PECH v Minister for Home Affairs
[2019] FCCA 353
•31 January 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| PECH v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 353 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) Visa Application – review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.375A, 476(1) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2, cl.820.211, 820.221 |
| Cases cited: AQN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 571 |
| Applicant: | TARARITHY PECH |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | PEG 200 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Kendall |
| Hearing date: | 31 January 2019 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 January 2019 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 31 January 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | Appearing in person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Ms A. Tattersall |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
| The Second Respondent: | Submitting appearance, save as to costs |
ORDERS
The Applicant’s application for judicial review is dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5,000.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 200 of 2018
| TARARITHY PECH |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex Tempore; Revised from Transcript)
Introduction
By application filed on 12 April 2018, the Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dated 16 March 2018.
The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs dated 12 May 2015 not to grant the Applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa (the “visa”).
This proceeding is brought pursuant to s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). To obtain relief from this Court, the Applicant must show jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision.
Background
The Applicant lodged an application for the relevant partner visa on 30 June 2014 on the basis of his relationship with his sponsor.
It is not in dispute that the couple were ultimately married.
At the time, Class UK contained only one subclass, subclass 820 (Partner (Temporary)).
The criteria for the grant of this visa are set out in part 820 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the “Regulations”).
The primary criteria must be satisfied by the Applicant. Relevant to this matter, the primary criteria include cl.820.221.
In effect, cl.820.221 requires that at the time of the decision, the Applicant continues to be the spouse or de facto partner of the sponsor, unless certain exceptions can be met. These exceptions include that the sponsor has died, the relationship ceased and the Applicant, or a relevant dependent child, suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner. Further exceptions are that the relationship ceased and the applicant either had custody, joint custody, access to a residence order or contact order in relation to a child with respect of whom the sponsor had been granted joint custody or access or a residence or contact order.
This legislative overview was outlined by the Tribunal ([14] and at [37]-[39]). The Court notes the summary of the Tribunal in that regard and accepts it to be an accurate overview of the legislation required.
As is discussed below, the issue of “family violence” is an issue pertinent to these proceedings. That is not disputed.
On 12 May 2015, the delegate refused to grant the visa. The delegate did so on the basis that, whilst satisfied that the Applicant was the spouse of the sponsor at the time of the application (i.e. the marriage had occurred), the relationship had ceased by the time of the relevant decision and the delegate was not satisfied that the Applicant’s circumstances fell within any of the permitted exceptions where a relationship has ended.
The Tribunal’s Decision
The Applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision to the Tribunal.
A hearing was first held on 2 May 2016. At that time, the Tribunal failed to disclose to the Applicant the existence of a s.375A certificate on the Departmental file.
Consequently, on 31 October 2017, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia quashed the decision of the Tribunal and, by consent, remitted the matter to the Tribunal, directing it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law. It was conceded by the Minister that the Tribunal had erred by not disclosing the existence of the s.375A certificate to the Applicant: CB 154-155.
Following the remittal of the matter to the Tribunal, the Tribunal notified the Applicant of the existence of the certificate, provided the Applicant with a copy of the certificate and advised the Applicant of the substance of the information covered by the certificate: CB 199-200 at [9]-[11] and 203 at [33]-[35].
Another hearing was held on 16 March 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision: CB 198.
The Tribunal’s decision appears at CB 198-204.
The Tribunal began by outlining the background to the matter, including the delegate’s decision.
The Tribunal then (forensically) summarised the evidence before it. In that regard, the Court notes that there were three sets of submissions and oral evidence provided to the Tribunal which the Tribunal relied on. The Court notes, importantly, paragraphs 14 – 27 of the Tribunal’s decision, as follows:
14. The issue for determination by the Tribunal is whether at the time of decision the applicant continues to be sponsored by Ms Tak and if not, whether he falls within certain prescribed circumstances in which an applicant may continue to be considered for the grant of permanent residence, where the relationship with a sponsor has ceased.
15. The relevant history of this matter is as follows:
·On 21 March 2014 the applicant and Ms Tak were married.
·The Department sent the applicant a letter dated 17 March 2015 informing him that it had received information that his relationship with Ms Tak had ended. The applicant was invited to comment on the adverse information it had received and he was informed of the circumstances which may lead to approval of a Partner visa despite a withdrawal of sponsorship.
