Pico Holdings Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ

PICO HOLDINGS, INC  APPELLANT

AND

WAVE VISTAS PTY LTD (FORMERLY TURF CLUB
AUSTRALIA PTY LTD) & ANOR   RESPONDENTS

Pico Holdings, Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 13

5 April 2005
B60/2004

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed with costs. 

2.Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of Queensland made on 23 May 2003 and in their place order:

(a)      the appeal to that Court is allowed;

(b)set aside the orders of Helman J made on 26 March 2002 and in their place declare that the appellant has an interest in the fund comprising the proceeds of sale of Lot 2 in Registered Plan No 817782 in the County of Ward, Parish of Nerang being all the land contained in title reference 1866 0224 ("the Property") corresponding with the equitable mortgage in its favour created by the contract between the appellant, the first respondent and Dominion Capital Pty Ltd arising from the oral promises of 25 April 2001, the letter of 4 May 2001 and Addendum No 2 to the Promissory Note dated 22 December 2000.

3.Remit to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland the question whether the appellant's equitable mortgage over the Property took priority over any interests in the Property held by the second respondent.

4.Reserve to the Supreme Court of Queensland the question of the costs of the trial.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland

Representation:

B W Walker SC with M R Pearce for the appellant (instructed by Gilbert & Tobin)

G D Sheahan for the first respondent (instructed by Mallesons Stephen Jaques)

H B Fraser QC with B T Porter for the second respondent (instructed by Thynne & Macartney)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Pico Holdings, Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd

Contract – Parties to a contract – Sole director of first respondent company was principal actor on behalf of another company in securing a loan – Director, as borrower's actor, offered to use land owned by first respondent as further security to obtain a further extension of loan repayment – No reference was made to the first respondent, or to its ownership of the land, or to the fact that the borrower's actor was the first respondent's sole director – Lender agreed to extend the repayment date – Whether first respondent was a party to the agreement – Whether a reasonable person in position of lender could have understood that the first respondent was making an offer to provide security – Whether borrower's actor was in fact exercising his authority to offer the land as security – Whether the lender supplied consideration for the first respondent's promise.

Corporations Law, ss 128(1), 128(4), 129(4), 180 and 181.

  1. GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ.   This appeal from the Queensland Court of Appeal should be allowed.  The…

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Details
Case
[2005] HCA 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Pico Holdings Inc (the appellant) against Wave Vistas Pty Ltd (the first respondent). The dispute concerned whether the first respondent was a party to an agreement to provide land as security for a loan. The sole director of the first respondent, Mr. Voss, acted on behalf of Dominion Capital Pty Ltd (the borrower) in securing an extension of a loan repayment date. In doing so, Mr. Voss offered land owned by the first respondent as further security, without explicitly referencing the first respondent or its ownership of the land, or his capacity as its sole director. The lender agreed to the extension based on this offer.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the first respondent was a party to the agreement to provide security, whether a reasonable person in the lender's position would have understood that the first respondent was making an offer to provide security, and whether the borrower's actor (Mr. Voss) was in fact exercising his authority to offer the land as security. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the lender supplied valid consideration for the first respondent's purported promise.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the first respondent was bound by the agreement. The court reasoned that Mr. Voss, as the sole director, was acting on behalf of the first respondent when he offered the land as security. The court applied principles of corporate law, including sections 180 and 181 of the Corporations Law, which allow third parties to assume that directors are acting properly. The court found that the lender could reasonably have understood that the first respondent was offering the security, and that the transaction was not so complicated or unrealistic as to suggest otherwise. The court also addressed the issue of consideration, rejecting the argument that there was a lack of it, and implicitly finding that the lender's forbearance constituted valid consideration.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of Queensland and declared that the appellant had an interest in the proceeds of sale of the property corresponding with an equitable mortgage in its favour. The matter was remitted to the Court of Appeal to determine the priority of the appellant's equitable mortgage over any interests held by the second respondent, and the question of trial costs was reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of Queensland made on 23 May 2003 and in their place order:

(a) the appeal to that Court is allowed;

(b) set aside the orders of Helman J made on 26 March 2002 and in their place declare that the appellant has an interest in the fund comprising the proceeds of sale of Lot 2 in Registered Plan No 817782 in the County of Ward, Parish of Nerang being all the land contained in title reference 1866 0224 ("the Property") corresponding with the equitable mortgage in its favour created by the contract between the appellant, the first respondent and Dominion Capital Pty Ltd arising from the oral promises of 25 April 2001, the letter of 4 May 2001 and Addendum No 2 to the Promissory Note dated 22 December 2000.

3. Remit to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland the question whether the appellant's equitable mortgage over the Property took priority over any interests in the Property held by the second respondent.

