FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pegasus Supply Solutions Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs [2024] FCA 450
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 450
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the AAT did not afford procedural fairness to Pegasus when it declined a request to inspect goods at Pegasus's warehouses, particularly as section 37 of the Customs Act provides that one of the means of accounting available to the recipient of a request to account is to have the Collector sight the goods. The court held that the AAT, standing in the shoes of the Collector, should have considered the request to sight the goods, and its failure to do so constituted a denial of procedural fairness and a failure to comply with section 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for determination according to law.
The court's reasoning highlighted the importance of correctly construing statutory provisions and ensuring procedural fairness in administrative law decisions. The court emphasized that the text of a statute should be construed with regard to its context and purpose, and the ordinary meaning of statutory words should be considered alongside the statutory purpose. In this case, the AAT's misconstruction of sections 35A and 37 of the Customs Act led to an incorrect application of the law, resulting in the denial of procedural fairness to Pegasus. The court's decision underscores the necessity for administrative tribunals to carefully consider statutory provisions and the principles of procedural fairness when making decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The order made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 24 November 2020 be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
A. INTRODUCTION
[1]
B. BACKGROUND
[9]
C. THE PROCEEDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
[19]
C.1 Request made at a pre-trial directions hearing
[20]
C.2 Request made on the first day of the hearing
[22]
D. STATUTORY CONTEXT
[24]
E. THE AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL AND THE NOTICE OF CONTENTION
[26]
F. THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECTIONS 35A AND 37 OF THE CUSTOMS ACT
[36]
F.1 Introduction
[36]
F.2 The Tribunal’s reasoning
[36]
F.3 Consideration
[42]
F.4 The consequences of the Tribunal’s misconstruction of sections 35A and 37 of the Customs Act
[60]
G. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND THE TRIBUNAL
[62]
G.1 Introduction
[62]
G.2 The obligation to afford procedural fairness
[64]
G.3 The content of the obligation to afford procedural fairness
[66]
G.4 Failure to afford procedural fairness and to comply with s 39 of the AAT Act
[68]
G.5 Should the Tribunal’s order be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal?
[79]
H. THE REMAINING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL
[81]
H.1 Failure to consider particular evidence
[82]
H.2 The making of serious findings without evidence
[88]
H.3 The remittal by the Tribunal to the Collector
[92]
I. CONCLUSION
[93]
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
More generally, the Tribunal placed considerable emphasis on authorities decided prior to the introduction of ss 36 and 37 into the Customs Act in 2009 – which authorities referred to the breadth of the Collector’s discretion as to how the requisite state of satisfaction is to be reached – and reasoned from the absence of a reference to s 37 or its purpose in the Explanatory Memorandum and the second reading speech concerning the Customs Amendment (Enhanced Border Controls and Other Measures) Bill 2009, which was the genesis of s 37, that the legislature did not intend to effect a substantive alteration to the content or the means of satisfying the accounting obligations relating to customable goods (T[34] to [36]).F.3 Consideration The starting point is the text of s 37, construed having regard to its history, context and purpose: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503 at 519 [39] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ). As Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 at 368 [14]:The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected. A feature of the text of s 37 is that it provides – by dint of the expression “if, and only if” – the only two methods by which a person may account for goods or a part of goods to the satisfaction of a Collector. One is where “the Collector sights the goods”. The other is where “if the Collector is unable to sight the goods – the person satisfies the Collector that the goods have been dealt with in accordance with this Act”. The ordinary meaning of the word “unable” is “not able”, or “incapable”: Films & Casting Temple Pty Ltd v Malla [2013] NSWCA 377 at [100] per McDougall J; with whom Ward JA and Gleeson JA agreed. The concept of willingness is, as a matter of ordinary language, distinct from the concept of ability. Further, as Lindgren J (with whom Burchett J generally agreed and Whitlam J agreed) explained in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Prathapan (1998) 86 FCR 95 at 101: “Clearly as a matter of language, unwillingness denotes choice, and inability, an absence of choice”. The historical context in which s 37 falls for consideration critically includes the Customs Amendment (Enhanced Border Controls and Other Measures)Act 2009 (Cth). The effect of that Act was, relevantly, by operation of s 3 and Sch 4 to that Act to amend the Customs Act by:(1)adding the words “in accordance with section 37” to each of ss 35A(1)(b), (1A)(c) and (1B)(b); and (2)inserting ss 36 and 37.