Permanent Custodians Ltd v Elite Grains Pty Ltd [No 2]

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   PERMANENT CUSTODIANS LTD -v- ELITE GRAINS PTY LTD [No 2] [2016] WASC 238

CORAM:   KENNETH MARTIN J

HEARD:   1 JUNE 2016

DELIVERED          :   5 AUGUST 2016

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2473 of 2012

BETWEEN:   PERMANENT CUSTODIANS LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR AND UNDER THE MASTER TRUST DEED ESTABLISHING THE RURAL PROGRAM

Plaintiff

AND

ELITE GRAINS PTY LTD
First Defendant

RODNEY NORMAN CULLETON
Second Defendant

IOANNA CULLETON
Third Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application to set aside default judgment obtained in default of memorandum of appearance - Judgment subsisting for more than three years - Attempt to ascertain arguable defence - Statutory unconscionability newly alleged - Delay in proceeding to move to set aside default judgment unsatisfactorily explained - Application refused

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Application refused

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Ms K F Banks-Smith SC & Ms E L Blewett

First Defendant             :     No appearance

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Third Defendant           :     Mr L A Warnick (Pro Bono)

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Corrs Chambers Westgarth

First Defendant             :     No appearance

Second Defendant         :     In person

Third Defendant           :     In person

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Attorney General of New South Wales v World Best Holdings Ltd [2005] NSWCA 261; (2005) 63 NSWLR 557

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 17; (2009) 253 ALR 324

Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1) [1981] HCA 20; (1981) 147 CLR 246

Culleton v Macquarie Leasing Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1478

Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Scully [2013] VSCA 292; (2013) 303 ALR 168

Hall v Nominal Defendant [1966] HCA 36; (1966) 117 CLR 423

Macquarie Leasing Pty Ltd v Culleton [2014] FCCA 1714

Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2015] FCAFC 50; (2015) 236 FCR 199

Permanent Custodians Ltd v Elite Grains Pty Ltd [2014] WASC 495

Starrs v Retravision (WA) Ltd [2012] WASCA 67

  1. KENNETH MARTIN J:  I am dealing with the third defendant's application by her chamber summons of 15 June 2015, seeking to set aside a default judgment which was obtained against her and against her husband (the second defendant) on 28 May 2013. 

  2. The judgment against the third defendant (Mrs Culleton) was obtained by leave in a mortgage action, given in default of any memorandum of appearance being filed at court by or on behalf of Mrs Culleton (and the second defendant) within the allocated time under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC). See RSC O 13 r 8(1), O 62A r 4, and O 5 r 11. The plaintiff, through its solicitors, proceeded to obtain the default judgment.

  3. Judgment by default was obtained by the plaintiff in this action against the first defendant corporation (as the principal debtor) on 4 October 2012.  There followed (almost eight months later) the default judgment against Mr and Mrs Culleton as guarantors of the principal debtor corporation's obligations…

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Details
Case
[2016] WASC 238
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Permanent Custodians Ltd v Elite Grains Pty Ltd [No 2] involved a dispute between the plaintiff, Permanent Custodians Ltd, and the defendants, Elite Grains Pty Ltd, represented by Mr and Mrs Culleton. The primary dispute was regarding an application to set aside a default judgment that had been obtained against the defendants in the absence of a memorandum of appearance or timely defence. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The defendants argued that the default judgment, which had been in place for over three years, should be set aside due to alleged unconscionability and delay in the plaintiff's application.

The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the default judgment, obtained after leave under O 62A, could be set aside under RSC O 13 r 10, and if so, whether the defendants' arguments regarding the alleged unconscionability and delay were valid. The court also needed to consider the defendants' explanations for the delay in proceeding to move to set aside the judgment. The court's reasoning focused on the protective regime established by O 62A, which requires close scrutiny by a registrar to ensure the administrative process of obtaining default judgment in mortgage actions does not miscarry. The court found that the defendants' arguments, which emerged over several affidavits, were untenable and that no irregularity in the default judgment process was detectable.

The court concluded that the application to set aside the default judgment should be refused. The reasoning was based on the protection provided by O 62A, which narrows the scope for irregularities in the administrative process of obtaining a default judgment. The court found no evidence of irregularity in the process by which the default judgment was obtained, and the defendants' arguments for unconscionability and delay were unsatisfactory. The court held that the practical consequences of the O 62A protective process meant that the default judgment remained valid and enforceable. The court's final orders confirmed the refusal of the application to set aside the default judgment, upholding the judgment as entered against Mr and Mrs Culleton on 28 May 2013.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Nevertheless, a requirement to obtain leave under O 62A as a precondition to obtaining default judgment in situations favouring an applicant mortgagee does not alter the fundamental underlying character of what is and remains a default judgment, as is ultimately entered and obtained. As I have earlier said, the character of such a judgment was explained by the High Court in Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd (No 1): it is that of an interlocutory judgment, albeit for all practical purposes it may carry with it all the qualities of being a final judgment as against a defendant. The legal reality, however, is that there has not been any underlying substantive merits determination by a curial officer if there is a default judgment that is entered in default of a memorandum of appearance, or in default of a defence pleading being filed on time. So, the default judgment standing against Mr and Mrs Culleton from 28 May 2013 remains theoretically open to the present application made under RSC O 13 r 10 for the judgment to be set aside. Nevertheless, the pragmatic consequences of the O 62A protective regime must be realised. Leave to enter default judgment was obtained from a registrar, carrying with it the intended close scrutiny of the underlying circumstances. Scrutiny by a high level administrative official of the court is a protection against irregularities in the administrative process of obtaining such an unopposed judgment outcome and which otherwise might go undetected in the process of obtaining and entering a default judgment by a plaintiff in a mortgage action. This is for circumstances where effectively, absent a memorandum of appearance or absent a defence pleading (within the times allowed by the rules of court), there is no affirmative resistance offered by the defendant that is otherwise vulnerable to such a default judgment. The practical consequence of scrutiny, usually, is that the scope for irregularities to arise in the administrative process of obtaining the default judgment is considerably narrowed, if not wholly eliminated. Underlying and presenting irregularities would likely be detected and dealt with under the protective process laid down for a mortgage action as specified by O 62A ‑ as a precursor to obtaining the leave necessary to enter the default judgment sought by a mortgagee plaintiff. But the O 62A protective process in a mortgage action is not directed towards evaluating the potential merits of defence arguments, which have not to that point, axiomatically, been articulated by a non‑participatory defendant. Order 62A is directed towards ensuring that the administrative process of obtaining default judgment in a mortgage action does not miscarry. In the present case I am untroubled in rejecting the multiple arguments of Mrs Culleton which have slowly emerged across her various affidavits since 15 May 2015, contending for an irregularity in the 28 May 2013 default judgment that was obtained against her and her husband. There is no such irregularity detectable. No such arguments were advanced on her behalf by pro bono counsel on 1 June 2016, and on my assessment, rightly so, as they would all be untenable.