PARTIES: STUART AXTELL DAVIS
v
GEORGE IOANNOU
TITLE OF COURT: Court of Summary Jurisdiction
JURISDICTION: Criminal
FILE NO(s): 20833154
DELIVERED ON: 15 March 2010
DELIVERED AT: Darwin
HEARING DATE(s): 10 August 2009 & 2 March 2010
JUDGMENT OF: Ms Sue Oliver SM
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – drink driving – breath analysis tests - blood tests - Bunning v Cross discretion.
Traffic Act ss 29AAD; 29AAE
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Complainant: DPP
Defendant: Woodcock Solicitors
Solicitors:
Complainant: Georgia McMaster
Defendant: Alan Woodcock
Judgment category classification: A
Judgment ID number: [2010] NTMC 016
Number of paragraphs: 16
IN THE COURT OF SUMMARY JURISDICTION
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN
TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
No. 20833154
[2010] NTMC 016
BETWEEN:
POLICE
Complainant
AND:
GEORGE IOANNOU
Defendant
REASONS FOR DECISION
(Delivered 15 March 2010)
Ms Sue Oliver SM:
1. The defendant is charged with two drink driving offences under the Traffic Act. At the conclusion of the prosecution evidence, the prosecution elected to proceed only on count 2, that is, driving a motor vehicle with a high range blood alcohol content namely, 0.150%. I declined to exercise what is commonly referred to as the Bunning v Cross discretion to exclude evidence of the blood alcohol reading which was sought to be given by way of certificates pursuant to s 29AAU of the Traffic Act. The exercise of the discretion was sought on the basis that the evidence disclosed that the defendant was given three opportunities to provide a sample of breath for analysis at the Darwin Watch House comprising an initial failure to provide a sufficient sample and then two successful analyses.
2. The evidence of the two police officers present in the breath analysis room was at variance as to what occurred following the initial failure. Constable Fowler, who was the breath analysis operator, said that he asked the defendant to supply another sample. That sample returned a result of .165%. Constable Fowler said that the defendant then asked if he could provide another sample and that as he was “well within his rights to ask for that”, a further opportunity was provided. The second reading was .150% and it is this reading and the certificate of that result pursuant to s 29AAU on which count 2 relies. Constable Burns’ evidence on the other hand was that it was the defendant who asked for a second opportunity following his initial failure and that Constable Fowler allowed him to have the second go. Constable Burns said that he disagreed with Constable Fowler’s decision.
3. The Bunning v Cross discretion was submitted to arise because there was no power under the Traffic Act to allow the defendant to provide a second sample of breath for analysis once he had failed to provide a sufficient sample. Section 29AAD provides for the giving of a further breath analysis. Section 29AAD(1) gives power to a police officer to require a second breath analysis when a person has provided a sufficient sample of breath for…
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- AGLC
- Police v Ioannou [2010] NTMC 16
- Case
- [2010] NTMC 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence regarding the defendant's breath analysis. Two police officers provided differing accounts of the events following the defendant's initial failure to provide a sufficient breath sample. The court ultimately found Constable Fowler's account more reliable and accepted that he asked the defendant for a second breath analysis sample. This was deemed permissible under the Traffic Act, as the Act allows for a further breath analysis upon a person's request after receiving the result of the initial analysis. The court concluded that the defendant's legal position was not disadvantaged by this request, as he could have been charged with failing to provide a sufficient sample of breath if he had not been given a second opportunity.
The court declined to exercise the Bunning v Cross discretion to exclude the evidence, finding that the police officer's conduct, while not authorized by the Act, did not result in any unfair or improper disadvantage to the defendant. The court found the defendant guilty of driving with a high range blood alcohol content.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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