FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pawel v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [1999] FCA 1660
INDUSTRIAL LAW - Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – unlawful termination – application dismissed on basis that termination not at initiative of employer – issue of jurisdictional fact – application for leave to appeal – proper approach to be taken by Full Bench
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – prerogative writs – application for certiorari and mandamus – administrative tribunal
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 45, 170CB(1), 170CE(1)
Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth)
Constitution ss 51(i), 51(xx), 51(xxxix), 52(ii), 122Victoria v The Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416, referred to
The King v Blakeley; Ex parte the Association of Architects, Engineers, Surveyors and Draughtsmen of Australia (1950) 82 CLR 54, cited
Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 162 ALR 577, referred to
The Queen v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte W.A. National Football League (1979) 143 CLR 190, cited
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Giudice (1998) 159 ALR 1, referred to
Singer v Berghouse (No 2) (1994) 181 CLR 201, referred to
The King v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407, cited
Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200, applied
Qantas Airways Limited v Christie (1998) 193 CLR 280, cited
Sammartino v Commissioner Foggo [1999] FCA 1231, cited
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, followed
Mann v Ross (1999) 88 FCR 274, considered
Haining v Drake (1998) 87 FCR 248, applied
Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (1990) 170 CLR 267, referred toKARL PAWEL v THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
V 381 of 1999 constituted by SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT POLITES, SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT WATSON AND COMMISSIONER GAY (respectively constituting a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission)
BRANSON, MARSHALL AND DOWSETT JJ
MELBOURNE
10 DECEMBER 1999
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 381 of 1999
REMITTED FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
KARL PAWEL
ApplicantAND:
THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION constituted by SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT POLITES, SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT WATSON AND COMMISSIONER GAY (respectively constituting a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission)
First RespondentFRESHMORE PTY LTD (ACN: 052-013-439)
Second RespondentJUDGES:
BRANSON, MARSHALL AND DOWSETT JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
10 DECEMBER 1999
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.That a writ of certiorari issue to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission removing into this Court and quashing the decision of the Full Bench of the Commission of 4 September 1998 in matter no C33992/98, being an application by the present applicant for leave to appeal pursuant to s 45 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) against a decision of Commissioner Simmonds dated 21 May 1998 in matter no U33326/97.
2.That a writ of mandamus issue to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, directing it to hear and determine matter…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1660
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Full Bench of the AIRC had not erred in refusing leave to appeal. The court found that certain of Commissioner Simmonds' findings were reasonably open to him on the evidence and that his conclusion that Pawel's employment was not terminated in harsh, unjust or unreasonable circumstances was also one reasonably open to him. The court concluded that Simmonds C had not made any error of a character which would justify the grant of leave to appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed Pawel's application for leave to appeal and quashed the decision of the Full Bench of the AIRC.
The court made three orders. First, it issued a writ of certiorari to the AIRC removing into the court and quashing the decision of the Full Bench of the AIRC. Second, it issued a writ of mandamus directing the AIRC to hear and determine Pawel's application for leave to appeal in accordance with law. Third, it remitted the matter to the AIRC.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. That a writ of certiorari issue to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission removing into this Court and quashing the decision of the Full Bench of the Commission of 4 September 1998 in matter no C33992/98, being an application by the present applicant for leave to appeal pursuant to s 45 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) against a decision of Commissioner Simmonds dated 21 May 1998 in matter no U33326/97.
2. That a writ of mandamus issue to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission, directing it to hear and determine matter no C33992/98 in accordance with law.
3. That the matter accordingly be remitted to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON, MARSHALL AND DOWSETT JJ
In considering the question of whether leave to appeal should be granted, the Full Bench identified the “real question” to be whether the employer’s instruction to Mr Pawel to undertake welding duties was a reasonable instruction. The Full Bench concluded that certain of the findings made by Commissioner Simmonds “were reasonably open to him on the evidence” and on that basis found that “his conclusion that he was unable to find that the employment was terminated at the initiative of the respondent was also one reasonably open to him.” The Full Bench concluded:“In short, we do not believe that in his approach to the matter or in his conclusions in relation to the evidence, Simmonds C made any error of a character which would justify the grant of leave to appeal. Accordingly leave to appeal is refused.”Consideration In considering the appropriateness of the approach adopted by the Full Bench of the Commission, it is necessary for consideration to be given to the statutory provisions which founded Mr Pawel’s application to the Commission. In particular, it is necessary for consideration to be given to the nature of the various determinations which such provisions require the Commission to make. As is mentioned above, s 170CE of the Act, the relevant provisions of which are set out above, is found in Subdivision B of Division 3 of Part VIA of the Act. Section 170CB(1) of the Act provides:“Subdivision B applies, in so far as it relates to an application to the Commission for relief in relation to the termination of employment of an employee on the ground that that termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, if the employee concerned was, before the termination:(a)a Commonwealth public sector employee; or(b)a Territory employee; or(c)a Federal award employee who was employed by a constitutional corporation; or(d)a Federal award employee who was a waterside worker, maritime employee or flight crew officer, employed in the course of, or in relation to, trade or commerce between Australia and a place outside Australia, between the States, within a Territory, between a State and a Territory, or between 2 Territories.” Section 170CB(1) of the Act has constitutional significance. It reflects limitations upon the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to confer jurisdiction on the Commission. In Victoria v The Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 517-8 the High Court held that the Commonwealth Parliament could not, in purported implementation of the Termination of Employment Convention, proscribe generally the termination by an employer of an employee’s employment in circumstances where the termination is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Section 170CB(1) is intended to provide a secure constitutional base for the present s 170CE(1)(a) of the Act by limiting its sphere of operation. Section 170CB(1) reveals that s 170CE(1)(a) has not been enacted pursuant to the power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to external affairs (Constitution s 51(xxix)) but pursuant to the powers of the Parliament to make laws with respect to the Commonwealth public service, the government of Territories, foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth, trade and commerce with other countries and among the States and matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by the Constitution in the Parliament or the Government of the Commonwealth (Constitution ss 52(ii), 122, 51(xx), 51(i), 51(xxxix) respectively).