Pipikos v Trayans

Case [2016] SASCFC 138


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

PIPIKOS v TRAYANS

[2016] SASCFC 138

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Kelly and The Honourable Justice Hinton)

16 December 2016

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - FORMATION OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS - MATTERS NOT GIVING RISE TO BINDING CONTRACT - VAGUENESS AND UNCERTAINTY - SALE OF LAND

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - STATUTE OF FRAUDS, SECTION 4 - CONTRACTS TO WHICH APPLICABLE - CONTRACTS FOR SALE OR DISPOSITION OF LAND OR ANY INTEREST IN LAND

CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - STATUTE OF FRAUDS, SECTION 4 - NON-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE - DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE - WHAT ACTS CONSTITUTE PART PERFORMANCE - ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING PART PERFORMANCE

Appeal against decision of a Judge of the District Court.

The appellant is the former brother in law of the respondent.  The appellant and his wife, and the respondent and her husband agreed to purchase a property together (the new property).  The appellant paid the contractual deposit as well as the balance of the purchase price and the transaction costs (collectively 'the settlement costs').  The appellant claims that because the respondent and her husband could not afford to contribute to the settlement costs they agreed that the respondent would sell them a half interest in another property owned by the respondent (the respondent's property).  The value of that half interest in the respondent's property was slightly higher than the amount owed by virtue of the agreement so the appellant would pay the respondent $8000.

The trial Judge found in favour of the respondent. Her Honour found that while there were discussions to the effect outlined above, the agreement was not concluded. The Judge also found that the discussions forming the basis of the agreement were between the appellant and the respondent's husband (the appellant's brother) and the respondent was not party to those discussions. The Judge also found that, if there was an oral agreement, it was not enforceable because there was no part performance and the agreement did not comply with the relevant statutory requirements.

The appellant appeals the factual finding that the agreement was not fully concluded. the appellant accepts that the respondent was not a party to the discussions forming the basis of the agreement. Yet, the appellant appeals on the basis that the respondent had knowledge of the agreement, and on the basis of that knowledge executed the transfer by which the property was purchased. The appellant argues that a handwritten note of the respondent, vague in its terms and authored some considerable time after the transaction, is evidence of the respondent's knowledge and acceptance of the overarching agreement and also fulfills the statutory requirements that a contract for the sale of land be in writing.

Held per Kourakis CJ (Kelly and Hinton JJ agreeing), dismissing the appeal:

1.  There was an agreement between the appellant and the  respondent.  It is improbable that the appellant would have agreed to purchase the new property with…

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AGLC
Pipikos v Trayans [2016] SASCFC 138
Case
[2016] SASCFC 138
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal from a decision of the District Court of South Australia regarding an alleged agreement for the sale of an interest in land. The appellant, Leon Pipikos, claimed he had entered into an agreement with the respondents, George and Velika Trayan, whereby he would pay $45,000 for half of their interest in the Penfield Road property. This payment was intended to cover their contribution to the deposit for the Penfield Road property, with any surplus to be given to George. The Penfield Road property was subsequently sold, with the appellant contributing the entire owner's contribution. The Clark Road property remained for sale, and there was no evidence of any attempt to sell the Taylors Road property.

The central legal issues before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia were whether an enforceable contract for the sale of an interest in land had been formed, and if not, whether the doctrine of part performance could validate the alleged agreement. Specifically, the court had to determine if the appellant's actions in contributing the full owner's contribution towards the Penfield Road property were unequivocally referable to the alleged agreement for the sale of an interest in that property, or any other property.

The court found that the purchase of the Penfield Road property, and the appellant's contribution to it, were not unequivocally referable to the alleged agreement. The payment could have manifested a variety of other arrangements or contracts. Consequently, the requirements of section 26 of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA), which mandates that contracts for the sale of land be in writing, were not met. Furthermore, the court held that the appellant's actions did not constitute part performance of the alleged agreement, as they were not unequivocally indicative of the specific contract claimed.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 4 February 2014, Leon, Sophie and Velika consented to orders for the sale of all three properties. The Penfield Road property sold in 2014 for $350,000 and settlement took place on 18 December 2014. An amount of $196,725.04 was applied in discharge of the ANZ mortgage. The net proceeds of $133,575.84 were placed into the Suitors’ Fund. Proceedings have not been issued for any form of accounting with respect to the Penfield Road property. The Clark Road property remains for sale but has not been sold. There was no evidence of any attempt to sell the Taylors Road property.Evidence of the agreement Next, it is convenient to turn to the evidence on the disputed question. That is the arrangement pursuant to which Leon alone contributed funds for the purchase of the Penfield Road property. It is convenient to record the Judge’s general comments about Leon’s testimony before recounting it. The Judge found Leon’s evidence to be ‘superficially plausible’. However, her Honour found that he was not reliable on contentious matters. The Judge observed that Leon and George entered into a large number of transactions involving cars, money and land, but neither kept good records of them. That observation is not in itself a reason to doubt the credibility of Leon’s testimony and indeed it explains the failure to properly document the agreement which Leon claims was made. The Judge also found that Leon bore George considerable ill-will as a result of the failure of various business dealings. That is not surprising having regard to the history I have recounted and is commonly encountered in the parties to a civil dispute. Of itself it is not a matter of great weight. Leon testified that an arrangement was made for the funding of the owners’ contribution in conversations between himself, Sophie, George and Velika.[1] Leon testified that during an inspection of the Penfield Road property he told George that if he wanted to become equal partners in the Penfield Road property he would have to contribute between $35,000 and $40,000 depending on the price that was ultimately negotiated for the purchase. Leon testified that George responded ‘I haven’t got any more money’ but then suggested:I tell you what. We’ll do a deal with you where we will sell you half our property. Then we could be equal partners on all three properties’. We are brothers, we always work together.[1] Pipikos v Trayans [2015] SADC 149 at [52]. According to Leon they returned to George and Velika’s home where all four had the following conversation in the family room:AThen we went back to their place and we worked out what price. They told me they paid around $80,000 for their land so, to be fair, you have given me 45 for half of it.QSo the arrangement was that you would pay $45,000 for half of their property.AThat’s right.QWhat was going to happen with the $45,000.AI was paying their half of the deposit for Penfield Road and then any surplus money I gave to George.QThat was a discussion which occurred at Clark Road.AYes.QWas the defendant present when those discussions took place.AYes, she was, yes.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The purchase of the Penfield Road property, in itself, is not unequivocally referable to, and does not manifest the existence of, an agreement of any kind between the purchasers. It is certainly not unequivocally referable to, or indicative of a contract for the purchase by Leon of an interest in the Clark Road property. The purchase of the Penfield Road property is complete in itself. Importantly the payment of the whole of the owners’ contribution by Leon might be the manifestation of any number of arrangements and contracts of a very different kind to the one Leon alleges. Conclusion For the aforesaid reasons the requirements of s 26 of the LPA have not been met and that failure had not been remedied by part performance. I would dismiss the appeal. KELLY J: I would dismiss the appeal. I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice. HINTON J: I agree with the Chief Justice for the reasons he has given that the appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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