·The applicant provided a written response dated 20 April 2015 in which he said:
o His relationship with MsTak [sic] was undergoing some difficulties and attempts to rectify the situation would be taken.
o The circumstances which may lead to approval of a Partner visa despite a withdrawal of sponsorship may not be relevant to his situation however he believed certain “Domestic Disturbances of an unnatural kind” affected their relationship when they lived in Ms Tak’s parents’ house. There was a strange presence in the Ms Tak’s parents’ house and a spirit haunted the house.
o In April 2014 he felt pounding and pressing and vibrations and said Ms Tak eventually told him that it was the spirit of the house.
o Ms Tak’s brother told him of his experiences in the house including the appearance and disappearance of a 23 or 24 year old girl in his room and of a shadowy figure in the kitchen. Another of Ms Tak’s brother’s also saw a shadowy figure in June 2014.
o During the period from July to September 2014, Ms Tak, her mother and her niece told him of incidents involving shadows, sounds and ghosts they had felt or seen.
o In October 2014 Ms Tak appeared to be “possessed” and the rest of the family advised him to ignore her.
o On 12 May 2015, the Partner visa application was refused.
16. Prior to the first hearing the Tribunal received a written submission from the applicant’s representative which attached a letter from the applicant dated 22 April 2016 and information from various websites in relation to haunted houses. The letter from the applicant provided the following information:
·The parties’ relationship had not worked out and they were still leading separate lives.
·Ms Tak’s family were concerned about the unnatural occurrences in their house and had attempted to sell the property.
·In Australia some properties are considered to be haunted.
·It was not easy to provide witnesses to support the statements made to the delegate because most people were unwilling to help due to psychological reasons such as fear or trauma.
·Several people had said they experienced a strange feeling in the bathroom and Ms Tak’s family renovated the bathroom when they decided to sell the property in the hope that the problem would be rectified.
·His grandparents are Australian citizens and they live in Perth. His grandfather was very ill and his grandparents required his assistance in the house.
The first hearing
17. The applicant’s oral evidence given to the Tribunal on 2 May 2016 was not materially different to the written evidence provided prior to the hearing. In addition he told the Tribunal:
·When he lived with Ms Tak in her parents’ house the spirit was not present in his bedroom during the day but was present during the night when he and Ms Tak were both in bed.
·He and Ms Tak tried to live together at his grandmother’s house however the spirit “pulled” Ms Tak back to her parents’ house.
·He wanted to stay in Australia to take care of his grandparents. He said because they don’t speak English he can call an ambulance if needed and can take them shopping.
·He considered his relationship with Ms Tak ended in October 2014 or December 2014/January 2015.
18. On 2 May 2016 the Tribunal indicated to the applicant and his representative that the legislative basis for the application was not apparent to the Tribunal. The representative said the legislation referred to domestic violence as one exception to the requirement that a relationship is genuine or continuing and asked the Tribunal to consider “domestic disturbance” on a similar basis. The representative made it clear that the domestic disturbance was about the presence of spirits contention only.
19. The applicant’s grandmother, Mrs Poth, was present during the hearing and was available to give evidence. The applicant said the nature of her evidence would have been in relation to the existence of spirits and haunted houses. The Tribunal decided not to take oral evidence from Mrs Poth.
The second hearing
20. Prior to the second hearing the applicant provided a written submission. The information provided in the written submission was not materially different to the evidence provided prior to and at the first hearing. The applicant did however ask the Tribunal to consider the domestic disturbances of an unnatural kind which he had previously raised to be considered as a form of domestic violence for the purposes of making a decision on his visa.
21. The applicant told the Tribunal that he and Ms Tak have not yet divorced but they remain separated. He said they remain in contact with each other but they have not reconciled.
22. The applicant said the reason things did not work out in his relationship with Ms Tak was because of the spirit in her parents’ house. He said Ms Tak was possessed by the spirit and this caused her to not speak to him and other family members for several hours at times. He said her mood would suddenly change and she would walk away and refuse to speak to him and other family members.
23. The Tribunal referred the applicant to his written submission provided prior to the second hearing and in particular to his request that the Tribunal consider the unnatural disturbances as a form of domestic violence. The applicant told the Tribunal that he was the victim of domestic violence because the spirit had kept annoying him, especially when he slept alone in his room at Ms Tak’s parents’ house. He said as soon as he closed his eyes he would hear someone knocking on the mattress or he would feel pulling the blanket.
