Langley v Lyons

Case [2017] TASSC 48


[2017] TASSC 48

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:                 Langley v Lyons [2017] TASSC 48

PARTIES:  LANGLEY, Joseph Colin
  v
  LYONS, Jason

FILE NO:  1438/2017
DELIVERED ON:  15 August 2017
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  7 August 2017
JUDGMENT OF:  Brett J

CATCHWORDS:

Traffic Law – Offences – Particular offences – Alcohol and drug related offences – Tasmania – Driving with more than prescribed concentration of alcohol in breath or blood – Sentence and penalty – Whether "special circumstances" pursuant to the Road Safety Alcohol and Drugs Act 1970, s 17(5).

Road Safety Alcohol and Drugs Act 1970 (Tas), s 17(5).
Bottomley v McDonald [2002] TASSC 27, 36 MVR 484; Phillips v Arnold [2009] TASSC 43, 19 Tas R 21, referred to.
Aust Dig Traffic Law [1156]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  P Sullivan
             Respondent:  E Bill
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Paul Sullivan
             Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:  [2017] TASSC 48
Number of paragraphs:  28

Serial No 48/2017

File No 1438/2017

JOSEPH COLIN LANGLEY v JASON LYONS

REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT  BRETT J

15 August 2017

  1. This notice to review concerns a penalty imposed by Magistrate McKee upon the applicant with respect to his plea of guilty to a charge of driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the prescribed concentration, and an associated regulatory charge of using his lights on high beam in the vicinity of an oncoming vehicle.  The magistrate imposed a global penalty consisting of a fine of $2,500 and a disqualification from driving for a period of two years. 

  2. Both the fine and the driving disqualification were higher or equivalent to the minimum penalty prescribed for the relevant offence by s 17 of the Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1970 (the Act). Section 17(3) provides that a court that convicts a person of a drink driving offence must impose penalties, including a driving disqualification, which are not less than that specified in the Table set out in the section. In the case of the offence to which the applicant pleaded guilty, the minimum disqualification provided by the Table was that actually imposed, a period of two years. However, s 17(5) provides that the court may impose a lesser period than that prescribed by the Table if the defendant "satisfies the court … that there are special circumstances why … the minimum period of disqualification specified in the Table should not be imposed …".

  3. During the sentencing proceedings, the magistrate heard evidence concerning the applicant's claim that there were special circumstances which justified a reduction of the penalty, in particular the driving disqualification, below the prescribed minimum. However, his Honour was not satisfied that the applicant had satisfied him of the existence of special circumstances for the purposes of the application of s 17(5). The applicant now seeks a review of the penalty, pursuant to s 107 of the Justices Act 1959, on the ground that the magistrate "erred in law and in fact in failing…

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Langley v Lyons [2017] TASSC 48
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[2017] TASSC 48
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Langley v Lyons was heard in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The appellant, Langley, challenged a conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrates' Court, which found him guilty of driving with an alcohol concentration exceeding the prescribed limit. The respondent, Lyons, was the state representative who prosecuted the case. Langley's appeal focused on whether the trial magistrate erred in finding that there were no special circumstances under the Road Safety Alcohol and Drugs Act 1970, section 17(5), which could have mitigated his sentence.

The central legal issue was the interpretation and application of "special circumstances" as outlined in section 17(5) of the Act. Langley argued that the magistrate should have considered certain personal and mitigating factors that warranted a lesser penalty. These factors included his otherwise unblemished criminal record, his expression of remorse, and the impact of the conviction on his employment and family. The court was tasked with determining whether the magistrate's failure to consider these factors constituted an error of law.

The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the trial magistrate had correctly exercised their discretion in assessing the circumstances of the case. The Court found that the magistrate had considered all relevant factors and was not required to give specific weight to the personal circumstances of the appellant. The Court held that the term "special circumstances" in section 17(5) was intended to be interpreted narrowly and did not include general personal hardships or remorse. The Court further noted that the overall penalty imposed was appropriate and within the statutory limits.

The Court ultimately affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrates' Court, finding no error in the magistrate's consideration of the penalty. The appeal was dismissed, and the original conviction and sentence remained in place.

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