Pegasus Supply Solutions Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs

Link copied
Case Copied 67 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Pegasus Supply Solutions Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs [2024] FCA 450  

Appeal from: Pegasus Supply Solutions Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs [2020] AATA 4688
File number(s): NSD 1371 of 2020
Judgment of: GOODMAN J
Date of judgment: 1 May 2024
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal remitting a decision concerning the amount payable under a demand issued under s 35A of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) after a failure to satisfactorily account to the Collector of Customs under s 37 of the Customs Act – proper construction of ss 35A and 37 of the Customs Act – s 37 provides the recipient of a request to account with two methods of avoiding a debt and exposure to penalties, one of which is to have the Collector sight the goods the subject of the request to account – Tribunal (standing in the shoes of the Collector) declined a request by the appellant to sight goods – denial of procedural fairness and failure to comply with s 39 of the AAT Act – appeal allowed – remittal to the Tribunal
Legislation:

Constitution, s 75

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 39, 44

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Customs Act 1901 (Cth), ss 35A, 36, 37, 273GA

Customs Amendment (Enhanced Border Controls and Other Measures)Act 2009 (Cth), s 3 and Sch 4

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Ascic v Comcare [2020] FCAFC 105

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 268 CLR 29

Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143; (2003) 131 FCR 28

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] FCA 21; (1979) 24 ALR 307

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Southern Shipping Co Ltd [1962] HCA 20; (1962) 107 CLR 279

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; (1994) 49 FCR 576

Comptroller-General of Customs v Pharm-A-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd  [2020] HCA 2; (2020) 270 CLR 494

Comptroller General of Customs v Zappia [2018] HCA 54; (2018) 265 CLR 416

CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 1; (2015) 255 CLR 514

Disorganized Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia [2023] HCA 22; (2023) 97 ALJR 575

ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46; (2018) 92 ALJR 1003

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503

Films & Casting Temple Pty Ltd v Malla [2013] NSWCA 377

Fletcher v Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 362; (1988) 19 FCR 442

Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16; (2019) 266 CLR 250

Haritos v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Pegasus Supply Solutions Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] FCA 450
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Pegasus Supply Solutions Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs, the appellant, Pegasus Supply Solutions, challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to remit a case concerning the amount payable under a demand issued under section 35A of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) after a failure to satisfactorily account to the Collector of Customs under section 37 of the Customs Act. The central legal issues were whether the AAT failed to afford procedural fairness to Pegasus and whether it misconstrued sections 35A and 37 of the Customs Act.

The court found that the AAT did not afford procedural fairness to Pegasus when it declined a request to inspect goods at Pegasus's warehouses, particularly as section 37 of the Customs Act provides that one of the means of accounting available to the recipient of a request to account is to have the Collector sight the goods. The court held that the AAT, standing in the shoes of the Collector, should have considered the request to sight the goods, and its failure to do so constituted a denial of procedural fairness and a failure to comply with section 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for determination according to law.

The court's reasoning highlighted the importance of correctly construing statutory provisions and ensuring procedural fairness in administrative law decisions. The court emphasized that the text of a statute should be construed with regard to its context and purpose, and the ordinary meaning of statutory words should be considered alongside the statutory purpose. In this case, the AAT's misconstruction of sections 35A and 37 of the Customs Act led to an incorrect application of the law, resulting in the denial of procedural fairness to Pegasus. The court's decision underscores the necessity for administrative tribunals to carefully consider statutory provisions and the principles of procedural fairness when making decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The order made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 24 November 2020 be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

A. INTRODUCTION

[1]

B. BACKGROUND

[9]

C. THE PROCEEDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL

[19]

C.1 Request made at a pre-trial directions hearing

[20]

C.2 Request made on the first day of the hearing

[22]

D. STATUTORY CONTEXT

[24]

E. THE AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL AND THE NOTICE OF CONTENTION

[26]

F. THE CONSTRUCTION OF SECTIONS 35A AND 37 OF THE CUSTOMS ACT

[36]

F.1 Introduction

[36]

F.2 The Tribunal’s reasoning

[36]

F.3 Consideration

[42]

F.4 The consequences of the Tribunal’s misconstruction of sections 35A and 37 of the Customs Act

[60]

G. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND THE TRIBUNAL

[62]

G.1 Introduction

[62]

G.2 The obligation to afford procedural fairness

[64]

G.3 The content of the obligation to afford procedural fairness

[66]

G.4 Failure to afford procedural fairness and to comply with s 39 of the AAT Act

[68]

G.5 Should the Tribunal’s order be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal?

