Piovene & Muhlfeld (No 3) - [2024] FedCFamC1F 614

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Piovene & Muhlfeld (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 614

File number: SYC 4211 of 2023

Judgment of: SCHONELL J

Date of judgment: 19 September 2024

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP – Where both parties sought declarations pursuant to s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the applicant asserts the parties were in a de facto relationship for approximately 12 years – Where the applicant contends that the relationship broke down in October 2022 – Where the respondent contends that a de facto relationship never existed – Where the applicant commenced proceedings in June 2023 – Where the applicant lived in the respondent’s investment property for nine years – Where the applicant did work for the benefit of the respondent’s investment properties – Both parties have children from previous relationships – Parties held no real property together – Parties shared Christmas and birthday celebrations – Parties travelled extensively together – Where there are issues of credit in relation to both parties’ evidence – Where the applicant’s evidence in these proceedings is contradictory to his evidence in previous family law proceedings and representations made to the SSAT – Where the evidence is diametrically opposed as to whether the parties slept in the same room together and the extent of a sexual relationship – Where consideration of the relevant provisions in the definition of “de facto relationship” in section 4AA – Declaration made that a de facto relationship never existed.

Legislation:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(1)

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4AA(1), 4AA(2), 4AA(3), 4AA(4), 90RD

Cases cited:
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67; [1893] 1 WLUK 44

Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom (1991) 22 NSWLR 389

Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084

Fairbairn v Radecki (2022) 275 CLR 400; [2022] HCA 18

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1999] HCA 8

Nguyen v Tran (2018) MVR 16; [2018] NSWCA 215

Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48

Division: Division 1 First Instance

Number of paragraphs: 185

Date of hearing: 26 August – 28 August 2024

Place: Sydney

Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Reeve, Marsdens Law Group

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Jones SC

Solicitor for the Respondent: Barkus Doolan Winning
ORDERS

SYC 4211 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:
MR PIOVENE

Applicant

AND:
MS MUHLFELD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SCHONELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 SEPTEMBER 2024

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as between the applicant and the respondent a de facto relationship never existed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Piovene & Muhlfeld has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SCHONELL J:

These are proceedings for declarations pursuant to s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The applicant seeks a declaration to the following effect:
1.A Declaration pursuant to Section 90RD of the Family Law Act that a De‑Facto relationship existed between the Applicant De-Facto Husband (“Applicant”) and the Respondent De-Facto Wife (“Respondent”) in Sydney, New South Wales that commenced in 2010 and broke down in Sydney on 26 October 2022.
(Exhibit 2)
The respondent for her part seeks the following relief:
1.A declaration pursuant to section 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 that, as between the Applicant and the Respondent, a de facto relationship never existed.
2. That the Initiating Application filed 14 June 2023 be dismissed.
(Exhibit 3)
Where each party moves the Court for a declaration as to whether there existed a de facto relationship, each party carries the onus to establish that for which they contend.
DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON
The applicant relied upon the following documents:
(1)Affidavit of the applicant filed 4 March 2024;
(2)Affidavit of Ms H (“Ms H”) filed 6 December 2023;
(3)Affidavit of Mr J (“Mr J”) filed 6 December 2023;
(4)Affidavit of Ms L (“Ms L”) filed 6 December 2023.
Each of the applicant, Ms H and Mr J were cross-examined.
The respondent relied upon the following documents:
(1)Response to Initiating Application filed 31 July 2023;
(2)Affidavit of the respondent filed 18 March 2024;
(3)Affidavit of Mr G (“Mr G”) filed 18 March 2024;
(4)Affidavit of Ms K (“Ms K”) filed 18 March 2024;
(5)Affidavit of Ms F (“Ms F”) filed 18 March 2024;
(6)Affidavit of Ms M filed 18 March 2024;
(7)Affidavit of Mr N (“Mr N”) filed 18 March 2024;
(8)Affidavit of Mr O (“Mr O”) filed 18 March 2024;
(9)Affidavit of Ms P (“Ms P”) filed 18 March 2024;
(10)Affidavit of Mr Q (“Mr Q”) filed 6 December 2023;
(11)Affidavit of Mr R (“Mr R”) filed 18 March 2024;
(12)Affidavit of Ms S (“Ms S”) filed 19 December 2023.
Each of the above deponents, with the exception of Ms S and Mr R, were cross examined.
There was an agreement between the legal representatives for the parties that the affidavits of Ms L, Mr R and Ms S would be read without the necessity for cross-examination and that neither party would take an objection consistent with Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67.
Each of the parties tendered a number of documents.
THE APPLICANT’S CASE
In broad terms, the applicant contended that he and the respondent were in a de facto relationship that commenced in or about September 2010 and concluded on 26 October 2022. He contends that between late 2010 and January 2013, the parties initially spent alternate weekends and some weekdays in a property owned by the respondent at Suburb T. From early 2013, the applicant commenced living in an apartment owned by the respondent in Suburb U. Thereafter, the applicant contends they would spend approximately two to three nights per week (albeit there was not a fixed pattern) at the Suburb U property.
The applicant contends that he became a part of the respondent’s “family unit” including attending on family functions, for events such as Christmas, birthdays, engagement parties and christenings as well as attending on holidays with the applicant within and outside of Australia. The applicant contends that the parties had an active sexual relationship which continued over the duration of the relationship. The applicant contends that the parties communicated on a regular basis by telephone, engaged in social occasions and events with family and friends and held themselves out as a couple to the world.
The applicant contended that he undertook work for the benefit of the respondent, that the respondent provided him with a supplementary credit card, the benefit of occupation of properties rent-free, and the use of motor vehicles. Whilst there were no children of the relationship, the applicant was closely involved with the respondent’s children and grandchildren.
The applicant contends that the relationship ended when the respondent discovered he had an affair.
THE RESPONDENT’S CASE
The respondent contends that she and the applicant were never in a de facto relationship. She contends that they never shared a household. She contends that contrary to the assertion of the applicant, she was in a de facto relationship with Mr N, which concluded towards the end of 2014.
The respondent admits that the applicant lived in a property owned by her at Suburb U and that she provided him with a supplementary credit card. She admits that the applicant undertook work on her behalf, describing the applicant as her property manager. The respondent concedes that they travelled extensively together but denies that when they travelled, they always shared a room together. The respondent concedes that the parties had a sexual relationship, but it was not of the duration or frequency contended by the applicant.
The respondent says that she and the applicant were not in a de facto relationship, rather he was her best friend.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The applicant was born in 1961 and is currently 63 years old. The respondent was born in 1958 and is currently 66 years old.
The parties were in a personal relationship in 1998 which subsequently ended in 2000. The applicant went on to marry and had two children. The applicant also had a child from a previous marriage. The respondent, widowed from a previous marriage that had produced two children, did not go on to marry. All children at the time of hearing were over the age of 18 and there are no children of the applicant and respondent.
The parties agree that they resumed contact with one another and agreed to meet in person in 2010.
The applicant in his affidavit says:
26.In or around late 2010, I called [Ms Muhlfeld] one day at work at her [business] in [Suburb W]. Leading up to my decision to make this call, I had wondered whether there was any prospect of being able to resume my relationship with [Ms Muhlfeld]. … I recall upon starting to speak, [Ms Muhlfeld] immediately said to me words to the effect of "[Mr Piovene], how have you been?". During the phone call, I recall [Ms Muhlfeld]and I briefly discussed what we had each been up to over the years and how we were each going. I then said to [Ms Muhlfeld] words to the effect of "would you like to go out to dinner together? It would be great to hear more about how you've been"…
…
