Pittaway v Noosa Cat Australia Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Pittaway v Noosa Cat Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2016] QCA 4

PARTIES:

DONALD PITTAWAY
(applicant)
v
NOOSA CAT AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
ACN 056 475 506
(first respondent)
NOOSA CAT COMPANY PTY LTD
ACN 010 818 256
(second respondent)
WAYNE LESLIE HENNIG
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 645 of 2015
DC No 3516 of 2012

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2014] QDC 295

DELIVERED ON:

2 February 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

27 July 2015

JUDGES:

Morrison JA and Douglas and North JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   The application for leave to appeal is granted.

2.   The appeal is allowed.

3.   The orders made on 19 December 2014 are set aside.

4.   The respondents’ application filed 17 September 2014 is refused.

5.   The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application, and appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – BUILDING, ENGINEERING, AND RELATED CONTRACTS – REMUNERATION – RECOVERY ON QUANTUM MERUIT – IN GENERAL – where the applicant and the respondent entered into two linked agreements, the Shed Agreement, where the applicant would build a shed for the respondent, and the Boat Agreement, where the respondent would build a boat for the applicant – where the applicant contended that he built the shed, but that the respondent did not pay the full amount for it, nor did they build the boat as required by the agreements – where the applicant started proceedings against the respondent in respect of damages for breach of contract – where orders were made in the District Court – where the applicant did not comply with those orders – where the respondent made an application to dismiss proceedings for want of prosecution under r 280 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) – where that application succeeded – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal from the order dismissing the proceedings – whether an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice – whether there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118(3)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 5, r 214(2)(e), r 280, r 389, r 444

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256, [2006] HCA 27, followed
Gold v State of Queensland
[2011] QSC 112, considered
Green v Pearson[2014] QCA 110, considered
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, [1936] HCA 40, cited
Johnson v Queensland Police Service[2014] QCA 195, cited
Mbuzi v Hornby[2010] QCA 186, cited
Pickering v McArthur[2005] QCA 294, cited
Schneider v Alusa Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 366, cited
Shellard v Orlanski [2001] VSCA 147, cited
Spitfire Nominees Pty Ltd v Ducco

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pittaway v Noosa Cat Australia Pty Ltd, the applicant, Pittaway, sought to recover on quantum meruit for services rendered under two linked agreements, one for the construction of a shed and the other for the construction of a boat. The respondent, Noosa Cat Australia Pty Ltd, had been ordered to pay for the shed but had not done so, nor had they built the boat as required by the agreements. The District Court had made orders regarding damages for breach of contract, but Pittaway did not comply with these orders, leading to the respondent's successful application to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution under r 280 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). Pittaway now sought leave to appeal the order dismissing the proceedings.

The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the dismissal of the proceedings constituted a substantial injustice and whether there was a reasonable argument that there was an error to be corrected. The court considered the twelve factors identified in Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd & Ors, which could be taken into account in determining whether the interests of justice required a case to be dismissed or leave to proceed to be refused. The court also noted the significance of delay in proceedings and its effect on the possibility of a fair trial.

The court concluded that the circumstances affecting Pittaway's ability to comply with the consent orders did not exhibit that degree of inattention or disregard that they should have been taken to support dismissal of the claim. The court found that the dismissal of the claim amounted to a substantial injustice and that there was a reasonable argument that there was an error to be corrected. The application for leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the orders made on 19 December 2014 were set aside. The respondents’ application filed 17 September 2014 was refused, and the respondents were ordered to pay the applicant's costs of and incidental to the application and appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is granted.

2. The appeal is allowed.

3. The orders made on 19 December 2014 are set aside.

4. The respondents’ application filed 17 September 2014 is refused.

5. The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application, and appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, the circumstances that affected the ability to comply with the consent orders of 30 May 2014 did not exhibit that degree of inattention or disregard that they should have been taken to support dismissal of the claim.Conclusion on the application For the reasons given above the learned primary judge fell into error in concluding that the circumstances warranted the dismissal of Mr Pittaway’s claim. It cannot be doubted that dismissal of the claim amounts to a substantial injustice. I would propose the following orders:1. The application for leave to appeal is granted.2. The appeal is allowed.3. The orders made on 19 December 2014 are set aside.4. The respondents’ application filed 17 September 2014 is refused.5. The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application, and appeal, to be assessed on the standard basis. DOUGLAS J: I agree with the reasons of Morrison JA and the orders proposed by his Honour. NORTH J: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons for judgment of Morrison JA. I wish to make some brief comments arising from his Honour’s discussion of the question of prejudice and whether on the evidence there was any risk that a fair trial could not be held.[132] The application before the learned primary judge was for an order dismissing the proceedings for want of prosecution pursuant to UCPR r 280. When considering such an application or the cognate UCPR r 389, whether to give leave to proceed following delay, it will be recalled that in Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd & Ors[133] Atkinson J, with whom McMurdo P and McPherson JA agreed, identified 12 factors which might be taken into account in determining “whether the interests of justice” required either a case to be dismissed or leave to proceed to be refused.[132]His Honour’s reasons at [40]-[45].[133][2000] QCA 178. Her Honour was careful to note:[134]“…The court’s discretion is, however, not fettered by rigid rules but should take into account all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case including the consideration that ordinary members of the community are entitled to get on with their lives and plan their affairs without having the continuing threat of litigation and its consequences hanging over them.[3]Unnecessary delay in proceedings has a tendency to bring the legal system into disrepute and to decrease the chance of there being a fair and just result. …”(Footnotes omitted)[134]Tyler v Custom Credit Corp Ltd & Ors [2000] QCA 178 at [2] and [3]. Noting also her Honour’s use of “include” in [2] before mentioning the 12 factors. A perusal of the 12 factors that Atkinson J identified demonstrates that delay is mentioned on a number of occasions.[135] Significantly factors 1 and 12 in combination identify that the elapse of time between the occurrence of the events the subject of the claim and the consideration of the application by the Court may lead to the conclusion that prejudice would be occasioned to a party because of the inability to ensure a fair trial.[136][135]“Delay” is mentioned expressly in 6 of them ((1), (5), (6), (10), (11) and (12) and inferentially referred to in a further two (2) and (7)).[136]The significance of the delay and the effect upon the possibility of a fair trial may vary from circumstance to circumstance. Some types of claims or complaints may more readily give rise to the inference of prejudice than others. See for example Hood & Anor v The State of Queensland & Ors [2003] QCA 408 at [34].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.