Pivotel Satellite Pty Limited v Optus Mobile Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pivotel Satellite Pty Limited v Optus Mobile Pty Limited [2009] FCA 1601

TRADE PRACTICES – application for an injunction –respondents blocked connectivity between the respondents’ network and the applicant’s network – alleged anti-competitive conduct – whether serious question to be tried – where balance of convenience lies – adequacy of undertaking as to damages

Held: interlocutory injunction granted

Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), ss 56(1), 276
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 46, 51AB, 51AC, 52, 151AJ, 151AK(1), 151CA

Boral Besser Masonry Limited v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 215 CLR 374; [2003] HCA 5
Queensland Wire Industries Proprietary Limited v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (1989) 167 CLR 177

Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act. 30th ed. Thomson Reuters. Sydney (2009)

PIVOTEL SATELLITE PTY LIMITED ACN 009 917 398 v OPTUS MOBILE PTY LIMITED ACN 054 365 696 and OPTUS NETWORKS PTY LIMITED ACN 008 570 330

NSD 1468 of 2009

JAGOT J
23 DECEMBER 2009
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1468 of 2009

BETWEEN:

PIVOTEL SATELLITE PTY LIMITED ACN 099 917 398
Applicant

AND:

OPTUS MOBILE PTY LIMITED ACN 054 365 696
First Respondent

OPTUS NETWORKS PTY LIMITED ACN 008 570 330
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

JAGOT J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 DECEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

Upon the entities listed in Schedule A to these orders, by their counsel giving, jointly and severally, the usual undertaking as to damages, THE COURT ORDERS, UNTIL FURTHER ORDER:

1. Pursuant to s 151CA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the respondents restore the state of interconnectivity between the respondents’ network and, via the network operated by Vodafone Pty Ltd, the applicant’s network, to the state in which it was in immediately prior to 20 December 2009.

2. Pursuant to s 151CA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the respondents be restrained from taking steps to block interconnectivity between the respondents’ network and the applicant’s network, other than blocking as it was in force immediately prior to 20 December 2009.

3. Pursuant to s 151CA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the respondents be restrained from taking steps to block access to numbers associated with the carrier access code “1450” under the requirements of the Mobile Number Portability Code, other than any number blocked immediately prior to 20 December 2009.

4.   Mr Stuart Salier, of the respondents, provide a written undertaking to the Court and the applicant by 7 January 2010 that the respondents have complied with Orders 1 to 3 of these orders.

5.   The operation of Orders 1 to 3 of these orders be stayed until 5.00pm on 24 December 2009.

6.   Despite the stay in Order 5, note the undertaking of the respondents, by their counsel, to comply with Orders 1 to 3 of those orders as soon as reasonably practicable.

7.   The applicant file and serve a statement of claim by 22 January 2010.

8.   The respondents file…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1601
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Pivotel Satellite Pty Limited v Optus Mobile Pty Limited, Pivotel brought an action against Optus alleging breaches of the Trade Practices Act, including misuse of market power and unconscionable and misleading or deceptive conduct. Pivotel claimed that Optus had acted anti-competitively by blocking calls to its network, thereby causing harm to its business. Optus defended the allegations, asserting that it had no legal obligation to carry calls to Pivotel and that its decision not to do so was based on genuine commercial considerations unrelated to its competitive position.

The court was tasked with determining whether Pivotel had established a prima facie case for the alleged breaches of the Trade Practices Act. Specifically, the court needed to assess whether Optus had misused its market power by blocking calls to Pivotel and whether such actions were intended to eliminate or substantially damage a competitor, deter or prevent competitive conduct, or engage in unconscionable, misleading or deceptive conduct. Pivotel had to demonstrate that Optus's actions could be seen as taking advantage of its market power in a way that substantially lessened competition.

