SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Hood & Anor v State of Qld & Ors [2003] QCA 408 PARTIES: JUDITH JOYCE HOOD
(first plaintiff/first appellant)
GREGORY JOSEPH HOOD
(second plaintiff/second appellant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(first defendant/first respondent)
MINISTER FOR FAMILIES, YOUTH AND
COMMUNITY CARE
(second defendant/second respondent)
CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES,
YOUTH AND COMMUNITY CARE
(third defendant/third respondent)FILE NO/S: Appeal No 6330 of 2002
SC No 8337 of 1996DIVISION: Court of Appeal PROCEEDING: General Civil Appeal ORIGINATING
COURT:Supreme Court at Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 12 September 2003 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 21 May 2003 JUDGES: McMurdo P, Williams JA and White J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court,
each concurring as to the order madeORDER: Appeal dismissed with costs CATCHWORDS: TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – WHERE NERVOUS SHOCK OR MENTAL DISORDER – COMMON LAW - where appellant care provider under the family day care scheme – where police investigated possible sexual abuse – where allegations not substantiated – where police and department did not inform the appellant of completion of investigation - where appellant suffered psychiatric disorder - whether a duty of care owed to the appellant - whether learned primary judge erred in the application of Morgan v Tame APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – FAILURE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION – where learned primary judge dismissed appellants claim seeking leave to proceed under r 389(2) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) - whether appellant had reasonable cause of action – whether the respondents suffered prejudice - whether the learned primary judge erred in finding that the pursuit of an ex gratia payment was not reasonable factor in causing delay Child Care Act 1991 (Qld), s 4, s 10, s 23, s 82
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 389(2)
Child Care (Family Day Care) Regulation 1991 (Qld), s 30AMP v RTA & Anor [2001] NSWCA 186, considered
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996)
186 CLR 541, considered
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, followed
Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWCA 121, distinguished
Sullivan v Moody (2001) 75 ALJR 1570, followed
Tame v NSW; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 76
ALJR 1348, distinguished
Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Ltd [2000] QCA 178;
Appeal No 9466 of 1999, 19 May 2000, followedCOUNSEL: M W Jarrett for the appellants
D O J North SC, with J B Rolls for the respondentsSOLICITORS: Klooger Phillips Scott for the appellants
Crown Solicitor for the respondents
McMURDO P: The first appellant, Mrs Hood, commenced an action for negligence, breach of statutory duty, breach of contract, defamation and injurious falsehood against the respondents in the Supreme Court by writ filed on 3 October 1996. This was renewed by leave on 30 September 1997 but not served on the respondents until 28 September 1998. The cause of action was alleged to have arisen between November 1993 and…
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- Case
- [2003] QCA 408
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centred on whether the respondents owed a duty of care to Mrs Hood to inform her of the conclusion of the police investigation, and if so, whether this duty was breached, and if such breach caused her psychiatric injury. The court had to consider the principles established in Morgan v Tame and apply them to determine the foreseeability of psychiatric injury and the appropriate standard of care owed by the respondents. Additionally, the court needed to assess the impact of the significant delay in pursuing the action and the reasons for that delay on the prospects of success and the prejudice to the respondents.
The court held that the respondents did not owe a duty of care to Mrs Hood to inform her of the conclusion of the police investigation. The court reasoned that it would be onerous and without precedent to impose such a duty on the Department or its officers to avoid psychiatric injury to Mrs Hood. The court also found that Mrs Hood's psychiatric condition did not result from a sudden shock but rather a gradual deterioration of her mental health, which was not reasonably foreseeable by the respondents. The court further noted that Mrs Hood's decision to pursue her complaint through the Ombudsman and the significant delay in obtaining a psychiatric report contributed to the respondents' prejudice. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed with costs. This outcome effectively closed Mrs Hood's legal avenue to seek damages from the respondents for the alleged negligence in not informing her about the conclusion of the police investigation.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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