IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S40 of 2015
B e t w e e n -
BRETT PERNICE
Applicant
and
JINGALONG PTY LIMITED
First Respondent
GREGORY GEORGE TODD
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAGELER J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER 2015, AT 1.01 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR R.D. WILSON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.H. NAGLE, for the applicant. (instructed by Hancock Alldis & Roskov)
MR R.E. DUBLER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR S. KANAGARATNAM for the first respondent. (instructed by A.L. Wunderlich & Co)
GAGELER J: Mr Wilson.
MR WILSON: Your Honours will have seen that this application concerns a consideration of the principles applicable to compromise agreements reached at mediations and whether the decision of this Court in Masters v Cameron extends to the determination of obligations arising under those compromise agreements where time is fixed for performance.
The point we want to agitate, your Honours, is nicely put by Justice Fullagar in Scott v English in 1947 in a passage partly quoted by his Honour Justice Sackville at paragraph 67 where Justice Fullagar pointed out that the question is likely to arise wherever a time is fixed for performance of the defendant’s promise as to whether the effect of the contract:
is to discharge the original cause of action absolutely . . . or whether it effects only a conditional discharge, merely suspending the original cause of action, so that, if it is not performed by the defendant according to its tenor, the plaintiff may still maintain that original cause of action.”
Your Honour, the heads of agreement, the subject of this application, appear in the application book at 59, 60 and I will shortly turn to the applicant’s construction of the heads of agreement after dealing with the Masters v Cameron point, but by way of summary, Mr Pernice says that upon their construction as a whole he accepted an obligation to purchase Lot 1 for $350,000 by the designated date, 13 May 2013, not in absolute discharge of his claim to Lot 1 but in conditional discharge so that if either Jingalong did not complete or Mr Todd did not contribute by paying $206,000 he could either sue under the heads of agreement or terminate and revert to the original cause of action.
Your Honours, this construction was squarely in play in the Court of Appeal. Your Honours, it is significant that at first instance Jingalong stated that it would not raise the agreement as a defence to Mr Pernice’s claim but only to Mr Todd’s claim and, indeed, my learned friend, Mr Nagle, took the point in the Court of Appeal but that matter was not dealt with by the Court of Appeal at all and the question does arise, your Honours, as to…
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- Case
- [2015] HCATrans 227
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper construction of clause 3(a) of the settlement agreement. This clause stipulated that the respondents would pay the applicants "$1.5 million". The applicants argued that this sum was inclusive of all amounts payable, including any interest that might have accrued. Conversely, the respondents contended that the phrase "$1.5 million" was intended to represent the principal sum, and that interest was payable in addition to this amount, as contemplated by the broader context of the settlement and the underlying dispute.
The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "$1.5 million" in clause 3(a) referred to the principal sum payable. Their Honours Gageler and Keane JJ reasoned that absent any express words to the contrary, such as "in full and final settlement of all claims including principal and interest," the figure stated represented the base amount. The Court found that the surrounding circumstances and the nature of the dispute, which involved a claim for damages that would typically include interest, did not provide a sufficient basis to depart from the clear and unambiguous language of the clause. The Court affirmed the principle that contractual terms should be given their ordinary meaning unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise.
The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed.
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