (to which I will refer as “the subject punch”). The appellant entered pleas of not guilty to each count and the trial proceeded. [2] As a matter of interest, it is well established that spitting can amount to an assault. See for example: R v Cotesworth (1704) 6 Mod 172; 87 ER 928; Re Cairns (1837) 1 Swin 543; Ewing v Earl of Mar (1851) 14 D 314, 330; R v Smith (1866) 4 F&F 1066; 176 ER 910; Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305; Doolan v Edgington (1994) 110 A Crim R 19; Burgoyne v Dixon (2004) 150 A Crim R 1; Blazey-Ayaib, Patricia, 'The Law Of Spitting' (1998) 22 Criminal Law Journal 151.[3] The appellant was subsequently found not guilty on count 2. Accordingly there is no ground of appeal in relation to the above matters and I do not comment upon them.The judgment of the Magistrate On 27 March 2013, the Magistrate reserved judgment and on 25 June 2013 he found the defendant guilty on count 1 and not guilty on count 2. As well as having the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, the Magistrate also had particularly extensive and thorough written submissions from both sides. His Honour, after the introduction to his judgment reproduced above, and correct directions as to the onus and standard of proof and the need to consider separately the two counts, dealt, in considerable detail over the course of a further 22 closely typed pages, with the evidence, the submissions of both parties and the making of specific findings of fact.The grounds of appeal The grounds of appeal are as follows:1. The learned Magistrate’s reasons for decision were inadequateParticulars1.1 The learned magistrate did not deal adequately with the question of the credit of the prosecution witnesses or defence witnesses.1.2 The learned magistrate placed undue reliance on the demeanour of the prosecution witnesses in making favourable credibility findings and undue reliance on the demeanour of the defendant in making adverse credibility findings.2.The learned magistrate’s decision that the appellant was guilty of one count of aggravated assault contrary to section 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 was against the weight of the evidence.3.The learned magistrate’s decision to find the defendant not guilty on count 2 was inconsistent with his decision to find the defendant guilty on count 1.The correct approach to a complaint of failure to give adequate reasons

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J

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