28.During the dinner with [Ms Muhlfeld], I immediately got on well once again with [Ms Muhlfeld] as I had done years prior during the time we were together. Although it had been a number of years, I did not feel uncomfortable in any way with [Ms Muhlfeld] and I did not form any impression that [Ms Muhlfeld] felt uncomfortable or awkward around me. We spent a number of hours talking away together at the restaurant. [Ms Muhlfeld] spent time telling me about what she had been up to the last few years, both in terms of business and also on a personal basis with her family and friends. I similarly talked with [Ms Muhlfeld] and my events, both in terms of my career and also my family… At the end of the night, I then drove [Ms Muhlfeld] to her home. We kissed a number of times in the car before we said goodnight to each other and each went home.
…
32.It was around this time, which to the best of my recollection was about September 2010, that I say my de-facto relationship with [Ms Muhlfeld] commenced. I did not date other women during the period of our relationship until I had an affair with [Ms X] in [mid] 2022 which led to our break up. [Ms Muhlfeld] and I had an active sexual relationship throughout the twelve years we were together. We had intercourse not less than weekly for most of the relationship…
33.I say that our relationship continued up until the time of our separation on 26 October 2022 as a de-facto couple.
The respondent says:
32.When [Mr Piovene] and I met again in 2010 we started a business relationship and friendship. From that time until after the end of my relationship with [Mr N] in 2014, [Mr Piovene] and I were not intimate with each other, that is we did not have sexual relations together.
33.Between 2015 to 2019 there were a few occasions we had sexual intercourse together. This usually arose if we had gone out to dinner and I did not have my car and [Mr Piovene] would say words to the effect 'Just stay over, I've had too much to drink". There were occasions that I stayed at the [Suburb U] property in a separate bedroom to [Mr Piovene].
38.In 2010 I received a telephone call from [Mr Piovene] on my work telephone. This was the first time I had heard from or spoken to [Mr Piovene] since we ceased dating in 2000. [Mr Piovene] said to me words to the effect of:
"What have you been up to? Can we meet for lunch?"
39.I agreed and met [Mr Piovene] for lunch at [a restaurant] in [Suburb W]…
In 2010, the applicant deposes he was living in Suburb Z with his son, sister and niece. During the same period, the respondent was living in Suburb W with her aged father and providing care to him. The respondent’s father later passed away in 2017.
The applicant ran a property development, sales and project management company through AA Pty Ltd. During the period of the purported de facto relationship, the respondent did works for the benefit of the respondent. The respondent owned three businesses, several investment properties, and a hospitality business in Brisbane. The respondent concedes that some of her investment properties were managed by the applicant in what she describes as his role as her property manager.
The applicant further contends that a property at Suburb T, purchased by the respondent as an investment property, was occupied by the applicant and respondent on alternate weekends and some midweeks 2010 to 2013. The applicant contends that the respondent and himself would spend weekends at the Suburb T apartment, often venturing out for outings at local restaurants, going for walks, and enjoying the space outside of their respective living arrangements that were impinged by family. The applicant says:
35.In or around September 2010, I then resumed my relationship with [Ms Muhlfeld]. At this time, [Ms Muhlfeld] was living with her father at [V Street, Suburb W]. This was a property owned by [Ms Muhlfeld]'s father, [Mr BB]. [Ms Muhlfeld]'s mother had at this time recently passed away. [Ms F] and [Mr O] were by this time living separately from [Ms Muhlfeld].
36.I was living in a rental property in [Suburb Z] with my son and with my sister [Ms CC], and her two adult daughters […].
37.This became awkward for [Ms Muhlfeld] and I as we wanted to have some privacy as our relationship developed.
…
39.In or about September, [Ms Muhlfeld] and I discussed purchasing an apartment […] at [Suburb T] so that we could spend more time together. We both spent many days there in cafes and restaurants together.
…
40.… [In late] 2010 [Ms Muhlfeld] through her company [Y Pty Ltd] entered into a contract to purchase the unit. We occupied the property close to Christmas 2010.
42.Once the property was set up, [Ms Muhlfeld] and I would then spend our weekends and some weekdays together at the [Suburb T] apartment. [Ms Muhlfeld] and I would typically go to the apartment on a Friday night and stay through the weekend until around Sunday afternoon. This was in place of us spending our time together at [Ms Muhlfeld]'s [Suburb W] residence where her father was residing, or spending time at my sister's residence at [Suburb Z].
43.[Ms Muhlfeld] and I would frequently attend [a cafe] for breakfast. We would also frequent [another cafe] together for Italian food, or [a restaurant] if we were looking for Greek food.
…
45.… On the weekends that [Ms Muhlfeld] and I were together at [Suburb T] we used to go for long walks from the unit, sometimes over the harbour bridge and also explore the local cafe scene together. This arrangement lasted for the first three years of our relationship before we bought a property at [Suburb U] which became my permanent home and the place where we spent most of our time together.
The respondent denies these contentions. The respondent asserts that between 2010 and 2011 her daughter lived in the Suburb T apartment, and in 2011 Mr N began living at the Suburb T property, occupying the unit until it was sold. In her affidavit she says:
37.On 27 October 2010 I purchased in the name of my self managed superannuation fund, a unit in [a] complex, being [Suburb T] ([Suburb T] apartment) being a property introduced to me by my daughter, [Ms F]. [Ms F] occupied the property rent-free from late 2010 until late 2011. The property was thereafter leased to [Mr N] from late 2011 until the property was sold in 2014. [Mr N] paid to my SMSF rent of $650 per week apart from one year rent-free accommodation I provided to him. I gave [Mr N] rent-free accommodation for a year as he had loaned me $1,000,000 interest free for a business venture.
There is no dispute that in 2013 the applicant moved into a property owned by the respondent at Suburb U. The applicant contends:
48.In or around [early] 2013, I moved into an apartment located at [Suburb U] together with [Mr B]…
The respondent concedes that the applicant moved into the Suburb U apartment but denies that the applicant’s son was living there at that time.
The applicant says:
51.Once I moved into the [Suburb U] apartment, [Ms Muhlfeld] would spend usually two to three days per week with me at the [Suburb U] apartment. There was no fixed pattern to this as it depended on our various commitments. The three days might be on the weekend when I did not have my daughters or during the week if I did. [Ms Muhlfeld] stored her personal items at the apartment, including her clothes, dressing gowns, toothbrush, make up items and other necessary day to day items. [Ms Muhlfeld] also had her own set of keys to the apartment so she could come and go as she pleased.
The respondent says in her affidavit:
81.In response to paragraph 51 - I did not spend 2 to 3 days per week with [Mr Piovene] at the [Suburb U] apartment, whether as a regular occurrence or on average. I did not spend overnight time there prior to the end of my relationship with [Mr N]. I stayed overnight at the [Suburb U] apartment between about 5 and 10 occasions in the period 2014 - 2019 with those occasions coinciding generally with occurrences of sexual intercourse between myself and [Mr Piovene]. I did have a set of keys to the [Suburb U] apartment, but not to "come and go as [I] pleased". I owned the property so of course I had keys to it.
The parties agree they undertook extensive travel together but are at issue about the reasons for same and where each slept on these trips. As to travel, the applicant says:
56.Following the resumption of my relationship with [Ms Muhlfeld] in late 2010, there were many holidays that we went on together. This included holidays to locations such as [Country DD], [Asia], [Country EE], [the USA], [Country FF] and New Zealand.
57.A number of these trips took place in the first twelve months of our relationship. We used to joke together that "we are on one long honeymoon".
…
72.In addition to the international travels, [Ms Muhlfeld] and I went on many domestic holidays together. These trips were more often than not to [City GG] in Queensland as [Ms Muhlfeld] owned a property up there which we could stay in. This is a four-bedroom townhouse which is fully furnished. [Ms Muhlfeld] and I would stay at [Region GG] anywhere from the weekend to a week at a time, depending on our work commitments. From early on in the relationship, I accumulated a number of clothes and personal items at this property from the numerous trips there, and [Ms Muhlfeld] also had her personal items and clothes there. This allowed us to often take trips there with very minimal planning.
…
75.In order to travel to [Region GG], [Ms Muhlfeld] would typically book the flight through [HH Company]. [Ms Muhlfeld] had an ongoing frequent flyer account with [HH Company] which meant she accumulated frequent flyer points for trips booked through her account. I was able to be listed as a family member on the frequent flyer program. When I booked a flight with [HH Company], [Ms Muhlfeld] would earn my points which would be allocated to her account and this assisted in maintaining priority status and other consequential benefits, such as upgrades, additional luggage, and access to the [HH Company] lounge at airports.