[79]

H. THE REMAINING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL

[81]

H.1 Failure to consider particular evidence

[82]

H.2 The making of serious findings without evidence

[88]

H.3 The remittal by the Tribunal to the Collector

[92]

I. CONCLUSION

[93]

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal should be allowed on the basis that the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness to Pegasus when it declined a request by Pegasus that it inspect goods at Pegasus’s warehouses in circumstances where the Tribunal stood in the shoes of the Collector and s 37 of the Customs Act provided that a means of accounting available to the recipient of a request to account is to have the Collector sight goods the subject of the request to account.B. BACKGROUND Pegasus, which at material times held a warehouse licence under Part V of the Customs Act, operated two warehouses in Marrickville, where it stored goods that were subject to the operation of that Act. The goods relevant to the present proceeding are alcohol and tobacco products which had entered the warehouses prior to mid‑2016. On 12 May 2016, the Collector notified Pegasus of an audit of its operations at the warehouses for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2016. The Collector foreshadowed an onsite inspection, and the examination of relevant records; and requested that Pegasus be ready to show the audit personnel any warehoused goods, and all records relating to the movement of such goods to and from the warehouse. On 20, 21 and 28 June, and 1 July 2016, the Collector’s officers attended Pegasus’s warehouses and, with the assistance of Pegasus personnel, undertook a stock take count of relevant goods. On 10 October 2016, as noted above, the Collector issued the request to account to Pegasus. The request to account was in the following form:Request to account for customable goods…You are hereby requested under section 37 of the Customs Act 1901 to account for the customable goods listed in Appendix “A” Imports and Appendix “B” Exports to the satisfaction of a Collector. Please also complete the attached questionnaire in Appendix “C”.What you need to doTo account for these goods, you need to successfully demonstrate to us that the goods were dealt with in accordance with the Customs Act 1901.By 27 October 2016, provide a written response, including any supporting evidence, to:Australian Taxation Office…If you do not satisfactorily account for the goods by this date, we will send you a demand to pay an amount equal to the customs duty on the goods. The amount of any such demand will be calculated at the duty rate payable on the day of the demand.(emphasis in original) The effect of appendices “A” and “B” to the request to account was described by the Tribunal in the following terms (T[85] to [87]):85.The 9 page “Appendix A” related to imported goods. It detailed the names, and both the anticipated and counted quantities of approximately 109 alcohol products and 138 tobacco products (about 91 of which were owned by Trojan Trading). The details relating to Pegasus owned goods recorded the total, and the net balance, of the N20 and EDN movements, without identifying specific customs declarations, and included at least 11 instances where none of the goods had been located and counted in the course of the June 2016 stock take. In the case of Trojan Trading’s goods, Appendix A typically did identify the relevant N20 entry document for the listed goods, but it also included about 48 instances where none of the listed goods had been counted in the June 2016 stock take.86.In relation to each of the listed products, Appendix A contained comments indicating instances where (a)goods were uncounted:- reconciliation of customs declaration documentation suggested stock had been entered for warehousing under N20 Declarations, and should be held in the warehouse, but none had either been listed in the bond register or located and counted at the time of the stock take “count”.(b)goods were not registered:- stock had been located in the warehouse, but not recorded on the Pegasus bond register.(c)goods were short counted:- there were shortage discrepancies where the stock take “count” tally was less than the balance derived from reconciliation of customs entry and export / entry documentation (ie., N30s and EDNs).(d)the goods register tallies were inaccurate:- the product tallies recorded in the bond register were sometimes greater than, and sometimes less than, the stock take count for the corresponding products.87.Appendix B to the 9 October 2016 request letter dealt with exported goods, where there were issues about the details or currency of an EDN. The items listed in Appendix B apparently invariably listed the identifying EDN number, but frequently did not identify the N20 entry declaration relating to the goods. (emphasis in original)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In view of the conclusion that I have reached as to the failure of the Tribunal to afford procedural fairness to Pegasus, the Tribunal’s order should be set aside and the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal. Accordingly, I deal succinctly below with the remaining questions of law and grounds of appeal that were argued by the parties.H.1 Failure to consider particular evidence Pegasus contended, in essence, that the Tribunal erred by overlooking or failing to consider evidence of Mr William Gary Rudd – a Collector within the meaning of the term in the Customs Act – that he visited Pegasus’s warehouses between 17 June 2019 and 20 June 2019 and sighted goods which were the subject of the demand. The evidence of Mr Rudd was not referred to in the Tribunal’s reasons. However, the absence of a reference to that evidence in the Tribunal’s reasons is of itself insufficient to establish that the Tribunal failed to consider that evidence: ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46; (2018) 92 ALJR 1003 at 1006 [13] (Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ). The effect of Pegasus’s submissions is to invite the Court to draw from the absence of any reference to that evidence in the Tribunal’s reasons an inference that the Tribunal did not consider that evidence. In determining whether, as a matter of inference, the Tribunal considered Mr Rudd’s evidence it is necessary to consider the Tribunal’s reasons, in order to understand why the Tribunal exercised its power in the way that it did: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 446 [47] (Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ). The Tribunal’s reasons are to be read as a whole and fairly, and not with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error, and the Court should not be concerned with looseness in language or unhappy phrasing: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271 to 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ); BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 268 CLR 29 at 45 [38] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2022) 275 CLR 582 at 604 [38] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ). The caution to be observed before drawing an inference that a Tribunal has failed to address a particular matter was explained by a Full Court of this Court (French, Sackville and Hely JJ) in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593 at 604 to 605 ([46] to [47]):46.It is plainly not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the Tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [87]-[97]) and a failure by the Tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Tribunal is not a court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires the expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Each of the applications it decides is, of course, of great importance. Some of its decisions may literally be life and death decisions for the applicant. Nevertheless, it is an administrative body and not a court and its reasons are not to be scrutinised “with an eye keenly attuned to error”. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected of a court of law.47.The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Pegasus expressly abandoned its challenge to the Tribunal’s decision to remit the matter to the Collector for redetermination, in the event that it succeeded on any other ground. As I have determined that Pegasus should succeed, this ground need not be considered further.I. CONCLUSION For the reasons set out above, the order made by the Tribunal should be set aside and the matter remitted to the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