24. The applicant told the Tribunal that other members of Ms Tak’s family were also victims of this domestic violence and he gave his former mother-in-law and his former brother-in-law as examples.
25. The Tribunal asked the applicant who he considered the perpetrator of the domestic violence to be. He said he wanted the Tribunal to consider the circumstances as a domestic disturbance rather than domestic violence and did not nominate a perpetrator.
26. The Tribunal asked the applicant whether he considered Ms Tak had committed violence against him. He said she had not been violent towards him.
27. The Tribunal asked the applicant the nature of the evidence his grandmother would provide should she be asked to do so. He said she would give evidence about what happened in Ms Tak’s parents’ house and in particular about the spirit in the house and how it affected his relationship with Ms Tak. The Tribunal decided not to take evidence from Ms Poth because it did not consider her evidence would be relevant to the issue for determination.
Relevantly, as summarised by the Minister, the Tribunal referenced the Applicant’s evidence that he was no longer in a relationship with the sponsor (CB 200 at [15] and 201 at [16]-[17]). On that basis, the Tribunal was satisfied that the Applicant did not “continue to be sponsored for the grant of a visa” and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of cl.820.221(1)(a) of the Regulations.
The Tribunal then noted that the Applicant’s sponsor was still alive, there were no children of the relationship and, importantly, that the Applicant, on his own evidence, did not contend that he had suffered “family violence committed by the sponsor”: CB 203 at [40]-[41].
In this context, the Court notes the Tribunal’s analysis at paragraphs 25 – 26 (CB 202):
25. The Tribunal asked the applicant who he considered the perpetrator of the domestic violence to be. He said he wanted the Tribunal to consider the circumstances as a domestic disturbance rather than domestic violence and did not nominate a perpetrator.
26. The Tribunal asked the applicant whether he considered Ms Tak had committed violence against him. He said she had not been violent towards him.
In the circumstances of the case before it, the Tribunal determined that it did not need to speak to the Applicant’s grandmother or make any determination in relation to the “domestic disturbances” because there was no evidence in relation to “family violence” specific to the provisions in cl.820.211 and the grandmother was not going to provide evidence in relation to violence of that sort. Rather, she was going to speak to the issue of a spiritual disturbance – an issue not covered by the relevant legislation.
In this context, the Court notes the Tribunal’s finding at paragraph 28, the Tribunal’s reference to “spiritual-related beliefs” and why that does not constitute an issue which the Tribunal can address:
28. The Tribunal makes no findings regarding the applicant’s contentions that Ms Tak’s parents’ house was haunted by spirits, and is not required to do so. Whether or not the applicant’s contentions have any basis is not a matter relevant to the Tribunal’s decision. There is no legislative basis which allows the applicant to meet the requirements of subclause 820.221 as a result of these spirit related beliefs.
Overall, the Tribunal found that the Applicant was unable to meet cl.820.221(2) or cl.820.221(3) of the Regulations. The Tribunal noted, relevantly, its assessment of the evidence in this regard at paragraphs 36 – 45 of its decision (CB 203 – 204), as follows:
36. Subclause 820.221(1) sets out the time of decision criteria and requires an applicant to continue to meet the applicable time of application subclause (cl. 820.211(1)(a)) or that the applicant meets the requirements of cl. 820.221(2) or (3) (cl. 820.211(1)(b)).
37. In the present matter the time of application subclause met by the applicant was cl.820.211(2). On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal is satisfied that at the time of decision the applicant does not continue to be sponsored for the grant of the Subclass 820 visa by the sponsoring partner. Accordingly he does not satisfy cl.820.221(1)(a).
38. There are specific circumstances in which an applicant will be eligible for a Subclass 820 visa notwithstanding that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring partner has ceased. They are set out in cl.820.221(2) and cl.820.221(3).
39. The specific circumstances include the death of the sponsor (cl. 820.221(2), that the applicant and/or a dependent child has suffered family violence committed by the sponsor (cl. 820.221(3) (a) and (3) (b) (i)) or that the applicant and the sponsor have joint custody or custody or access by a court to at least one child in respect of who they have shared rights and obligations (cl .820.221(3) (b) (ii)).
40. The Tribunal confirmed at hearing that Ms Tak is still alive and there were no children of the relationship.
41. The applicant did not contend that he had suffered family violence committed by Ms Tak.
42. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has had reasonable opportunity to put forward any submission in respect of the above exceptions. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant meets the requirements of subclauses (2) or (3).
