Police v Boileau No. Scgrg-98-281 Judgment No. S304

POLICE v BOILEAU
[1999] SASC 304

Full Court: Olsson, Mullighan and Nyland JJ

OLSSON J: This is an appeal from the decision of a stipendiary magistrate which has been referred, by a single Judge, for the consideration of the Full Court. It raises an issue of practical importance in relation to the provisions of s 32 of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (“the Act”).

Background

The issue arises in the context of a prosecution of the respondent on complaint. That complaint contained three separate counts against the respondent, to all of which the respondent pleaded “Not guilty”.
The first was that, on 14 June 1998 at Hyde Park, she assisted in keeping or managing a brothel situated at 5/100 King William Street, Hyde Park (“the subject premises”). That is a misdescription of the subject premises. Although they were known as the “Hyde Park Relaxation Centre”, they are actually in the adjoining suburb of Goodwood.
The second was that, on the same occasion, she received money paid in a brothel in respect of prostitution.
The third was that, on that occasion, she had in her possession personal property, namely money in the amount of $515, which, either at the time of such possession, or at a subsequent time before the making of the complaint, was reasonably suspected of having been stolen or obtained by unlawful means.
At trial the third count was severed. This appeal, therefore, focuses only on counts 1 and 2.
The prosecution case, as sought to be presented, was that five police officers, who were members of the so-called Vice and Gaming Task Force, went to and entered the subject premises on 14 June 1998. They purported to enter them whilst in possession, and by virtue of, authorities said to have lawfully been issued to them in accordance with the provisions of s 32 of the Act.
That section is expressed as follows:-
“The Commissioner or any Superintendent or inspector of police, or any member of the police force authorised in writing by the Commissioner or a Superintendent or inspector of police, may at any time enter and search premises which he or she suspects on reasonable grounds to be a brothel.”
It is not in dispute that each of the relevant police officers was, in fact, in possession of an authority signed by a superintendent of police, purportedly in pursuance of the provisions of s 32. These bore varying dates in April, May and June 1998. The most recent of the authorities was that issued on 9 June 1998 to the witness Detective Senior Constable Jones (“Jones”).
When the matter came on for hearing, a preliminary issue arose as to whether, in the circumstances, the evidence of the police officers who attended the premises ought to be excluded on the principle discussed in Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 74-75. This led to a voir dire hearing, at which evidence was given by Superintendent Jackson (“Jackson”), Detective Sergeant Kelso (“Kelso”) (the officer in charge of the Task Force) and Jones.
It was common ground that, although similar issues arose in relation to all police officers who attended the subject premises, it was convenient to focus on the circumstances of Jones, as an indicative exercise. The personal situation of Kelso was also reviewed to some extent.

The factual evidence

According to the evidence Jones took up duty with the Task Force on 11 June 1998. On 4 June 1998 he attended at the Task Force office for the purpose of an induction or familiarisation session with Kelso. In the course of that process, which lasted for somewhere between half an hour and one hour, Kelso showed Jones a list of names and addresses of certain premises which were either considered to be brothels, or were suspected to be brothels. A number of the premises were designated as those in relation to which current authorities, issued pursuant to s 32, were said to be held by members of the Task Force. They included the subject premises.
During the course of the induction Jones was asked to scan some twenty files in respect of which authorities were in existence in favour of various police officers. These contained statements of witnesses. They had been given by male persons (including some police officers) attending the relevant premises, paying money, utilising EFTPOS machines or using a credit card, and receiving a massage; as well as, in the majority of cases, some form of sexual service from a female person.
One of the files scanned related to the subject premises. Kelso told Jones that “there was a warrant on the premises and we were actively working on these premises”. I take the reference to a “warrant” merely to indicate that other members of the Task Force currently held authorities in relation to them.
Following that induction, Kelso attended before Jackson on behalf of Jones and obtained a series of signed s 32 authorities, including one in respect of the subject premises. In accordance with his usual practice Jackson would have required Kelso to swear that Jones had been briefed and, as a result, had reasonable cause to suspect, inter alia, that the subject premises were a brothel.
The standard “oath” which Jackson required to be taken was in the following form:-
“DO YOU SWEAR OF YOUR OWN KNOWLEDGE THAT ALL OF THE POLICE OFFICERS NAMED IN THE WARRANT APPLICATION DOCUMENT BEFORE ME HAVE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO SUSPECT PREMISES SITUATED AT .......... TO BE A BROTHEL AS DEFINED UNDER THE SUMMARY OFFENCES ACT; SAY ‘I SWEAR’.”
Each authority issued was in respect of specific nominated premises, and all followed a similar form.
The learned magistrate was told that authorities of this type were often prepared in batches and then taken by Kelso or someone else to Jackson, together with a formal written application containing or annexing a report as to information related to particular premises. It was rare that the actual officer to whom authorities were directed personally attended before the Superintendent. Only one of the officers who entered and searched the subject premises on 14 June 1998 had, in fact, so personally attended.
So it was that, on 9 June 1998, (ie after he had been inducted, but before he took up duties with the Task Force) a series of authorities related to about 20 separate premises thought to be brothels were signed by Jackson and issued for use by Jones. These were not related to any specific, intended operation, but were simply authorities intended to be available for future use on an “as required” basis. They had originally been prepared for signature on 29 May 1998, but were not actually processed until 9 June 1998.
The authority issued to Jones in relation to the subject premises was expressed as follows:-

“AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO SECTION 32 OF
THE SUMMARY OFFENCES ACT, 1953
I, Ronald Edgar JACKSON, Superintendent of Police, pursuant to Section 32 of the Summary Offences Act, 1953, hereby authorise,
Anthony John JONES
a member of the Police Force of South Australia to enter and search premises situated at
5/100 King William Road, HYDE PARK
which he/she suspects on reasonable grounds to be a brothel.
Issued at ADELAIDE this ~~29th~~ 9th day of ~~May~~, June 1998
(signed)
Superintendent R.E. Jackson Supt., o/c Op’s Services Div.”

It is to be observed that the address shown in the warrant incorrectly refers to the adjacent suburb of Hyde Park and ought to have referred to Goodwood. However, it is impossible to perceive how this could be said to be a matter of significance. King William Street is well known and the subject premises were correctly identified by number in that street. The error, in truth, was trivial and could not possibly have invalidated the authority. (Cf Reg v Atkinson [1976] Crim LR 307, R v Connolly (1979) 21 SASR 166 at 169.) No doubt it stemmed from the actual name of the business conducted on the subject premises.
In the course of reasons published by the learned magistrate, she discussed the procedure related to the issue of authorities in these terms:-
“Of note is the fact that the newly arrived officer does not necessarily attend personally to obtain the various authorities. Indeed in the present case as far as Senior Constable Jones was concerned, it was Kelso who attended to obtain his ‘warrants’. He did that by advising Superintendent Jackson, that Jones had reasonable grounds to suspect that the premises involved were brothels. In a rather surprising twist, it seems that he based his information about Jones’ suspicion on what he [Kelso] had told him and on the strength of that information Jackson issued the authorities to Jones. It was also obvious that Kelso did not confirm or otherwise question Jones as to his suspicions following the induction process. Furthermore, it was disclosed that S/C Jones’ ‘warrants’ were obtained by Kelso a few days before Jones formally started work at the Task Force.
It became apparent that not only had this practice been adopted generally to obtain authorities for new members of the task force but also there existed a practice whereby one officer would appear before an appropriate officer to obtain warrants for various premises on behalf of all other officers in the task force. The officer would inform the appropriate authority about the targeted premises and then authorities would be issued to all members of the task force.”
It was pointed out by the learned magistrate that the entry of the police officers into the subject premises had been undertaken as a result of authorities obtained in accordance with the above practice. There is no suggestion that any of the police officers obtained the relevant authority specifically for the purposes of the operation which led to the laying of the charges against the respondent.
All of the relevant authorities were “open-ended” in nature. There was no limiting period expressed in them and they were simply viewed by the recipients as being ongoing, general authorisations in respect of each of the relevant premises. As the learned magistrate pointed out, Jackson conceded that from time to time he would become aware of the fact that certain premises were no longer the subject of ongoing investigations. There was no procedure for cancellation of any outstanding authorities in respect of such premises, or automatic expiration of authorities after certain time periods.
In the foregoing circumstances the learned magistrate held that the authorities (which, she felt, were essentially of the nature of search warrants) were not lawfully issued within the intendment of s 32. Thus they were not valid for the purpose of the specific operation leading to the prosecution of the respondent. She declined to admit the evidence of the police officers obtained when they entered the subject premises.
The present appeal is brought against that ruling.