The respondent denies many of these contentions. The respondent denies that any personal items of the applicants were held at the Region GG property. In her affidavit she says:
86.In response to paragraph 56 - I deny that we resumed a relationship in late 2010 in so far as that suggests a de facto relationship or a sexual relationship prior to in or about 2014. I did travel with [Mr Piovene], usually for business purposes and sometimes for sightseeing, as we shared an interest in travel that my de facto partner [Mr N] did not share with me. [Mr N] was aware that I travelled with [Mr Piovene] as a friend. I rarely travelled alone, and had the luxury of having enough money to pay for others to accompany me, and this included at times my daughter [Ms F] and at other times there were other friends. The trips to New Zealand, [Country FF] and [City JJ] were for business purposes,
87.In response to paragraph 57 - I deny the second sentence .
…
98.In response to paragraph 72 - [Mr Piovene] did travel to my holiday house at [Region GG]. Sometimes it was to assist me with the property itself, sometimes to visit his friend […] after she moved there in or about late 2019, and sometimes just for a holiday. [Mr Piovene] did not always stay at my [Region GG] house and did not have his own keys to the property. There was a period of about 2 years where [Mr Piovene] started offering the use of the [Region GG] home to his own friends, and I became annoyed as he had no right to do so and put an end to it by telling him "you are not to offer my property to anyone". [Mr Piovene] did not keep personal effects of his stored at the [Region GG] property.
…
100.In response to paragraph 75 - During the period from about 2011-2017 I swapped the [HH Company] Frequent Flyers partner nominees around to help various people get a higher status when flying on [HH Company], including [Mr Piovene]. I did not need to personally, as the quantum of my travel meant I have maintained "platinum flyer'' status since shortly after buying my Brisbane [hospitality] business. I agree that there were periods when [Mr Piovene] was listed as a family member on my Frequent Flyer program, and I also arranged for him to be listed on my [friend’s HH Company] Frequent Flyer program to help him with status points.
The applicant contends that social events were enjoyed by the parties as a couple, including Christmas shared together with the respondent and her family and dinners with other coupled friends that they would host in tandem. He says the following:
149.[In] December 2013, [Ms Muhlfeld] and I hosted a Christmas party. This was a big party we hosted at the [Suburb U] apartment. I recall we had around 50 of our friends and family in attendance…
150.[In] December 2014, [Ms Muhlfeld] and I then hosted another Christmas party for over 70 guests. The guests were again friends and family on both sides.
…
152.[In early] 2015, [Ms Muhlfeld] and I then hosted another party at the [Suburb U] property for around 60 guests.
153.[In] December 2015, [Ms Muhlfeld] and I then hosted a further Christmas party for over 60 guests. The guests were again our friends and family.
154.[Ms Muhlfeld] and I then hosted further Christmas/ Australia Day parties at the [Suburb U] property for around 60-70 guests in [early] 2017 and 2018. These parties were lively. We did not have a party in 2016 or after 2019. I think we just got a bit exhausted, and there was also the Covid pandemic which [Ms Muhlfeld] took pretty seriously.
The respondent does not deny the applicant’s attendance at these functions, however, denies they demonstrate a de facto relationship. The respondent says that many people attended these functions saying:
110.In response to paragraph 151-155 - We each invited our friends. Some were mutual friends. There were many people there at any given party that I had never met from his side of the invites, and I was introduced by him to them as his "friend, [Ms Muhlfeld]" or "[Ms Muhlfeld]".
111.In response to paragraph 156 - [Mr Piovene], his sister, nieces and friends were invited to a Christmas event at [Ms F’s] home. Myself and [Ms F] referred to it as an "Orphan's Christmas" as it included 20 to 25 family, friends and staff associated with myself and [Ms F], most of whom were not related to me.
As to the breakdown of the relationship, the applicant contends that the respondent found out about an affair that the applicant was having with a younger woman, became enraged, and started verbally abusing the applicant and destroying furniture in the Suburb U property. He says:
275.On 26 October 2022, [Ms Muhlfeld] called me and asked if we could meet in [the apartments], [Suburb T] at around 3pm.
276.When I arrived, [Ms Muhlfeld] was already in the unit and greeted me as usual with a kiss. We sat in the living room and very soon she became angry and started yelling at me saying that she had evidence of me having an affair with [Ms X], who was a work colleague of mine. [Ms Muhlfeld] produced many pages of screenshots of SMS messages from my phone between [Ms X] and myself. She began reading them out to me and boasted how she was able to have my phone hacked and that she now knew everything.
277.[Ms Muhlfeld] continued to yell and swear at me saying words to the effect of "You made a fucking fool of me. I have told the children everything so let's see how you're going to explain yourself with this shit you got up to." I tried to calm [Ms Muhlfeld] down for the next two hours and asked if there was any way she could forgive me but she was very angry and was very clear that our relationship was over.
The respondent recalls a much more staggered disintegration of the friendship, noting that she had complaints about the work the applicant was conducting for her investment properties. She says:
182.In response to paragraph 275 - After the failure of the [business] that [Mr Piovene] operated through his son's company ([KK Pty Ltd]), his work performance […] was unsatisfactory. For example, I had vacant units and potential tenants calling me to see when they could view them and [Mr Piovene] was not responding to them; also minor repairs and maintenance issues were not being attended to by [Mr Piovene] and tenants were complaining. I raised both directly with [Mr Piovene] and with each of my children my concerns about his performance. There had been a discussion at the [apartments] in October, involving myself, [Mr Piovene] and [Ms F], where [Ms F] had called [Mr Piovene] an "opportunist' and that he "was greedy'. [Ms F] walked out of the discussion, and over the weeks that followed I received verbal communications both from [Ms F] and [Mr O] asking that I "get [Mr Piovene] out of the [Suburb U] property'.
…
188.In response to paragraph 276 - I had been aware from a date in 2021, that [Mr Piovene] was having a relationship of a personal nature with [an employee] from the former [business] he operated. I did not show [Mr Piovene] any text messages. I did not say nor boast that I was able to his phone "hacked".
189.In response to paragraph 277 - Whilst there were moments of anger, I deny the conversation attributed to me in paragraph 277. I said to [Mr Piovene] "I want you to finish up this year, and rent out the units if you can that are presently empty, and I want you out of [Suburb U] before Christmas. I have no faith in your ability to do your job properly."
The applicant commenced proceedings in June 2023, some six months after the incident deposed to above.
APPLICABLE LAW
The factual contentions advanced by each of the parties call for a finding on the part of the applicant that the parties were in a de facto relationship during the period contended for by the applicant. As with all human relationships, de facto relationships can take many different forms and no one relationship is the same as another; such is the varied nature of human interactions. In making the findings urged by each of the parties, the Court is compelled to examine what the parties said and did and all of the circumstances attending their relationship to form a composite picture that leads to the conclusion were, or were not, the parties in a de facto relationship.
Section 4AA(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) states that a person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:
(a) the persons are not legally married to each other; and
(b) the persons are not related by family; and
(c)having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.
The Act enumerates a non-exhaustive series of matters under s 4AA(2) that the Court may have regard to in determining whether a de facto relationship exists. They are:
(a)       the duration of the relationship;
(b)      the nature and extent of their common residence;
(c)       whether a sexual relationship exists;
(d)the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;
(e)       the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
(f)       the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
(g)whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;
(h)      the care and support of children;
(i)       the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
Relevantly s 4AA(3) and (4) require careful consideration, recording that:
(3)No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.
(4)A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.
In Fairbairn v Radecki (2022) 275 CLR 400 (“Fairbairn & Radecki”) the High Court, observed as follows:
28. Section 4AA(1)(c) identifies the relationship which is the concern of the Act: “a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis”. The existence of such a relationship is determined having regard to “all the circumstances” of a relationship; significantly, those “circumstances” include any or all of the circumstances listed in s 4AA(2), and, by reason of s 4AA(3), no particular finding about any circumstance is necessary for there to be a de facto relationship. Consistently with the reality that human relationships are infinitely mutable, in determining whether a de facto relationship exists a court is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate.
…
39. The language of s 4AA of the Act and its reference to “living together” requires no different approach to determining whether a relationship exists of the kind defined. “Living together”, consistently with authority, should be construed as meaning sharing life as a couple. Section 4AA does not prescribe any way by which a couple may share life together. Its language is sufficiently broad to accommodate the great variety of ways a de facto relationship may exist. That conclusion is supported by the varied factors listed in s 4AA(2). In a given case, some of the factors listed in s 4AA(2) may be relevant and some may be irrelevant; inevitably some may have greater prominence than others. A conclusion that a de facto relationship has ended may also arise because of factors not listed in s 4AA(2). Such a conclusion is mandated by s 4AA(3) and (4). In particular, s 4AA(4) is a statutory recognition that what may constitute a genuine de facto relationship is not be determined in the same way in every case by reference to rigid criteria that must always be satisfied. In that respect, the language of s 4AA(2)(b) does not assume that every de facto relationship must have a “common residence” to some “extent” and of some “nature”. Such a construction is entirely denied by s 4AA(3).
(Footnote omitted)
Recently the Full Court in Shelby & Rylan [2022] FedCFamC1A 143 observed:
19.The High Court has arguably clarified that parties do not need to live together in order to be in a de facto relationship if they are sharing life as a couple. This however does not mean that every couple sharing life is necessarily living in a de facto relationship. The Court must have regard to all of the evidence, including to the matters referred to in s 4AA(2) of the Act. On one view, the phrase “sharing life” is simply a general summary of the s 4AA(2) circumstances.
CREDIT
The credit of each of the parties loomed large and was primarily the focus of the concluding submissions. Solicitor advocate for the applicant and senior counsel for the respondent each urged that their client’s evidence be preferred to that of the other.
Section 140(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) requires the Court to find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. This can be informed by ‘an actual persuasion of the fact’; inconsistencies may be resolved by evidence that is more probable than not or evidence that is consistent with incontrovertible facts or compelling inferences.
The Court is not however obliged to nor is it necessary to resolve every factual dispute as between the parties. If it were judgments would be even more endlessly prolix than they otherwise are. I have, however, read all of the evidence relied upon in the proceedings including the exhibits but do not propose to repeat all of it in these reasons. As the High Court reminds in Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447:
62. … A judge’s reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge’s failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party’s case.
I will, however, make some initial observations of my impressions of the credibility of each of the parties. I reach my findings based upon my observations of the way they gave their oral evidence as well as the exploration of the historical matters that impinge or bolster their credit in the course of cross examination.
While each party attested to the truth of the assertions in their affidavit, they were each found wanting in aspects of their evidence as to matters of history which was in some respects inconsistent with other evidence.
There are instances in the applicant’s evidence where I am satisfied that not only were there deficiencies of memory but admissions that did him no credit. The applicant was cross‑examined at length about various representations he had made in Family Court (as it was then known) proceedings between he and his former wife and in relation to proceedings in the then-called Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) about child support.
He was asked questions about a medical episode he had in 2009 and it was put to him that following that medical episode he had played very little poker. The applicant denied the proposition contending that he played poker regularly. He was then taken to documents submitted by him to the SSAT and agreed he informed that tribunal that he had played poker irregularly because of his health. He asserted that what he said to that tribunal was the truth. There was an inconsistency between what he represented to this court and what he had represented to the SSAT.
He was cross-examined on a statement he made during the Family Court proceedings where he told the court that the Suburb U property was owned by a close friend. He was then asked the following questions:
And that was the truth, wasn’t it? --- I could have been a little more clearer.
But was it – no, that – no, that was the truth, wasn’t it? --- Not quite.
So are you suggesting that you were willing to mislead the court? --- No, I don’t think I meant to mislead the court. I think I was being selective in the way I wanted to describe my situation to my ex-wife, because it was as difficult ---
(Transcript 26 August 2024, p.26 lines 35–40)
I asked him the following question:
HIS HONOUR: --- when you said you were being selective about what you told your former wife? --- Yes.
Do you mean by that, that you didn’t tell her the whole truth? --- That’s right, your Honour. I was going through a very difficult divorce, and she was being very difficult with my access to my daughters. And I knew that she wouldn’t be too happy with our daughters coming home to another woman.
And that justified not telling the whole truth? --- At the time, I didn’t think it was that bad.
(Transcript 26 August 2024, p.27 lines 5–20)
I am satisfied that in the proceedings before the Family Court, despite his obligation to tell the whole truth, he did not do so.
The applicant agreed that he represented to the Family Court in 2013 that the respondent had offered to let him live in the Suburb U unit until he got back on his feet financially. This assertion is inconsistent with what he represents to be the true nature of his relationship with the respondent. He agreed that he represented to the SSAT that his income for the 2013 financial year should be assessed at $23,500 and that he did not have the means to pay any substantial capital expenses. Notwithstanding that proposition, he adhered to his evidence that he paid for various improvements to the Suburb U property from commissions he was entitled to and denied that such improvements were paid for by the respondent. He agreed he did not inform the SSAT that he was entitled to these commissions.
I am satisfied that the applicant sought to arrange his financial affairs in the proceedings with his former wife in a way that was to his financial advantage and to the financial disadvantage of her and their children. In that respect, he agreed that he asked the respondent to stop paying him wages so that they would not be garnisheed to pay child support. His explanation that he established the company KK Pty Ltd with one of his children and niece as shareholders to keep it separate from his other corporate interests was implausible. He could have been a shareholder and kept his interest separate. I am satisfied it was done to minimise his child support obligations.
The applicant was cross-examined about a phone call made upon the discovery of the respondent’s father’s body. The applicant had represented that he had made the phone call to emergency services. The applicant, when cross-examined, backtracked from the proposition and said that he may have made the call but that it was Mr O who spoke to them. He says it was a very stressful situation and he agreed that the evidence from the emergency services demonstrated that in fact Mr O spoke to them. It was put to him that the evidence of Mr O and the emergency services contradicted what he said and that he was now changing his story to which he answered, “Only because of the evidence” (Transcript 26 August 2024, page 43 line 5).
I am satisfied, in light of the applicant’s cross-examination on these issues, that the applicant was less than truthful for the purposes of obtaining a financial advantage in representations he made to the SSAT and the Family Court. I also find that he did not tell the Family Court, consistent with his oath, “the whole truth”. Of course, the fact that the applicant may have been less than frank in other proceedings does not mean that the applicant is being untruthful now. It does, however, mean that I approach all of his evidence with a greater degree of caution that might otherwise have been the case and will prefer it only where it is supported by other evidence or documents.
The respondent also had difficulty with aspects of her evidence. I found her argumentative and combative, and she failed to make appropriate concessions notwithstanding it being demonstrated that there were inconsistencies between her affidavit and contemporaneously prepared documents.

