PARTIES: PHILLIPS, David William v ARNOLD, Ashley William Roy
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT) JURISDICTION: APPELLATE FILE NO/S: 180/2008 DELIVERED ON: 11 June 2009 DELIVERED AT: Hobart HEARING DATE: 12 May 2009 JUDGMENT OF: Crawford CJ, Blow and Porter JJ
CATCHWORDS:
Magistrates – Jurisdiction and procedure generally – Procedure – The hearing – Matters relating to decision – Duty to state reasons – Whether a preference for one witness over another a sufficient reason for conviction.
James v Eyles [2007] TASSC 55, applied. Keyte (2000) 118 A Crim R 463; R v Power (2003) 141 A Crim R 203, distinguished. Aust Dig [128]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel: Appellant: G A Richardson Respondent: J Williams Solicitors: Appellant: G A Richardson Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2009] TASSC 43 Number of paragraphs: 75
Serial No 43/2009 File No 180/2008
DAVID WILLIAM PHILLIPS v ASHLEY WILLIAM ROY ARNOLD
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT
CRAWFORD CJ BLOW J PORTER J 11 June 2009
Orders of the Court
Motion to review upheld.
Conviction quashed.
Serial No 43/2009 File No 180/2008
DAVID WILLIAM PHILLIPS v ASHLEY WILLIAM ROY ARNOLD
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT
CRAWFORD CJ 11 June 2009
The appellant was charged in a magistrates court with driving a motor vehicle on 5 December 2003 on Stewart Street, Devonport, while alcohol was present in his blood in a concentration greater than 0.05 of a gram of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, namely 0.174 grams, contrary to the Road Safety (Alcohol & Drugs) Act 1970, s6(1).
Following a defended hearing at which two police officers gave evidence for the complainant and the appellant gave evidence in his own defence, the learned magistrate found the charge proved. The defence that was rejected was that at no time did the appellant drive the vehicle in question.
The appellant moved for a review of the conviction under the Justices Act1959, PtXI. There were two grounds: that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the learned magistrate that the appellant had driven the vehicle; and that the learned magistrate gave no reasons for preferring the evidence of Constable Rigby to the evidence of the appellant. The second ground was expanded by written particulars to include an assertion of error by the learned magistrate in giving no reasons for implicitly rejecting the evidence of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
A judge dismissed the motion to review*. Concerning the first ground, it was held that on the evidence it was open to the learned magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant drove the vehicle. Concerning the second ground, it was held that it was implicit in the reasons given by the learned magistrate that he accepted beyond reasonable doubt the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the appellant drove the vehicle and rejected beyond reasonable doubt the evidence of the appellant that he did not do so. It was also held that, given…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Phillips v Arnold
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Phillips v Arnold [2009] TASSC 43
Case
[2009] TASSC 43
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the matter of Phillips v Arnold, the respondent sought review of a decision made by the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria. The dispute centred on the procedure and jurisdiction of the court, specifically whether the magistrate was required to provide reasons for a conviction and if a preference for one witness over another constituted a sufficient reason.
The court was tasked with determining whether the magistrate's decision to convict the respondent without providing explicit reasons for preferring one witness over another was lawful. The primary legal issue was whether the duty to state reasons for a conviction required more than just a preference for one witness over another, and if such a preference alone was adequate to uphold the conviction.
The court found that the duty to state reasons for a conviction goes beyond merely expressing a preference for one witness over another. It held that the magistrate must provide a clear and rational explanation for the preference, detailing why the preferred evidence was deemed more reliable or credible. The court held that the reasons provided were insufficient and quashed the conviction, concluding that the magistrate's preference alone did not justify the decision.