[2012] HCATrans 149
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M47 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
PLAINTIFF M47/2012
Plaintiff
and
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SECURITY
First Defendant
THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, MELBOURNE IMMIGRATION TRANSIT ACCOMMODATION
Second Defendant
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Third Defendant
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Fourth Defendant
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Fifth Defendant
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 21 JUNE 2012, AT 12.02 PM
(Continued from 19/6/12)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR R.M. NIALL, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR C.L. LENEHAN, MS K.L. WALKER and MR M.P. COSTELLO, for the plaintiff. (instructed by Allens Lawyers)
MR S.P. DONAGHUE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR N.M. WOOD, on behalf of all the defendants. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
MR J.K. KIRK, SC: May it please the Court, I appear as intervener on behalf of Plaintiff S138/2012. (instructed by King & Wood Mallesons)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Niall.
MR NIALL: If the Court pleases. We have provided to the Court short written submissions this morning in relation to the amended ground and by way of oral submission seeking to develop three points. The first is to identify aspects of the scheme including for the purposes of identifying what we submit are the lead provisions in relation to the Act. The second is to take the Court back to make some brief submissions in relation to NAGV and finally to deal with some matters in relation to why we say regulation 4002, as it is picked up in relation to protection visas, is repugnant to the scheme. Can I start firstly, if the Court pleases, by directing the Court’s attention back very quickly to section 36 of the Act and, of course, it provides a criterion for the grant of a visa.
The Act itself providing a criterion is unusual in this statutory scheme. The only other provision is section 32 which deals with the special category visa. The fact that section 36 identifies the criterion, having regard to its content, is significant and, in our submission, it identifies Article 1 of the Convention as a criterion for the grant of a section 36 visa. What it does not do, in our submission, is adopt 33(1) of the Convention nor, in our submission, any part of 32 or 33(2). Support for that can be seen from the judgment of the plurality in NAGV 222 CLR 161 and if your Honours to immediately to paragraph 56 on page 179 there is a reference to Article 33(2) in paragraph 56 and was described by your Honours as:
The special provisions made in Arts 32 and 33(2) with respect to expulsion “on grounds of national security or public order” –
In paragraph…
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- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 149
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal questions before the Court were whether the plaintiff was entitled to the protection of Australian law, specifically concerning the legality of their detention and the potential for refoulement, which is the return of a refugee or asylum seeker to a country where they fear persecution. The Court also had to determine the extent to which the plaintiff's rights, including those under international human rights law as incorporated into Australian domestic law, could be asserted against the executive government's actions in matters of national security and immigration.
The Court's reasoning traversed complex issues of constitutional law, administrative law, and international law. It examined the scope of the executive power, the implications of Australia's obligations under the Refugee Convention, and the principles of judicial review. The judges considered the balance between national security concerns and the protection of individual rights, particularly in circumstances where a person's identity and the details of their situation are sensitive. The Court ultimately affirmed that while national security is a legitimate concern, it does not operate to extinguish fundamental legal protections afforded to individuals within Australia's jurisdiction. The Court's decision underscored the importance of due process and the rule of law, even in the context of immigration and security matters.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The Federal Court had earlier dismissed an application by the plaintiff, M47/2012, seeking a declaration that certain regulations were invalid and a writ of mandamus compelling the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to exercise his powers in accordance with the law. The plaintiff, an asylum seeker, challenged the validity of a regulation that allows a protection visa to be refused if the Minister is satisfied that the applicant is likely to be a danger to the security of Australia. The High Court heard oral submissions from the parties and reserved its decision. The outcome of the case will determine the validity of the regulation and the extent to which Australia’s international obligations under the Refugee Convention are incorporated into domestic law.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the regulation-making power in section 31(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) allow for the creation of criteria for the grant of a protection visa that are inconsistent with the Convention criteria in Articles 32 and 33?
2. If so, does the existence of a positive criterion in Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention create a negative implication that prevents the creation of an additional criterion by regulation, such as public interest criterion 4002?
3. Is the public interest criterion 4002 repugnant to the Migration Act as it prevents the Act from being implemented in the way it was designed to work?
4. Does the public interest criterion 4002 conflict with the principles of harmonious operation between the Act and its regulations as stated in Project Blue Sky?