The respondent was cross examined on paragraph 126 of her affidavit where she asserted that the applicant had not played any material role in the development of the Suburb LL Project and her evidence at paragraph 36 of her affidavit that the extent of their financial relationship was her providing the applicant with free accommodation, paying him wages and providing him with motor vehicles and a supplementary credit card, all on the basis of him managing a block of apartments in Suburb LL. I am satisfied that in each respect she significantly understated the role played by the applicant.
The respondent was cross-examined on a reference signed by the applicant for use in proceedings where she was charged with offences of dishonesty and subsequently convicted. She initially denied any knowledge of the reference only to somewhat reluctantly accept that he did provide a reference and she had known about it.
As with the applicant’s evidence I will for the above reasons proceed with caution accepting the uncorroborated evidence of the respondent.
Courts are not obliged to reject the whole of the evidence of a party or witness just because they do not accept a party’s evidence on a particular issue. As O’Loughlin J observed in Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1:
118. Before commencing a detailed analysis of the evidence in this case, I desire, in the first instance, to make clear the approach that I have taken to the evidence of a witness where I have found some, but not all, aspects of the evidence of that witness to be unreliable. Simply because I find against a party or a witness on one issue and reject some part of the evidence of that person, it does not mean that what remains is tainted, or otherwise lacks probative force, with the consequence that I should dismiss all the evidence of that person. The principles enunciated in the cases indicate that the trial judge is entitled to believe part of the evidence given by a witness and to reject the rest. After making an assessment of the evidence, after utilising the advantage of having seen and heard all the witnesses, and after forming an impression of each, the confidence that the judge reposes in a particular witness is assessed accordingly. Where evidence has a logical probative value, a judge will rely on it; where it contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force, the judge will, in all probability reject it or, at least, not rely on it…
Like many such cases, the resolution of this matter does not turn on a singular piece of evidence. As Beazley P observed in Nguyen v Tran (2018) MVR 16:
54. The fact finding exercise which is required to be undertaken by the tribunal of fact, whether that be judge or jury, is not properly approached in that segmented way. The tribunal of fact, after hearing the witnesses, making assessments as to the credit and reliability of their evidence and examining the documentary evidence, if any, must weigh the whole of the evidence to determine whether the party bearing the legal onus has proved his or her case.
In light of the above inconsistencies in the parties’ evidence, I do not propose to resolve the case by simply preferring the evidence of one party over that of the other, but rather will look to the substantial issues and the findings in relation to them to inform my findings in relation to matters overall. In doing so I will look to the evidence of each of the parties which is corroborated by other evidence, evidence that is more probable than not, and evidence that is consistent with incontrovertible facts or compelling inferences.
Each of the parties called various witnesses. The applicant called a Ms H who said she recalled meeting the respondent in 2010 where she was introduced by the applicant as her partner. The respondent denied that was said. Ms H said she observed the parties being affectionate, attending various social functions, saw the respondent lying in the applicant’s lap and that she observed them sharing a bedroom on a number of occasions. Mr J gave evidence of being invited by them and inviting the parties to social events and family occasions. Despite saying in his affidavit that the respondent referred to the applicant as ‘my partner’, he denied she did in his oral evidence. There is no reason to doubt the evidence of these witnesses.
In the respondent’s case, a large number of witnesses were called and required for cross examination. The respondent’s daughter, Ms F, and son, Mr O, each swore affidavits. The solicitor advocate for the applicant submitted that the evidence of the respondent and her daughter was disturbingly similar and in effect no weight should be placed upon Ms F’s evidence.
There was a similitude in the manner in which the respondent and Ms F gave their evidence. Each approached cross examination pugnaciously. That, does not, however, detract from her credibility. While recognising that Ms F was clearly supportive of her mother’s case and accepting that she was found wanting in some of her assertions as to matters of recall, I do not however reject Ms F’s evidence as implausible or fabricated. On balance, I accept Ms F gave her evidence honestly. I will deal with aspects of her evidence later in these reasons.
I have no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the evidence of the respondent’s son Mr O or that of his former partner Ms K, the respondent’s friend Ms P or Mr G. No submission was made that I should not accept their evidence.
Mr N was called in the respondent’s case. The respondent asserts she and Mr N were in a de facto relationship between 2005 and 2014. Mr N agrees they were in a relationship over the same period. They finalised their financial relationship in the terms of a Financial Agreement entered into in 2015. The applicant’s solicitor advocate asserted that Mr N was not a credible witness, pointing to inconsistencies between assertions made in his affidavit in relation to works undertaken by the applicant on various building projects with contemporaneous documents. On those matters, Mr N frankly admitted that his recall was deficient. He made frank admissions that he could not recall exactly which Christmas Day functions he attended between 2010 and 2014.
Contrary to the applicant’s submission, I find those admissions more consistent with the evidence of a credible witness who accepts in the face of the obvious that they were wrong than the witness who steadfastly adheres to their affidavit in the face of conflicting testimony. I am satisfied, notwithstanding Mr N’s deficits in recall of various works undertaken by the applicant, that on the whole he was a credible and otherwise reliable witness. He was unshaken in his recall of seeing a Financial Agreement with a date of February 2014, he was sure that he did not assume occupation of the Suburb T apartment until 2013 and he was not cross examined on the detail of his evidence in paragraphs 14 and 15 of his affidavit. I find him to be a credible and reliable witness on the issue of his relationship with the respondent, the Financial Agreement he signed and his use and occupation of the Suburb T apartment.
There are many aspects of the parties’ relationship that are not in issue. Thus, it is not in issue that the applicant occupied a home owned by the respondent, that they holidayed together both in Australia and/or overseas and that the respondent provided a motor vehicle for the use of the applicant at various periods over the course of the relationship. Nor is it in issue that the parties had a sexual relationship or that the applicant and the respondent engaged in and attended many social and family functions together. There are other matters, however, about which the applicant and the respondent are clearly at odds.
Those contentious matters are cast in fairly absolute terms. In a case such as this where credit looms large, I will deal with these contentious issues in the context of considering the credit of the parties and various witnesses. I intend to do so because findings on these contentious issues are important to the determination of credit and that credit finding will affect the determination of other substantive issues.
Occupation of the Suburb T Apartment
The applicant contends that in or about late 2010, he and the respondent discussed purchasing an apartment in Suburb T so they could spend more time together and thereafter he negotiated the purchase of a one-bedroom unit on behalf of the respondent, albeit purchased in the name of a company owned and controlled by the respondent.
He contends that he and the respondent thereafter went shopping for a bed for the apartment and designed the interior of the apartment. He says that once the property was set up, he and the respondent would spend weekends as well as weekdays at the apartment. He contends that the respondent kept several outfits at the Suburb T property and that they each had a key to the apartment.
He says they would typically go to the apartment on a Friday night and stay throughout the weekend until about Sunday. He says that he had his daughters on alternate weekends, and they would often stay at the apartment on the occasions he had them in his care. He says that the parties would go for walks together, go to two restaurants in the area with such an arrangement lasting for the first three years of their relationship until the purchase of the property at Suburb U.
The respondent admits she purchased a unit in Suburb T in the name of a company and that the applicant undertook negotiations on her behalf to acquire the property. Apart from those facts, the balance of the evidence of the applicant on this topic is denied by the respondent. The respondent says that upon acquisition, her daughter Ms F moved into the apartment and remained there until about 2011. After Ms F moved out of the apartment, the respondent contends that her then de facto partner, Mr N, took up occupation. In that respect, she gives the following evidence:
73.In response to paragraph 42 – Denied. After [Ms F] moved out of the [Suburb T apartment in 2011, [Mr N] took up occupation. [Mr N] had previously lent me $1million, and as I was grateful for his financial assistance caused him to receive a year of free rent. After that first 12 months, [Mr N] paid the rent of $650 per week into the bank account of [Y Pty Ltd] ATF [Muhlfeld Superannuation Fund] business account. Now exhibited to me and marked [MM]-3 is a true copy of a bank statement for that super fund dated 29 June 2012.
The respondent was not cross-examined on any of the any of the detail referenced in this paragraph. She also disputed the contentions of the applicant in relation to the attendance at various restaurants, suggesting that the restaurant which the applicant contended they attended did not open until early 2012 and that the cafe did not open until late 2013. Each of these matters were ultimately conceded by the applicant during cross-examination. She disputed that the applicant had a key and disputed the contention that his daughters stayed at any time in the Suburb T apartment. She denied that she kept any outfits or possessions in the Suburb T apartment.
The applicant’s daughter, Ms F, gave evidence that towards the end of 2010 she moved into the Suburb T apartment and after she left, Mr N moved in.
Mr N, gave evidence as follows:
14.[In mid] 2011, [Ms Muhlfeld] allowed me to live rent free in her unit at [Suburb T] for 12 months. The unit was fully furnished. I moved in [in mid] 2011 and lived there without paying rent. In 2008 I had loaned [Ms Muhlfeld] $1 million that she needed for a business venture at the time. [Ms Muhlfeld] told me in 2011 “I’m letting you stay rent free for 1 year because you loaned me that money”.
15.From [mid] 2012 until [mid] 2014, I paid rent to [Ms Muhlfeld] and there are bank records that confirm my rent for that 2 year period for living in the fully furnished apartment at [Suburb T]. These payments were made by me to a National Australia Bank account being account number […92]. The account was in the name of [Y Pty Ltd] ATF [Muhlfeld Superannuation Fund].
(Original emphasis)
It was put to Mr N that he did not occupy the apartment until 2013. He denied that proposition. There was no cross-examination of Mr N on the detail as referred to in paragraph 15 above.
The respondent’s affidavits were served in March 2024. The applicant was clearly on notice that there was a serious contention putting in issue much of his evidence as to the first three years of their relationship including where the parties, according to him, spent a significant period of time. The applicant was cross-examined and admitted that his daughters were witnesses who were available and could have given evidence in the proceedings. In those circumstances, it was available to the applicant to have called evidence from his daughters to bolster the evidence in his case and to put in issue the allegations raised by the respondent, the respondent’s daughter and Mr N. He elected not to do so. I draw the inference that their evidence would not have assisted his case (Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298).
In circumstances where I accept Mr N as a credible witness on this issue and where the assertions in the documentary evidence in support referred to by the respondent and Mr N of the payment of rent was not challenged, I prefer the evidence of the respondent, the respondent’s daughter and Mr N on the issue of the use and occupation of the Suburb T apartment.
Accordingly, I do not accept the evidence of the applicant on this issue.
Were the respondent and Mr N in a de facto relationship
The respondent gave evidence that in late 2005, she and Mr N rekindled their personal relationship and that it continued until February 2014 when it ended. She described it as a de facto relationship. She says that she did not have a sexual relationship with the applicant during any period of time in which she was in a relationship with Mr N.
M N gave evidence that he and the respondent had been in a relationship in 1994 and 1995 and resumed their relationship in late 2005 which continued until February 2014. In 2015, he said that he and the respondent entered into a Financial Agreement. This latter issue is not in dispute.
The respondent’s daughter, Ms F, gave evidence that between 2004 and 2014, her mother was in a romantic relationship with Mr N. She said that her mother would frequently say to her, “I’m going over to [Mr N’s]” or “I am staying at [Mr N’s] place in [Suburb T]” (Affidavit of Ms F filed 18 March 2024, paragraph 7).
Ms P, who gave evidence on behalf of the respondent, said that at the time she met the applicant, the respondent and Mr N “were together in a personal relationship” (Affidavit of Ms P filed 18 March 2024, paragraph 24). She referred to a holiday that the respondent and Mr N went on overseas in 2013. Ms P did not ever refer to the applicant and the respondent being together in a “personal relationship”.
Given the weight of the evidence in support of Mr N and the respondent being in a relationship, consistent also with the existence of the Financial Agreements and my acceptance of the evidence of Mr N, I am satisfied that he and the respondent were in a de facto relationship that ended in 2014.
The existence of a de facto relationship between Mr N and the respondent does not exclude the existence of a de facto relationship between the applicant and the respondent.
Financial Agreement entered into between Mr N and the respondent
The applicant made much of the Financial Agreement entered into between the respondent and Mr N. There is no issue that there were a number of versions of the Financial Agreement. One version recorded the date of separation of Mr N and the respondent as 2009 which was subsequently amended with a handwritten amendment recording 2011. During the respondent’s cross-examination on this document, she contended that there were in fact three versions of the Financial Agreement.
Mr N gave clear evidence in the course of his cross-examination when he said that the final copy he saw at Suburb MM hospitality office said the relationship ended in February 2014.
Two Financial Agreements were tendered (Exhibits 21 and 43). The existence of a third accords with the evidence of the respondent and Mr N. The solicitor advocate for the applicant submitted from the Bar Table that they had issued a subpoena calling for Financial Agreements and only two were produced. No evidence of the subpoena or the documents produced were tendered.
I accept the evidence of the respondent and Mr N as to when their relationship ended and that there existed more than two Financial Agreements, one of which recorded a date of February 2014.
Whether the applicant said he planned to marry Ms NN
The respondent, in her affidavit, contended that the applicant and Ms NN were in a relationship between 2015 and 2016. She says it was “openly discussed by [Mr Piovene] in my presence that he ‘intended to marry [Ms NN]’.” (Affidavit of the applicant filed 18 March 2024, paragraph 26).
I am also satisfied that the applicant told the respondent that he was “planning to marry [Ms NN]” (Affidavit of the applicant filed 18 March 2024, paragraph 132). The applicant’s daughter, Ms F, gave evidence in her affidavit that Ms NN told her that she was “sleeping with [Mr Piovene]” and said “[Mr Piovene] will marry me to keep me in the country” (Affidavit of Ms F filed 18 March 2024, paragraph 31).
Ms K gave evidence that she observed the applicant and Ms NN “giggling and acting towards each other in what [she] would describe as a flirtatious manner” and “observed them going in and out of [Ms NN’s] apartment on several occasions” (Affidavit of Ms K filed 18 March 2024, paragraph 10). She was not cross examined on this observation.
The applicant was cross-examined about this issue to the following effect:
Now, you were in a relationship with a [Ms NN] from 2015 until 2016? --- No.
[Ms NN] was the nanny of [Ms F]. Wasn’t she? --- She was.
And you had an intimate relationship with her. Didn’t you? --- No.
In fact, you were – wanted to – you thought so much of her – she was [a foreigner]. Wasn’t she? --- Yes.
And she was not a permanent resident of Australia. Was she? --- No.
She was on a visa? --- I believe so.
Yes. And you thought so much of her, that you wanted to – or intended to marry her, to help her stay in Australia. Didn’t you? --- No.
And that is what you told [Ms F]. Didn’t you? --- No.
(Transcript 26 August 2024, page 39 lines 5-25)
There is a clear conflict between in the evidence of the applicant and the respondent.
Ms F, in her affidavit, refers to a text she sent to her partner on 14 July 2021 to the following effect:
Speaking of [Ms NN] did I ever tell you that [Mr Piovene] was going to marry her so she could stay in Australia …
Her partner, Mr G, records receiving such a text from Ms F. Neither he nor Ms F were cross examined on this text.
The applicant’s solicitor advocate cross-examined the respondent on an interview conducted with the Department of Social Services in May 2019, in which the respondent was asked various questions about Ms NN. The applicant’s solicitor advocate makes the point that at no time during the course of that transcript does the respondent contend that Ms NN was in a relationship with the applicant and submits that the respondent on a number of occasions said Ms NN was in a relationship with somebody else. The applicant’s solicitor advocate submits that the issue of the applicant having been in a relationship with Ms NN was an entire fabrication, describing it as “a lie from the mouth of the respondent” and a deception.
I do not accept that submission. It does not accord with the text message sent by Ms F.
The text message that Ms F sent was not the subject of any cross examination. I am persuaded that the natural inference and what is most plausible is that consistent with the evidence of the respondent and consistent with what Ms NN told Ms F, and what she discussed with the applicant, the applicant did say that he that he would marry Ms NN. It is the most plausible explanation for the text and conversations. No other more plausible explanation was proffered by the applicant.

