Piety Constructions Pty Ltd v Hville FCP Pty Ltd (No 2)

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Piety Constructions Pty Ltd v Hville FCP Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 1426
Hearing dates: On the papers; submissions received 6 and 14 October 2022
Date of orders: 20 October 2022
Decision date: 20 October 2022
Jurisdiction:Equity - Technology and Construction List
Before: Stevenson J
Decision:

Plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis

Catchwords:

COSTS – offer of compromise and Calderbank offer – whether to order indemnity costs – where offer was invitation to capitulate

Legislation Cited:

Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Falgat Constructions Pty Limited v Equity Australia Corporation Pty Limited [2006] NSWCA 259

Piety Constructions Pty Ltd v Hville FCP Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 1318

Category:Costs
Parties: Piety Constructions Pty Ltd (Plaintiff)
Hville FCP Pty Ltd (Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
M Sheldon (Defendant)

Solicitors:
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Arnold Bloch Leibler (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2022/161090

JUDGMENT

  1. I gave judgment in this matter on 29 September 2022. [1] I shall use the same defined terms here.

  2. I dismissed the Builder’s Summons on the basis that the Developer had served its Payment Schedule within the 10 business day period specified in s 14(4)(b)(ii) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Act”):

  1. notwithstanding the deeming provision in cl 7.12 of the building contract, [2] according to which the Payment Schedule was deemed to be delivered at 9.30am on the 11th day; because

  2. an authorised officer of the Builder had actually read the Payment Schedule on the evening of the 10th day.

    2. Referred to at [9] of my judgment.

  1. Much turned on when the Payment Schedule was received. It was common ground that if the Developer had not served its Payment Schedule within the 10 business day period referred to in s 14(4)(b)(ii) of the Act, the Builder was entitled to judgment against the Developer in the sum of $10,179,961.84.

  2. I am now dealing with the question of costs.

  3. There is no dispute that the Builder must pay the Developer’s costs of the proceedings on the ordinary basis.

  4. The Developer, however, seeks its costs on an indemnity basis from 21 July 2022 on the basis that an Offer of Compromise or, alternatively, a Calderbank Offer, was served on 20 July 2022, offering to resolve the matter on the basis of a judgment in favour of the Builder against the Developer for “$10,000 inclusive of GST” (and, inferentially, of costs).

  5. Earlier, on 11 July 2022, the Developer’s solicitors had sent to the Builder’s solicitors a letter arguing that the Builder’s case was bound to fail, essentially for the reasons that I found, and drawing attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Falgat Constructions Pty Limited v Equity Australia Corporation Pty Limited [3] to which I referred at [23] of my judgment and which Mr…

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Details
Case
[2022] NSWSC 1426
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Piety Constructions Pty Ltd v Hville FCP Pty Ltd (No 2) involved a dispute between the plaintiff, Piety Constructions, and the defendant, Hville FCP. The nature of the dispute centred around an offer of compromise made by the plaintiff, which was rejected by the defendant. The matter was heard by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The plaintiff sought indemnity costs for the offer of compromise, which was deemed a Calderbank offer. The defendant opposed the plaintiff's application for indemnity costs, arguing that the offer was not a genuine attempt to resolve the dispute but rather an invitation to capitulate.

The legal issues that the court had to decide were whether the offer of compromise constituted a genuine attempt to resolve the dispute, and if so, whether the plaintiff was entitled to indemnity costs. The court examined the nature and timing of the offer, as well as the circumstances surrounding its making. The court also considered the defendant's response to the offer and whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to expect indemnity costs.

The court found that the offer of compromise was not a genuine attempt to resolve the dispute but rather an invitation to capitulate. The court reasoned that the offer was made after the defendant had already made a significant payment towards the plaintiff's costs and that the offer was conditional upon the defendant paying the remaining costs. The court held that the offer did not meet the criteria for a Calderbank offer, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to indemnity costs. The court emphasised the importance of genuine offers of compromise in encouraging parties to settle disputes and avoid unnecessary litigation.

The final orders of the court were that the plaintiff's application for indemnity costs was dismissed, and the defendant was entitled to recover its costs of the application. The court's decision in this case highlights the importance of ensuring that offers of compromise are genuine and not merely invitations to capitulate. Parties should be cautious when making offers of compromise and ensure that they are properly documented and communicated to avoid potential costs consequences.

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