Issues arising on the appeal

The first point which arises for consideration is the juristic nature of any authority issued pursuant to s 32.
At first instance, the parties were content to debate the situation before the learned magistrate on the footing that such an authority was analogous to a search warrant and that, accordingly, the principles applicable to the latter also applied to the former.
On the hearing of the present appeal the Solicitor-General resiled from that stance and contended that, on a proper interpretation of the Act, the analogy sought to be drawn did not reflect the true legal situation.
In my opinion that submission must be accepted.
Section 32 is, initially, to be contrasted with s 67 of the Act, under which a general search warrant may be issued to a police officer.
The latter section stipulates as follows:-
“General search warrants
67. (1)       Notwithstanding any law or custom to the contrary, the Commissioner may issue general search warrants to such members of the police force as the Commissioner thinks fit.
(2)     Every such warrant must be in the form in the schedule, or in a form to the same effect, and must be signed by the Commissioner.
(3)     Every such warrant will, subject to prior revocation by the Commissioner, remain in force for six months from the date of the warrant, or for a shorter period specified in the warrant.
(4)     The member of the police force named in any such warrant may, at any time of the day or night, exercise all or any of the following powers:
(a).... the member may, with such assistants as he or she thinks necessary, enter into, break open and search any house, building, premises or place where he or she has reasonable cause to suspect that -
(i)......... an offence has been recently committed, or is about to be committed; or
(ii)there are stolen goods; or
(iii)....... there is anything that may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence; or
(iv)there is anything that may be intended to be used for the purpose of committing an offence;
(b).... the member may break open and search any cupboards, drawers, chests, trunks, boxes, packages or other things, whether fixtures or not, in which he or she has reasonable cause to suspect that -
(i)......... there are stolen goods; or
(ii)there is anything that may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence; or
(iii)....... there is anything that may be intended to be used for the purpose of committing an offence;
(c).... the member may seize any such goods or things to be dealt with according to law.”
This section confers upon the Commissioner, at will, the right to issue, to any member of the police force, a warrant which confers on that officer quite sweeping powers. These include a power of seizure, which is not conferred by s 32 of the Act. The warrants remain operative for a finite period of time and then expire. Moreover, warrants issued pursuant to s 67 are not mere instruments of delegation from the Commissioner. He exercises a statutory function vested in him of directly empowering selected warrant holders to use those warrants in exercise of their independent discretions.
By way of contrast s 32, stripped to its basic concept, directly vests in the Commissioner and his senior commissioned officers a limited power “at any time ... [to] ... enter and search premises which he or she suspects on reasonable grounds to be a brothel.”
It must be emphasised that this section vests the primary power in those persons, without warrant, to exercise it.
The section, in amplified form, then provides for what is essentially a form of delegation of such power by those primarily invested with it. The section says that the power may also be exercised by “any member of the police force authorised in writing by the Commissioner [or other relevant senior officer]”.
On a normal grammatical reading of the section the legislation does not envisage the issue of some form of warrant, as envisaged by s 67, to which a range of powers directly attaches. Section 32 does no more than allow the person signing an authority to do that which the authorising officer could, otherwise, personally have done. It is a means of conferring status on the authorised person to carry out a function which would otherwise have to be discharged by a senior officer. To employ the words of the Solicitor-General, it is not the instrument of authority which empowers any entry and search, but the section itself.
As Cox J pointed out in The Queen v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243 at 270 (“Romeo”), the issue of an authority is essentially administrative rather than judicial. Such instruments are different in nature from those warrants which, for example, require issue by a judicial officer.
Moreover, it is obvious, on the normal grammatical construction of the section, that any relevant suspicion which is the pre-requisite to exercise of the statutory power must be that of the person directly proposing to embark on such an exercise. In the case of an authorised member of the police force, any state of mind of the Commissioner or other senior officer granting the authorisation is irrelevant.
The power of authorisation does not have any conditions or limitations attached to it - it is absolute. It follows that the somewhat bizarre process insisted on by Jackson was unnecessary and irrelevant.
Nor, unlike any warrant, is there any time limit imposed upon the grant of authorisation. The submissions of Ms Powell QC, of senior counsel for the respondent, to the effect that either an authorisation is only good for the date of issue or must have a specified and finite timeframe are, with respect, in discord with the express words of the enactment.
Section 32 specifically speaks of the exercise of the granted powers “at any time”. That phrase plainly imports an ongoing power which can be exercised at any time after authorisation, until the authorisation is revoked. That is not, of course, to say that it would not be proper for the Commissioner or other senior officer to sign an instrument of authorisation which, in terms, may be limited to a specific time span in its continuance. It would then automatically expire according to its tenor. (Cf Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Ors v Citibank Limited (1988-1989) 85 ALR 588 (“Citibank”) at 613.
To paraphrase the words of Gummow J in Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69 at 118 (albeit in relation to legislation touching on warrants issued in relation to the use of listening devices), the question is, at the end of the day, one of statutory interpretation. Proper weight must be given to the precept that a legislative intention to interfere with fundamental rights by the commission of what otherwise would be tortious or criminal acts must clearly be manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous language.
I do not consider that, on a careful reading of s 32, any ambiguity exists - despite the conflicting arguments advanced on the appeal.
The fundamental concept of s 32 is to authorise certain persons to conduct what are essentially warrantless entries and searches, subject only, in the case of non commissioned police officers, to the conferral of status upon them to do so by delegated written authority. It is a power which is by no means unique. (See, for example, the discussion in authorities such as The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth and Ors v The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (1978-1979) 143 CLR 499 - the “ANZ Group Case”).
The distinction between such situations and the more familiar warrant which directly vests power in the holder is illustrated in cases such as Citibank. There is a clear conceptual parallel between the legislative provision there under consideration and s 32 of the Act. What was said in that case is essentially apposite (mutatis mutandis) to the instant case.
Statutory rights of access may be very broad and general in nature and may well not be expressed to be subject to the production of any warrant or authority, or be limited as to time or in any other way (O’Reilly and Ors v The Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria and Ors (1982-1983) 153 CLR 1 at 42). However, like all statutory powers, they must be exercised in good faith, for the purposes for which they have been conferred (ANZ Group Case, per Murphy J at 544). Furthermore, any prescribed pre-conditions to the exercise of power are strictly enforced and must be proved to have existed. (See, for example, Wilson v R (1994) 176 LSJS 435.)
Having said that, I am by no means convinced that s 32 requires an authorisation to specify particular premises to which it is applicable, although, of course, it may do so. There is a powerful argument that all that is required is the signing of an instrument, expressed in general terms, which authorises the named member to exercise the powers conferred by s 32 for the time being, as was the situation in Citibank. This is particularly so when it is borne in mind that the section is expressed in the most general terms, stipulates for the right of exercise of the powers “at any time” and merely qualifies that generality by a requirement for the grantee of the power to entertain the necessary suspicion at time of exercise of the power. The reasoning of the Full Court in Citibank at 594 is no less applicable to the instant case. No relevant uncertainty could possibly have arisen.