I do not accept the applicant’s denial that he did not say that he planned to marry Ms NN.
I am satisfied that the applicant’s statement to the respondent that he planned to marry Ms NN and Ms F’s evidence on this topic are inconsistent with the applicant and respondent being in a de facto relationship.
Sleeping Arrangements on Holidays
There is no issue that the parties travelled extensively on holidays. In almost every instance the applicant contended that the parties stayed in the same room and slept in the same bed.
The assertion is not, in every instance, accepted by the respondent. The respondent’s evidence on this issue is corroborated by the evidence of her daughter that she and the respondent shared a room on the holidays she went on.
Ms H says that the applicant and respondent shared a room. In cross examination, she said:
And [Ms Muhlfeld] never laid on [Mr Piovene]’s lap, watching television? --- They did. There was three of us in the [Suburb U] home. We were watching television; they were sitting on the couch. -[Ms Muhlfeld] – [Ms Muhlfeld] was lying on [Mr Piovene]’s lap, and I was sitting on the single chair, watching television.
[Ms H], the case is this: you’re just making up this evidence because you want to help [Mr Piovene]? --- Not – all the evidence I provided I also provided photos.
(Transcript 26 August 2024, page 72 lines 30-40)
I am not satisfied that evidence is such that it renders implausible the evidence of the respondent and her daughter. At its highest, it amounts to a conclusion that comes from a knock on the door.
Photographs, Text Messages, WhatsApp Messages and the Transcript of the Respondent’s Interview (Exhibit 47)
The applicant tendered a vast array of photographs, text messages and WhatsApp messages. The applicant’s submission was that these documents demonstrated that the relationship between the applicant and the respondent was more than as contended for by the respondent, namely, that of a best friend, and was consistent with the applicant’s case that the applicant and respondent were in a de facto relationship and that the applicant was a member of the respondent’s family unit.
In relation to the photographs, the applicant’s solicitor advocate contended that the Court should draw inferences from the various positions of the applicant and/or respondent in the photograph, including what was described as body language. I accept that the photographs show the applicant present at many social occasions, family celebrations and events of significant interest including engagement parties, dinners and other social occasions involving the respondent. There are many photographs of the applicant and respondent sitting together and in close proximity to each other. There are also photographs of the applicant and the respondent with other people. I do not draw the inference as invited by the applicant that the position of the applicant in a particular photograph, as opposed to the position of Mr N, permits the inference that at the time the applicant was in a de facto relationship with the respondent and that Mr N was not.
I am, however, satisfied that the photographs demonstrate a closeness in the relationship between the applicant and the respondent and the respondent’s family. I am not satisfied that I could draw the conclusion from them that they establish that they are in a de facto relationship albeit I accept it is but one part of a number of pieces of evidence that may ultimately demonstrate that fact.
Reliance was also placed on a significant number of text and WhatsApp messages between the applicant and other persons. The various instances of communication reveal the applicant referring to the respondent as his partner and/or lover as well as using various other terms of endearment. Some of the documents also refer to the respondent referring to the applicant as her partner. The applicant relies on the message sent by Mr Q to the applicant where he refers to the respondent as the applicant’s “better half” suggesting a closeness to the relationship equivalent to that of de facto. Solicitor advocate for the applicant submitted that this was a telling example of where the truth lies in contrast to the case as presented by the respondent. The applicant also submitted that the transcript of the respondent’s interview disclosed the respondent referring to the applicant as her partner in contradistinction to her referring to Mr N as her former partner.
The respondent’s senior counsel submits that there is no inconsistency between the evidence of the respondent and the representations made at that time with those she currently makes. He submitted that it was entirely accurate of her to refer to the applicant as her partner and Mr N as her former partner and that there is a looseness of language about which the Court should not place too much emphasis. He submits that what is more relevant is that she describes her marital status as widow as opposed to de facto and that references by the applicant to the respondent as his lover are consistent with the fact that they were at times intimate.
As against these documents are various text messages sent by the respondent’s daughter Ms F. Ms F sends a text message to the respondent on 10 October 2020, which states:
I know he’s your best mate mum but he creeps me out mum.
The reference to ‘best mate’ correlates with the respondent’s contention of the applicant as her best friend. I also note a text message sent by Ms F to her partner, Mr G dated 3 December 2020. That text messages records that he is:
Not even part of our family … just an employee…Mum is frustrating as he’s like her best friend and she just won’t listen …
The text messages, whilst not complimentary of the applicant, demonstrate that as far as the respondent’s daughter was concerned, the relationship between the applicant and the respondent accorded with the respondent’s view of the relationship as one of friendship.
All of these documents relied upon by the applicant as demonstrative of the parties being in a de facto relationship, including numerous references to the use of terms such as partner, lover and various other terms of endearment, require the Court to infer a relationship. They are in stark contrast with the two text messages sent by Ms F which do not require the drawing of any inference but on their face clearly characterise the relationship between the applicant and the respondent as the respondent’s best friend because that is what the respondent said to Ms F that he was. Not her lover, boyfriend or partner, but best friend.
In some circumstances the distinction may not differ, someone can be a de facto and someone’s best friend. In this case, however, I am satisfied on balance when taken with all of the other evidence referred to above it is a distinction of significant difference that was well understood by the respondent’s daughter.
Events of October 2022
The applicant’s affidavit discloses that on 27 October 2022, he was called by the respondent to a meeting. He says that shortly after arriving the respondent became angry and started yelling at him, saying that she had evidence of him having an affair with Ms X, a work colleague of the applicant. He said that she produced pages of screenshots, text messages from his phone, and began reading them out to him and yelling at him. His affidavit records the following:
277.[Ms Muhlfeld] continued to yell and swear at me saying words to the effect of “You made a fucking fool of me. I have told the children everything so let’s see how you’re going to explain yourself with this shit you got up to.” I tried to calm [Ms Muhlfeld] down for the next two hours and asked if there was any way she could forgive me but she was very angry and was very clear that our relationship was over.
He says that he met the next day with his son and was informed that the respondent had contacted him and shown him text messages, as well as contacting his sister and niece and showing them text messages. He says that he thereafter tried to arrange meetings with the respondent’s son and daughter who declined to meet with him, each sending him text messages.
The respondent was cross-examined by the applicant’s solicitor advocate about these events, seeking to portray the actions of the respondent as being consistent with the breakdown of a de facto relationship upon having discovered the applicant having an affair with a very young woman. The applicant, in submissions, invited the Court to conclude that the actions and conduct of the respondent at this time, including her stabbing a couch in anger, were entirely consistent with hurt and humiliation upon discovering he had an affair.
Much of the finer detail of the events at this time are the subject of dispute. The respondent denies the broad thrust of the applicant’s contentions, denies showing the applicant any text messages and denies showing any text messages to the applicant’s son, sister and niece.
The respondent contends that she was aware of an affair between the applicant and Ms X in the early part of 2022. Such contention was advanced by both the respondent and her daughter. Neither the respondent, nor her daughter, were challenged on their evidence that they were aware of an affair with Ms X prior to October 2022. Both the respondent and her daughter contextualise their ‘anger’ as one of more disgust in the context of discovering that Ms X was someone who was the same age as the applicant’s daughters, as opposed to anger at an affair.
The evidence, such as it is, does not enable me to draw the conclusion that the applicant invites. In circumstances where the respondent’s affidavit was sworn on 18 March 2024 and the applicant being, as he must have been, conscious of the factual controversy on this issue, elected not to call any evidence from either his son, sister or niece either as to the respondent showing them the messages or as to what the respondent actually said. This is despite admitting in cross-examination that they were available to have given evidence in the proceedings. I draw an inference that their evidence would not have assisted the applicant. The evidence of the respondent and her daughter’s knowledge of the affair with Ms X many months earlier does not render implausible their outrage many months later.
The applicant gives no evidence of any fracturing in the relationship between he and the respondent prior to this point in time. The respondent and her daughter give evidence, that was not challenged, of problems in the relationship between the applicant and the respondent and how the applicant was perceived by the respondent and members of her family.
In that respect, the applicant gives evidence that she had in 2019 discussed with the applicant his occupation of the Suburb U property and gave him notice to vacate verbally. She then agreed that he could live there for a further five years. The applicant gives evidence that in October 2019, she and her children had discussed concerns about the performance of the applicant and that there had been a discussion where her daughter had described the applicant as an “opportunist” and greedy, and that both Ms F and Mr O had said to the applicant that she should “get [Mr Piovene] out of the [Suburb U] property” (Affidavit filed 18 March 2024, paragraph 182). The applicant gave evidence that the respondent did not travel with her at Christmas 2019 to Europe and gives evidence that between 2020 and 2021 she only saw him on limited occasions and declined invitations to events that he would be attending. Her senior counsel points to Ms F, not the applicant, being named as her ‘bubble buddy’ following the intervention of Covid.
The respondent’s senior counsel submitted the conduct of the respondent in stabbing the couch, was entirely explicable in the context that she regarded the applicant as having stolen her furniture and her explanation that she did it so he could not enjoy was entirely understandable and logical. I don’t accept that it was logical.
On balance, I am not satisfied that I could conclude on weighing all of the above evidence that the conduct, behaviour and words used by the respondent in October 2022 are consistent with the case advanced by the applicant. I am satisfied that there were already difficulties in the relationship between the applicant and the respondent as evidenced by the unchallenged evidence of the respondent and the respondent’s daughter.
On balance, I am not persuaded that the explanation for the behaviour, language and conduct of the respondent following the meeting in October 2022 can be explained through the prism of a de facto partner having discovered her partner in an affair with a much younger woman.
SECTION 4AA(2) INDICIA
To the extent I have not already done so I set out below my considerations of the statutory indicia.
The duration of the relationship
The parties are at issue as to the existence of a relationship. A finding as to the existence and consequential duration of the relationship is informed by an assessment of all of the relevant circumstances in the period between the date asserted by the applicant as to when a relationship if any commenced and if established when the relationship broke down.
Nature and extent of their common residence
There was no submission that the Suburb T, Suburb U, or any other residence was considered a ‘common residence’.
I have already made findings that the parties did not at any time occupy or use the Suburb T apartment in the manner contended by the applicant between its purchase in 2010 and 2013. In that period, contrary to the sworn evidence of the application and consistent with the evidence of the respondent and her witnesses, I find that the Suburb T property was occupied by the respondent’s daughter and then by Mr N.
There is no issue that from 2013 the applicant occupied the respondent’s property at Suburb U property until he moved out at the end of 2022.
I am not satisfied that the parties ever had a common residence. At its highest the applicant resided in the Suburb U property and the respondent resided in her home at Suburb W. On occasions the respondent stayed overnight in the Suburb U property and at other times they stayed in the respondent’s property in Region GG and overnighted in other places on holidays.
The applicant’s assertion that he stayed in the respondent’s home at Suburb W more regularly after 2017 at paragraph 49 of his affidavit is contradicted by the evidence of the respondent and witnesses in her case. In that respect, Ms K gives evidence of having lived in the granny flat at Suburb W between the end of 2017 and 2021 and that the granny flat was about 10m from the main house. She says:
15.I recall an occasion when the Applicant stayed in the spare room at [Ms Muhlfeld]’s and the reason I recall this one-off occasion is because of a conversation that occurred between me and [Ms Muhlfeld] about the [dog] urinating on the bed in the spare room.
This evidence of a one-off occasion sits inconsistent with the evidence of the applicant.
Mr O’s evidence is deposed as follows:
6.Between 2017 and 2023 I lived in the granny flat at my mother’s home at [OO Street], [Suburb W]. During this period, I observed [Mr Piovene] visit the home from time to time, around twice a month, and I overheard [Mr Piovene] and my mother talking about business opportunities. I did not at any time observe [Mr Piovene] to stay overnight and I saw him leave the home or notice that he had left later in the day on each occasion. I would many times each week go into my mother’s home. I did not at any time see [Mr Piovene]’s personal items or belongings at my mother’s home.
I prefer the evidence of Mr O and Ms K on this issue. I am not satisfied that the applicant stayed in the respondent’s home at Suburb W as often as he contends.
The applicant contended that the respondent would spend two–three nights per week at Suburb U. This was denied by the respondent. The respondent’s senior counsel submitted that the absence of any evidence from Ms L (a witness in the applicant’s case) of seeing the respondent at the Suburb U residence two–three nights per week in circumstances where she was a resident of that block of units, invites the type of inference identified in Commercial Union Assurance v Ferrcom (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 at 418. I do not accept that such an inference is available on this evidence.
The applicant contended that he and the respondent left clothing and toiletries in the Suburb T property. I do not, for the reasons given earlier, accept his evidence.
The applicant also contended that he left personal possessions in the respondent’s home at Region GG and at Suburb W and that she left personal property in the Suburb U home. This is denied by the respondent. The respondent’s senior counsel submits as evidence of the falsity of the applicant’s contention, that the applicant adduces no evidence of seeking the return of such property following the events at the end of 2022 when the applicant vacated the Suburb U property. However, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
Whether a sexual relationship existed
A sexual relationship is just one indicium of a de facto relationship. The parties present on this issue, as with other issues, diametrically opposed cases.
The applicant contended that the parties had an active sexual relationship having “intercourse not less than weekly for most of the relationship” (Affidavit of the applicant filed 4 March 2024, paragraph 32).
The respondent contended that she did not have a sexual relationship with the applicant or any other person other than Mr N from 2010 until about 2014 at paragraph 64 of her affidavit. She deposed at paragraph 65 of her affidavit, that she and the applicant had sexual intercourse about 5 to 10 times between 2014 and 2019. In her evidence in chief, she sought to correct that assertion contending that a sexual relationship ended in 2018. In explaining why, she had changed that date, she said that when she prepared her affidavit, she believed that she had met her doctor in 2019 who had confirmed a diagnosis of a sexually transmitted infection, but now believed it to be 2018. She said that after that date she stopped any sexual intercourse. She tendered in support of the date a pathology test (Exhibit 7).
I prefer the evidence of the respondent to that of the applicant on this issue. I have, for reasons advanced earlier, accepted her evidence that she was in a de facto relationship with Mr N until 2014. I find the respondent’s explanation as to why she stopped having a sexual relationship as plausible and inherently believable, particularly in circumstances where I have found the evidence of the applicant on a number of key issues wanting, inconsistent and implausible. On balance, weighing the evidence of both parties with other evidence, I am satisfied that I prefer the evidence of the respondent to that of the applicant on this issue.
The degree of any financial dependence or independence and any arrangements for financial support between them
At no time over the period of the party’s relationship was the respondent ever financially dependent on the applicant, nor did the applicant financially support the respondent.
The parties did not conduct a joint account or purchase any assets together. Their business interests were kept separate in that neither were a shareholder in, or director of a company associated with the other. They did not borrow money together nor offer a guarantee in support of or by way of assistance to the other.
It is not in issue that the respondent provided the applicant with rent free accommodation at Suburb U, the use of a motor vehicle and a supplementary credit card. The applicant was the beneficiary of flights on the respondent’s frequent flyer programme. The parties went on various holidays together.
There is no issue that the applicant undertook work for the respondent and that for a period of time he was paid a wage. He also introduced the respondent to various investments but also received commissions for work that he had done through his involvement in various projects.

