SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Pittaway v W H Tutt & Quinlan & Anor [2002] QCA 336
PARTIES:
JASON PITTAWAY
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
W H TUTT & QUINLAN
(first defendant/first appellant)STEPHEN E KERIN
(second defendant/second appellant)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 10016 of 2001
SC No 6683 of 2001
DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
6 September 2002
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
17 May 2002
JUDGES:
McMurdo P, McPherson JA and Wilson J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the court, each concurring as to the orders made.
ORDERS:
1. That the appeal be allowed.
2. That the order of the primary judge be set aside.
3. That the respondent’s claim be dismissed.
4. That the respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the claim and of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – CONTRACT, TORTS AND PERSONAL ACTIONS – WHEN TIME BEGINS TO RUN – PARTICULAR CAUSES OF ACTION – NEGLIGENCE – where defendant solicitors advised plaintiff that he had no realistic hope of success in a personal injury claim – where plaintiff alleged that defendants’ advice was negligent – where plaintiff sued defendants for damages for negligence outside limitation period – where defendants pleaded limitation defence and sought summary judgment in their favour – whether the defendants’ allegedly negligent advice precluded the plaintiff from instituting proceedings against the defendants inside limitation period – whether question of limitation defence ought to be resolved on summary judgment application
PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PRACTICE UNDER RULES OF COURT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – where plaintiff injured when he drove car into tree – where no other vehicles involved – where plaintiff alleged accident caused by employer forcing him to drive when he was overtired - where firm of solicitors advised plaintiff that he had no realistic hope of success – where plaintiff sued firm of solicitors for negligence outside limitation period – where firm of solicitors pleaded limitation period defence – where application for summary judgment was dismissed – whether judgment should have been given for the defendants
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10, s 11
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 293Cheney v Duncan [2001] NSWCA 197; (2001) 34 MVR 28, referred to
Gorton v The Commonwealth of Australia [1992] 2 Qd R 603, distinguished
Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, distinguished
Johnson v Perez (1988) 166 CLR 351, referred to
Sampson v Zucker, unreported, CA (NSW) No 40834 of 1995, 11 December 1996, referred toToomey v Western Aboriginal Legal Service [1999] NSWSC 560, No 500054 of 1997, 10 June 1999, referred to
Wardley Australia Ltd v The State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514, referred to
Wilson v Rigg [2000] NSWSC 16, No 20364 of 1998, 7 February 2000, referred toCOUNSEL:
P A Keane QC, with K N Wilson, for the appellants
J A Griffin QC,…
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- Case
- [2002] QCA 336
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the defendants' allegedly negligent advice precluded the plaintiff from instituting proceedings against the defendants within the limitation period and whether the question of the limitation defence should be resolved on the summary judgment application. The court noted that the plaintiff had failed to raise a triable issue in respect of the limitation defence, and the primary judge had erred in dismissing the defendants' application for summary judgment.
The court found that the primary judge had failed to give proper consideration to the limitation defence raised by the defendants. The court held that the question of limitation was a matter of law and could be determined on a summary judgment application. The court found that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred, and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the primary judge, dismissed the plaintiff's claim, and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs of the claim and appeal. The court held that the primary judge had erred in dismissing the defendants' application for summary judgment and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court found that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred, and the defendants were not liable to the plaintiff for any damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. That the appeal be allowed.
2. That the order of the primary judge be set aside.
3. That the respondent’s claim be dismissed.
4. That the respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the claim and of the appeal to be assessed on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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