DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2002] AATA 492
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2001/549 and Q2001/1100
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re Dr JOHN PEMBERTON
Applicant
And CSIRO
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr B J McCabe, Member
Date21 June 2002
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
..................(Sgd).......................
B J McCabe
Member
CATCHWORDS
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – whether a proper search for records made – whether reasonable search conducted - exempt documents – personal information contained in documents – meaning of 'personal information' – whether release of documents is in the public interest
Freedom of Information Act 1982
Re Cristovao and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 53 ALD 138
Re Beesley and Commissioner of Taxation [2001] AATA 476
Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 100 ALR 111
Department of Social Security v Dyrenforth (1988) 80 ALD 533
Re Luton and Child Support Registrar [1999] AATA 808
REASONS FOR DECISION
21 June 2002 Mr B J McCabe, Member
Introduction
Dr Pemberton has sought review of a decision by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to claim an exemption under s 41 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 in respect of documents containing names of persons who were tested by the CSIRO for exposure to the Hendra virus. He has also questioned the adequacy of the CSIRO's search of its records. He believes there must be other documents in existence that relate to his requests. He made two separate FOI requests seeking a wide range of documents, although the focus of his interest was the names of those individuals who were tested. His appeals in relation to each request were dealt with together.
Background FactsThe following summary of facts is based on the written submissions of Dr Pemberton and upon his sworn testimony. Dr Pemberton is a member of the faculty of the Department of Microbiology at the University of Queensland. He was also the chair of the University's Bio-safety committee until the committee was restructured in 1998. Under Dr Pemberton's leadership, the committee apparently had responsibility for oversight of safety and ethical issues arising in the laboratories at University of Queensland.
The University has a number of laboratory facilities and it carries out a wide range of research. As I understand it from Dr Pemberton's evidence, laboratories are classified under the relevant Australian Standard into four levels. The highest level of classification, PC 4, is reserved for the most dangerous material. The deadly Ebola virus is an example of a class four pathogen that must be dealt with in a PC 4 laboratory where appropriate precautions can be taken to ensure containment and avoid contamination. Less dangerous material can be dealt with in laboratories with a lower classification.
The University did not have a PC 4 laboratory during the time Dr Pemberton was chairing the Biosafety committee. Indeed, there were no PC 4 laboratories in Queensland at the time, he said.
In 1994, horse trainer Vic Rail and twenty of his horses died…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Pemberton and CSIRO and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2002] AATA 492
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues were whether the CSIRO had made a reasonable search for the requested records and whether the documents contained personal information exempt from disclosure under section 41 of the FOI Act. The court also needed to determine the meaning of 'personal information' and whether the release of such documents was in the public interest.
The court found that the CSIRO had conducted an adequate search for the requested records and was entitled to claim an exemption under section 41 to protect the identity of individuals who supplied samples and the results of those tests. The court referenced previous cases such as Re Cristovao and Secretary, Department of Social Security and Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation to support its interpretation of 'personal information'. The court concluded that being tested for exposure to a dangerous virus forms part of an individual's private medical history, which is an example of personal information. The disclosure of such information must be unreasonable and not in the public interest for the exemption to apply.
The court ultimately found that Dr. Pemberton's allegations were serious, but the CSIRO had provided sufficient material and conducted an adequate search. The release of the documents containing personal information was not in the public interest, and the exemption under section 41 was justified.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Cavanough argued that being tested for exposure to a dangerous virus forms part of an individual's private medical history. An individual's medical history, he suggested, is the quintessential example of personal information. That approach accords with the views of Lockhart J in the Full Federal Court in Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 100 ALR 111. In that case, his Honour said (at 119) "…it would be inappropriate to attempt to define the meaning of 'personal affairs' in some definitive way" (see also Department of Social Security v Dyrenforth (1988) 80 ALR 533). His Honour added that 'personal affairs' (the wording of the section has changed, although little appears to turn on that: see, for example, Re Luton and Child Support Registrar [1999] AATA 808 at para 49) need not be confidential in the sense of being unknown in the wider community in order to attract the exemption. His Honour explained (Colakovski, at 118-119):"I prefer the view that the 'personal affairs' of a person within the meaning of s 41(1) and 12(2) of the FOI Act connotes information which concerns or affects the person as an individual whether it is known to other persons or not. For example, a document may contain statements about a person's private life in the sense of his personal life which is widely known in various sections of the community. Something may be notorious, but its notoriety does not deprive it of the character of information relating to the person's 'personal affairs'. Such a document would therefore prima facie answer the description of one which relates to the 'personal affairs' of a person within s 41(1)." His Honour went on to find (at 119) that names and contact details of persons may constitute personal information within the meaning of s 41. The mere fact that the document contains personal information does not justify its exemption from disclosure, however. The disclosure of the information must be unreasonable. The question of reasonableness in the context of s 41 was considered in Colakovski. Lockhart J said (at 120):"What is 'unreasonable' disclosure of information for purposes of s 41(1) must have as its core public interest considerations. The exemptions necessary for the protection of 'personal affairs' (s 41) and 'business or professional affairs' (s 43) are themselves, in my opinion, public interest considerations. That is to say, it is not in the public interest that the personal or business or professional affairs of persons are necessarily to be disclosed on applications for access to documents. The exemption from disclosure of such information is not to protect private rights, rather it is in furtherance of the public interest that information of this kind is excepted from the general right of public access provided the other conditions mentioned in sections 41 and 43 are satisfied. An examination of the other provisions of Part IV of the Act concerning exempt documents confirms this approach." Heerey J took a similar view of the primacy of the public interest. His Honour explained (at 123):"…it seems to me that attention is directed, amongst other things, to whether or not the proposed disclosure would serve the public interest purpose of the legislation, which is to open to public access information about government which government holds, this being information which in truth is held on behalf of the public. I do not think it is necessary in order to make out the s 41(1) exclusion that there is some particular unfairness, embarrassment or hardship which would enure to a person by reason of the disclosure. Such matters, if present, would doubtless weigh in favour of exclusion. But if the information disclosed were of no demonstrable relevance to the affairs of government and was likely to do no more than excite or satisfy the curiosity of people about the person whose personal affairs were disclosed, I think disclosure would be unreasonable."