Plankton Australia Pty Limited v Rainstorm Dust Control Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Plankton Australia Pty Limited v Rainstorm Dust Control Pty Limited [2018] FCAFC 205

Appeal from: Plankton Australia Pty Limited v Rainstorm Dust Control Pty Limited [2018] FCA 174
File number: NSD 486 of 2018
Judge: MCKERRACHER, REEVES AND FARRELL JJ
Date of judgment: 21 November 2018
Catchwords:

APPEAL – primary proceeding a trial – consideration of the evidence before the primary judge and his Honour’s analysis – where the same material examined on appeal – whether the primary judge’s findings were “glaringly improbable” – no appellable error found

CONTRACTS – appeal from the primary judge’s finding that no legally binding contract had been formed between the relevant parties – whether his Honour erred in failing to find the parties formed a contract – whether his Honour erred in unduly focusing on language, failing to give surrounding circumstances any or sufficient consideration or failing to have appropriate account of post-contractual conduct

CONSUMER LAW – misleading or deceptive conduct – whether his Honour erred in failing to find a reasonable party would have concluded there was a binding agreement

ESTOPPEL – where estoppel claim based upon representation – where representation alleged was not found

Held:    no appellable error

Cases cited:

Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd (2018) 358 ALR 683

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540

Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v GR Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622

Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424

Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592

Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304

Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Limited (2000) 202 CLR 45

Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486

Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd [1995] NSWCA 166

Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82

GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631

Jpex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239

Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44

Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353

Rafferty v Madgwicks (2012) 203 FCR 1

Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550

Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177

Terrex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144

Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling and Freezing Co Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 429

Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661

Date of hearing: 13 August 2018
Date of last submissions: 27 August 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 186
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr GA Sirtes SC with Mr B Le Plastrier
Solicitor for the Applicants: Bartier Perry
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr SK Dharmananda SC with Mr WCJ Zappia
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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 205
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Plankton Australia Pty Limited, Plankton Farms Pty Limited, and Ian Tracton, who controlled InterClinical Laboratories Pty Ltd and Plankton, appealed against the findings of the primary judge in the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal concerned the primary judge's conclusion that no legally binding contract was formed between Plankton and Rainstorm Dust Control Pty Limited regarding the use of a site in the Pilbara region of Western Australia for the cultivation of Dunaliella selina algae (DSA). The appeal also contested the primary judge's decisions on claims of misleading or deceptive conduct and estoppel.

The court examined the primary judge's analysis of the evidence presented and the reasoning behind his conclusions. The primary judge found that, although the parties had engaged in negotiations with the intention to create legal relations, they had not reached a consensus that would constitute an enforceable contract. The court agreed that the primary judge's findings were not "glaringly improbable," as the activities on the site after the proposed agreement date did not unequivocally demonstrate the parties' intent to contract as alleged. The court found that the primary judge correctly applied the relevant principles of contract law and adequately considered the surrounding circumstances and post-contractual conduct.

No appellable error was found in the primary judge's decision. The court concluded that the primary judge's analysis of the contractual claims was thorough, and there was no basis to conclude that a reasonable person in Mr Tracton's position would have believed that a binding agreement existed. The primary judge's rejection of the subsidiary claims of misleading or deceptive conduct and estoppel was also upheld. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the costs of the respondents, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As it was at trial, it is necessary to go into detail as to both the evidence and the analysis. The same material was examined on the appeal. COMMON BACKGROUND As at 2010, Aurora Algae Ltd leased a Site at Gap Ridge, near Karratha in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. At the Site there was a particular species of micro algae indigenous to Australia, known as Dunaliella selina algae (DSA), being cultivated in saline pools. Other algal species were also cultivated there. The Site was contained on two Crown leases. The leases for the Site were due to expire on 26 April 2015. In April 2014, Rainstorm entered into an agreement with Aurora to take an assignment of the leases. Under this agreement there was a restraint upon Rainstorm using the Site for production of algae. However, Rainstorm’s interest was not in algae cultivation, rather it wanted to use the ponds and other infrastructure to process waste bitterns, sourced from an adjacent land owner, Dampier Salt, into a dust control product. After entry into the agreement with Aurora, Rainstorm sought to transfer the leases and sought a new long term lease on the Site to commence upon the expiry of the existing leases. In due course, the existing leases were transferred to Rainstorm. Mr Ian Tracton, the third appellant, controlled InterClinical Laboratories Pty Ltd, which was involved in DSA production at the Site prior to 2014. Mr Tracton also controlled Plankton. From April 2014, negotiations ensued between Mr Tracton, for Plankton, and Mr Robert Kerr, the managing director of Rainstorm, regarding arrangements for DSA production at the Site. Before those negotiations, Mr Tracton had approached Aurora concerning whether there would be any issue with DSA production (as distinct from other forms of algae production) on the Site. Despite the restraint agreed with Rainstorm, Mr Tracton was informed there would be no issue in relation to DSA production. A Plankton subsidiary, Plankton Farms Pty Limited, the second appellant, was incorporated for the undertaking of the cultivation of DSA on the Site. THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT As indicated at the outset, Plankton, Plankton Farms and Mr Tracton, contended at first instance that a legally binding Joint Venture Agreement was concluded between Plankton and Rainstorm in relation to activities on the Site, including the cultivation of DSA by Plankton and the production by Rainstorm of its dust suppression product. Plankton asserted that by the terms of the Joint Venture Agreement, amongst other things, Plankton and Rainstorm agreed to establish Algalfields Pty Ltd. Algalfields was to be a company in which Rainstorm and Plankton would be shareholders and which would hold the “master lease” in respect of the Site, granting sub-leases to each of Plankton Farms and Rainstorm. Importantly, the parties accepted that this could not occur without first obtaining the consent of the Minister for Lands for the State of Western Australia. The primary judge noted that the issue in the proceeding was not whether Plankton and Rainstorm intended to create legal relations. His Honour accepted that they participated in a process of negotiation where the ultimate object was to conclude a contract. However, the principal issue, as his Honour saw it, was whether prior to the disavowal of the existence of an enforceable contract by Rainstorm in June 2015 the parties had reached a consensus of a kind that the law would regard as being an enforceable contract or, alternatively, whether Rainstorm had led Plankton to believe that such an agreement had been concluded and Rainstorm had acted in reliance upon that state of affairs. The primary judge discussed the relevant contractual principles (at [11]-[18]), referring to Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 and a number of other cases. It is common ground that the principles cited were unexceptional and gave no cause for complaint to Plankton on appeal. The history of dealings

