Plaintiff S111A/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Plaintiff S111A/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 5) [2022] FCA 603

File number(s): NSD 584 of 2019
Judgment of: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 23 May 2022
Catchwords: COSTS – where applicant substantially successful in the proceedings – where proceedings were lengthy – disparity between parties as to resources – where one party caused changed circumstances relevant to proceedings – respondents ordered to pay costs for different periods during proceedings – costs to be fixed by way of lump sums
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A(2)
Cases cited:

AJL20 v Commonwealth [2020] FCA 1305; 279 FCR 549
Automotive, Food, Metals Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 123; 235 FCR 366
Axent Holdings Pty Ltd t/a Axent Global v Compusign Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1835
Bostick Australia Pty Ltd v Liddiard (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 304
Bowman v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 594
Cabal v United Mexican States (No 6) [2000] FCA 651; 174 ALR 747
Commonwealth v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 95 ALJR 567
Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4
DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2018] FCA 1793
Dodds Family Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Industries Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 261
Firebird Global Master Fund II Ltd v Republic of Nauru (No 2) [2015] HCA 53; 90 AJLR 270
Herold v Seally (No 3) [2017] FCA 95
Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 750; 237 FCR 127
MB v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 559
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v PDWL (costs) [2021] FCAFC 75
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v MB [2021] FCAFC 194
Plaintiff S111A/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1271
Plaintiff S111A/2018 v Minister of Home Affairs (No 3) [2021] FCA 207
Plaintiff S111A/2018 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 4) [2022] FCA 329
Summers v Repatriation Commission (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 64

Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 3) (1979) 28 ALR 201

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 46
Date of last submission/s: 19 April 2022
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Finnane QC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Zali Burrows Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr P Herzfeld SC with Ms A Hammond
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 584 of 2019
BETWEEN:

PLAINTIFF S111A/2018

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Subject to order 2 below:

(a)the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the commencement of the proceeding in the High Court on 17 April 2018,…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 603
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Plaintiff S111A/2018 versus Minister for Home Affairs (No 5), the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with adjudicating on the costs incurred during a lengthy and complex legal battle. The applicant, who was detained, sought relief from the court, claiming his detention was unlawful. The respondents, representing the Minister for Home Affairs, argued that the proceedings were unnecessarily prolonged, causing them to incur significant costs. The court was required to decide the appropriate allocation of costs between the parties, considering the applicant's substantial success in the proceedings, the disparity in resources between the parties, and the changed circumstances caused by one party.

The court applied the well-established principles governing costs discretion, taking into account the context of an applicant seeking to secure their liberty. The applicant had succeeded in securing substantive relief in respect of both the 2018 ASA and 2020 ASA, as well as the protection visa decision adverse to him. Given the current state of the law, this was likely the maximum relief he could have expected to secure. However, the court noted that the course of the proceedings had been far from straightforward, with both parties engaging in incessant inter-party squabbles and lengthy correspondence that had not advanced the applicant's circumstances. The court emphasised the need for the matter to be tried efficiently, and at a cost proportionate to the length and complexity of the ultimate trial.

The court ordered that the respondents pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the commencement of the proceeding in the High Court on 17 April 2018, and pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding up until 16 May 2019, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The respondents were also ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding from 29 October 2020, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The respondents were to pay only 70% of the applicant's lump sum costs referred to in order 1(b), but must pay all of the applicant's lump sum costs referred to in order 1(a). If the parties could not agree on appropriate lump sums payable under order 1, then the question of appropriate lump sum costs was to be referred to a Registrar of the Court for determination. Any existing costs orders, and orders reserving costs, were to be vacated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Subject to order 2 below:

(a) the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the commencement of the proceeding in the High Court on 17 April 2018, and pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding up until 16 May 2019, to be fixed by way of a lump sum; and

(b) the respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding, from 29 October 2020, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

2. The respondents must pay only 70% of the applicant’s lump sum costs referred to in order 1(b), but must pay all of the applicant’s lump sum costs referred to in order 1(a).

3. If the parties cannot agree on appropriate lump sums payable under order 1, then the question of appropriate lump sum costs be referred to a Registrar of the Court for determination.

4. Any existing costs orders, and orders reserving costs, be vacated.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

These features led, the respondents submit, to a situation where evidence in the proceeding was almost entirely directed to issues that were ultimately not pressed by the applicant, or on which the applicant did not ultimately succeed. As a result, the respondents submit, the respondent parties have been put to significant and unnecessary costs arising from the manner in which the applicant and his representatives have litigated the matter. MY CONCLUSIONS The principles applicable to the exercise of the Court’s broad costs discretion are well established: see Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v PDWL (costs) [2021] FCAFC 75 at [14]-[16]; Summers v Repatriation Commission (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 64 at [13]-[14]; Automotive, Food, Metals Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 123; 235 FCR 366 at [4]. I set out the relevant principles, with particular reference to the context of an applicant seeking to secure their liberty, in Bowman v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCA 594 at [60], citing Cabal v United Mexican States (No 6) [2000] FCA 651; 174 ALR 747 at [22]; MB v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 559 at [3]-[5]; Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v MB [2021] FCAFC 194 at [19]; see also DBE17 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2018] FCA 1793 at [22]-[23]. The applicant has succeeded in securing substantive relief in respect of both the 2018 ASA and 2020 ASA, and in respect of the protection visa decision adverse to him. Given the current state of the law as set out in Commonwealth v AJL20 [2021] HCA 21; 95 ALJR 567 (AJL20 (HCA)), that is likely the maximum relief that he could have expected to secure. In that sense, he has been substantially if not wholly successful in terms of the outcome of the proceeding. In a straightforward situation, on usual principles costs would follow that event and he would receive compensation for his legal costs of the proceeding as a whole. However, the course of this proceeding has been far from straightforward: see the primary reasons at [10] and the earlier reasons there referred to. In the 11 March 2021 decision permitting amendments to the applicant’s pleadings (Plaintiff S111A/2018 v Minister of Home Affairs (No 3) [2021] FCA 207), I said at [18] and [25]:The interlocutory debates between the parties need to cease. While it is important that parties be able to advance their cases, and are aware of the case they have to meet, in this proceeding both sides have had plenty of time to acquaint themselves with these matters. The incessant inter-party squabbles, the pages and pages of correspondence, and the nice legal arguments, have not advanced the circumstances of the applicant one jot. He remains detained without his allegations of false imprisonment having been determined. It is his liberty at stake, and on both sides there appears to have been insufficient regard paid to this fact. Whether or not his case succeeds, he is entitled to have it tried, and tried with relative efficiency, and at a cost which is proportionate to the length and complexity of the ultimate trial. It is clear the respondents are unlikely to recoup any legal costs from the applicant and the time has come to cease running up costs on interlocutory and preliminary matters.….I consider the point has been reached in this proceeding where the need to get the matter on for trial, and to facilitate compliance with existing orders of the Court, overwhelms other considerations. In a perfect world with two fully funded parties and numerically strong legal teams at their disposal, a trial may well much more closely resemble the adversarial, gladiatorial style of the past. Encouraging that kind of process is inappropriate to the circumstances of a proceeding such as this. To the extent the proceeding has been conducted in this way to this point, the history of the proceeding is the best evidence of its failure. The applicant remains deprived of his liberty more than three years after he commenced this proceeding alleging his detention is unlawful, and there has still not been a trial, but no doubt the respondents’ legal costs are already very high. All for what the parties jointly say to the Court is a three day trial. That is not an effective and efficient use of anybody’s resources, and especially not public resources, on the side of the respondents and the Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established