Hood v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Hood & Anor v State of Qld & Ors [2003] QCA 408
PARTIES:  JUDITH JOYCE HOOD
(first plaintiff/first appellant)
GREGORY JOSEPH HOOD
(second plaintiff/second appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first defendant/first respondent)
MINISTER FOR FAMILIES, YOUTH AND
COMMUNITY CARE
(second defendant/second respondent)
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES,
YOUTH AND COMMUNITY CARE
(third defendant/third respondent)
FILE NO/S:  Appeal No 6330 of 2002
SC No 8337 of 1996
DIVISION:  Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:  General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING 
COURT: 
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:  12 September 2003
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  21 May 2003
JUDGES:  McMurdo P, Williams JA and White J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
each concurring as to the order made
ORDER:  Appeal dismissed with costs
CATCHWORDS:  TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – WHERE NERVOUS SHOCK OR MENTAL DISORDER – COMMON LAW - where appellant care provider under the family day care scheme – where police investigated possible sexual abuse – where allegations not substantiated – where police and department did not inform the appellant of completion of investigation - where appellant suffered psychiatric disorder - whether a duty of care owed to the appellant - whether learned primary judge erred in the application of Morgan v Tame
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – FAILURE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION – where learned primary judge dismissed appellants claim seeking leave to proceed under r 389(2) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) - whether appellant had reasonable cause of action – whether the respondents suffered prejudice - whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the pursuit of an ex gratia payment was not reasonable factor in causing delay
Child Care Act 1991 (Qld), s 4, s 10, s 23, s 82
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 389(2)
Child Care (Family Day Care) Regulation 1991 (Qld), s 30
AMP v RTA & Anor [2001] NSWCA 186, considered
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996)
186 CLR 541, considered
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, followed
Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWCA 121, distinguished
Sullivan v Moody (2001) 75 ALJR 1570, followed
Tame v NSW; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 76
ALJR 1348, distinguished
Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd [2000] QCA 178;
Appeal No 9466 of 1999, 19 May 2000, followed
COUNSEL:  M W Jarrett for the appellants
D O J North SC, with J B Rolls for the respondents
SOLICITORS:  Klooger Phillips Scott for the appellants
Crown Solicitor for the respondents
  1. McMURDO P: The first appellant, Mrs Hood, commenced an action for negligence, breach of statutory duty, breach of contract, defamation and injurious falsehood against the respondents in the Supreme Court by writ filed on 3 October 1996. This was renewed by leave on 30 September 1997 but not served on the respondents until 28 September 1998. The cause of action was alleged to have arisen between November 1993 and…

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Details
Case
[2003] QCA 408
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hood v State of Queensland involved the appellant, Mrs Hood, a family day care provider who sought to hold the respondents, the State of Queensland and its officers, liable for negligence. Mrs Hood alleged that she suffered a psychiatric disorder due to the failure of the respondents to inform her in a timely manner about the conclusion of a police investigation into allegations of sexual abuse involving her husband. The respondents argued that Mrs Hood's claim was unlikely to succeed and that there was significant prejudice due to the delay in pursuing the action. The primary judge dismissed Mrs Hood's application, finding that she had failed to demonstrate good reason for leave to proceed given the speculative nature of her claim, the significant delay, and the lack of foreseeability of psychiatric injury.

The legal issues before the court centred on whether the respondents owed a duty of care to Mrs Hood to inform her of the conclusion of the police investigation, and if so, whether this duty was breached, and if such breach caused her psychiatric injury. The court had to consider the principles established in Morgan v Tame and apply them to determine the foreseeability of psychiatric injury and the appropriate standard of care owed by the respondents. Additionally, the court needed to assess the impact of the significant delay in pursuing the action and the reasons for that delay on the prospects of success and the prejudice to the respondents.

The court held that the respondents did not owe a duty of care to Mrs Hood to inform her of the conclusion of the police investigation. The court reasoned that it would be onerous and without precedent to impose such a duty on the Department or its officers to avoid psychiatric injury to Mrs Hood. The court also found that Mrs Hood's psychiatric condition did not result from a sudden shock but rather a gradual deterioration of her mental health, which was not reasonably foreseeable by the respondents. The court further noted that Mrs Hood's decision to pursue her complaint through the Ombudsman and the significant delay in obtaining a psychiatric report contributed to the respondents' prejudice. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed with costs. This outcome effectively closed Mrs Hood's legal avenue to seek damages from the respondents for the alleged negligence in not informing her about the conclusion of the police investigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