The applicant in his Case Outline refers to him loaning the respondent various moneys. In particular, his affidavit refers to him providing the respondent $400,000 as a short term loan to enable her to reduce her mortgage and a further $600,000 from a company in 2020. The respondent denies such a contention and in particular asserts in her affidavit in relation to each of these amounts as follows:
161.In response to paragraph 240 – If [Mr Piovene] had “loaned” his sister $400,000 to purchase [a property] in around 2015, that is not something that he told me at the time, and it was my understanding from [Mr Piovene] himself that he was in a very poor financial situation and also did not want income paid into a bank account in his name because of concerns he had about “having to pay child support”. [Mr Piovene] did not ask me whether I needed the money, and I did not need assistance in reducing a mortgage as I was in fact loan/mortgage free after selling a block of units […]. Now exhibited to me and marked Exhibit [MM]-21 is a true copy of a print of all my personal and company account with [PP Bank] which showed an overall credit balance across aggregate accounts. Instead, I agreed to the money being paid into my bank account, as [Mr Piovene] said to me: “Can you hold the money for me? I don’t want it in my bank account as it might get seized by the Child Support Agency or affect what I have to pay”.
…
172.In respect of paragraphs 256 – I did not need monies from [Mr Piovene] for the purpose of reducing a loan balance or at all. [Mr Piovene] said to me: “Can I park about $600,000 with you, as I don’t want it in my account because of my child support issues”. I agreed to the money being paid into the account of accounts controlled by me. Now exhibited to me and marked [MM]-24 are 7 pages of [PP Bank] transaction listings showing the return of $500,000 of the $600,000 (I have not yet located the further $100,000 statement). Each payment was made to either [Mr Piovene]’s business account (#[...38]) or to [KK Pty Ltd] account (#[…61]). I made each of the payments referred to on that document, at the timing and for the purpose he directed.
I accept the evidence of the respondent on this issue as it accords entirely with the applicant’s admissions in attempting to circumvent his child support obligations.
The parties are at issue as to the circumstances in which the applicant received a fee for his involvement in a property at Suburb QQ. There is no issue that he undertook work on the project nor is it issue that he was not an owner. The paucity of cross examination relative to the breadth of the issue in the affidavit is such that I am unable to resolve the competing contentions as to why he was paid an amount equivalent to approximately a third of the profit.
The respondent loaned moneys to the applicant on promises to repay, some of which she asserts remains unpaid, as well as loaning moneys to his son by way of a loan agreement.
The respondent provided generous benefits to the applicant. She was, however, also financially generous to Ms P, Ms K, Ms S and Mr Q and his partner.
I am not satisfied for the above reasons that any part of the financial arrangements between the parties supports a finding of a de facto relationship.
The ownership, use and acquisition of their property
The parties did not jointly own or acquire any property together.
The applicant had the use of property owned by the respondent in Suburb U and in Region GG. There is no evidence of the respondent having the use of property owned by the applicant.
The applicant agreed that he told the SSAT that the respondent said he could stay in Suburb U until he got himself back on his feet financially.
The degree of a mutual commitment to a shared life
I am not satisfied that the parties had a mutual commitment to a shared life between 2010 and 2022.
I am satisfied that the respondent was in a de facto relationship with Mr N until 2014. I also find that the applicant told the respondent and that Ms NN told Ms F that the applicant said he was going to marry Ms NN.
Such a statement is inconsistent with a mutual commitment to a shared life together.
I accept that the applicant attended many social and family events with the respondent and her family and that parties travelled together to various interstate and overseas places on holiday. During some of that time, the respondent also travelled with Mr N.
I am satisfied however that towards the end of the period asserted by the applicant, the applicant and respondent saw much less of each other than had been the case in the years prior to 2020. In that respect there was unchallenged evidence of the respondent at paragraphs 165 and 184 of her affidavit, Ms F at paragraphs 37 and 49 of her affidavit, Mr O at paragraphs 14 of his affidavit, and Ms K at paragraph 16 of her affidavit.
As of October 2022, the applicant was aged 61 and the respondent was aged 64. There is no evidence of any long term plans made about their life together, planning for their retirement, estate planning or wills.
Whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship
The relationship was not registered under any prescribed law of a State or Territory.
The care and support of children
There are no children of the relationship albeit each party had children of former relationships.
The respondent conceded that the applicant helped the respondent’s children and also attended a single grandparents day at a preschool.
The respondent provided no care to the applicant’s children.
The reputation and public aspects of the relationship
The applicant calls no witnesses who say that the applicant told them he was in a de facto relationship with the respondent. He does not call any member of his family, whether his daughters, son, niece and/or sister who could have given evidence of what they observed of the nature of their relationship or any representation by him of there being a de facto relationship.
Mr J’s evidence is no more than that the applicant and respondent were in a relationship. His evidence is that they did not overly show affection to each other and denied, inconsistent with his affidavit, that the respondent ever referred to the applicant as her partner.
Ms H gave evidence of observing them being affectionate and of them sharing a room in Country DD and Region GG. Each of these contentions are denied by the respondent.
Ms L gives evidence of the respondent referring to the applicant as her partner and saying that on the birth of her grandson that she and the applicant were happy to be grandparents and asserts that the respondent told her in 2015 that “[Mr Piovene] left me once, but he realised what he was missing and came back to romance me until I took him back” (Affidavit of Ms L filed 6 December 2023, paragraph 14)
These contentions are denied by the applicant.
I have earlier referred to the weight that I give the various photographs and WhatsApp messages and representations about being a partner. Such matters are neither consistent nor inconsistent with the case each content for.
In the respondent’s case, no witness attested to either of them saying they were in a de facto relationship. The highest it got was Mr Q saying a reference to a better half was a reference by him to a de facto relationship.
The applicant did not refer to the respondent as his de facto in his tax returns but nor did the respondent refer to Mr N as her de facto in her returns.
More significant is the absence of any reference to the respondent in the documents relating to his hospital admissions in 2013 (Exhibit 6). Part of Exhibit 6 is the instructions for inclusion of Next of Kin. The instructions record “that the usual priority is as follows – spouse (husband/wife, de facto or live in partner)”. The applicant when he fills out the form nominates his son. For the person to contact, he nominates his sister. In neither instance does he nominate the person he says he is in a de facto relationship with.
The applicant contended that he was very close to the respondent’s father. Despite this asserted closeness, following his death in 2017 and despite the applicant’s assertion that he was in a de facto relationship with the respondent, he did not attend at the funeral. He provided no explanation for why that might be so.
CONCLUSION
As referred to earlier in these reasons, the High Court in Fairbairn & Radecki observed that:
39. The language of s 4AA of the Act and its reference to “living together” requires no different approach to determining whether a relationship exists of the kind defined. “Living together”, consistently with authority, should be construed as meaning sharing life as a couple. Section 4AA does not prescribe any way by which a couple may share life together. Its language is sufficiently broad to accommodate the great variety of ways a de facto relationship may exist. That conclusion is supported by the varied factors listed in s 4AA(2). In a given case, some of the factors listed in s 4AA(2) may be relevant and some may be irrelevant; inevitably some may have greater prominence than others…
Section 4AA makes it apparent that each case will turn on its own facts. Not every fact relied upon by a party will point either consistently or necessarily logically to the conclusion sought by that party. Such proposition is self-evident on the facts in this case. It is for that reason that there is a requirement to have regard to all of the circumstances of their relationship to determine if the relationship had broken down.
On my assessment of all of the evidence as referred to above, I am not persuaded that the evidence supports a finding that the parties were in a de facto relationship between 2010 and 2023. Most persuasive and telling against there being a de facto relationship as asserted by the applicant, includes my acceptance of the respondent’s evidence on the use of the Suburb T apartment and the rejection of the applicant’s evidence, the respondent’s evidence as to the extent of their sexual relationship, the respondent’s de facto relationship with Mr N, the applicant’s statement that he planned to marry Ms NN, the rejection of the applicant’s evidence of staying at Suburb W, the text messages between Ms F and others as to the nature of the applicant’s relationship with the respondent, the failure of the applicant to call evidence from his daughters, son, sister and niece and the unexplained failure of the applicant to attend the respondent’s fathers funeral and wake.
In this matter, having regard to all of the circumstances referred to above I am not persuaded that I could make the declaration sought by the applicant. I am persuaded however that the evidence supports the making of a declaration as sought by the respondent.
Accordingly, I will make the declaration sought by the respondent.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighty-five (185) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Schonell.
Associate:
Dated: 19 September 2024