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

No error is demonstrated in relation to these subsidiary grounds of appeal.CONCLUSION The parties accept that costs should follow the event. As none of the grounds of appeal have succeeded, the appeal will dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The ongoing activities on the Site after the 26 November 2014 date of the putative agreement fell well short of equivocally demonstrating that the parties intended to contract as pleaded. Remaining grounds and their consideration Grounds 2 and 3 deal with misleading or deceptive conduct while grounds 4 and 5 deal with estoppel. These subsidiary grounds of appeal are essentially just assertions that the primary judge was wrong in his conclusions on those matters. They raise nothing that has not been previously considered above. The primary complaint of Plankton in this regard is that the analysis of the statutory claim was undertaken “in the shadow of his Honour’s findings on the contract claim”. It was a non-sequitur, Plankton argues, for his Honour to reject all the representations said to arise out of the Submission on the basis that it was necessarily implicit in the finding that no agreement existed, that Mr Tracton could not have been misled into thinking an agreement did exist. Plankton argues that the threshold to reach a conclusion that Mr Tracton was misled into thinking that a contract existed was lower than that required to determine whether a contract objectively construed actually came into existence. Far more material requires consideration than that which is permitted in an inquiry into whether a contract exists. Further, where a Court finds that a contract was not formed, it does not mean that someone was not misled into thinking that one was formed. Equally, it is argued that there is no necessary equivalence between a finding that a contract did not exist and a finding that it was likely one existed, that is, that there was a “real or not remote chance” having regard to all the surrounding circumstances that a person was misled into thinking that a contract had existed: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82 per Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Fitzgerald JJ (at 87). Plankton argues that the relevant circumstances were such that it was likely that, even if not reaching the higher standard of a concluded agreement, the Submission and exchanges on 26 November 2014 nevertheless created a real or not remote chance that a person in Mr Tracton’s position would think that there was a concluded agreement. Considering that the primary judge concluded that there was reliance, against which there is no cross-appeal, Plankton contends it was not open to seamlessly migrate the findings on the contractual claim to the misleading or deceptive conduct claim without appreciating the different analytical approach required for such a cause of action. In the circumstances of this case, grounds 2-5 may be considered together. There is no doubt that the Submission did not objectively convey a representation to Plankton as to the existence of an enforceable agreement, either in the terms pleaded or at all. It was also entirely apparent that the primary judge did undertake a detailed contextual inquiry, closely examining all relevant circumstances relied upon and advanced in the trial in reaching his conclusion, both for the purposes of the parties’ contractual intentions and in relation to the subsidiary alternative pleas of misleading representations and estoppel. These were negotiating commercial parties. Their commercial dealings were laid bare in the written communications and the contextual surroundings as reflected in the affidavit material. There was nothing unorthodox in the approach of the primary judge and it cannot be said that he did not clearly understand the plea of representations in relation to the subsidiary grounds. Nor can it be seriously contended that he did not set out the appropriate authorities and apply them. A finding was entirely open, having regard to all the material at the time of the Submission, that a reasonable person in Mr Tracton’s position would not have concluded that there was a binding agreement between Plankton and Rainstorm. Nothing in the act of subscribing to the statements in the Submission, or in other pleaded activity, altered this finding. The Submission was directed to the Department for a particular purpose. That is not to say its content would prove to be inaccurate if approval was given in the form requested in the Submission. But approval was not forthcoming in the form requested, such that the parties did not enter into a binding Joint Venture Agreement on the terms the subject of previous proposals.