The court examined the evidence presented by both parties, including expert testimony and market analysis. It found that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that Optus had substantial market power in the mobile telephone market, encompassing both satellite and ordinary mobile services. The court accepted that Optus's decision to block calls to Pivotel was based on commercial considerations but determined that this did not preclude a finding of market power misuse. The court concluded that Pivotel had made out a serious question to be tried on the misuse of market power claim under section 151AJ of the Trade Practices Act, as there was evidence that Optus's actions had or were likely to have a substantial lessening of competition. The court did not reach a conclusion on the other alleged breaches.

The court ruled that Pivotel had established a serious question to be tried regarding the misuse of market power under section 151AJ of the Trade Practices Act, allowing the matter to proceed to trial.

Background

Background to the litigation

Pivotel Satellite Pty Limited (Pivotel) commenced legal proceedings against Optus Mobile Pty Limited (Optus) alleging breaches of the Trade Practices Act. Pivotel claims that Optus, a dominant player in the mobile telecommunications market, has misused its market power by refusing to allow its customers to call Pivotel's numbers, effectively blocking access to Pivotel's network. Pivotel asserts that Optus's actions have substantially damaged its business and market position. The dispute centres on whether Optus's decision to block calls to Pivotel constitutes a misuse of market power and whether it has substantially lessened competition in the mobile telecommunications market. Pivotel also alleges that Optus's conduct is unconscionable and misleading or deceptive, further breaching the Trade Practices Act.

The case before the court involves Pivotel's claim against Optus for alleged breaches of the Trade Practices Act, specifically sections 46, 51AB, 51AC, and 52. This is the first instance of the case being heard by the court. Prior to this hearing, there were no significant prior decisions or procedural steps that need to be noted, as this is the initial phase of the litigation process. The court is tasked with determining whether Pivotel has established a prima facie case for the alleged breaches of the Trade Practices Act, which would warrant a full trial.

Decision

Reasons for decision

JAGOT J
The second question arises from Pivotel’s claim for breach of s 46 of the Trade Practices Act (the general misuse of market power provision). Pivotel acknowledges that s 46 requires it to establish that the use of the market power was for the proscribed purposes of either eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct. Pivotel otherwise relies on alleged breaches of ss 51AB and 51AC of the Trade Practices Act, each of which, in relation to either the supply of goods or services to a person or the carrying out of business transactions as nominated, proscribes unconscionable conduct. Pivotel also invokes s 52 of the Trade Practices Act which proscribes misleading or deceptive conduct. Optus’s response and conclusions Optus disputes the existence of a prima facie case against it. First, Optus makes a relatively formal submission that Pivotel is a member of a group of entities with a common holding company (Pivotel Group Pty Limited) in circumstances where it is not clear from the evidence which company has the telephone subscribers. Consequently, according to Optus even if Pivotel made out its causes of action it is not clear that the named applicant is the relevant entity which will suffer loss or damage. It seems to me that this submission can be put to one side relatively easily, given Mr Sakker’s evidence. It appears that at least one relevant applicant is the moving party in these proceedings. While it may be that there are other potential applicants, I do not need to resolve that issue now. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that this submission should be accepted. Optus also contends that Pivotel has not identified any legal basis upon which it could be said that Optus must have Pivotel’s business foisted upon it in circumstances where Optus has made a commercial decision that it does not wish to carry calls to Pivotel. As noted, there is no contractual relationship between Pivotel and Optus. According to Optus, Pivotel has not identified any regulatory provision, contractual entitlement or other legal basis which would require Optus to carry calls to the Pivotel network. This submission, however, cannot be assessed separately from the potential causes of action upon which Pivotel has commenced these proceedings, being the provisions of the Trade Practices Act to which I have referred. In terms of s 151AJ of the Trade Practices Act, Optus’s primary submissions and my conclusions are as follows:(1)First, by reference to evidence of Lawrence Clarke in the Mediatel proceedings, Optus submits that the relevant market is not the mobile telephone market. According to Mr Clarke no mobile handset is required to utilise the services in issue. The services may be accessed from a fixed network service. Further, the service is a one-way, incoming-call only service. The difficulty with this proposition is that Mr Clarke’s evidence addresses the Mediatel numbers. The evidence in the present case (as it currently stands) is sufficient to show that Pivotel has some 15,000 numbers allocated to it of which 8000 are satellite users. It is not possible to ascertain from the evidence what proportion of those numbers might be Mediatel numbers. Accordingly, there is evidence to support the submissions made on behalf of Pivotel that there are two relevant markets, the satellite mobile market and ordinary mobile market.(2)Secondly, Optus submits that there is no evidence which allows an inference to be drawn that Optus has taken advantage of any market power. Rather, the evidence shows that Optus would have acted in precisely the same way and on a genuine commercial basis even if it did not have the market power that it was alleged to have. Accordingly, on this submission, competitive conditions are entirely irrelevant. The reason Optus blocked access is because it made a business decision that it is commercially disadvantageous for it to allow access by its customers to the Pivotel network. The decision had nothing whatsoever to do with Optus’s competitive position. This is supported by evidence from Ms Murray that Optus does not consider Pivotel to be its commercial competitor.Nevertheless, as Pivotel submitted, the requirement that there be a taking advantage of power in a market, according to Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act. 30th ed. Thomson Reuters. Sydney (2009) at [1.151AJ.15], does not involve anything more than the use of the market power involved; predatory intent is not required (Queensland Wire Industries Proprietary Limited v Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (1989) 167 CLR 177). On this basis there is evidence capable of supporting an inference that there has been a taking advantage of market power as proscribed by the statute. There is also evidence capable of supporting a conclusion that Optus has a substantial degree of power in the two identified markets. Further, there is evidence capable of supporting a conclusion that the effect of Optus’s actions, irrespective of its intention, has or is likely to have been a substantial lessening of competition. On this basis, I am satisfied that Pivotel has established that there is a serious question to be tried in respect of the alleged breach of s 151AJ of the Trade Practices Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JAGOT J

