Pelemis v The State of Western Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 10 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   PELEMIS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 151

CORAM:   McLURE JA

BUSS JA
MILLER JA

HEARD:   5 AUGUST 2009

DELIVERED          :   25 AUGUST 2009

FILE NO/S:   CACR 29 of 2009

BETWEEN:   RADIVOLE PELEMIS

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :YEATS DCJ

File No  :IND 1255 of 2008

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Information in pre-sentence report contested - Reliance on report without the author being called to give evidence - Whether matter could be remitted for re-sentencing

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 31
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 15, s 20, s 21, s 22

Result:

Extension of time granted
Leave to appeal on amended ground granted
Appeal allowed
Sentence set aside
Matter remitted to District Court for re-sentencing

Category:    D

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     Mr J Mactaggart

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Justine Fisher

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

'HAS' v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 29

Holden v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 50

Royer v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 139

Teakle v The State of Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 188

The State of Western Australia v Wickham [2009] WASCA 137

  1. McLURE JA:  This is an application for an extension of time, an application for leave to appeal and an appeal against sentence. 

  2. The appellant was convicted on his own fast‑track plea of guilty of one count of being in possession of MDMA with intent to sell or supply contrary to s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA). The appellant was in possession of 593 MDMA tablets weighing 149.18 g.

  3. On 11 February 2009, the appellant was sentenced by Yeats DCJ to a term of immediate imprisonment of 3 years and 6 months.  The time for filing a notice of appeal expired on 4 March 2009.  The appeal notice is dated 2 April 2009.  There is no evidence in support of the application for an extension of time.

  4. The only proposed ground of appeal reflects a lack of understanding of the relevant sentencing principles. It is said the sentencing judge erred 'when she did permit defence counsel to cross‑examine the author of a pre-sentence report such that, in all the circumstances, the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive'. This ground conflates two separate and distinct types of error, one express and the other implied. It became apparent in the course of oral submissions that the appellant's claim of manifest excess was contingent upon the court accepting that the express error was made out. However, if an express material error in the sentencing process is established, this court can without more intervene. An error is 'material' if it satisfies the requirement in s…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Pelemis v The State of Western Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] WASCA 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pelemis v The State of Western Australia involved an appeal against a sentence imposed by the District Court of Western Australia. The appellant, Pelemis, contested aspects of a pre-sentence report used by the sentencing judge. The central issue was whether the court could re-sentence the appellant without the author of the report being called to give evidence, and if the appeal could proceed under section 31 of the Criminal Appeals Act.

The court found that the sentencing judge made an express error by relying on the contested pre-sentence report without resolving the conflict between it and the appellant’s evidence. The conflicting information, if resolved in favour of the appellant, would have resulted in a lesser sentence. However, the court lacked the necessary materials to determine an appropriate sentence. The court considered whether it could allow the appeal under section 31(4)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act, which permits an appeal if a different sentence should have been imposed.

Given the inability to re-sentence without the missing evidence, the court concluded that the most appropriate remedy was to set aside the sentence and remit the matter to the District Court for re-sentencing. This decision was consistent with previous interpretations of section 31(4)(a) which allows an appeal if, on the most favourable facts for the appellant, a different sentence should have been imposed. The judges unanimously agreed with the decision to extend the time for appeal, grant leave to appeal on the amended ground, allow the appeal, set aside the sentence, and remit the matter for re-sentencing.

Orders

Orders of the court

Extension of time granted

Leave to appeal on amended ground granted

Appeal allowed

Sentence set aside

Matter remitted to District Court for re-sentencing

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons I have concluded that the sentencing judge made an express error in sentencing the appellant. If the conflict between the disputed statements in the PSR and the appellant's evidence had been resolved in the appellant's favour, his culpability and thus his sentence would have been less. This court is clearly not in a position to re‑sentence as it does not have the necessary materials to do so. That raises the question whether this court can allow the appeal under s 31 of the Criminal Appeals Act. That section materially provides:Appeal against sentence etc, decision on(1)This section applies in the case of an appeal commenced by an offender … against ‑ (a)the sentence imposed or any order made as a result of ‑ (i)a conviction on indictment;… (3)Unless under subsection (4) the Court of Appeal allows the appeal, it must dismiss the appeal.(4)The Court of Appeal may allow the appeal if, in its opinion ‑ (a)in the case of an appeal referred to in subsection (1)(a), a different sentence should have been imposed. There is no difficulty in the application of s 31(4)(a) in the usual case where this court has all the necessary material to itself determine the appropriate sentence. As Owen JA observed in Royer v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 139 [114], as a matter of grammar the phrase 'a different sentence should have been imposed' suggests the appellate court has decided that the sentencing judge ought to have imposed a different sentence from the one that he or she originally pronounced. On the facts in this case the court is unable to make such a determination. The best that can be said is that if the conflict had been resolved in the appellant's favour, a different sentence should have been imposed. Further, if this court heard all the evidence on the matters in dispute and sentenced the appellant he would effectively be deprived of an appeal against that sentence. The most appropriate course to correct the miscarriage of justice in this case is to set aside the sentence and remit the matter to the District Court for re‑sentencing. Section 31(4)(a) has been construed to empower this court to allow an appeal if, in its opinion, on the facts most favourable to an appellant on a rehearing, a different sentence should have been imposed: The State of Western Australia v Wickham [2009] WASCA 137 [33] ‑ [34]. For these reasons, I would extend the time to appeal, grant leave to appeal on the amended ground, allow the appeal, set aside the sentence BUSS JA: I agree with McLure JA. MILLER JA: I agree with McLure JA.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established