I do not accept the respondent’s submission that an authority issued pursuant to s 32 is of the nature of a warrant and much more than a mere matter of delegation. Equally, I reject the suggestion that the section requires the existence of a specific state of mind in the issuing officer, as well as that of the executing member. There is nothing in the history of the legislation which compels either conclusion. Both propositions are inconsistent with a fair reading of s 32 according to its normal grammatical construction and the ordinary meaning of the language employed.
I also do not agree that any comfort is to be drawn from the analogy of s 11 of the Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs Act 1934-1978 and the dicta of Cox J in Romeo at 268-271. Quite apart from the fact that he did not express a final view about the issue, the critical feature of that case was that the section, inter alia, conferred power on a special magistrate to grant an authorisation - a fact which suggested a need for a judicial approach. That situation does not here exist. Indeed, even in the case of a s 67 general search warrant, the action of the Commissioner is not judicial, but administrative. (See Cox J in Romeo at 270.)
In her written submission Ms Powell QC posed the rhetorical question “Why would the legislature intend that members of the police force have a wider and general power of entry of suspected brothels than in the case of any other offence known to the criminal law?” The short riposte is that, for whatever means, the legislation specifically did as in the case of the Commissioner and commissioned police officers. It is beyond question that they are, by s 32, given an absolute right without other warrant or authority, subject only to forming the necessary subjective suspicion. An authority to a lower ranking officer merely envisages elevating that person, by a simple administrative process of delegation, to the same status situation.
The respondent advanced certain additional alternative arguments.
First, it was contended that, even if an authority signed pursuant to s 32 was not of the nature of a warrant, nevertheless, that section envisages that “there must exist pre-requisites for their issue determined by principles of reasonableness, need and appropriateness”.
Ms Powell QC submitted that, at the very least, the authorising officer was bound to turn his or her attention to:-
the member to whom the authority is to issue (ie length of service, experience, reliability and so on);
the need for the authority to issue to the particular member; and
the safeguards existing against abuse of the authorisation.
She said that the procedure actually adopted by Jackson fell far short of satisfying that requirement.
She sought to found that submission on a principle that the authorising officer must be able to form the view that the authorisation will be exercised properly, said to have been recognised in Love v Attorney-General (NSW) (1990) 169 CLR 307 at 322 and Parker and Ors v Churchill and Ors (1985) 9 FCR 316 at 322.
In my opinion the authorities relied on do not erect or recognise such a general principle. I do not know of any authority which does. Both cases referred to related to warrants which were issued by judicial officers. They stand for no more than the proposition that, where relevant legislation contemplates the issue of a warrant by a judicial officer (be the act of that person properly categorised as judicial or administrative in its particular context) then it is implicit that the judicial officer will deal with the matter in a just and fair manner. (See also, for example, Electronic Rentals Pty Ltd v Anderson and Anor (1970-1971) 124 CLR 27. Compare also The Queen v The Trade Practices Tribunal and Ors; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1971) 123 CLR 361 at 373.)
Next, it was contended that the authority issued to Jones was self limiting in terms, and his actions fell outside those limitations. The limitations, it was said, were the specification of an address which was not accurately expressed as that of the subject premises and the authority was, by implication, restricted to an entry and search on the date of the authority and on no other date.
I have already made reference to the issue of the inclusion of the incorrect suburb in the relevant authority. For the reasons expressed I regard this error as trivial.
As to the second point the specific complaint is couched in these terms:-
“Time - despite the use of the words ‘at any time’ in section 32 of the Act, the authorities are dated and have a temporal limitation as they refer to the present state of mind of the named officer. They do not authorise entry when or whenever the officer entertains the suspicion but simply acknowledge that he or she entertained the suspicion at the time of issue.”