4. Reserve to the Supreme Court of Queensland the question of the costs of the trial.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Lender's written submissions suggested that the outcome of the appeal would be determined by the correction of errors in legal principle. However, this appears not to be so. Rather, the differences between the parties turn on questions of inferences from, and characterisation of, the following uncontroversial circumstances.The factual background The First Promissory Note of 8 September 2000. The Lender was a Californian corporation. On 8 September 2000, in circumstances of great urgency, the Lender made a loan of $US1 million to Dominion Capital Pty Ltd ("the Borrower"), a company registered in Victoria. The loan was to bear interest at eight percent per annum. It was said to be repayable on 8 September 2001. The terms were recorded in a Non-Negotiable Secured Promissory Note ("the First Promissory Note"). On the face of this Note, the Lender was given security over 350,000 common shares in "Dominion Wineries"[1]: an original share certificate was to be delivered to the Lender. It was never delivered, and the loan was never repaid. [1]It is possible that this was a mistake for "Dominion Wines Ltd". The Second Promissory Note of 22 December 2000. On 22 December 2000, the Lender made a loan ("the Loan") of $US1.2 million to the Borrower. Again the circumstances were very urgent. The Loan was to bear interest at 12 percent per annum. The terms of the Loan were recorded in a Non-Negotiable Secured Promissory Note ("the Second Promissory Note"). The Loan was to be secured by "Collateral" – share certificates of 400,000 unencumbered common shares in "Dominion Wineries Ltd" were to be delivered to the "Maker", ie to the Borrower[2]. On Default, the Lender was "entitled to exercise upon and to own the [Lender's] interest in the equity of Dominion Wineries". If, as the Second Promissory Note suggested on its face, the Lender was not entitled to possession of the share certificates, the "Collateral" was a rather weak form of security, even though the Second Promissory Note contained a representation that the share certificates were not encumbered and that there were no obligations or commitments on them which were outstanding, and even though it was agreed that a "Default" would be deemed to have occurred if the Borrower assigned the Collateral for the benefit of creditors. The principal and interest were repayable about a fortnight later on 5 January 2001. [2]In proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria which were heard and decided after the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in the present proceedings, Mandie J found that the relevant language was mistaken, held that Dominion Wines Ltd share certificates (not "Dominion Wineries Ltd" as specified on the face of the Second Promissory Note) were to be delivered and assumed that they were to be delivered to the Lender: Pico Holdings Inc v Voss [2004] VSC 263 at [105]-[112]. He reached these conclusions on evidence which was apparently more extensive than that which is before this Court. For the purposes of this appeal it does not matter whether the language is mistaken.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ

This argument of the second respondent should be rejected. The lack of benefit issue was not pleaded. Even if it had been pleaded, by reason of s 128(1) and s 129(4) of the Corporations Law Mr Hart was entitled to assume that Mr Voss was properly performing his duties to the first respondent, and hence was acting with care and diligence, in good faith and in the best interests of the first respondent, and for a proper purpose: see ss 180 and 181 of the Corporations Law. In consequence, s 128(1) debarred the first respondent from asserting that that assumption was incorrect. Further, to seek to infer from the lack of benefit to a particular company that Mr Voss was not intending to act on its behalf is wholly unconvincing: a man whose problems were as pressing and whose actions were as shifty as Mr Voss's were in 2000-2001 is very unlikely to have been guided by scruples of that kind. Even if he was, a promise by the Borrower to procure the first respondent to put up the Turf Club Land as security would raise the issue of benefit to the first respondent at a later stage, and would require it to be resolved by a process of internal dialogue in Mr Voss's brain between two corporations which he controlled. The difficulty of establishing a benefit to the first respondent was never advanced by Mr Voss after 4 May 2001 as a reason for not supplying the certificate of title. The complicated, indirect and unrealistic transaction for which the second respondent argues is much less likely than the simple transaction for which the Lender argues. Consideration In the courts below only Jerrard JA dealt with this question. He said that there was a "lack of any obvious consideration"[10]. He continued[11]:"The [Lender] contended that consideration was provided by its forbearance to sue [the Borrower] for the money lent, and that a request for that forbearance by [the first respondent], to be implied from the circumstances, was sufficient to bind [the first respondent]. As the first respondent submits, the problem with that argument is that there was no 'forbearance' promised or granted in the unusual circumstances of this case. Instead, the [Lender] had 'threatened' to write off the debt, not to enforce it; and it was Mr Voss who responded on [the Borrower's] behalf to that 'threat' with a request for an extension. No one bargained to obtain forbearance."[10]Pico Holdings Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 204 at [18].[11]Pico Holdings Inc v Wave Vistas Pty Ltd [2003] QCA 204 at [19]. The first respondent supported this conclusion by contending that the first respondent did not request any extension of time or indulgence in favour of the Borrower: the only relevant request came from the Borrower. This reasoning depends on three propositions. The first is that the Lender had threatened to write off the Loan, not to enforce it. The second proposition is that the Borrower, not the first respondent, met that threat with a request for an extension. The third proposition is that it is not sufficient that there be forbearance in fact: no forbearance was bargained for, and hence none was promised.