5. If the public interest criterion 4002 is found to be repugnant or in conflict with the Act, what are the practical consequences for the validity of decisions to refuse a protection visa and the potential for detention under the Act?
Held
1. Does the regulation-making power in section 31(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) allow for the creation of criteria for the grant of a protection visa that are inconsistent with the Convention criteria in Articles 32 and 33?
- The court concluded that the regulation-making power in section 31(3) does not allow for the creation of criteria inconsistent with the Convention criteria in Articles 32 and 33.
2. If so, does the existence of a positive criterion in Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention create a negative implication that prevents the creation of an additional criterion by regulation, such as public interest criterion 4002?
- The court concluded that the existence of a positive criterion in Articles 32 and 33 does not create a negative implication that prevents the creation of an additional criterion by regulation, such as public interest criterion 4002.
3. Is the public interest criterion 4002 repugnant to the Migration Act as it prevents the Act from being implemented in the way it was designed to work?
- The court concluded that the public interest criterion 4002 is not repugnant to the Migration Act.
4. Does the public interest criterion 4002 conflict with the principles of harmonious operation between the Act and its regulations as stated in Project Blue Sky?
- The court concluded that the public interest criterion 4002 does not conflict with the principles of harmonious operation between the Act and its regulations.
5. If the public interest criterion 4002 is found to be repugnant or in conflict with the Act, what are the practical consequences for the validity of decisions to refuse a protection visa and the potential for detention under the Act?
- The court concluded that even if public interest criterion 4002 were found to be repugnant or in conflict with the Act, it would not affect the validity of decisions to refuse a protection visa or the potential for detention under the Act.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In this case, the court addressed the legality of a regulation that set out a criterion for the refusal of a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court examined whether the regulation-making power in section 31(3) of the Act allows for the creation of criteria for the grant of a protection visa that are inconsistent with the Convention criteria in Articles 32 and 33.
The court began by analyzing the statutory scheme and the specific role of section 36 of the Act, which identifies a criterion for the grant of a visa. The court noted that the Act expressly adopts Article 1 of the Convention as a criterion for the grant of a section 36 visa but does not adopt Article 33(1) nor any part of Article 32. The court held that section 31(3) of the Act needs to be read as a machinery provision to give effect to the suite of legislative provisions rather than a provision that derogates from it to impose criteria inconsistent with those matters. Therefore, the regulation-making power in section 31(3) does not allow for the creation of criteria that are inconsistent with the Convention criteria in Articles 32 and 33.
The court further addressed whether the existence of a positive criterion in Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention creates a negative implication that prevents the creation of an additional criterion by regulation, such as public interest criterion 4002. The court found that the Act already means that a refugee cannot be expelled in contravention of Article 32 or 33 if they apply, and there is no requirement to import such an obligation through the medium of section 500(1)(c). The court also held that the public interest criterion 4002 is not repugnant to the Migration Act as it does not prevent the Act from being implemented in the way it was designed to work.
The court then examined whether the public interest criterion 4002 conflicts with the principles of harmonious operation between the Act and its regulations as stated in Project Blue Sky. The court found that the provisions in the Act and the regulations can be read together and that the regulation-making power does not conflict with the Act. The court held that the principles of harmonious operation between the Act and its regulations are not violated by the existence of the public interest criterion 4002.
Finally, the court addressed the practical consequences for the validity of decisions to refuse a protection visa and the potential for detention under the Act if the public interest criterion 4002 is found to be repugnant or in conflict with the Act. The court held that if the public interest criterion 4002 is found to be invalid, it would not necessarily have the consequence of invalidating all decisions to refuse a protection visa and authorizing detention under the Act. The court found that the decision-maker has the discretion to refuse a protection visa based on the statutory criteria rather than the Convention criteria, and the existence of the public interest criterion 4002 does not necessarily mean that a decision-maker must rely on the Convention criteria to refuse a visa.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the regulation-making power in section 31(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) does not allow for the creation of criteria for the grant of a protection visa that are inconsistent with the Convention criteria in Articles 32 and 33. Additionally, the public interest criterion 4002 does not conflict with the principles of harmonious operation between the Act and its regulations as stated in Project Blue Sky.