Pirmax Pty Ltd v Kingspan Insulation Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pirmax Pty Ltd v Kingspan Insulation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 1526   

File number: VID 528 of 2019
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 16 December 2022
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of primary judgment prior to institution of appeal – where final orders not determined – consideration of form of prohibitive injunctive relief – consideration of form of mandatory injunctive relief – orders made
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – rr 36.08, 41.03
Cases cited:

NRM Trading Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2015] FCA 595

Pirmax Pty Ltd v Kingspan Insulation Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 1340

Stefanovski v Digital Central Australia (Assets) Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1121

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 27
Date of hearing: 15 December 2022
Counsel for the Applicant / Cross-Respondent: Mr T J Walker KC with Mr R J Harris
Solicitor for the Applicant / Cross-Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Respondent / Cross-Claimant: Mr C M Archibald KC with Mr L Connolly
Solicitor for the Respondent / Cross-Claimant: Herbert Smith Freehills

ORDERS

VID 528 of 2019
BETWEEN:

PIRMAX PTY LTD

Applicant

AND:

KINGSPAN INSULATION PTY LTD

Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

KINGSPAN INSULATION PTY LTD

Cross-Claimant

AND:

PIRMAX PTY LTD

Cross-Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 DECEMBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant be permanently restrained from representing or repeating, further publishing, conveying and/or disseminating representations that the Pirmax HR Panel Products:

(a)achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 1 classification when tested in accordance with AS 5637.1;

(b)achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 1 classification under the National Construction Code (“NCC”) 2016; and

(c)comply, alternatively have been evaluated and considered to comply, with the deemed-to-satisfy requirements of the NCC 2016 for use in internal ceilings as an exposed or concealed soffit lining.

2.The applicant be permanently restrained from representing or repeating, further publishing, conveying and/or disseminating representations that the Pirmax ISO3 Panel Products:

(a)achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 3 classification under the NCC 2019; and

(b)achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 3 classification when tested in accordance with AS 5637.1.

3.The applicant must take all reasonable steps to inform its distributors of the injunctions in paragraphs 1 and 2 herein and that the distributors are not to publish or republish any material in whatever form making any of the representations referred to therein.

4.Orders 1, 2 and 3 be stayed for a period of 3 business days from the date of this order.

5.The respondent be immediately released from the undertakings that are the subject of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the orders made herein by Davies J on 17 May 2019.

6.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs insofar as they pertain solely to the respondent’s abandoned claim for damages on its cross-claim, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s costs practice note (GPN-COSTS).

7.Subject…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1526
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Pirmax Pty Ltd sought a stay of the execution of primary judgment pending an appeal, and Kingspan Insulation Pty Ltd opposed the application. The dispute involved the accuracy of product classification and compliance claims made by Pirmax regarding its HR Panel Products and ISO3 Panel Products. The Federal Court considered the application and the legal principles guiding the court’s discretion to grant or deny a stay of execution of its orders.

The court examined the principles outlined in Rule 36.08 and Rule 41.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, and considered the well-established considerations for granting a stay of enforcement of a judgment pending appeal. These considerations included the principle that a court should not easily delay the enforcement of a judgment obtained after a trial, and the need for the applicant to provide sound reasons to justify a suspension of the successful party's right to recover judgment. The court also considered the risk of potential prejudice to the parties if the stay was granted or refused, and the prospect of the appeal having merit.

After considering the evidence and the established principles, the court found that the applicant had demonstrated that the case was an appropriate one for the exercise of the court's discretion in their favour. The court noted that the applicant needed to establish that their appeal had some merit, and that there was a real risk that a successful appellant would be deprived of the fruits of their appeal if a stay was not granted. The court determined that the circumstances warranted the granting of a stay and made orders to that effect.

The court made orders that the applicant be permanently restrained from making certain representations regarding the classification and compliance of its products, and that the applicant must inform its distributors of the injunctions. The orders were stayed for a period of three business days from the date of the order, and the respondent was released from certain undertakings. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's costs pertaining to the abandoned claim for damages, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the proceeding, subject to certain exceptions. The entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be permanently restrained from representing or repeating, further publishing, conveying and/or disseminating representations that the Pirmax HR Panel Products:

(a) achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 1 classification when tested in accordance with AS 5637.1;

(b) achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 1 classification under the National Construction Code (“NCC”) 2016; and

(c) comply, alternatively have been evaluated and considered to comply, with the deemed-to-satisfy requirements of the NCC 2016 for use in internal ceilings as an exposed or concealed soffit lining.

