FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Plankton Australia Pty Limited v Rainstorm Dust Control Pty Limited [2018] FCAFC 205
Appeal from: Plankton Australia Pty Limited v Rainstorm Dust Control Pty Limited [2018] FCA 174 File number: NSD 486 of 2018 Judge: MCKERRACHER, REEVES AND FARRELL JJ Date of judgment: 21 November 2018 Catchwords: APPEAL – primary proceeding a trial – consideration of the evidence before the primary judge and his Honour’s analysis – where the same material examined on appeal – whether the primary judge’s findings were “glaringly improbable” – no appellable error found
CONTRACTS – appeal from the primary judge’s finding that no legally binding contract had been formed between the relevant parties – whether his Honour erred in failing to find the parties formed a contract – whether his Honour erred in unduly focusing on language, failing to give surrounding circumstances any or sufficient consideration or failing to have appropriate account of post-contractual conduct
CONSUMER LAW – misleading or deceptive conduct – whether his Honour erred in failing to find a reasonable party would have concluded there was a binding agreement
ESTOPPEL – where estoppel claim based upon representation – where representation alleged was not found
Held: no appellable error
Cases cited: Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd (2018) 358 ALR 683
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540
Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd v GR Securities Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 622
Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592
Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304
Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Limited (2000) 202 CLR 45
Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486
Geebung Investments Pty Ltd v Varga Group Investments No 8 Pty Ltd [1995] NSWCA 166
Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82
GR Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631
Jpex Software Services Pty Ltd v Hosking [2000] VSCA 239
Laidlaw v Hillier Hewitt Elsley Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 44
Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353
Rafferty v Madgwicks (2012) 203 FCR 1
Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550
Taco Co of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177
Terrex Resources NL v Magnet Petroleum Pty Ltd (1988) 1 WAR 144
Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling and Freezing Co Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 429
Date of hearing: 13 August 2018 Date of last submissions: 27 August 2018 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 186 Counsel for the Applicants: Mr GA Sirtes SC with Mr B Le Plastrier Solicitor for the Applicants: Bartier Perry Counsel for the Respondents: Mr SK Dharmananda SC with Mr WCJ Zappia
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Plankton Australia Pty Limited v Rainstorm Dust Control Pty... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 205
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the primary judge's analysis of the evidence presented and the reasoning behind his conclusions. The primary judge found that, although the parties had engaged in negotiations with the intention to create legal relations, they had not reached a consensus that would constitute an enforceable contract. The court agreed that the primary judge's findings were not "glaringly improbable," as the activities on the site after the proposed agreement date did not unequivocally demonstrate the parties' intent to contract as alleged. The court found that the primary judge correctly applied the relevant principles of contract law and adequately considered the surrounding circumstances and post-contractual conduct.
No appellable error was found in the primary judge's decision. The court concluded that the primary judge's analysis of the contractual claims was thorough, and there was no basis to conclude that a reasonable person in Mr Tracton's position would have believed that a binding agreement existed. The primary judge's rejection of the subsidiary claims of misleading or deceptive conduct and estoppel was also upheld. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the costs of the respondents, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The ongoing activities on the Site after the 26 November 2014 date of the putative agreement fell well short of equivocally demonstrating that the parties intended to contract as pleaded. Remaining grounds and their consideration Grounds 2 and 3 deal with misleading or deceptive conduct while grounds 4 and 5 deal with estoppel. These subsidiary grounds of appeal are essentially just assertions that the primary judge was wrong in his conclusions on those matters. They raise nothing that has not been previously considered above. The primary complaint of Plankton in this regard is that the analysis of the statutory claim was undertaken “in the shadow of his Honour’s findings on the contract claim”. It was a non-sequitur, Plankton argues, for his Honour to reject all the representations said to arise out of the Submission on the basis that it was necessarily implicit in the finding that no agreement existed, that Mr Tracton could not have been misled into thinking an agreement did exist. Plankton argues that the threshold to reach a conclusion that Mr Tracton was misled into thinking that a contract existed was lower than that required to determine whether a contract objectively construed actually came into existence. Far more material requires consideration than that which is permitted in an inquiry into whether a contract exists. Further, where a Court finds that a contract was not formed, it does not mean that someone was not misled into thinking that one was formed. Equally, it is argued that there is no necessary equivalence between a finding that a contract did not exist and a finding that it was likely one existed, that is, that there was a “real or not remote chance” having regard to all the surrounding circumstances that a person was misled into thinking that a contract had existed: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82 per Bowen CJ, Lockhart and Fitzgerald JJ (at 87). Plankton argues that the relevant circumstances were such that it was likely that, even if not reaching the higher standard of a concluded agreement, the Submission and exchanges on 26 November 2014 nevertheless created a real or not remote chance that a person in Mr Tracton’s position would think that there was a concluded agreement. Considering that the primary judge concluded that there was reliance, against which there is no cross-appeal, Plankton contends it was not open to seamlessly migrate the findings on the contractual claim to the misleading or deceptive conduct claim without appreciating the different analytical approach required for such a cause of action. In the circumstances of this case, grounds 2-5 may be considered together. There is no doubt that the Submission did not objectively convey a representation to Plankton as to the existence of an enforceable agreement, either in the terms pleaded or at all. It was also entirely apparent that the primary judge did undertake a detailed contextual inquiry, closely examining all relevant circumstances relied upon and advanced in the trial in reaching his conclusion, both for the purposes of the parties’ contractual intentions and in relation to the subsidiary alternative pleas of misleading representations and estoppel. These were negotiating commercial parties. Their commercial dealings were laid bare in the written communications and the contextual surroundings as reflected in the affidavit material. There was nothing unorthodox in the approach of the primary judge and it cannot be said that he did not clearly understand the plea of representations in relation to the subsidiary grounds. Nor can it be seriously contended that he did not set out the appropriate authorities and apply them. A finding was entirely open, having regard to all the material at the time of the Submission, that a reasonable person in Mr Tracton’s position would not have concluded that there was a binding agreement between Plankton and Rainstorm. Nothing in the act of subscribing to the statements in the Submission, or in other pleaded activity, altered this finding. The Submission was directed to the Department for a particular purpose. That is not to say its content would prove to be inaccurate if approval was given in the form requested in the Submission. But approval was not forthcoming in the form requested, such that the parties did not enter into a binding Joint Venture Agreement on the terms the subject of previous proposals.