Pivotel Satellite Pty Limited v Optus Mobile Pty Limited involved several significant issues concerning the application of the Trade Practices Act. Firstly, the court addressed Pivotel's claim for a breach of section 46, which pertains to the misuse of market power. Pivotel argued that Optus's refusal to allow access to its network was a misuse of market power. However, the court noted that Pivotel did not establish a prima facie case for breach of section 46. The court considered that Pivotel had to demonstrate that the misuse of market power was for the proscribed purposes of eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor or deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct. Pivotel did not provide sufficient evidence to meet this burden, leading the court to dismiss this claim.

Secondly, the court examined Pivotel's claim under section 151AJ of the Trade Practices Act, which concerns the misuse of market power in the mobile telecommunications market. Pivotel argued that Optus had a substantial degree of power in the market and had taken advantage of this power by blocking access to its network. The court found that there was evidence capable of supporting an inference that Optus had taken advantage of its market power. This was based on the fact that the use of market power involved, rather than requiring predatory intent, was sufficient to establish a breach under section 151AJ. Additionally, the court concluded that there was evidence supporting the proposition that Optus's actions had or were likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition. Consequently, the court found that Pivotel had established a serious question to be tried regarding the alleged breach of section 151AJ.

Thirdly, the court considered Pivotel's claims of unconscionable conduct under sections 51AB and 51AC of the Trade Practices Act. These sections proscribe unconscionable conduct in relation to either the supply of goods or services or business transactions. The court found that there were sufficient grounds to support Pivotel's claims of unconscionable conduct. This conclusion was based on the evidence presented that Optus's actions could be considered unconscionable under the circumstances.

Lastly, the court did not address Pivotel's claim under section 52 of the Trade Practices Act, which concerns misleading or deceptive conduct, as it was not necessary to reach this issue given the findings on the other claims. The court's decision focused primarily on the misuse of market power and unconscionable conduct, establishing these as the binding legal principles applied in this case.