More generally, the Tribunal placed considerable emphasis on authorities decided prior to the introduction of ss 36 and 37 into the Customs Act in 2009 – which authorities referred to the breadth of the Collector’s discretion as to how the requisite state of satisfaction is to be reached – and reasoned from the absence of a reference to s 37 or its purpose in the Explanatory Memorandum and the second reading speech concerning the Customs Amendment (Enhanced Border Controls and Other Measures) Bill 2009, which was the genesis of s 37, that the legislature did not intend to effect a substantive alteration to the content or the means of satisfying the accounting obligations relating to customable goods (T[34] to [36]).F.3 Consideration The starting point is the text of s 37, construed having regard to its history, context and purpose: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503 at 519 [39] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ). As Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ explained in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 at 368 [14]:The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected. A feature of the text of s 37 is that it provides – by dint of the expression “if, and only if” – the only two methods by which a person may account for goods or a part of goods to the satisfaction of a Collector. One is where “the Collector sights the goods”. The other is where “if the Collector is unable to sight the goods – the person satisfies the Collector that the goods have been dealt with in accordance with this Act”. The ordinary meaning of the word “unable” is “not able”, or “incapable”: Films & Casting Temple Pty Ltd v Malla [2013] NSWCA 377 at [100] per McDougall J; with whom Ward JA and Gleeson JA agreed. The concept of willingness is, as a matter of ordinary language, distinct from the concept of ability. Further, as Lindgren J (with whom Burchett J generally agreed and Whitlam J agreed) explained in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Prathapan (1998) 86 FCR 95 at 101: “Clearly as a matter of language, unwillingness denotes choice, and inability, an absence of choice”. The historical context in which s 37 falls for consideration critically includes the Customs Amendment (Enhanced Border Controls and Other Measures)Act 2009 (Cth). The effect of that Act was, relevantly, by operation of s 3 and Sch 4 to that Act to amend the Customs Act by:(1)adding the words “in accordance with section 37” to each of ss 35A(1)(b), (1A)(c) and (1B)(b); and (2)inserting ss 36 and 37.