PLAINTIFF S244/2012 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

PLAINTIFF S244/2012 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 537
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Review of decision of former Refugee Review Tribunal – refusal of a protection visa – applicants claiming political persecution in Fiji – applicants not believed in critical respects – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 48A, 422B, 424A, 424AA, 425

Cases cited:
Lansen v Minister for Environment and Heritage (2008) FCAFC 189; 174 FCR 14
Minister for Immigration v SZLFX [2009] HCA 31
Minister for Immigration v SZMDS (2010) HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) HCA 1; 168 ALR 407
SFGB v Minister for Immigration (2003) 77 ALD 402; [2003] FCAFC 231
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration (2007) 81 ALJR 1190
SZSWC v Ministerfor Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 415
First Applicant: PLAINTIFF S244/2012
Second Applicant: SZVIC
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2924 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Driver
Hearing date: 14 March 2016
Date of Last Submission: 7 April 2016
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 6 May 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr B O'Donnell
Solicitors for the Applicants: Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mr A Silva of Silva Solicitors

ORDERS

  1. The application as amended on 21 March 2016 is dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2924 of 2014

PLAINTIFF S244/2012

First Applicant

SZVIC

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

  1. This is an application to review a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal).  The decision was made on 24 September 2014.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicants protection visas.  There are two applicants who are a husband and wife.  Both applicants made claims for protection, although the first applicant was the principal applicant.

  2. The following statement of background facts is derived from the submissions of the Minister.

  3. The first applicant (applicant) is a citizen of Fiji who last entered Australia on 21 March 2010 on a tourist visa.

  4. On 10 May 2010, he applied for a protection (Class XA) visa (the first visa application).  His wife, who is also a citizen of Fiji, was included in that application (second applicant). A delegate of the Minister refused the first visa application on 30 July 2010 and, on 21 February 2011 the Tribunal (differently constituted) affirmed the delegate’s decision[1].

    [1] Court Book (CB) 139 [2]

  5. On 26 November 2012, the applicants applied for a further protection visa (the second visa application), which was deemed invalid pursuant to s.48A of the Migration Act 1958 (Migration Act)[2]. The second applicant was included in that application as a member of the applicant’s family unit.

    [2] CB 1-61

  6. The applicants claimed…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 537
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by the applicants against a decision of the Minister for Immigration. The central dispute revolved around whether the Minister's delegate and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had afforded the applicants procedural fairness during the assessment of their applications. The case was heard by Judge Driver.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Minister's delegate had sufficiently indicated to the applicants that their claims were in issue, and whether the AAT had failed to provide adequate notice of its concerns regarding the applicants' evidence, thereby breaching procedural fairness. Specifically, the court considered whether the AAT was obliged to put certain "thought processes" regarding the evidence to the applicants, and whether the hearing opportunity provided was consistent with section 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

Judge Driver reasoned that the delegate's reasons clearly indicated that the applicants' credibility and the veracity of their claims were in doubt, particularly due to their failure to attend a requested interview. The court applied the principle from *SZBEL* that procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to provide a running commentary on its assessment of evidence, as this could risk conveying an impression of prejudgment. The court found that the matters the applicants alleged should have been put to them were akin to "thought processes" and thus not covered by the procedural fairness obligations under sections 424A and 424AA of the Migration Act. Furthermore, the court rejected the contention that the hearing opportunity was inconsistent with section 425, noting that a request for the applicant to summarise evidence was not indicative of prejudgment but rather a management of the hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

However, as the High Court pointed out in SZBEL at [47]:[T]here may well be cases, perhaps many cases, where either the delegate’s decision, or the Tribunal's statements or questions during a hearing, sufficiently indicate to an applicant that everything he or she says in support of the application is in issue. That indication may be given in many ways. It is not necessary (and often would be inappropriate) for the Tribunal to put to an applicant, in so many words, that he or she is lying, that he or she may not be accepted as a witness of truth, or that he or she may be thought to be embellishing the account that is given of certain events. The proceedings are not adversarial and the Tribunal is not, and is not to adopt the position of, a contradictor … (emphasis added) It is, in my opinion, clear that the reasons of the Minister’s delegate “sufficiently indicate[d] to [the Appellant] that everything he … [said] in support of [his] application [was] in issue”. It is clear from the delegate’s reasons that, as a result of the applicants failing to attend the requested interview, the delegate had doubts about the applicants’ general credibility and about the veracity of almost all their claims[30]. [30] CB 8 Moreover, the matters that by this ground the applicants allege the Tribunal ought to have put to them appear to be in the nature of “thought processes” and, as the High Court stated in SZBEL at [48][31]:Procedural fairness does not require the Tribunal to give an applicant a running commentary upon what it thinks about the evidence that is given. On the contrary, to adopt such a course would be likely to run a serious risk of conveying an impression of prejudgment. [31] See also SZBYR at [21] regarding the operation of the same principle under the rubric of ss.422B, 424A and 424AA of the Migration Act For these reasons, and notwithstanding argument to the contrary at the trial of this matter, I accept that there is no scope for the principle in SZBEL to operate in this matter and the application of the hearing rule is thus entirely governed by ss.424A and 424AA, which do not apply to the material the applicants allege should have been put to them. The new argument thus fails. To the extent that the applicants rely upon s.425, without any resort to the principle in SZBEL, I reject the contention that the hearing opportunity afforded the applicants was inconsistent with s.425. It is true that during the hearing, when the applicant was giving evidence about a meeting at which he overheard a discussion of a plot against Mr Bainimarama, the Tribunal asked him to just “summarise to me what happened, please?”[32]. However, this is in the context where the applicant had been going into considerable detail about the gathering, including his role in the provision of refreshments. The applicant responded to the request by saying “I’m just building up the background to what happened that made the military personnel interested in me in trying to get information from me”[33].[32] Transcript, page 22 at line 7[33] Transcript, page 22 at lines 9-11

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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