File number:	SYC 4211 of 2023
Judgment of:	SCHONELL J
Date of judgment:	19 September 2024
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP – Where both parties sought declarations pursuant to s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the applicant asserts the parties were in a de facto relationship for approximately 12 years – Where the applicant contends that the relationship broke down in October 2022 – Where the respondent contends that a de facto relationship never existed – Where the applicant commenced proceedings in June 2023 – Where the applicant lived in the respondent’s investment property for nine years – Where the applicant did work for the benefit of the respondent’s investment properties – Both parties have children from previous relationships – Parties held no real property together – Parties shared Christmas and birthday celebrations – Parties travelled extensively together – Where there are issues of credit in relation to both parties’ evidence – Where the applicant’s evidence in these proceedings is contradictory to his evidence in previous family law proceedings and representations made to the SSAT – Where the evidence is diametrically opposed as to whether the parties slept in the same room together and the extent of a sexual relationship – Where consideration of the relevant provisions in the definition of “de facto relationship” in section 4AA – Declaration made that a de facto relationship never existed.
Legislation:	Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(1) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4AA(1), 4AA(2), 4AA(3), 4AA(4), 90RD
Cases cited:	Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67; [1893] 1 WLUK 44 Commercial Union Assurance Co of Australia Ltd v Ferrcom (1991) 22 NSWLR 389 Cubillo v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084 Fairbairn v Radecki (2022) 275 CLR 400; [2022] HCA 18 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; [1999] HCA 8 Nguyen v Tran (2018) MVR 16; [2018] NSWCA 215 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447; [2003] HCA 48
Division:	Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs:	185
Date of hearing:	26 August – 28 August 2024
Place:	Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Mr Reeve, Marsdens Law Group
Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr Jones SC
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Barkus Doolan Winning

SYC 4211 of 2023
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:	MR PIOVENE Applicant
AND:	MS MUHLFELD Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	SCHONELL J
DATE OF ORDER:	19 SEPTEMBER 2024