43. As the applicant is unable to meet cl .820.221(2) or cl. 820.221(3) he cannot meet cl.820.221(1)(b).
44. The Tribunal therefore finds that the applicant does not meet subclauses 820.221(1), 820.221(2) and 820.221(3).
45. Given these findings the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant meets cl. 820.221 at the time of decision and does not satisfy the criteria for the grant of the visa.
Proceedings in this Court
On 12 April 2018, the Applicant filed an application in this Court. His grounds of review were:
1. I believe that the Tribunal erred jurisdictionally by not taking into consideration that my marriage relationship was affected by domestic disturbances of an unnatural kind.
2.I have given sufficient evidence that my wife and I were genuinely married but domestic disturbances of the sort outlined to the Tribunal genuinely affected my relationship.
3.The Tribunal erred in its belief that it is not required to make any findings in relation to the domestic disturbances outlined to the Tribunal orally and in written form. This effectively has denied me justice in the Tribunal’s affirmation of the delegate’s decision not to grant me a partner visa to reside in Australia.
Despite orders made by a Registrar of this Court on 20 June 2018, requiring the Applicant to file any written submissions 35 days prior to the hearing (that is, by 27 December 2018), the Applicant did not file written submissions until 25 January 2019. The Court agreed to accept those submissions even though they were filed late. It is noted that Counsel for the Minister, Ms Tattersall, did not object and addressed the submissions orally. The Court had before it an extensive Court Book with all evidence that appeared before the Tribunal and extensive written submissions from the Minister dated 9 January 2019.
The Applicant’s grounds of review are vague and, unfortunately, the written submissions do not specifically address the concerns that seem to be raised in his grounds of review. A failure to particularise provides a basis for each of the Applicant’s grounds of review to be dismissed: AYE16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1424 at [20] per Judge Lucev, approved on appeal in AYE16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 108. See also WZAVW v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35] per Gilmour J; AQN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 571 at [5]-[6] per Logan J (from which an application for special leave was refused: AQN15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] HCASL 183).
The Court notes that more recently, however, the decision of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 (“DQQ17”) at [8], in which His Honour commented that the consequences of a failure to particularise will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case before the Court.
The Court will not dismiss the applicant’s grounds of review because of the applicant’s failure to particularise, noting that the applicant was not legally represented.
The Court asked the Applicant to explain what he believes the Tribunal “did wrong”. In this context, the Court explained to him that the possible categories of jurisdictional error most commonly include the following categories:
a)Where the decision maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (see Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 39 ALD 193 (“Craig”) at [198]).
b)Where the decision maker ignores relevant material (see Craig at [198]).
c)Where the decision maker relies on irrelevant material (see Craig at [198]).
d)Where the decision maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (see SAAP and Another v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Another (2005) 83 ALD 545 at [207]-[208]).
e)Where the decision maker fails to consider the entirely of an applicant’s claims (or “integers” of the claims) as made (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT and Another (2013) 136 ALD 41 at [111]; Salahuddin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 141 at [22]).
f)Where the decision maker shows actual or apprehended bias (see SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; AZAEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 193 at [16]-[17]).
g)Where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (see Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (“SZMDS”) at [131]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44]).
The Applicant was also advised that this Court could not engage in “merits review” of the Tribunal’s decision and what merits review means.
The Court is satisfied that the Applicant understood what was said. He was asked to outline what, in his opinion, he felt the Tribunal did that was wrong. The Applicant did so, as discussed below.
In relation to the Applicant’s grounds of review, the Court notes the Minister’s written submissions (at [19]-[20], [20.1]-[20.4] and [21]):
19 First, it is apparent that the Tribunal had regard to the applicant’s assertion that his relationship with the sponsor had ended as a result of domestic disturbances of an unnatural kind: CB 200-201, [15]-[17]; CB 202, [20]; CB 202, [22]-[28].
20 Second, the finding that the applicant did not meet the relevant criteria for the grant of the visa was the only finding open to it in circumstances where the applicant’s evidence was that:
20.1 he and the sponsor were no longer in a relationship (CB 201, [17]);
20.2 the sponsor had not died (CB 203, [40]);
20.3 the sponsor had not been violent towards him (CB 202, [26]) and
20.4 there were no children of the relationship (CB 203, [40]).