2. The applicant be permanently restrained from representing or repeating, further publishing, conveying and/or disseminating representations that the Pirmax ISO3 Panel Products:

(a) achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 3 classification under the NCC 2019; and

(b) achieve, or previously achieved, a Group 3 classification when tested in accordance with AS 5637.1.

3. The applicant must take all reasonable steps to inform its distributors of the injunctions in paragraphs 1 and 2 herein and that the distributors are not to publish or republish any material in whatever form making any of the representations referred to therein.

4. Orders 1, 2 and 3 be stayed for a period of 3 business days from the date of this order.

5. The respondent be immediately released from the undertakings that are the subject of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the orders made herein by Davies J on 17 May 2019.

6. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs insofar as they pertain solely to the respondent’s abandoned claim for damages on its cross-claim, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s costs practice note (GPN-COSTS).

7. Subject to order 6, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding (other than those pertaining solely to the respondent’s abandoned claim for damages on its cross-claim), to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s costs practice note (GPN-COSTS).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

There was no material dispute concerning the principles that guide the court’s discretion to grant or not grant a stay on the execution of its orders. Rule 36.08 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides as follows:36.08 Stay of execution or proceedings under judgment appealed from(1) An appeal does not:(a)operate as a stay of execution or a stay of any proceedings under the judgment subject to the appeal; or(b)invalidate any proceedings already taken.(2)However, an appellant or interested person may apply to the Court for an order to stay the execution of the proceeding until the appeal is heard and determined.(3)An application may be made under subrule (2) even though the court from which the appeal is brought has previously refused an application of a similar kind. Rule 41.03 further confers upon parties bound by a judgment an ability to apply to the court for an order that it be stayed. As has been noted, the court has a broad discretion to grant or not grant such orders. The considerations that inform that discretion were the subject of discussion in Stefanovski v Digital Central Australia (Assets) Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1121 (R Derrington J), in which it was noted (at [4]):The principles which apply in determining whether a stay of the enforcement of a judgment pending appeal ought to be granted were not the subject of dispute between the parties. Generally speaking, they are now well established and are as follows:(a)A court should not be easily disposed to delaying the enforcement of a judgment obtained after a trial. Prima facie, the successful party at trial is entitled to the fruits of their judgment. In particular, judgments of the trial division should not be treated merely as provisional and, following a trial the successful party should generally have an unfettered entitlement to enforce their judgment;(b)However, the provisions permitting the Court to grant a stay pending the determination of an appeal exist to prevent possible injustice arising from the enforcement of a judgment which might subsequently be overturned;(c)It is not necessary for a party seeking a stay to show “special” or “exceptional” circumstances. All that needs to be shown is that the applicant has demonstrated that the case is an appropriate one for the exercise of the discretion in their favour (see Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65 and Re Middle Harbour Investment (in liq) (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales (CA), 15 December 1976));(d)The applicant for a stay must necessarily provide sound reasons to justify a suspension of the successful party's right to recover judgment (see McBride v Sandland No.2 (1918) 25 CLR 369, 374; Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65, 66);(e)Necessarily, the applicant will need to establish that their appeal has some merit to it. They are not obliged to demonstrate that the appeal will be successful, or that success is more probable than not. The degree of confidence which a court needs to have in the appeal’s prospects will most likely vary with all of the circumstances of the case including the potential prejudice which might be suffered by the parties as the result of the granting or refusal of the stay. That said, where an appellant can demonstrate that they have substantial prospects on appeal, that will be a significant factor in favour of granting a stay.(f)Although the applicant for a stay must necessarily establish the grounds of their application by admissible evidence, it must be kept steadily in mind that much of the evidence will relate to events which may occur in the future. Necessarily, the evidence produced must provide an appropriately sound foundation on which a court may assess the risk of those future events occurring. In that respect, for the purposes of establishing that the circumstances warrant the granting of a stay, the applicant must not leave the situation in a state of mere “speculation” or “argument”.(g)A significant factor in any discretionary consideration is whether there is a real risk or probability that a successful appellant would be deprived of the fruits of their appeal if a stay is not granted (see Scarborough v Lew’s Junction Stores Pty Ltd (1963) VR 129, 130). That consideration extends to the circumstances where there is a real risk that it will not be possible for the successful appellant to be substantially restored to its former position if judgment is executed against it (see Cellante v G Kallis Industries (1991) 2 VR 653);(h)Conversely, there is a strong reason for refusing a stay where it is established that there is a real risk that the granting of a stay may prevent the successful party at trial from obtaining the full benefits of their judgment if the appeal is unsuccessful.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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