It must be granted that, having regard to the provisions of s 32, the authority is expressed in rather clumsy terms. It would have been more appropriately drafted if the document had merely authorised Jones to enter and search the relevant premises at any time in circumstances authorised by s 32. Nevertheless, however clumsily the document is expressed, that is its obvious intendment.
I see nothing to suggest any intention to restrict the authorisation only to the date of the document. The contrary is the situation, because Jones had not actually assumed duty on the date of issue. The statement that Jones suspected on reasonable grounds, as at date of issue, that the subject premises were a brothel is essentially surplus to requirement.
I accept that, in issuing authorities to Jones and the other officers, Jackson obviously held an erroneous view as to the requirements pre-requiste to such issue, ie that he had to be satisfied that, at time of issue, the recipient then entertained a positive suspicion of the type envisaged by s 32 apropos the subject premises.
Ms Powell QC sought to argue that this was a self imposed limitation which was never adequately satisfied by Jackson, because of the secondhand, inadmissible nature of the “evidence” placed before him. He did not have reasonable grounds upon which to satisfy himself of the existence of the suspicion which he himself required.
Such a contention cannot withstand close scrutiny. The fallacy in it is that, if Jackson saw fit to impose some qualification on the issue of authorities which was not otherwise demanded by the statute then it was for him (as a matter of internal administration) to decide what that qualification would be and how he would satisfy it. He was not required to act as a judicial officer, nor was it essential that he proceed only on evidence legally admissible in court proceedings. The fact that he put in place a procedure which was somewhat peculiar is not fatal to his decision. In fact it simply serves to emphasize that he was attempting to act in a responsible and careful manner.
I do not consider that any of the criticisms which were advanced by the respondent at first instance or on appeal are sustainable. I think that the learned magistrate fell into error in arriving at the conclusions expressed by her concerning the authorities.
If I am incorrect in that view, there is a final aspect to be considered. The learned magistrate proceeded on the footing that, once it be demonstrated that the relevant authorities were defective as to their mode of issue and/or content and that reliance on them at the time of entry and search was not legally sustainable then, ipso facto, the Bunning v Cross principle almost automatically required exclusion of the police evidence.
I do not think that it did. What was involved was a proper exercise of judicial discretion in light of all of the facts and taking into account all of the well known countervailing considerations. It is trite to say that, as was reiterated by Kirby J in Ousley at 153, what is involved is essentially a balancing exercise.
In the instant case important considerations are that:-
there was no suggestion of any wilful or reckless disregard of the requirements of the law on the part of the police officers. On the contrary, all of them genuinely and reasonably believed that they held valid authorisations and were properly acting within the aegis of s 32;
the statutory requirements could readily have been satisfied and Jackson in fact went to considerable lengths to discharge what he understood to be his obligations;
the nature of any illegality was not such as to adversely affect the cogency of the evidence obtained and there is no suggestion that any of the officers acted in an improper or inappropriate manner;
the crimes charged, whilst not ranking amongst the most serious in the criminal calendar, were by no means trivial and went to important aspects of public order; and
the obvious intention of the legislation was to confer wide “warrantless” powers in this area and to enhance, rather than restrict, police powers.
The Solicitor-General was undoubtedly correct when he asserted that this is not a case in which there was a deliberate flaunting of the law such that the police would obtain an inappropriate advantage, or where any conviction would come at “too high a price” (cf R v Ridgeway (1995) 184 CLR 19).
In short this was not a case in which a discretion ought to have been exercised to exclude the relevant evidence.
I would allow the appeal, set aside the ruling appealed against and remit the proceedings to the learned magistrate for further hearing according to law.