21 Third, any spirit related beliefs and their impact on the relationship were irrelevant to the issues required to be considered under the regulations.
For the reasons that appear below, this Court accepts the Minister’s submissions.
The Applicant was asked to comment in relation to these submissions. He referenced his own written submissions, which the Court has read.
The Court notes that the Applicant, in his submissions, seems to concede that he does not satisfy any of the exceptions in cl.820.221(2) and cl.820.221(3) of the Regulations. Rather, the Applicant stresses that the legislation should be amended or changed so that his particular factual circumstance can be addressed and accommodated. The Court makes no comment in that regard other than to note that, in relation to legislative change, this Court simply is not in a position to assist him.
Unfortunately, the Applicant’s written submissions do not address the issue of jurisdictional error, per se. The Court is, thus, in a position where it must rely on the evidence before it and the oral submissions made by the Applicant.
In those submissions, the Applicant stressed that his marriage was valid and that there were, in fact, 200 people at his wedding. This seems to be a misunderstanding of the Tribunal’s finding and, indeed, what the Tribunal was asked to assess and what it could assess. It was never an issue that the marriage was valid and that it occurred. The issue before the Tribunal was whether there was a genuine relationship at the time of the hearing of the decision. On the Applicant’s own evidence, that relationship had ceased to exist.
The Court has looked at the relevant exceptions. In relation to the assessment provided by the Tribunal, the Court finds that there is no jurisdictional error of any sort on the face of the evidence. The Tribunal’s concerns, as expressed here, are entirely reasonable within the context of the Applicant’s own evidence, particularly his evidence that he was no longer with his wife and, importantly, that no domestic family violence existed in the marriage. He said the haunting was “violence”. The Tribunal disagreed as per the terms of the relevant statute and found that the Regulations did not accommodate his particular situation and did not apply as there was no evidence of “family violence”.
On one level, it is arguable that the Applicant is seeking for the Court to look at the evidence before it and come to a conclusion that differs from the Tribunal’s overall conclusion. This Court cannot do that as this would amount to an impermissible merits review. In that regard, the Court relies on the decision in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 136 ALR 481 at 491:
These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this court. For example, it was said by Brennan J in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin:
The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.
To the extent that the Applicant is saying that he believes that the Tribunal’s decision is “illogical” on the basis of the evidence before it, the Court also disagrees. In that context, the Court notes the decision in SZMDS (at [131]), where Crennan and Bell JJ set out the test for irrationality or illogicality as follows:
[T]he test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or irrational or reasonable lines might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical, rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.
SZMDS sets a very high threshold for findings of irrationality or illogicality and unreasonableness. The Court is also guided by the decision in Gupta v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2017) FCAFC 172 at [34]–[36] and DAO16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2018) FCAFC 1 at [30].
It cannot be said here that the Tribunal’s ultimate finding was not open to it. There is no evidence here that the Tribunal failed to look at all of the evidence before it. Rather, it considered the facts of the case, the legislation it was required to examine and all of the evidence that had been given. All relevant material was examined. No relevant material was ignored. Nor can it be said that procedural fairness was not afforded. This also includes any concern that the Applicant might have had in relation to evidence that might have been given by his grandmother. The Tribunal clearly assessed the grandmother’s evidence and determined that it was not relevant because of the nature of the evidence that was about to be given.
Here, it is clear that the Tribunal weighed the material before it and determined, objectively, that none of the exceptions in the Regulations applied as there was no evidence of family violence. That was clear particularly from the Applicant’s own statements before the Tribunal. To quote the Minister in relation to this matter:
In effect, the Tribunal had no choice but to do what it did. The finding that the Applicant did not meet the relevant criteria for the grant of the visa was the only finding open to it in circumstances where the evidence given by the Applicant was of the sort given by the Applicant in relation to the violence question.
Nor can it be said that there is any issue in relation to procedural fairness. The Applicant was given every opportunity to attend and present evidence. The Applicant was given the time he needed to present his evidence and he did so. The Tribunal in its decision clearly references three sets of written submissions and clearly outlines, in detail, the oral evidence from the Applicant.
On the basis of the above findings, the Court finds that none of the grounds of review in relation to jurisdictional error are sound.
Conclusion
For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that the Applicant has failed to show any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. His application is, accordingly, dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Kendall
Associate:
Date: 19 February 2019
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