The family day care scheme is largely set up under the Regulation. The licensee of a family day care scheme, here Merthyr, manages the scheme and must keep the Chief Executive informed of the details of those engaged as family day care providers. A licensee who suspects that a child in family day care has suffered abuse whilst in that care must give the Chief Executive written notice within seven days of becoming aware of the suspected abuse.[8] The licensee must also ensure that the quality of care meets the standards provided for in the Regulation. If the licensee is satisfied that the care provider is no longer providing appropriate care for a child[9] or the behaviour of another member of the care provider's household is inappropriate for the care of the child[10] or the care provider's home is no longer a safe place in which to provide care to children[11] the licensee may suspend the care provider's certificate of approval. The licensee may only suspend a certificate of approval if the care provider has been given a reasonable opportunity to make the necessary changes or there is an immediate risk to the child.[12] The licensee acting to suspend the care provider's certificate of approval must give the care provider written reasons for the suspension and inform the care provider of his or her right to make oral and written submissions to the licensee within 14 days of the suspension.[13] The licensee must then consider the submissions and may remove the suspension with or without conditions or continue the suspension for a specified period or cancel the certificate of approval.[14] The licensee must notify the care provider of its decision and, if it acts in any of these ways, must give written reasons within 30 days of receiving the care provider's submission and inform the care provider that the care provider may appeal to the Chief Executive.[15] Any appeal must be in writing and lodged within 14 days of receipt of notice of the licensee's decision.[16] In addition, the Chief Executive may prohibit a person from providing paid care at home[17] if of the opinion that it is in the interest of the relevant children.[18] [8] Section 11 of the Regulation. [9] Section 30(1)(b) of the Regulation. [10] Section 30(1)(d) of the Regulation. [11] Section 30(1)(e) of the Regulation. [12] Section 30(2) of the Regulation. [13] Section 30(3) of the Regulation. [14] Section 30(4) of the Regulation. [15] Section 30(5) of the Regulation. [16] Section 30(6) of the Regulation. [17] Section 82(1) of the Act. [18] Section 82(2) of the Act. The facts The proposed statement of claim pleads that in July 1993 the mother of a child cared for by Mrs Hood through the family day care scheme complained to Mrs Hood that the child had said things of an inappropriate sexual nature. Mrs Hood notified Merthyr who notified the Department, who in turn notified the police and the Royal Brisbane Hospital Scan Team to investigate the matter, rather than taking action under the licensing provisions. During this investigation police interviewed the appellant's husband, Mr Hood, as a suspect who may have sexually abused the child in Mrs Hood's care.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In February 2001, counsel was briefed to draft the proposed statement of claim. On 23 April 2001, Mrs Hood notified the respondents of her intention to proceed with her action. This was the first time the respondents became aware that Mrs Hood had suffered psychiatric harm. Only on 12 March 2002 was the application for leave to proceed filed, five and a half years after the writ was issued and about eight years after the cause of action is alleged to have arisen. The primary judge's decision The learned primary judge noted the considerable delay in pursuing the action and determined that the real reason for the delay was the appellant's choice to pursue her complaint through the Ombudsman rather than her impecuniosity, which did not prevent her retaining a solicitor and issuing a writ to preserve her rights should she be unsuccessful with the Ombudsman. His Honour observed that it seemed too onerous and without precedent to place a duty on the Department or its officers to inform Mrs Hood of the outcome of police investigations to avoid psychiatric injury to her, applying Morgan v Tame;[21] AMP v RTA & Anor[22] and Sullivan v Moody.[23] His Honour concluded that Mrs Hood would probably be unable to establish first, that the psychiatric condition she developed resulted from "a sudden affront or assault on her psyche" arising from any act or omission of Departmental officers, and second, that any psychiatric condition did not result from a gradual deterioration of her mental health caused by anxiety from the police investigations. Mrs Hood had very slender prospects of succeeding in her claim that it was reasonably foreseeable that the failure of the Department or its officers to notify her of the close of police and Scan investigations would expose her to a real risk of psychiatric injury. [21] [2000] NSWCA 121. At that time the High Court had given special leave to appeal but had not determined the appeal. [22] [2001] NSWCA 186 at [115]. [23] (2001) 75 ALJR 1570, 1580-81. His Honour determined that the respondents had suffered significant prejudice because of the nature of the psychiatric condition the appellant now claims to have suffered eight years ago and because of her delay in obtaining a psychiatric report relying on Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor.[24] [24] (1996) 186 CLR 541, 554-5. His Honour concluded that Mrs Hood had failed to show good reason why he should give leave to proceed because of her unlikely prospects of success, prejudice and the extensive delay attributable to her decision to pursue her claim against the Department through the Ombudsman and so dismissed the application. The appellant's case In her proposed draft statement of claim, Mrs Hood now only seeks to pursue her cause of action against the respondents in negligence. Her complaint is that she was not informed in a timely manner by the Department that the police investigation had been completed by 11 November 1993. The Department took no steps to revoke the direction that her registration as care provider be suspended; nor did it take steps to have her registration as care provider reinstated. She claims that in those circumstances the Department's officers knew or ought to have known that failure to take such steps could cause injury, loss and damage to her. The submissions made on behalf of Mrs Hood have focussed on the contention that the Department was under a duty to advise her that the police and the Scan team had closed their file investigating her husband and that, through the Department's officers, the respondents ought to have foreseen that she may have become distressed and suffer psychiatric injury if she believed that police and the Scan team enquiries involving her husband continued beyond about January 1994.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal considered whether a duty of care was owed by the respondents to the appellant, Mrs Hood, under the circumstances of the case. In applying the principles from Morgan v Tame, the Court recognised that it is not always necessary to impose a duty of care where the harm is purely psychiatric. The Court further examined the facts to determine whether the psychiatric condition Mrs Hood developed resulted from a sudden affront or assault on her psyche arising from any act or omission of Departmental officers, or if it was due to a gradual deterioration of her mental health. The Court found that Mrs Hood had very slender prospects of succeeding in her claim that it was reasonably foreseeable that the failure of the Department or its officers to notify her of the close of police and Scan investigations would expose her to a real risk of psychiatric injury. In the context of the case, the Court held that it seemed too onerous and without precedent to place a duty on the Department or its officers to inform Mrs Hood of the outcome of police investigations to avoid psychiatric injury to her. Therefore, the Court upheld the primary judge's decision that no duty of care was owed to Mrs Hood by the respondents.

The Court also examined whether the primary judge erred in the application of Morgan v Tame. The Court found that the primary judge had correctly applied the relevant principles and authorities in determining the issue of duty of care, and thus did not err in his application of Morgan v Tame. The Court concluded that the primary judge's decision was sound, and there was no basis to interfere with the dismissal of the appellant's application.