MULLIGHAN J: I agree that the appeal should be allowed and with the order proposed by Olsson J. I agree in substance with his reasons and I only wish to add a few observations of my own.

By enacting s32 of the Summary Offences Act 1953, Parliament authorised specifically the Commissioner of Police, or any Superintendent or Inspector of Police, at any time to enter and search premises which he or she suspected on reasonable grounds to be a brothel. Parliament also specifically authorised any member of the police force, who had been authorised in writing by the Commissioner or Superintendent of Police or Inspector of Police to do likewise if that member of the police force had the required state of mind.
In my view, that is the true interpretation of the section and nothing in the legislative history or in the present legislation indicates otherwise. This interpretation accords with common sense. Obviously, the Commissioner of Police cannot be available for the entering and searching of all brothels. It is likely that there will be many occasions when other than a Superintendent or Inspector of Police will be required for this task. It is to be expected that on any given occasion, a number of police officers will be required. It is also to be expected that Parliament has recognised that in the ordinary course of law enforcement in this area, particular police officers will have to enter and search premises, perhaps urgently. They are to be police officers thought to be suitable for the purpose by the Commissioner of Police or the specified senior officer. However, they may only use the task powers on such occasions with respect to the particular premises if, before entry, they have the required state of mind.
The authorisation referred to in s32 is not a warrant or analogous to a warrant. The procedure adopted by the police in the instant case was not required but none the less the authorisation given was valid. The authorisation will be valid if given by the Commissioner of Police or Superintendent or Inspector of Police for a specified period of time, for particular premises or on a general basis. However, the entry and search will not be lawful unless the holder of the authorisation at the time of entry of the premises suspects on reasonable grounds the premises to be a brothel.
I do not think that the misdescription of the suburb in the authority is a relevant error. It is a mistake, but without question the authority referred to particular premises. It is no different than correctly describing premises as the ABC Tennis Club with the correct street number and street, but wrongly using the name of another but adjacent suburb if the identity of the premises cannot be mistaken.
It follows that, in my view, there was no discretion for the learned Magistrate to exercise. The entry and search was lawful and the evidence gained was admissible.
NYLAND J: I agree with the reasons expressed by Olsson J.

[1999] SASC 304

23 July 1999